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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO

"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY

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&c. &c. &c.

29569

VOL. X.

LONDON:

COLBURN AND CO., GREAT MARLBOROUGH-STREET.

SOLD ALSO BY

CHAPMAN AND HALL, 193, PICCADILLY.

1851.

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

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HAVING left Valladolid on horseback on the 17th of January, 1809, having reached Burgos on the 18th, and Bayonne on the 19th, where he stopped merely to despatch certain orders, Napoleon took coach there and arrived in the Tuileries on the night of the 22nd, surprising everybody by the promptitude of his appearance. He was not expected back so soon, and his abrupt return naturally excited some perturbation both in France and Europe. The reasons for the one and for the other were the same. He had quitted Valladolid, leaving to his generals, unfortunately divided and feebly held together by Joseph's timid command, the task of completing the conquest of Spain; he had quitted, because from all quarters he had received intelligence that Austria was more actively than ever prosecuting the military preparations she had so often intermitted and renewed during the last two years; because he was furnished from Vienna, Munich, Dresden, and Milan with precise details of those preparations, so as to leave no doubt of the imminence of the danger; because from Constantinople he had reports of the incredible efforts of Austria to make the Turks break with France and to reconcile them with England; and lastly, because it was intimated to him from Paris that there was a strange uneasiness abroad, that intrigues were timidly but visibly urged at the court, that bold language was uttered in the town, and that everywhere, in short, people were uneasy, discontented, ill-disposed, and ill-spoken. In the sudden irritation of his passionate nature he could not help returning immediately to France. Those who both within and without had provoked his return might expect to feel its consequences. Euro-

pean diplomacy prognosticated an explosion. The affrighted court dreaded some act of severity.

Napoleon was, in fact, about to find France such as he had not yet seen her. Though during the ten years of his reign he might have discerned through all her admiration for him some symptoms of distrust and even of disapprobation, he had never known her such as she was now depicted to him by some faithful servants, and as he was about to behold her with his own eyes. This change was entirely owing to the Spanish war, which was beginning to produce its disastrous consequences.

Public opinion had from the first condemned the enterprise itself as likely to augment the heavy burden with which the empire was already encumbered. The form, too, had been censured as nothing but a perfidy towards stupified and helpless princes. But the public had relied on the genius and the good fortune of Napoleon to conquer these new difficulties; they had been dazzled and exalted by the homages rendered to him at Erfurth, and thus they had fluctuated between fear, hope, and gratified pride. Then that very campaign in which it had seemed as though his mere presence sufficed to scatter the levies *en masse* of the Spaniards, had suggested painful reflections. He had been obliged to transfer his valiant armies from the north, where they were still necessary, to the south, whence no serious danger threatened France; to spread them over a devouring soil, where they exhausted themselves in destroying gatherings that nowhere stood their ground, but that revived incessantly in guerillas when they could no longer give battle as regular armies; to force the English to re-embark, who retired defending themselves vigorously, and soon showed themselves again on other points of the coast, displaying as much mobility with their ships as the Spaniards with their legs. The universal cry was, that the Spanish war was a gulf to swallow up much money and many men for a result which was very uncertain, which was no doubt desirable in the age of Louis XIV., but infinitely less important at an epoch when France was mistress of the continent; which, moreover, might very well have been postponed in presence of so many other unfinished enterprises, and which would be sure to render more difficult that general peace which was already so difficult and so justly desired. But what completed the public disapprobation was the very general conviction that Austria, taking advantage of the departure of the French armies for the Peninsula, would seize the opportunity to recommence the war with better chances of success. To this certainty was added the fear that other powers would join her, and that the coalition would again become general. Thus in one fault were seen a thousand faults linked one with another, and importing an interminable series of disastrous consequences. At the same time, reiterated summonses, addressed not only to the class of 1809 but to that of 1810, levied a year in advance, and even to the anterior classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, which had supposed themselves freed from liability, were

beginning to produce universal dissatisfaction in families, and make them feel as a keen affliction that war which, until then, had been only an occasion for triumph, a subject of pride, a means for making proofs of imperial munificence to old soldiers descend into the most sequestered rural districts. The old royalists, partly converted, had hitherto held their peace, and so had the clergy; but now the most inveterate among them found in the events in Spain and Austria, and in the grievances of families, a pretext for bitter invectives. To the clergy, usually united with the royalists in interest and in sentiment, the ill usage dealt to the pope at Rome was quite as offensive as the forced renunciations of Bayonne were to the royalists. Hence many *curés*, both in town and country, indulged in very equivocal language in their pulpits, and under pretext of preaching Christian submission they were beginning to speak to their flocks as the church is used to do in times of persecution.

People expressed themselves in public places with strange freedom, and that restless Paris, so turbulent or so docile by turns, so disparaging or so enthusiastic in its admiration, never wholly obedient or wholly disobedient, and of which one may always expect a return to discretion at the moment when it is most extravagant, or a lapse into folly in the midst of its steadiest mood,—Paris, almost weary of admiring its Emperor, forgetting even the gratitude it owed him for having put down the scaffold and restored the altar, and for having brought back security, wealth, and pleasure; Paris, now liked to note his errors, to criticise his faults, and whilst enjoying the satisfaction of inveighing against its ruler, it was beginning to entertain serious apprehensions for the future, which it translated into sad and often bitter language. The public funds, notwithstanding the continual purchases of the Treasury, fell below eighty francs, the price declared normal by the Emperor for the five per cents., and would have fallen much lower but for the efforts made to keep them up.

Nor was there less uneasiness and frowardness in the governmental circles. The legislative body had remained assembled during the whole time of Napoleon's brief campaign beyond the Pyrenees. It had been occupied, as usual at that period, not with political, but with financial and legislative matters. It had had to discuss the Code of Criminal Instruction, a difficult subject, and one likely to awaken many an old dissension. The oppositionists, then a very small body, which had never been used to muster more than from ten to fifteen votes, had now been able to meet the government with as many as eighty to a hundred negative votes, out of a total of 250 to 280 voters, in the debates on the several articles of that code. Perceiving with his usual clear discernment this revival of the spirit of contradiction, and fearing to excite it by bringing under discussion a code which brought so strongly into collision the old *penchants* of one party for liberty, of another for authority, the archchancellor Cambacérès had warned the Emperor of the danger, and had sought to dissuade him from terminating the Code of Criminal

Instruction in that year. He would rather have chosen a time when members were more inclined to approbation, and when the Emperor should be present, for everybody grew bolder in his absence. But Napoleon, ignoring all obstacles, had resolved that the Code of Criminal Instruction should be discussed that very year, and vehement debates, followed by votes more than usually divided, had astonished reflecting minds, and had contributed to indispose a master who, though absent, was attentive to all that occurred in France.

Encouraged by that absence, certain persons, too, had given free course to their tongues, and to their propensity to intrigue. Two especially had imprudently forgotten the submissiveness to which they had seemed inured for nearly ten years. These were MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand. We have elsewhere made known the characters and the positions during the first year of the consulate of these two very dissimilar and mutually hostile personages, the most important of the day after the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. The latter, though less consulted than formerly, always strove in secret, and without ostentation, to incline Napoleon's mind to moderation and prudence, wherein he succeeded much more seldom than formerly. Events were now beginning to weary and sadden him, and he was daily become more and more disposed to retire into the background, a thing which is always easy to do, for the crowded actors on the world's stage are never loth that others should make room for them. Napoleon alone noticed the fact with regret, for he valued his signal prudence, though often irksome to himself. The public thought, therefore, much less than before of the prince arch-chancellor. MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, on the other hand, liked much to be thought of, and gladly drew upon themselves whatever attention a public could bestow whose thoughts were all but engrossed by Napoleon alone. M. Fouché, who was an excellent minister of police in the early days of the consulate, by reason of his indulgent indifference towards all parties, which led him to deal tenderly with everybody, had yet two serious defects for a minister of police, namely, an anxiety to magnify himself at the expense of the government, and a propensity to meddle in everything. Whenever he mitigated or prevented an act of rigour, he attributed the merit to himself, giving the parties interested to understand, that but for him they would have suffered far more severely from the tyranny of an impetuous master. He affected to curb the headlong zeal of the prefect of police, Dubois, who was personally devoted to the Emperor, ridiculed his alleged discoveries, and treated as chimerical all the plots denounced by that functionary. In this M. Fouché may have been right, but he, too, had his own excesses of zeal. He liked to meddle with everything, in order to appear influential in everything. Recently, in the desire to give himself importance, he had taken upon him to recommend a divorce to the Empress Josephine, believing that he should thus gratify Napoleon by bringing about a sacrifice that the latter ardently desired but durst not demand. This self-seeking and indiscreet in-

terference in what did not concern him had already gone near to bring M. Fouché into disgrace with Napoleon, who naturally did not choose that others should exalt themselves at his expense—should depict him as stern and cruel, and appropriate to themselves the honours of indulgence—should affect incredulity with regard to plots that might compromise the safety of the government—and should presume to take the initiative in weighty state or family matters which concerned himself alone, and the maturity of which he alone could and should determine.

A very recent circumstance had given him an opportunity to signify his sentiments in this respect, and he had done so in an unpleasant way for M. Fouché. A veteran officer, general Malet; an incorrigible conspirator, Servan, formerly minister of war; an ex-conventional, Florent Guyot, an obscure *employé* in the department of public instruction, were compromised in a plot of no very serious nature, but which was so far significant, as it marked a beginning of resistance to absolute power. There was only one thing of moment in the matter, and no one then took note of it, namely, a scheme that had taken hold of general Malet's mind, to avail himself of one of Napoleon's frequent absences in war in order to declare the death of the Emperor and provoke an insurrection. Whether this scheme of general Malet's, which he afterwards put in operation, was then only in the germ, or was ripened in the plot which M. Dubois supposed he had discovered, it is impossible to decide. M. Fouché rallied M. Dubois a good deal, and the latter, feeling that he was supported, treated his superior with little respect. Napoleon having been informed in Spain of this disagreement, and not choosing that the minister of police should play the sceptic in matters of conspiracy, or should perhaps have an opportunity of ingratiating himself with the *corps d'état*, by hushing up an affair in which several of their members were compromised, gave full support to M. Dubois, and ordered that the question should be examined in a council presided over by prince Cambacérès. The prudent arch-chancellor pacified the quarrel by deciding that if there were no grounds for further prosecuting the inquiry, at least there was great attention to be given to these first symptoms of the spirit of revolt. M. Fouché was sharply reprimanded by order of the Emperor. He had just been still more harshly reproved for his proposal of a divorce. This proposal, spontaneously made by the minister of police to the Empress Josephine, had struck the latter as dictated by the Emperor himself, for she could not suppose that a minister would have taken it upon himself to risk such a step without authority, and there had ensued domestic agitations that had strongly affected Napoleon. To insure the stability that was passing away from him, he desired an heir, and began gradually to entertain the project of a divorce. But the nearer he approached the realisation of that project, the more unwilling he was to anticipate the poignant distress it must occasion him. M. Fouché was, therefore, disavowed as regarded this matter, and condemned to

make humiliating excuses to the Empress. M. de Cambacérès was again the intermediary and the pacificator on the occasion. But from thenceforth M. Fouché might perceive the rapid decline of his credit.

As for M. de Talleyrand, his situation was likewise very much compromised, and through his own fault. He had already given many occasions of distrust and displeasure to Napoleon, particularly in quitting the ministry of foreign affairs, in 1807, for the vain motive of becoming a grand dignitary of the empire. He had regained the imperial favour by becoming the active instrument of the policy that had brought about the war in Spain, and Napoleon had by turns taken him to Erfurth or left him in Paris, in order to palliate the offensiveness of that policy in the eyes of European diplomacy. But M. de Talleyrand was of all men the least capable of resisting the opinion of the day, and, the Spanish war having at last incurred universal reprobation, it was now, in his eyes, good for nothing but to be disavowed. Accordingly, he failed not to say that he had not advised it, his grounds for the assertion, no doubt, being, that among the projects proposed he had preferred the dismemberment of Spain to the usurpation of the crown. Once in the way of disavowal, he went back to the affair of the duke d'Enghien, for in that moment of disfavour censure fastened upon all the faults that Napoleon might have committed, and M. de Talleyrand would not own that he was an accomplice in any of them. His imprudence was great, for he could not fail to be soon denounced to the Emperor.

His misdeeds were not confined to some groundless disavowals. He had come to a reconciliation with M. Fouché, after ten years of mutual hatred and vilification. As mutually portrayed, the one was a frivolous intriguer, affecting to direct a diplomacy which went on of itself, aided by victory; the other was a subaltern intriguer, teasing the Emperor with vulgar denunciations, and pompously parading a system of police which the general submissiveness rendered easy, and even useless. M. de Talleyrand despised the vulgarity of M. Fouché; the latter the frivolity of M. de Talleyrand. Nevertheless, as though some serious contingency had required them to forget their old animosities, MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché had become reconciled, and publicly visited each other, to everybody's surprise. The real motive of their reconciliation was, that circumstances might soon occur in which their union would be necessary to both. It was strongly surmised, in fact, that Napoleon would end by encountering the poniard of a fanatic in Spain, or a cannon-ball in Austria. MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand being well inclined to believe in the fall of an order of things which they no longer liked, seemed to share the belief that Napoleon's person would infallibly succumb before a peril braved too often. "What will become of us?—what shall we do?" were the questions they had asked themselves, and for which they had certainly found no answer. But the persons who had brought them together,

exaggerating, as usual, the semi-confidential communications between the two principals, alleged that a whole plan of government had been prepared by them in case Napoleon should fall. There was even ascribed to them the idea of transmitting the imperial crown to Murat, who, before repairing to Naples, had exhaled in Paris his dissatisfaction at not being king of Spain.

These idle rumours would be unworthy the notice of history did they not indicate a commencing change in men's minds, a result of Napoleon's faults, and if they had not had the unfortunate effect of keeping foreigners awake to what was passing in Paris, and persuading them that Napoleon's authority was much weakened, that the nation was disgusted with his policy, that his means of action were much diminished, and that the moment was come to declare war against him again. It is certain that the state of men's minds in Paris at that time acted strongly on the minds of Europe generally, and contributed extremely to rekindle war, as we shall presently see.

Napoleon knew before he left Valladolid a great part of what we have just related, and it filled him with an anger he could not contain. On the eve of his departure, hearing that the grenadiers of the old guard were murmuring because they were left in Spain, at least for a while, and learning too that general Legendre, one of the signers of the capitulation of Baylen, was to appear before him in a review he was about to hold, Napoleon gave way to impulses of anger, which deeply afflicted those who witnessed them. Traversing on foot the ranks of his grenadiers, who presented arms to him, whether it was he had heard some murmur, or that he had recognised one of the malcontents, he snatched the musket out of the man's hands, and pulling him to him, "Wretch!" he said, "you deserve that I should have you shot, and I have almost a mind to do so." Then flinging him back into the ranks, and addressing his comrades, "Ha!" said he, "I know it; you want to get back to Paris, to your mistresses and your amusements, but I will keep you under arms till you are eighty years old!" Afterwards, perceiving general Legendre, he seized his hand and said: "That hand, general—that hand; how is it that it did not wither up in signing the capitulation of Baylen?" The unfortunate general seemed overwhelmed with shame, and every one bent before the inflamed visage of Napoleon, whilst secretly blaming these inordinate displays of violence.

He then set out for Paris where he arrived, as we have said, with a rapidity equal to his passion. He had received many letters in Spain, for he had numerous correspondents who communicated to him all they thought, and all they picked up.* He had learned much on the road, rapidly as he travelled; he had given a great

* Among these correspondents were MM. Fiévée and de Montlosier, and Madame de Genlis, who wrote, not to denounce, but to give their opinions respecting what they saw daily passing before them. M. Fiévée's correspondence has been printed, and proves that Napoleon allowed many things, and of the boldest sort, to be said to him.

number of orders; in particular he had ordered the arrest of an abbé Anglade, in the Gironde, who had spoken ill of the conscription in the pulpit, and he had summoned to Paris the archbishop of Bordeaux, who had tolerated the abbé Anglade's sermons. He had scarcely entered the Tuileries when he was beset with thousands of reports on what had occurred in his absence. Highly exaggerated as they were, they could not deceive a mind so sagacious as his; but an angry man readily listens to what coincides with his present passion, and Napoleon believed, or appeared to believe, many unlikely things. He sent for the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and repeated to him with extreme animation all that had been reported to him, inveighing especially against MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, who, he maintained, could not have made up their quarrel without very bad intentions. The arch-chancellor strove to calm him, but with imperfect success. What incensed Napoleon was, that the offending persons disposed of the succession to his crown as though his death was certain; what incensed him still more was, the disavowal of his policy by a man who had been its accomplice, and who had been taken to Erfurth and left in Paris to be its apologist. Hence the main force of the storm was destined to fall on the head of M. de Talleyrand, M. Fouché having already been sharply reprimanded in writing, and not having yet filled up the measure of his offences sufficiently to be sacrificed.

In a council of ministers, at which were present several great dignitaries then in Paris, Napoleon complained of everything and everybody, for there was nothing with which he was not dissatisfied. At that period, acquaintance with public opinion and its rapid shiftings had become lost amid the tranquillity of the empire; the notion prevailed that a government could direct it at pleasure, and in this respect a puerile faith was reposed in the influence of the police because it had absolute authority over the public journals. Napoleon complained that the public mind had been allowed to fall into error respecting the events of the day; that it had been suffered to interpret his last signally successful campaign as one abounding in disasters; and he threw out several acrimonious hints against those who had spoken and acted as if at the close of an expiring reign and the eve of a new one. Above all, he complained with extreme bitterness of those who, in order to disavow him, did not hesitate to disavow themselves; till losing all self-control, striding across the council-hall, and addressing M. de Talleyrand, who was standing with his back to a chimney, he said to him, with the most vehement gesticulations, "And you dare to assert, sir, that you had nothing to do with the death of the duke d'Enghien! You dare to assert that you had nothing to do with the war in Spain! Nothing to do with the death of the duke d'Enghien! Do you forget, then, that you advised me to it in writing? Nothing to do with the war in Spain! Do you forget, then, that you advised me in your letters to recommence the policy of Louis XIV.? Do you forget that you were the intermediary in all the negotiations that terminated in the

war now pending?" Then passing and repassing before M. de Talleyrand, and each time addressing him in the most galling terms, accompanied with menacing gestures, he froze all the beholders with dismay, and left those who loved him full of sorrow at that debasement of the twofold dignity of the throne and of genius.* Napoleon then dismissed the council, vexed at what he had done, and having superadded to his dissatisfaction at others the dissatisfaction he could not but feel with himself.

M. de Talleyrand was seized with a sort of fit on his return home. His physicians had some fears for his life, for he had by no means the courage to bear up against disgrace, though he endured it with seeming impassibility. Napoleon, meanwhile, was too angry to content himself with words, and chose that the public should learn by an official manifestation that M. de Talleyrand had incurred his displeasure. That personage, who loved all kinds of honour, had aspired to be grand-chamberlain whilst he discharged the important functions of minister for foreign affairs. Having become a grand dignitary, he had remained grand-chamberlain, and enjoyed the pecuniary emoluments of both dignities on the day after the stormy scene in the council of ministers. Napoleon made him resign the grand-chamberlain's key, and transmitted it to M. de Montesquiou, one of the most deservedly honoured members of the legislative body, who, besides his more recent distinctions, possessed others of ancient date of a kind much valued by Napoleon when conjoined with intrinsic worth. M. de Talleyrand, however, perceiving that he had been too hasty in behaving towards the imperial government as towards a government undone, sought to redeem by extreme submission the imprudent language imputed to him. Two or three days afterwards he appeared at a grand *fête* at the Tuileries in the most brilliant costume, bowing profoundly before the master whose outrages he had endured, as if he would almost make him and, above all, the public doubt all that had happened. In this he succeeded to a certain extent, for Napoleon, disarmed by this cunning submissiveness, detected the cunning, but accepted the humility.

After having silenced the babbling tongues about him without silencing the public whom he could not disgrace, Napoleon immediately applied himself to the important matters that had brought him to Paris. These included both diplomacy and war, which were to be pushed on simultaneously, for a rupture with Austria was imminent. That power which we have seen so agitated for three years, oscillating between the desire to avenge her humiliation and the fear of fresh disasters; continually seeking a favourable opportunity, having found one as she thought in Napoleon's bold movement towards the north in 1807, but having let it pass unused, and bitterly regretting that neglect; thinking she perceived a new opportunity in the Spanish war, hesitating for six months whether to avail herself of it or not, and amidst her hesitations

* The veracious and honourable duke de Gaëte, who was an eye-witness of this scene, related it to me in minute detail some days before his death.

arming with incessant activity, that power seemed at last on the point of declaring war. All she did throughout her own empire in the way of preparations, and among the cabinets of Europe in the way of political intrigue, revealed an almost matured resolution. The approach of spring, moreover, gave reason to think that there remained at most but two or three months for preparing to confront her. It was necessary to make haste, therefore, to avoid being taken unprepared; but it was in the act of well employing time and of creating by a miracle what did not exist, that Napoleon excelled; of this he afforded a new and striking proof on the present occasion.

With his military preparations he had to conduct simultaneously the negotiations which should either prevent war or render its result more certain by means of well-arranged alliances. He had some months previously, on his first return from Spain, explained himself so fully and explicitly to the ambassador of Austria, and yet to so little purpose, that it seemed superfluous and undignified to repeat the process. Napoleon was of opinion that an extreme reserve with regard to that ambassador, an extreme openness with regard to the others, and a display of great administrative activity, were the proper course to be pursued, and the only way to excite salutary reflections at Vienna, if it were yet possible. He was, therefore, polite, but cold and chary of words with M. de Metternich; and he enjoined the whole imperial family, in which M. de Metternich was usually well received, to imitate his own reserve. On the other hand, he was much more open with the other ambassadors, avowed to them the reason of his return to Paris, and declared to them that it was Austria and her armaments that brought him back so soon, that he might respond to them by armaments no less formidable.

"It seems," he said to them all, "that it is the waters of Lethe, not those of the Danube that flow past Vienna, and that they have forgotten the lessons of experience there. They want fresh ones; they shall have them, and this time they shall be terrible, I promise you. I do not desire war; I have no interest in it, and all Europe is witness that all my efforts and my whole attention were directed towards the field of battle which England has selected, that is to say, Spain. Austria, which saved the English in 1805 when I was about to cross the straits of Calais, has saved them once more by stopping me when I was about to pursue them to Corunna. She shall pay dearly for this new diversion in their favour. Either she shall disarm instantly, or she shall have to sustain a war of destruction. If she disarms in such a manner as to leave no doubt on my mind as to her future intentions, I will myself sheathe my sword, for I have no wish to draw it except in Spain against the English; otherwise the conflict shall be immediate and decisive, and such that England shall for the future have no allies on the continent."

The Emperor produced on all who heard him the effect he intended; for he was sincere in his language, and spoke the truth in

asserting that he did not desire war, but that he would wage it tremendously if forced into it again. Even though believing he had drawn it upon himself, by his conduct in Spain, every one thought that Austria was committing a great imprudence, and trembled for the sake of Europe at the consequences to which that court was about to expose itself.

For one reason or another, M. de Romanzoff, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, had been detained in France since the interview at Erfurth. As we have already stated, that minister had repaired to Paris in Napoleon's suite, to watch personally over the negotiations which were to be begun with England, and to hasten as much as possible the acquisition of the Danubian provinces. The negotiation with England having broken down, M. de Romanzoff might have returned to St. Petersburg, where his young master awaited him impatiently; but he remained for the purpose of promoting their common desires. Not more than two months, he had been told in Paris, would be requisite to terminate matters in Spain, bring back king Joseph to Madrid, recrown him there, drive the English into the sea, and inspire Europe with thoughts of resignation instead of resistance to the plans laid down at Erfurth. It might, therefore, be really expedient to put off still longer the overtures which were to be made at Constantinople, relatively to Moldavia and Wallachia; for if Napoleon was completely victorious, Austria would not dare to engage in a fresh conflict, England would find no allies on the continent, the Turks would find none either on land or sea, and Russia would, without a general conflagration of Europe, acquire the Danubian provinces as she was on the point of acquiring Finland, by means of a merely local war of very limited importance. These considerations were worth some further patience; for it was, after all, only a delay of two months, and that interval M. de Romanzoff thought it advisable to spend in the vicinity of the events whereof he awaited the issue. Meanwhile he carefully observed the colossus of which Russia was for a time the accomplice rather than the ally; he studied its strength, whether transient or durable; tried to ascertain the validity of the thousand phrases repeated at St. Petersburg by the echoes of European diplomacy, and lived amidst a cloud of incense, for the imperial court had received orders to be lavish of attention to the ex-minister of Catherine and actual minister of Alexander: orders, of all others, the most easily obeyed at Paris, where people delight so much in pleasing, when they do not make it a point of honour to be offensive.

M. de Romanzoff passed his two months in Paris, and then three, hardly noticing the lapse of time, and striving to allay the impatience of his master, who was continually urging him to return. Napoleon had so far kept his word that in two months he had scattered the Spanish armies like dust, driven the English out of the Peninsula, and brought back his brother to Madrid, yet without making it in the least degree probable that the Spanish war was

done and ended. This was not quite what he had hoped, nor what he had promised, for no chance now remained of realising the great acquisitions projected in the East by a simple act of volition. Napoleon saw M. de Romanzoff immediately after his arrival; exerted upon him his usual power of fascination; expressed his indignation at seeing Austria interfere again at the decisive moment to snatch the English out of his hands; for, if he had himself pursued them, not one of them, he said, would have escaped, and he avowed his determination to take signal vengeance for such a breach of faith (alluding to the promises made him at the bivouac of Urschitz). Confident as he was in the immense means that remained to him, he behaved towards the representative of Russia neither braggingly nor obsequiously, but firmly and positively, and peremptorily required from him the accomplishment of the engagements entered into at Erfurth,—like a man who was ready again to wage war with all who should break their word with him, whether by attacking him or by not aiding him after they had engaged so to do. "If your emperor had followed my advice at Erfurth," said he to M. de Romanzoff, "we should now be in a different position. Instead of mere exhortations, we should have held out serious threats, and Austria would have disarmed. But we have talked instead of acting, and we are about, perhaps, to have war—I, for what I want to accomplish in Spain; you, for what you want to terminate in Finland and begin in Turkey. In any case, I rely on your master's word. He promised that if the cabinet of Vienna should become the aggressor, he would place an army at my disposal. Let him fulfil his promise; let him proceed more actively with the war in Finland, so as to have done with that petty power which holds him in check; let him have an army on the Danube sufficient to baffle all the intrigues of the confederate English and Austrians with the Turks; and let him have an imposing army on the Upper Vistula, in order to let Austria see that we are both in earnest. As for me, I will assemble on the Danube and the Po 300 thousand French and 100 thousand Germans, and probably their presence will oblige Austria to leave us at peace, which I should prefer for your sake and my own, for in that case you will have Moldavia and Wallachia almost without a blow, and I shall be able to complete the subjection of the Peninsula without fresh expenditure. If these demonstrations are not sufficient—if we must employ force, then we will crush for ever the resistance made to our common projects. But an alliance for peace and for war, a thorough, effective alliance, that is what I have promised, what has been promised me, and what I expect."

To this language, which was that of a man by no means intimidated, Napoleon added every gracious art necessary to complete the effect he wished to produce, and he obtained the most satisfactory declarations from M. de Romanzoff. The latter did not conceal the dissatisfaction he felt at seeing Russia exposed to a collision with Austria; the difficulty of the projected acquisitions

in the East augmented by all the difficulties which the French policy might encounter in the West; in a word, the circle of the strife extending instead of contracting; but he admitted the necessity of holding strong language at Vienna to prevent the necessity of acting; he agreed that to make words effectual certain demonstrations should be superadded to them; and he promised in consequence, that Russia should have an army in Gallicia, ready to take the route by Prague or by Olmutz, both of which lead to Vienna.

Satisfied with M. de Romanzoff, and wishing to prove to him how much he desired peace and not war, Napoleon suggested the idea of offering to Austria the double guarantee of France and Russia for the conservation of its actual dominions, a guarantee which ought completely to reassure that power, if the fears were genuine which it professed for itself in consequence of the events of Bayonne. In fact, if Austria was actuated by nothing else than personal fears, the idea of this guarantee was of a nature to satisfy her and prevent a war. M. de Romanzoff undertook to communicate the proposal promptly both to his own court and to that of Vienna.

To these interviews with M. de Romanzoff, Napoleon added a thousand delicate attentions, such as taking him himself to the manufactories of the Gobelins, Sèvres, and Versailles, showing him the marvels of his empire, and every moment presenting rich specimens of them, so that, as M. de Romanzoff himself said, he durst no longer praise anything in the presence of so magnificent a sovereign, for fear of bringing upon himself fresh presents of tapestries, porcelains, and costly arms.

Having done what was proper by the ambassador of his principal ally, Napoleon addressed himself to the ministers of the Confederation of the Rhine. He told them, and wrote to the same effect to their masters, the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Westphalia, and the dukes of Baden, Hesse, and Wurtzburg, that he did not wish to put them to premature expense by requiring the immediate assemblage of their troops, but that he desired them to prepare for it, since there was a new prospect of hostilities; that to prevent war if there was yet time, or to secure its prosperous issue if it was inevitable, they must put themselves in a condition to meet force with force; that for himself he was about to assemble 150 thousand French and Italians on the Po, 150 thousand French on the Upper Danube, that he counted on 100 thousand Germans, and that with these 400 thousand men he would prevent war or would render it decisive, and would for ever secure his allies from the claims which Austria threatened to assert against the German powers that had formerly been dependent on or subject to her empire. He wrote in particular to the king of Bavaria and to the king of Saxony, and formally demanded of them the assemblage of a first moiety of their troops round Munich, Dresden, and Warsaw. Distrusting Prussia, which might

be tempted to imitate Austria and seek the reparation of her misfortunes in an act of despair, he notified to her that if she levied a single man beyond the 42 thousand authorised by the secret conventions, he would forthwith declare war against her. He commissioned Russia to make known at Koenigsberg that the least act of hostility would be the occasion of a new contest which would be mortal to the one side or the other, if there was any symptom of a wish to join Austria.

To these manifestations, which were the more significant from the fact that they rested on precautions no less real than apparent, Napoleon added certain movements of his own troops, which were but the consequence of arrangements already conceived and prescribed at Valladolid. These arrangements were on a scale proportioned to the occasion, and to the mass of enemies known and unknown that were soon to be encountered.

Whilst he was in Spain, Napoleon had watched with extreme solicitude over the execution of his orders, foreseeing that Austria, though intimidated by the presence of the two emperors at Erfurth, and though not quite prepared, nor as yet sufficiently excited to lose all prudence, would nevertheless break out at last in the spring. These orders related principally to the levy of the two conscriptions authorised by the senate in 1808. The one comprised the conscripts of 1810, levied according to custom one year in advance, but who could not be called out before the 1st of January, 1809, and were only liable to serve in the interior during that year. It was a levy of 80 thousand men, but this amount not being adequate to Napoleon's plans, he had thought of recurring to the anterior classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, which had never furnished more than 80 thousand men each. The hundred and fifteen departments of that period contained a population not much greater than of the eighty-six of the present day, for whereas the present class amounts to 320 thousand young men of an age fit for service, the hundred and fifteen departments furnished 377 thousand. Napoleon held that 80 thousand out of 377 thousand was too small a portion, and that he might call out 100 thousand, or rather more than one-fourth of the whole. It was certainly a thing that might be done, provided it was not repeated too often; for there is no population that would not soon perish, if a fourth part of the adult males were abstracted from it every year.

He resolved then to fix at 100 thousand the annual contribution of the population, so that applying the rule retrospectively he might demand a supplement of 20 thousand men from each of the anterior classes. This plan had the advantage of procuring him much more robust recruits than those furnished by the ordinary levies, since they would be of the ages of 20, 21, 22, and 23 years, whilst those of 1810 were only aged about 18. But it was a serious inconvenience to drag from their homes men who might have deemed themselves exempt from all service, the class to which they belonged having already furnished its contingent. Accordingly, to diminish

the unpleasant effect of this measure, he took care to subjoin to the decision of the senate an assurance that the classes anterior to 1806 should be definitively exempted, thus leaving the unfortunate classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, liable to fresh demands. Further to allay discontent, the men who had married in the interval were not to be called out; but these mitigations of the new measure did little towards soothing the displeasure of the people, who saw the price of substitutes rising every day, and calls succeeding calls without interruption. However, except in some departments of the west, where a small number of malcontents recommenced the life of *chouans*, but were promptly put down, obedience was general, and the men once enrolled adopted forthwith the vigorous spirit of the French army.

Employment was to be found for this vast levy of young men, and no one, it is confessed, ever equalled Napoleon in the arts of organisation. He had two years previously decreed the formation of all regiments in five battalions. Various causes had hitherto prevented the complete execution of this measure; first, the number of conscripts, which was not yet sufficient, and would not become so until the arrival of the 160 thousand men lately called out; next, the expense, which could not but be great; lastly, the movements of the regiments, which were continually in transit, and passed their time, when they were not fighting, in marching from the Vistula to the Tagus, or from the Po to the Ebro. For these reasons, most of the regiments were still engaged in forming the fourth battalion, and scarcely any had formed the fifth.

After having sent into Spain three corps of the grand army—those of marshal Victor (formerly the first), of marshal Mortier (formerly the fifth), and of marshal Ney (formerly the sixth), and the troops that had formed marshal Lefebvre's division, besides all the dragoons; after having detached from the army of Italy wherewith to treble the army of Catalonia, Napoleon had considerably weakened his forces in Germany, particularly in old soldiers. He had still under the denomination of the army of the Rhine, commanded by marshal Davout, six divisions of infantry, the fine Morand, Friant, and Gudin divisions (which had formerly formed the third division); the excellent St. Hilaire division, which had made part of marshal Soult's division; Oudinot's famous division of grenadiers and voltigeurs, then at Hanau; Dupas' division of two regiments only, constituting with the Dutch troops the guard of the Hanse Towns; fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, an incomparable force, which no infantry in Europe had ever withstood; seventeen regiments of light cavalry, the best drilled in the world, and a formidable artillery. To these forces were to be added the Carra St. Cyr and the Legrand divisions, which had belonged to marshal Soult's corps, and were now marching for Paris to make a demonstration towards the camp of Boulogne; and the Boudet and Molitor divisions, long left on the Elbe as a nucleus of the army of reserve in 1807, and afterwards removed to Lyons with a view to the constantly projected but never executed expedition against Sicily. These fine troops, the best in

Europe, formed, however, a total of not more than 110 thousand men, after deducting all the soldiers who were incapacitated for service by age or wounds. It was not with such forces, however excellent the soldiers composing them, that Napoleon could reduce the house of Austria. This was the way in which he had resolved to increase them.

The army of the Rhine comprehended twenty regiments of infantry, which had received their three war battalions since the formation of the fourth battalions had been begun. When they had four, as was about to be the case, this army of the Rhine would present 84 battalions and 70 thousand infantry soldiers. Oudinot's corps, consisting of companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs, originally detached from the regiments that did not form part of the army in active service, was a body formed for reasons which had ceased to operate. Now that the regiments were acting so far from their depôts, and had battalions at the same time in Germany, Italy, and Spain, it was becoming difficult to detach picked companies to such great distances. Having, moreover, in the imperial guard a choice corps which was developing itself more and more every day, Napoleon was no longer reduced to seek for one by combining companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs. It occurred to him, therefore, merely to convert Oudinot's corps into an assemblage of fourth battalions, which should be detached from the regiments to which they belonged. At first, as the body comprised twenty companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers belonging to marshal Davout's army, he sent them to him to serve as a nucleus for the formation of the fourth battalions in that army. The fusilier companies were to march as soon as possible from the depôts in Alsace, Lorraine, and Flanders, to complete these fourth battalions.—The other choice companies of Oudinot's corps belonged to thirty-six regiments which had passed from Germany into Spain. Napoleon resolved, likewise, to make of these companies the nucleus of thirty-six fourth battalions, which were for the present to serve in Germany, whither they were all marched, the intention being to move them afterwards into Spain, if their regiments continued to serve there. The fusilier companies were to be sent successively to them from the depôts in the north and east of France. They were to be distributed into three divisions of twelve battalions each, and to consist, after their formation, of 30 thousand infantry.

The four divisions of Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor, comprised twelve regiments, then of three war battalions, and soon to be raised to four, which would make forty-eight battalions more, and give about 30 thousand men. The army of the Rhine might thus amount to 130 thousand foot, without counting the 5 thousand of Dupas' division. Out of the vast recruiting decreed, Napoleon resolved to take what was requisite to raise all the cavalry regiments to 11 hundred men each, which could not fail to ensure them 9 hundred fighting men. The fourteen regiments of cuirassiers reckoned 11 or 12 thousand men in the ranks; he hoped, by taking all that the depôts could supply, to raise them to 13 or 14 thousand

present under arms. He proposed to extend to 14 or 15 thousand men the effective of the seventeen regiments of light cavalry. He resolved also to turn to account the twenty-four regiments of dragoons employed in Spain. Such a force was more than sufficient for the requirements of that war, especially considering what would be wanted for the other wars in preparation in the north of Europe. The depôts, moreover, swarmed with dragoons quite trained, whom Napoleon deemed more useful at that moment in Germany than in Spain. He therefore ordered the *état-major* of Madrid to send back to the depôt the skeleton of the third war squadron, draughting into the first two squadrons the men capable of serving, whereby the active force in Spain would be left at nearly the same effective amount, and skeleton squadrons would be formed for incorporating the cavalry soldiers already trained in the depôts. His scheme was to draught successively from the depôts into the third and fourth squadrons all the trained men, and to send them into Germany, forming with these forty-eight squadrons twelve provisional regiments of dragoons of four squadrons each. The dragoon depôts were spread over Languedoc, Guyenne, Poitou, and Anjou. Napoleon hoped thus to have first three thousand, then six, and up to twelve thousand dragoons, as soon as the conscription should have furnished the necessary *personnel*. He might consequently reckon on having before two months 13 or 14 thousand cuirassiers, 14 thousand hussars and chasseurs, and 3 thousand dragoons,—that is, together, 30 thousand cavalry, almost all veterans. With 130 thousand infantry, 30 thousand cavalry, 20 thousand artillery, 5 thousand of Dupas' division, and 15 or 20 thousand of the guard, he would have 200 thousand French in Germany, who, with 100 thousand German and Polish auxiliaries, would give him 300 thousand fighting men on the Danube. The same system of formation would procure him 100 thousand in Italy.

Napoleon had in Italy twelve regiments of infantry, the formation of which by four battalions was completed, and that by five begun. They were parted into four divisions of three regiments, and of 9 to 10 thousand men each, including artillery. The first of these divisions was at Udine, the second at Treviso, the third at Mantua, and the fourth at Bologna. The skeletons of the third battalions of the eight regiments composing the army of Dalmatia had been recalled after the men fit for active service had been draughted into the first two battalions, whereby the effective force appointed to guard that remote province was not sensibly weakened. By means of these eight skeleton battalions, and by the creation of eight others resulting from the new organisation, there was formed at Padua a fifth division of sixteen battalions of infantry, at least 12 thousand strong. In consequence of the rest enjoyed by the army of Italy, and the care Napoleon had taken to secure it its share of each conscription, the new formations were more advanced there than elsewhere. Lastly, with some third and fourth battalions of the army of Naples, and two whole regiments taken from Naples itself,

there had been formed a fine division, which guarded the Roman States, under the command of general Miollis. Napoleon had ordered Murat, now king of the Two Sicilies, to distribute his army into two divisions, the one placed between Naples and Reggio, the other between Naples and Rome, so that the latter, by detaching a brigade to Rome upon occasion, might render Miollis' division free and disposable. The English were sufficiently occupied in Spain, and were likely to be sufficiently occupied on the German coasts if the war was rekindled in the north, to prevent their making any very formidable attempts upon the south of Italy. There could therefore be brought into the field six divisions, comprising about 58 thousand infantry, all old soldiers who had not fought for a long while, and had a strong desire to resume their old trade. Five regiments of dragoons, and five of hussars and chasseurs, which was enough in Italy, afforded by drawing upon the depôts a further supply of 8 thousand cavalry. With 6 thousand artillery, there was a certainty of having an army of 72 thousand Frenchmen. Adding to these 18 or 20 thousand Italians, and, in case of a march forwards, 10 thousand Frenchmen from Dalmatia, there would be a total of about 100 thousand men in Italy who might be easily moved into Germany. Combining all these forces, it would be possible to assail the house of Austria with 400 thousand fighting men.

These formations, ordered whilst Napoleon was commanding in Spain, that is to say, in November and December, 1808, and accelerated in January, 1809, during his stay in Valladolid, were prosecuted with more activity than ever since his return to Paris. But though the men were arriving rapidly in the depôts, other parts of the organisation were less advanced. Much was still wanting as regarded clothing, which is always slow of production; training, which cannot be extemporised; and the formation of new skeletons of battalions, which demanded a great number of capable officers and non-commissioned officers. It is true, that in the latter respect our old armies afforded Napoleon great resources. But it was necessary to collect together the scattered elements of these various creations, and the nature of things does not yield absolute submission even to genius. One man may employ time better than others, but none can dispense with it altogether. Two or three months, which were yet hoped for, were not sufficient, and it was to be feared that all would not be ready if the war broke out too soon.

The depôts had furnished all their disposable *personnel* to the divisions of the army of the Rhine, and to the Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor divisions, so that these had their three war battalions quite complete in veteran soldiers, and in young ones tolerably well trained. The organisation of the fourth battalion did not proceed in as satisfactory a manner. It was on this occasion that Napoleon made excellent use of the imperial guard. He had resolved to entrust to that body 10 thousand conscripts of 1810, and 6 or 7 thousand of the anterior classes, that it might employ its leisure in training them; which had the double advantage of keeping the guard itself from the dangers of idleness, and of

propagating the excellent spirit with which it was animated. It was at Versailles, Paris, and the adjacent places that it applied itself to this useful task, whilst the younger soldiers composing it were serving in Spain under the Emperor's eyes. A part of the conscripts intended for it having arrived, had been converted in a few months into soldiers, who were on a par with the veterans in point of training and *tenue*. Selecting the strongest and most advanced of these recruits, Napoleon formed them into companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs, which he sent to Oudinot's corps, to supply the place of the twenty-two companies already given back to the army of the Rhine. He likewise sent other companies of these grenadiers and voltigeurs to the depôts of the army of the Rhine, to facilitate the organisation of its fourth battalions. At the same time he urged forward the arrival and the training of the conscripts still due to the guard, that they might serve to recruit those corps that might not find adequate resources in their own depôts. He despatched general Mathieu Dumas, an intelligent, exact, and active staff-officer, to visit quickly all the depôts of the south, east, and north, from Marseilles, Grenoble, Lyons and Strasburg, to Mayence and Cologne, and send off from them, without waiting for the orders of the minister of war, the fusilier companies that were ready, and that were to complete the fourth battalions. He further prescribed that as soon as the 80 thousand conscripts of 1810 began to arrive in the depôts, the regiments which were in a more advanced state of progress should proceed to the formation of their 5th battalions, so as to prepare the elements of a strong reserve in the interior and on the coasts.

The cavalry depôts abounded in men and horses, for Napoleon had not ceased to devote attention and funds to that end. He sent off more than 3 thousand cuirassiers, chasseurs, and hussars, and made the necessary arrangements for the prompt departure of as many more. He gave orders to purchase 12 thousand artillery horses, and to prepare all the furniture of that arm. He ordered general Lauriston to add to the artillery of the guard a reserve of 48 pieces, and to purchase 1800 horses in Alsace, where the guard was to receive them *en route*, with the *matériel* of that reserve. Lastly, as though he had divined the great works he would have to execute on the islands of the Danube, and foreseeing certainly the part which that vast river would play in the approaching war, he ordered that besides the usual implements of the engineer corps, there should be laid in an extraordinary store of 50 thousand pick-axes and shovels, which were to follow the army in artillery waggons. Moreover, he joined with the guard a battalion of 1200 sailors from Boulogne. As he had special need of officers and non-commissioned officers for the new battalions, independently of the officers taken from the guard, he took 300 from St. Cyr. He even directed that from each lyceum in which there were only youths not exceeding 16 or 17 years of age, there should be taken for this purpose ten of the most precocious and the most adapted

for war. Not content with this, he ordered M. Fouché to make out a census of the old noble families that were living in retirement on their estates, and having no connexion with the government, in order to enrol their sons in spite of them, and send them to the military schools. If they complain, he wrote, you shall say that *such is my good pleasure;* and he added a less extravagant reason—namely, that it was not right that, in consequence of pernicious divisions, certain families should be allowed to withdraw themselves from the efforts which the present generation was making for the glory and grandeur of the future generation.* He also took some non-commissioned officers from the velites and fusiliers of the guard, troops already well inured to war, though younger than the rest of the same body. Having much cavalry, and intending to make great use of it against the Austrian infantry, he recalled from Spain the two officers of that arm he most esteemed, generals Montbrun and Lasalle. He recalled from Aragon marshal Lannes, who had just terminated the siege of Saragossa, and he summoned to him marshal Massena.

Without wishing yet to commit any act of hostility, for hitherto Austria had abstained from such, he thought it expedient to draw his troops nearer to the probable theatre of war, for the double purpose of afterwards moving them without fatigue towards the points of concentration, and of giving Austria a significant hint, which might, perhaps, inspire her with more prudent reflections. In consequence, he ordered the Dupas division to quit the borders of the Baltic, and approach Magdeburg. He made Saxo-Polish troops replace all the French detachments he had still in Dantzig, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. He ordered marshal Davout to proceed from Saxony to Franconia, to fix his head-quarters at Wurtzburg, and to direct one of his divisions to Bayreuth. General Oudinot was to transfer himself, with the consent of the king of Bavaria, from Hanau to Augsburg; the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions were to march from the environs of Paris to those of Metz; and the Boudet and Molitor divisions were to advance from Lyons to Strasburg. These three rallying-points—Wurtzburg, Augsburg,

* The following extraordinary letter was among those he wrote when he was beginning, in Spain, to give orders for his first preparations:

"*To the Minister of Police.*

"Benavente, Dec. 31, 1808.

"I am informed that some families of emigrants withdraw their children from the conscription, and keep them in a mischievous and culpable idleness. It is a fact that the ancient and wealthy families which *are not in the system* are against it. I desire that you have a list made out of ten of those principal families in each department, and of fifty for Paris, making known the age, fortune, and quality of each member. My intention is to make a decree for sending to the military school of St. Cyr the young men belonging to these families aged more than sixteen and less than eighteen. If any objection is made, no other answer is to be given than that such is my good pleasure. The future generation must not suffer for the rancours and petty passions of the present. If you ask information of the prefects, do it in this sense."

and Strasburg—could not but be highly significant for Austria. He instructed prince Eugene not to encamp his troops, the season not yet being sufficiently advanced, but to assemble successively in the Friuli his first four divisions, his artillery *matériel*, and his cavalry, so as to be able in twenty-four hours to bring out 50 thousand men in order of battle. He renewed the order to Murat to call back his forces to Rome, so as to leave the Miollis division free to act. He directed that all the forts in Italy should be put in a state of defence, and that the most important works at Osopo, Palma Nova, Venice, Mantua, and Alessandria, should be completed. Lastly, he sent orders to general Marmont, who commanded in Dalmatia, to concentrate his army on Zara, leaving only the necessary garrisons at the mouths of the Cattaro and some interesting points; to form at Zara an intrenched camp, which should be provisioned for a year, and thus prepare to hold out for several months against considerable forces, or to advance and join the army of Italy.

To these military manifestations, which yet did not constitute acts of hostility, Napoleon added a diplomatic manifestation. He ordered general Andréossy, ambassador at Vienna, to quit that capital, not after demanding his passports, which would have looked like a declaration of war, but on the pretext of a *congé* formerly solicited and recently obtained. The dissembled recal afforded Napoleon, in addition to the advantage of signifying his dissatisfaction, that of removing a cause of irritation between the two cabinets, for general Andréossy felt for the court of Austria a hatred which the latter reciprocated. He had orders to pass through all the Austrian cantonments on his way back, so that, on his return, he might be able to give precise information as to the military resources of the enemy. These very active and provident arrangements prove that Napoleon took as much pains to prevent war as to prepare for it. Unfortunately, his ambitious policy had imposed war upon him as a fatal necessity after it had ceased to be for him an object of predilection.

All these vast preparations demanded commensurate financial means. We have already made the painful remark that the Spanish war, whilst disastrously diminishing the military forces of France by their dispersion, diminished in an equal degree her financial resources by the excessive multiplication of the causes of expense; though the twofold creation of the service-chest and the army treasury secured Napoleon from all present want of funds, resources were nevertheless beginning to be less abundant, and it was easy to foresee an end to them and to the power of France, if a stop was not soon put to this course of exorbitant enterprises.

The budgets promised to be liquidated without deficit, being kept rigorously within the assigned limits, which was easily done, since the only possible excesses arising out of the state of war were covered by drafts on the army treasury. The expenditure of the years anterior to 1800, defrayed by means of bills on the *caisse*

d'amortissement (which, as the reader recollects, were but a slow alienation of the national property), was advancing to a final settlement. That of 1806 and 1807, fixed at 730 millions for the general expenses, and 40 for the departmental, which with the costs of collection made a total of 890 or 900 millions, inspired no uneasiness for its liquidation, especially as the armies beyond the Rhine continued to be paid out of the contributions of Prussia. It was not the same as to the expenditure of 1808. This had been fixed, like the others, at 730 millions for general expenses, and 40 for special; the army of the Rhine being still paid down to the 31st December by the war contributions. But if the balance between requirements and resources was not broken by the augmentation of outgoings, it was about to be affected by a decline in receipts, till then unknown in Napoleon's reign. This decline was not manifested in the indirect taxes, or in the proceeds of registration, which would have indicated a diminution of prosperity in the interior, but in the customs, and in the alienations of the national domains. The foreign imports had been remarkably reduced by the Milan decree, and there was reason to fear a diminution of 25 millions in that branch of the public revenue. The overdue instalments of the purchasers of national property, and the slackening in the sales of that property, had caused a further falling off of 15 millions in the receipts of the treasury. A surplus expected but not realised in 1807, and debited at 3 or 4 millions in the estimates of 1808, and a deficiency of some millions on the post-office, on powder and saltpetre, and on the outport receipts of Italy, raised the total deficit for 1808, the year just ended, to 47 or 48 millions.

This was but a part of the difficulty. The expenses of the preceding years 1807, 1806, 1805, might be considered as balanced, on counting at their cash value certain securities, valid enough, but of remote realisation, such as the debt of the united merchants, which was still 18 or 19 millions; the loan for Spain, which had been computed as 25 millions, and had not yet been carried beyond 7 or 8; the deposits in Bayonne, which were to have been only provisional, and were becoming permanent, like the war beyond the Pyrenees; and the advances for the Russian and Neapolitan troops, which amounted to 2 or 3 millions, and had not been repaid. These, together, made a total of receipts in arrear of 40 millions, and formed, with the 47 or 48 millions of deficient receipts in 1808, a general deficit of about 90 millions. It is further to be observed that to put the several corps in a condition to make their preparations for war, it had been necessary to pay them sooner than usual the sums remaining due for 1808, whence it resulted that in this department the receipts were in arrear, whilst the expenditure was in advance, which doubled the difficulty.

The difficulty, however, was not serious as regarded the present, for the service-chest and the army-chest were quite adequate to meet it. The reader, doubtless, recollects the creation of the service-chest and its principle, devised by M. Mollieu. Instead of em-

ploying the bank or a financial company to discount the obligations of the receivers-general, the treasury had instituted a chest, into which the receivers-general were required to put their funds as soon as they received them, even when according to the regulations they did not owe them yet.* They were paid interest up to the day when the tax represented by those funds was due, the amount being carried to their credit in the settlement of their obligations. This operation rendered it unnecessary to discount those obligations. However, as the estimated receipts of every year included more than 125 millions, which were payable only in the four or five first months of the following year, there would have been no way of avoiding the necessity of discounting a part of that amount, had not Napoleon lent to the treasury, in the name of the army-chest, 84 millions deposited therein. Thus with the advances obtained from the receivers-general, and with the 84 millions lent to it, the treasury had been able to abstain from discounting the 125 millions of obligations falling due the following year, and these were locked up and did not make their appearance in the market. For want of these obligations to employ their money, capitalists were now obliged to purchase the bills of the service-chest, which thus took the place of the former, much more cheaply for the treasury, with more order, and, above all, with the advantage of realising the proceeds of the taxes as soon as they were in the receivers' hands. The treasury was thus put in possession of considerable resources, and was not embarrassed to meet a present deficiency of some 50 or 100 millions. If, for instance, it held securities for 40 millions of income not yet realised for the anterior budgets, it could obtain their amount by paying interest during the time of the advance. If the income of 1808 fell short by 48 or 50 millions, the treasury could provide for that deficiency, provided a corresponding value was quickly created. And this Napoleon did. He caused to be selected from the national domains of France, Piedmont, and Tuscany, property to the amount of 50 millions, the sale of which, slowly effected by the *caisse d'amortissement*, should serve to cover the amount by which the receipts of 1808 fell short of the estimates. Thus the service-chest furnished the immediate, and the national property of France and Italy the ultimate, means of supplying the deficit of 1808.

The budget of 1809 was fixed at the same figure as those of

* This may appear obscure to readers who do not recollect what has been said in the preceding volumes, or who are unacquainted with finance. They will ask how it can be that receivers have to pay over funds which are not yet due by them. The paradox is thus explained:—The direct taxes, which form the chief branch of the public revenue in France, are due by months, that is to say, by twelfths. Now some of the taxes are paid six months or a year in advance, whilst others remain in arrear. The receivers set off the advances against the arrears, and the more to interest them in the prompt collection of the taxes, they are themselves allowed, under the name of bonifications, two or three months' delay, during which time they have the use of the money in their hands.

1808 and 1807, that is to say, 730 millions for general expenses, and 40 millions for departmental, making 890 millions with the costs of collection. But in 1807 and 1808, the troops beyond the Rhine had been paid by the army treasury. It was necessary that the same should be done in 1809. We have already said that all the expenses of our armies in Germany having been paid to December 31, 1808, there remained about 300 millions in the army treasury, 20 millions of which were derived from the Austrian war, and 280 millions from the Prussian. Napoleon had subsequently reduced the contribution of Prussia by 20 millions, at the request of the emperor Alexander: sundry rectifications had raised other items of income, and the total assets of the army treasury in January, 1809, were found to be 292 millions, of which 84 millions were lent to the treasury, and were represented by a like sum in *rentes*, 10 millions in excellent immovable property accruing from the liquidation of the united merchants, 24 millions in specie or in tangible value, 64 millions falling due in the year 1809, 106 millions in the years 1810 and 1811, and 3 or 4 millions lent to various persons whom Napoleon had desired to aid. The whole of these consisted of values either well placed, or current, or proximately recoverable. The 24 millions in specie or tangible value, added to the 64 millions falling due in 1809, made up an immediate resource of 88 millions, respecting which Napoleon had already made certain arrangements. He had recently bestowed 4 millions in gifts to certain corps, paid 1 million to the towns that had fêted the army, lent 800 thousand francs to the town of Bordeaux, 2,500,000 to the vine-growers of La Gironde, 8 millions to the city of Paris, and 1 million to the university. He had, moreover, applied 1 million in aid of maritime expeditions, 10 millions to purchasing the Canal du Midi, 12 millions to the purchase of *rentes* for the purpose of upholding the market, and some hundred thousand francs to the creation of burses in the lyceums. Most of these were very good investments, which, whilst doing service to the establishments to which they had been applied, or to the credit of the treasury, enabled Napoleon to recompense certain members of the army as he desired. Nevertheless, they reduced the resources of the year to some 50 millions; enough, it is true, for the immediate requirements of the war. In continuing to pay the troops in Germany out of the army-chest, Napoleon would have required 77 millions for the year (22 of which were to be levied from the vast magazines that remained to us, and 55 in cash), if he would not see a deficit in the budget of 1809, which had quite enough to do to pay the armies of Spain and Italy. Napoleon contented himself with taking three months' subsistence for the army of the Rhine, which required about 20 millions. These 20 millions, all he took immediately from the army-chest, with the sums advanced upon the ordinary budget to the several corps, were sufficient to put them all at their ease. Napoleon thought that in the first months of 1809 his troops would be on the enemy's territory, where they would live gratuitously on the fat of

the land, that victory would re-open the source of the war contributions, and would amply indemnify the army-chest for the sacrifices he was obliged to impose on it. Of the 12 millions of *rentes* (in capital) recently purchased, he immediately distributed 7 millions among his generals, wishing to procure them some gratifications before leading them again to death.

Thus, as we have said, the budget of 1808 was to have its diminished receipts compensated for by a sale of national property; the budget of 1809 was, like the preceding budgets, to be relieved by the army-chest of the expense of the troops in Germany; and, as for current facilities until certain values should have been realised, these were to be immediately provided by the service-chest, which enjoyed the greatest credit, and by the army-chest, which was incessantly receiving the produce of the war contributions. But if there was no actual want of money as yet, it was, nevertheless, full time to stop, if the finances were not to be ruined as well as the army. Napoleon himself thought so; for, whilst he suspended the loan assented to for Spain, and left his brother to depend solely on the wool revenues of Castile and on some hundred thousand francs worth of silver-plate converted into money, he interrupted the purchases of *rentes* which had been effected from August to December, 1808, with the intention of keeping up the price. There had been purchased 46 millions, of which 10 were on account of the Bank, 11 for the service-chest, 25 for the *caisse d'amortissement* (acting for itself and for the army). Independently of these sums, the Bank had already purchased 16 millions on its own account, which gave for the purchases of this year a total of 62 millions. No less an effort could, in defiance of the events in Spain, have maintained the *rente* at the price of 80, which Napoleon called the normal price in his reign—a painful admission to make, for after Tilsit and before Bayonne the price had been 94. Austrian events having given a fresh shock to credit, and there being a strong tendency to a fall of the funds in January, 1809, Napoleon would not abridge his disposable resources to stop a decline of credit which was now imputable, not to the Spanish war, but to the Austrian. The ill effect, he maintained, would fall not on him, but on perjured powers, which, when vanquished, promised him peace, and the moment they were recovered from their defeat recommenced war. He was mistaken, for everybody connected the Austrian with the Spanish war; and he became responsible for the present decline of credit which he refused to resist, as well as for the former one which had stopped by force of money. His best justification, after all, would be found in victory, and he neglected nothing, indeed, to make it certain; for, as we have seen, conscripts were flocking into the dépôts, new battalions were becoming organised, and the principal armies were advancing to the Upper Palatinate, Bavaria, and Friuli, to oblige Austria to reflect, or to crush her if from threats she advanced to action.

Unfortunately that power had gone too far to retract. Never had

she been able to console herself for having lost in fifteen years (from 1792 to 1806) the Low Countries, the imperial possessions of Swabia, the Milanese, the Venetian States, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and lastly, the imperial crown itself! Perhaps, if the world had settled down, as in 1713 after the treaty of Utrecht, and in 1815 after that of Vienna, she would have submitted to necessity amidst the general immobility. But whilst Napoleon was daily exposing the fate of Europe and his own to new hazards, she could not help thrilling at every chance that presented itself; and though the Austrian was an oligarchical court that had little communication with its subjects, it now felt no emotion which was not shared by the Austrian people; for nations, whatever be the form of their institutions, never remain indifferent to the fate of their government. It is not necessary they should possess free institutions in order to have pride and ambition. So, when passing over Prussia to rush upon Poland, Napoleon had left half the continent behind him, Austria had thought of profiting by the opportunity to assail him in the rear. But this scheme was so formidable, so much remained to be done before the Austrian armies should have been reconstituted, and Napoleon had been so prompt, that the opportunity had been lost almost as soon as seen, and had left behind it in Vienna a vexation, almost a despair, that had vented itself both in words and actions. That first opportunity, offered by fortune and lost by the hesitations of prudence, had excited an universal clamour against the men whose importunate discretion was said to spoil every chance for action. It was only the restoration of Braunau to Austria by Napoleon that quieted her for a while. She did, in fact, remain quiet for some months, from the end of 1807 to the beginning of 1808, on seeing Napoleon carrying elsewhere his incessant activity, Russia uniting with him, and England giving offence to all Europe by her barbarous expedition against Copenhagen, and she even signified to the latter power the necessity of remaining quiet at least for a time. But this resignation had been of short duration. The attack upon the crown of Spain had aroused all her passions. Her indignation was sincere, and she showed it the more freely because Napoleon for the first time seemed embarrassed. His sudden return in August after the events of Bayonne, his sharp speeches to M. de Metternich, and his intimacy with the emperor of Russia at Erfurth, had restrained, but not calmed, Austria, which had, on the contrary, been still more vexed and disquieted at the silence observed towards her. Without being informed of it, she had guessed that the Danubian provinces were the price paid by Napoleon at Erfurth for the Russian alliance, and this had not contributed to appease her. Lastly, the campaign Napoleon had just made in Spain had rather exalted than cooled her ardour. No doubt he had beaten the Spanish army, which was not a miracle, having set his best armies against undisciplined peasants; but these peasants were rather dispersed than vanquished, and were certainly not reduced to submission. As for the English, Napoleon had forced them to re-em-

bark without destroying them; and if the capitulation of Baylen had done great damage to the *prestige* of France, the weak pursuit of the English by marshal Soult was doing it no less at the present moment. The English were extolled with strange exaggeration, and people repeated in Vienna, with as much satisfaction as they could have done in London, that at last the French had found on the continent an army capable of withstanding them. Nor were other grounds of encouragement wanting in Vienna. The spirit of all Germany was said to be exasperated against the French, who, not content with having so often beaten and humbled it, had been too long occupying and devouring it. It is certain, that the presence of our troops in the conquered countries, added to the bitter recollections of the last years, produced an extraordinary feeling of irritation. The odious act of Bayonne, and the difficulties encountered in Spain, had, both in Germany and Austria, aroused indignation and revived hope. Men felt not only detestation but contempt for a perfidy which had not succeeded, and they declared that Europe should take vengeance for it. Prussia, deprived of her king, who, since the fatal field of Jena, lived obscurely at Koenigsberg, not venturing to show himself to subjects to whom he had nothing to announce but the necessity of paying another 120 millions of taxes,—Prussia was ready to revolt to a man, from the peasant to the noble, from Koenigsberg to Magdeburg. The retirement of the French, which was regarded, not as the faithful execution of a treaty, but as a consequence of their disasters in Spain, gained for them a contempt which was equally unjust and imprudent. The last detachments of our troops issuing from the fortresses of the Oder, and escorting our magazines to their place of assemblage at Magdeburg, were everywhere insulted, and could not pass through the villages without being pelted with mud and stones. The French durst hardly show themselves in Berlin, whilst an officer of partisans, a major Schill, who had incommoded the besiegers of Dantzig by some marauding attacks, was welcomed and fêted with enthusiasm, as if a partisan officer could pluck Germany out of Napoleon's hands.

The feelings manifested in the countries allied to France were not much better. In Saxony, though we had given back Poland and a royal title to the reigning house, they said that the king betrayed the cause of Germany for his personal interests, and crushed down his subjects with taxes and levies of troops; for the conscription was already a European sore, which was everywhere imputed to Napoleon. In Westphalia, where a young prince of the Bonaparte family had supplanted the old house of Hesse, and presented by his gorgeous magnificence, much more than by the wisdom of his government, a striking contrast with the hereditary stinginess of that house, the popular hatred was most keen. In Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, where the sovereigns had gained aggrandisements of titles and territories, which the people paid for in lodgments of troops, conscriptions, and taxes, they loudly complained of princes

who sacrificed their country to their personal ambition. Among all these peoples the feeling of national independence awoke that of liberty, and they talked of freeing themselves from princes who could not free themselves from Napoleon. Some bolder spirits went still further, and were already forming secret societies to deliver Europe from her oppressor, and the nations from their absolute governments. An alarming phenomenon was even beginning to appear. Certain persons, fired by the general flame, were secretly cherishing, as will presently be seen, the horrible thought of assassinating Napoleon, whom the admiration and the hatred of the world represented to all eyes as the sole cause of the events of the age.

The Tyrol, in which there subsisted an old hereditary attachment for the house of Austria, impatiently supported the yoke of Bavaria. The people boldly displayed this impatience, assembled in the houses of the innkeepers the chief persons of those mountains as of those of Switzerland, and made preparations for a general rising on the first outbreak of hostilities. Numerous emissaries went every day to report these tidings at Vienna, without concealing their purpose from the Bavarian authorities, who were too weak to make themselves respected. All this, it is true, was but a first impulse of the heart among all the German peoples. There needed many sufferings yet on their part, and many disasters on that of the French, before they dared to rise against the so-called Attila. But if Austria raised her banner and was successful in the first instance, there was no doubt but that the insurrection might soon become general throughout Germany, and that our allies themselves would make a prompt defection.

These facts, reported of course with much exaggeration at Vienna, put the climax to the enthusiasm already felt there. The time was come at last, it was said, for acting, and for no longer letting slip opportunities, as had been done in 1807; if that afforded by the Spanish insurrection was neglected, it could never be recalled; the moment was the more favourable since Napoleon had not 80 thousand men in Germany (which was very incorrect), dispersed from the Baltic to the Upper Danube; since Italy itself was stripped of troops for Catalonia; since the conscription was raised with the greatest difficulty, and since the tyrant of Europe was also that of France, for, in order to keep down his fellow-citizens, become first his subjects and then his slaves, he had been obliged to smite even his best servants (meaning MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché, who were said to be in disgrace). It was said, moreover, that Napoleon could not supply the place of the veteran troops sent across the Pyrenees; that he would be taken in an unprovided condition; that his German allies would fall off from him at the first signal, the German states hostile to him would rise with enthusiasm, and Prussia to the last man; that the emperor Alexander himself, entangled in a policy which the Russian nation condemned, would, on the first occasion of adverse fortune, abandon an alliance which he had adopted because it was powerful, not because it was agreeable to

him; that in a word it was only necessary to give the signal, for all the world would obey it, and those who gave it would thus be the authors of the general salvation.

Besides these very plausible reasons, others much less cogent were adduced, in order to swell the excitement. It was alleged that not merely for the sake of retrieving the national fortunes, but for self-preservation, it was necessary to act with all speed, for the ruin of the house of Hapsburg was decreed after that of the house of Bourbon. The Emperor of the French, it was said, intended to supersede all the old dynasties by others of his own creation. In confirmation of this belief, extraordinary stress was laid upon an insignificant expression which Napoleon had addressed to the Spaniards under the walls of Madrid, when he had displayed a sort of affectation in making them await his brother Joseph's return. "If you do not like him for your king," he said, "I do not want to force him upon you. I have another throne to give him; and as for you, I will treat you as a conquered country." This was a phrase suggested by circumstances, and uttered only to produce a momentary effect; and if Napoleon really thought of any other throne than that of Spain, at the very most it was that of Naples, which Joseph had again pressed for, and of which Murat, who was then ill, had not yet taken possession. But according to the upper classes of Viennese society, that other throne was neither more nor less than the throne of Austria. Nothing remained then but to submit and perish ignominiously, or to resist and perish, it might be, but perish gloriously. There was no other alternative, and the choice must be made, and made quickly. In short, Vienna in 1809, was just like Berlin in 1806.

The impulse thus springing from accumulated resentments coincided with another arising out of the armaments themselves, which had been so much advanced since the end of 1808, that it was absolutely necessary either to use them or abandon them. After her military disasters, Austria had naturally applied herself to discover the cause and apply the remedy. In consequence of this she had entrusted the ministry of war to the archduke Charles, with the understanding that he was to reorganise the Austrian army in such a manner that, on the first favourable opportunity, the contest with France might be renewed with greater chance of success. Applying himself conscientiously to the task imposed on him, the prince began by completing the third battalions of the several regiments, so as to make them fit to become war battalions. He then created the landwehr, a sort of militia, formed in imitation of our national guard. It was composed of the nobles and the people; the former acting as officers, the latter as privates, and was required to assemble at certain points to form *corps de réserve*. This landwehr was diligently trained, and every Sunday the young men of all classes, wearing uniform and moustachios, and affecting the military air which Napoleon obliged all Europe to assume, manœuvred in the towns of Austria, under the direction of old nobles who had long retired from the army, but were ready to return to it for the

service of a dynasty to which they were devoted. Strangers who had formerly known Austria so calm, so averse to war, could scarcely recognise her in the agitated and martial people they now beheld. The diet of Hungary had just been held, and had voted the rising, as it was called—a sort of levy *en masse*, consisting chiefly of cavalry, and independent of the regular regiments which are recruited with Hungarian soldiers. Besides this rising, the diet had voted extraordinary funds to defray its expenses. No pains, therefore, were any longer taken to conceal these preparations, and they were even hurried forward as for a war which was to break out in the spring; that is to say, in two or three months.

Austria reckoned on about 300 thousand active troops, whom the archduke Charles had spent three years in organising, 200 thousand men of the reserve, including the most military portion of the landwehr, and a force which it was impossible to estimate, namely, that of the Hungarian rising. Regiments had already begun to assemble in Carinthia, Upper Austria, and Bohemia, in order to the formation of *corps d'armée*. Artillery traversed the streets of Vienna in broad day, preceded and followed by regiments of infantry, amidst the acclamations of the people of the capital. Considerable works were carried on in those fortresses which were to enter into the plan of operations. These were that of the Enns, at the confluence of the Danube and the Ens, with a bridge at Mauthausen to cover Vienna against an invasion from Bavaria; that of Brusk on the Muhr, to cover Vienna from an invasion from Italy; and that of Comorn, to serve as a great fortress depôt in case of retreat into Hungary —an indication that it was intended to fight to the last, and not regard the war as ended after the loss of Vienna. That city was publicly put in a state of defence, and cannons were mounted on the ramparts.

The language adopted by the Austrians to explain to themselves and others such conduct as this in the midst of peace was, that the destruction of the house of Spain presaged an approaching attack on that of Austria; that it was necessary, therefore, to be in readiness for the month of March or April; that they should be attacked infallibly, and with such a certainty they ought not to let themselves be anticipated, but anticipate a perfidious enemy; that it mattered little who should fire the first cannon-shot, for, in the eyes of honest men, the real aggressor would be the author of the Bayonne crime. The bulk of the population believed in this reasoning with perfect good faith; the court had little or no belief in it, although the dethronement of the Bourbons had seriously alarmed it; but it was deeply exasperated by its own mischances, and after the lost opportunity of the Polish war it was afraid of letting slip that of the war in Spain. All the nobility were of this way of thinking, being moved at once by just national resentments and by the bad passions of the German aristocracy. Moreover, the numerous agents of England, reintroduced officiously at Vienna, were doing all in their power to excite the nation. The archdukes were among the most eager in this sort of crusade, except, however,

the chief and most responsible of them, the archduke Charles, who being destined to command in chief, trembled not at the thought of the cannon balls, for there was no braver soldier than he, but at the idea of finding himself again in front of the victor of the Tagliamento, playing at the game of war with him for the fate of the Austrian monarchy. According to his custom, he prepared for war without desiring it. In order to pique his courage, a nickname was applied to him, borrowed from the events of Spain, that of *Prince of the Peace*. The emperor Francis, always rational but wanting in energy, yielded to an infatuation he blamed, contenting himself with a few sarcastic comments upon the faults he suffered to be committed, especially when those faults were the work of his brothers. Recently united, since the death of his first consort, with a princess of the house of Modena, who was most deeply imbued with Austrian prejudices, he found in his family a unanimity that perfectly accommodated his weakness, for all its members, except himself, approved of the tendencies to which he passively yielded. This suited his character and sufficed for his repose.

Thus arming continually, talking and exciting each other for months, the princes and nobles who governed Austria had come at last into a state of open hostility, which made some decisive step inevitable. Moreover, Napoleon's abrupt return to Paris, his appeal to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the movements of French troops towards the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria, gave reason to think that France was preparing for the war with what it had been intended to surprise her. Thus the endeavour to take securities against a danger that did not exist, had actually created that danger. An attempt might no doubt have been made to come to an understanding with Napoleon, by means of the guarantee proposed in Paris by the Russian and French diplomatists. But this kind of *dénouement* was stale, for it had been already employed after Tilsit to escape from a similar perplexity. To escape a second time from such a position by a sham reconciliation was not an easy thing. War, then, or immediate disarming, was the only alternative; for, besides the impossibility of finding specious apologies for preparations so far advanced, it was also becoming impossible to support the expense. But in the face of Germany, of England, and of the nation itself, suddenly to express a sense of security after having appeared so alarmed, to abandon those who had been fondly called the heroic Spaniards, and to let slip what had been on all hands declared to be the finest of opportunities,—this was impossible. It was come to this, that Austria must conquer or fall in arms. And had she not many chances in her favour? Her army reorganised and more flourishing than ever; exasperated Germany breathing earnest good wishes, and ready upon the least encouragement to pass from wishes to the most active co-operation; England offering her subsidies; Russia wavering; France beginning to think what Europe thought, and less disposed to back the conqueror who exhausted herself in order to ravage the world; and the

French army dispersed from the Oder to the Tagus, from the mountains of Bohemia to those of the Sierra Morena, decimated by eighteen years of incessant wars, and feebly recruited by young soldiers, torn from their despairing families at an age which was scarcely that of adolescence. Under the headlong influence of these motives, one day it came to pass, one knew not how, that war was decreed. Orders were given to assemble five corps d'armée in Bohemia, two in Upper Austria, two in Carinthia, and one in Gallicia. The archduke Charles was to be commander-in-chief. The efforts of diplomacy were employed to prepare alliances as another means of war.

The relations with England, which had only been fictitiously interrupted, were renewed; the plenteous subsidies she offered were accepted, and the business of effecting a reconciliation between her and Turkey was continued. It was resolved also to try and bring back the emperor Alexander to a sense of what was called the interests of Europe, by which was meant his own.

Austrian diplomacy had much to do at Constantinople. To alienate the Turks from France, bring them into relations with England, and dispose them to fall upon Russia if the latter continued to act in concert with Napoleon, or leave her at peace if she broke with him, so that there might be none but the common enemy of Europe to encounter,—this was a very judicious line of policy, and one which deserved to be actively pursued. Moreover, the continual revolutions of the court of Turkey facilitated all kinds of foreign intrigues.

Since the fall of sultan Selim fresh catastrophes had ensanguined the seraglio, and given Turkey the appearance of an empire perishing through its inward convulsions. The famous pacha of Rutschuk, Mustapha Baraïctar, whether really attached to his master Selim, as he alleged, or offended because a fanatical faction of Janissaries and Ulemas had disposed of the sceptre without consulting him, had taken up his position at Adrianople with a large army. All the other pachas had sent deputies to him, or had repaired to him in person, and Mustapha himself, the new sultan, had sent ambassadors to his camp, as if to put himself at the pacha's discretion. Thus, under the pretext of conferring on the fate of the empire, Mustapha Baraïctar became its actual ruler. Presently he encamped under the walls of Constantinople, and one day at last he marched upon the seraglio to release Selim, who was kept shut up with the women, under the guard of eunuchs, and replace him on the throne. But at the moment he was about to execute that design, the head of his unfortunate master, the best sovereign that for a long time had reigned in Constantinople, was flung at his feet. To avenge Selim, Baraïctar deposed Mustapha after a short reign, and, for want of a more eligible successor, he had been obliged to take Mustapha's brother Mahmoud, aged twenty-four, a prince who was not without merit, and who had been inoculated by the imprisoned Selim with a taste for European civilisation. Having effected this revolution, Mustapha Baraïctar governed the empire

for some months with absolute authority in the name of the young sultan; but a fresh revolt of the Janissaries put an end to his despotism, and heaped catastrophe on catastrophe. Baraïctar, having been surprised by the Janissaries before he could retreat to the seraglio, hid himself in the cellarage of his burning palace, and had perished in the ruins.

Mahmoud, who was a man of some boldness as well as cunning, had not been a stranger to this last revolution. Delivered from an insolent master, he had taken upon himself to govern his tottering empire, and he was engaged in the attempt at the moment when France and Austria were about to measure each other's strength once more on the banks of the Danube. To win the Turks to her, that she might dispose of them to her own advantage, was, as we have said, of great importance to Austria, for thus she could either set on an enemy the more against the Russians if they continued to be allies of France, or relieve them from that troublesome enemy if they consented to join what was called the European cause.

The thing was becoming easy since the new position assumed by France towards Turkey, with which it was impossible for her to remain on a friendly footing whilst united as she was with Russia. As a colourable pretext for the change which took place after Tilsit, she had at first alleged the fall of her excellent friend Selim. To this sultan Mustapha replied, that this event ought not to occasion any coolness on the part of France, for the Porte remained her best friend. Upon this Napoleon rejoined, that such being the case he would endeavour to effect a good peace between the Russians and the Turks, but he did not venture to speak of conditions. The Russians, however, insisting both before and after Erfurth, that France should end matters with the Turks and demand from them the Danubian provinces; the Turks on their part complaining to France that she did not procure them the promised peace, whilst Napoleon was running continually from Bayonne to Paris, from Paris to Erfurth, from Erfurth to Madrid; the latter, in order to amuse both parties, ended by hinting to the Turks with demonstrations of the liveliest regret, that they were no longer capable of defending Wallachia and Moldavia, that they would do well to give them up, and at that price secure themselves a solid peace, and concentrate all their energies within the provinces that were strongly attached to the empire; and that if that price they would terminate a war which threatened to be most disastrous to them, he promised to procure them an immediate arrangement, and to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire in the name of France. Nothing could give any idea of the revolution that took place in the temper of the Turks upon this overture of French diplomacy. Though it had been made with great caution, and nothing had been said which it was possible to avoid saying after the engagements contracted with Russia, the indignation of sultan Mahmoud, the divan, the Ulemas, and the Janissaries was extreme; and this mere hint so violently agitated the Turkish ministry, that the emotion communi-

cated itself like lightning to the entire nation. The talk was immediately of arming 300 thousand men, of even levying the Ottoman people *en masse*, and sacrificing the very last disciple of the prophet rather than yield. France was no longer regarded as a friend who reluctantly made known a painful necessity to her allies, but as a false friend who betrayed her ancient allies to an insatiable neighbour. Watching these vicissitudes with extreme impatience to profit by them, Austria assured the Turks that the secret of the famous interview at Erfurth had been nothing less than the sacrifice of the mouths of the Danube promised by the French to the Russians; that to insure the indulgence of Russia in the affairs of Spain, France surrendered the Porte to her, and thus after having betrayed her friends, the Spaniards, she sought for pardon by betraying her friends, the Turks, and relieved herself from a difficulty by heaping treachery on treachery. To these dark representations was added a very incorrect account of what was happening in Spain, showing how the French were beaten by insurgent peasants and by the armies of England; and as the Mussulmans entertain a superstitious respect for victory, it produced the most decisive impression upon them, since it represented Napoleon as judged by the result, that is to say, condemned by God himself. From all these allegations Austria drew the conclusion that the Porte ought to forsake France and unite with England, forget the recent passage of the Dardanelles by admiral Duckworth, and rely on the support of the Austrian and English armies to resist the ambition of a formidable neighbour and the treachery of a false friend.

This language penetrated with incredible promptitude the exasperated hearts to which it was addressed; and in a short time there was effected in the foreign policy of Constantinople a revolution quite as strange as that which had occurred in its domestic policy. A year ago the French had been in high favour with the Turks, who erected great batteries under their direction, whence they discharged red-hot balls at the detested English; now the French could not show themselves in the streets of Constantinople without being insulted, and the presence of the English was invoked by the whole population. Attentive to all these movements of an ardent and fanatic people, Austria notified the English of the success of her manœuvres, and had Mr. Adair sent to the Dardanelles. He anchored there on board an English frigate, and had not long to wait for permission to appear in Constantinople, where, after some discussion, the peace concluded with England was signed in the beginning of January, 1809. From that moment the Porte was at the disposal of the new coalition, ready to do whatever Austria and England should desire for their common cause.

Austria was not less active in her exertions in St. Petersburg than in Constantinople, but without the same success. The court of Vienna had chosen, as her representative on this occasion, prince Schwarzenberg, a brave soldier, unskilled in the refinements of diplomacy, but capable of imposing by his very integrity and mislead-

ing inquirers as to the real intentions of his court, which were hardly known to him. He was instructed to aver that the intentions of Austria were upright and disinterested, that she had no enterprise in view, her whole anxiety being, on the contrary, to defend herself against enterprises like that of Bayonne; that if the emperor Alexander would return to a better appreciation of the interests of Europe and of Russia, he should find in her a sure friend, by no means jealous, nor at all inclined to oppose his aggrandisement in any way compatible with the balance of power. M. de Schwarzenberg was enjoined to lay particular stress on the grand argument of the moment, the perfidy committed against Spain, which made it impossible for any one to remain in alliance with the French cabinet without dishonour. On this point M. de Schwarzenberg, who was a man of strict honour, was to endeavour to awaken whatever honourable susceptibility there was in the breast of Alexander. Lastly, if he succeeded in obtaining a favourable hearing, he was to offer the hand of the heir of the Austrian empire for the grand-duchess Anne, a proposal which could not encounter any obstacle on the part of the empress mother, and which, if accepted, would have re-established the intimacy between the two imperial courts.*

The emperor Alexander was at this period no longer sincere in his relations with Napoleon, though he had been so in the beginning, when the enthusiasm of chimerical projects led him to approve of everything in his ally. He had then sincerely admired the genius of Napoleon and the man himself, both worthy to be admired, and, interest helping enthusiasm, he had become a perfectly cordial ally. But the illusion that had attended his grand projects had disappeared when Constantinople was no longer in question, but only Bucharest and Jassy. Doubtless the conquest of the Danubian provinces, which is not even yet accomplished at this day, was a very sufficient matter of interest for Russia; but it was one of a less dazzling character, that left Alexander's mind in a more sober mood, and made him careful about the means of execution. It had seemed in the beginning that no more would be wanting than Napoleon's consent to obtain the Danubian provinces; but when the time approached for realising the design, the practical difficulties appeared much more serious than had been anticipated. If Napoleon by rapidly subjugating Spain, and inflicting some signal disaster on the English, had hindered Austria from even conceiving a thought of resistance; and if the Turks had consequently been forced to submit to whatever had been desired respecting their provinces, Alexander might have retained, if not the enthusiasm inspired by his first projects, at least the fervour of an alliance which brought him such sure and prompt advantages. But great as were the genius and the resources of Napoleon, he had created for himself such difficulties as gave his enemies of all kinds courage to attack

* Prince Schwarzenberg's mission, which was of great importance at that period, was entirely known to the French cabinet through the communications made to M. de Caulaincourt by the emperor Alexander.

him again. Russia, on her part, had not been as successful in Finland as had been expected in St. Petersburg and in Paris. That vast empire, a Hercules in the cradle, with an immense future before it, but with a present far from equalling its future, had never been able to send more than 40 thousand men into Finland during the summer campaign, and had spent the fine season in waging a sort of war against Sweden that ill became her own greatness. In short, this Swedish war, which was in its origin not a jot more moral than that of Spain, had not been more successful, and the two emperors, though much superior to their enemies, had not obtained any very enchanting favours from fortune; accordingly, the emperor Alexander was by no means enchanted. He found that what Napoleon conceded to him he had still to conquer with painful efforts; and the process of disenchantment, which was always so prompt with him, was already making visible progress in his mind. He deemed Napoleon still powerful enough to make it unsafe to quarrel with him; but he did not deem him victorious enough to make his alliance as advantageous as ever, nor pure enough to make it as much an honour; and as, moreover, he probably would not have obtained the consent of Austria and England to the conquests which continued to be his ruling passion —that of the Danubian provinces—and as a new revolution in his friendships would have dishonoured him, he had resolved to persist in the French alliance, but to draw from it the largest profit, at the cost of the least possible return.

Under these circumstances this war between France and Austria could not but be most inopportune for Alexander, for it would render more difficult the conquest of the Turkish provinces, compel a costly effort, if it was requisite to aid Napoleon by sending an army into Gallicia, and add a new war to the four already on hand with the Swedes, the English, the Persians, and the Turks. This war would, moreover, put Russia in still more flagrant contradiction with her past proceedings, for it might expose her to fight in the plains of Austerlitz for the French against the Austrians, and furnish fresh grounds of complaint to the Russian aristocracy, who blamed the close connexion with France. Finally, whether prosperous or unprosperous, it would bring about a result equally to be deprecated; for if prosperous, it might inspire Napoleon with the pernicious design of destroying Austria, and thus extinguishing every intermediate power between the Rhine and the Niemen; if unprosperous it would render ridiculous, dangerous, and at the least, fruitless, the alliance contracted with France, to the great scandal of all old Europe. There is no worse position than that of not being able to wish either the success or the failure of a war, and the best thing to do in such a case is to try to hinder it. This was what Alexander resolved to do by every imaginable means.

M. de Romanzoff had returned to St. Petersburg, seduced by Napoleon's attentions, as much as M. de Caulaincourt had been by those of Alexander. But the two sovereigns were sufficiently

superior to their ministers to escape from the seductions which beguiled the latter. Alexander listened to M. de Romanzoff's accounts of the marvels of Paris, and the attentions lavished on him by Napoleon, just as Napoleon received from M. de Caulaincourt details of the gracious favours daily bestowed on him; but he did not deviate from any of his resolutions. He settled with M. de Romanzoff the language and the conduct he was to use towards France, and held several important conversations with M. de Caulaincourt. He scarcely at all concealed from him what he thought of the existing situation, of which he spoke impartially for Napoleon and with moderation for himself. He admitted that the war in Finland had not been well conducted, but expressed regret that Napoleon on his part had not obtained more decisive successes against the English. He appeared even to think that after all the English alone had gained something by the enterprise against Spain, since they were about to have the Spanish colonies at their disposal, which was much more than an equivalent for the conquest —the very dubious conquest—of Lisbon and Cadiz by the French. He declared how painful it would be to him to have to fight the old allies by whose side he had stood at Austerlitz, and what perplexities that singular situation would cause him in the higher circles of St. Petersburg, and even in the nation. He avowed the difficulty he should have in assembling, besides a new army in Finland, an army of observation along the Baltic, a grand conquering army to act against Turkey, and an auxiliary army to act with the French against Austria—a difficulty which was not only military but in a still higher degree financial. He even went so far as to declare that the success of the new war would cause him much uneasiness, for he should look with alarm on the extinction of Austria, and would not consent to its being replaced by another Poland. Peace was necessary for himself, but he believed it necessary also for Napoleon; for it did not escape him, he said, that France was beginning to desire it, and to experience a change of feeling towards her glorious sovereign. These were all so many reasons why he should be left to act with freedom as regarded Austria, and do all he could to prevent a war, the very idea of which was utterly repugnant to him. Unfortunately, he added, he was far from believing with Napoleon that it was enough to threaten and to deliver *ultimata* in the name of the two greatest powers in the world to stop the headlong course of people swayed by hate and terror, in whose breasts there subsisted, allowing for much exaggeration of language, a portion of genuine fear, which must be taken into consideration. He asked, therefore, that he should be permitted to reassure them and at the same time intimidate them; to reassure them by peremptorily denying the existence of any intention to treat them like Spain; to intimidate them by demonstrating the disastrous results which a new war would bring down upon them. Furthermore, Alexander refused to entrust the conduct of this affair, as Napoleon desired, to the two ministers of Russia and France at

Vienna. Napoleon, whilst wishing for peace, thought that those two ministers would be more peremptory, and would therefore be more attended to. Alexander, on the contrary, thought they would go straightway for war. "Our ministers will make a mess of everything," said he to M. de Caulaincourt. "Let me be left to act and to speak, and if war can be avoided I will avoid it; if it cannot, I will act, when it shall have become inevitable, loyally and frankly."

There was no choice then but to leave him to act, since after all, his views, being quite pacific, were perfectly in accordance with those of Napoleon. So earnestly did the latter desire peace that he had secretly authorised Alexander to promise not only the joint guarantee of Russia and France for the integrity of the Austrian dominions, but also the complete evacuation of the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine, which signified that there should not remain a single French soldier in Germany.

Alexander kept his word, and expressed himself with perfect frankness to M. de Schwarzenberg. Though unable to hide his confusion when the Austrian minister upbraided him with being the accomplice of the base conduct practised at Bayonne, he was callous to the appeal made to his feelings in favour of the European cause, and reproaching the Austrian policy with all the falsehood and dissimulation it had been guilty of for two years, for it had never ceased to talk of peace whilst it was preparing war, he ended by declaring that he was under formal engagements contracted solely for the interests of his empire, and which he was resolved to fulfil; that if Austria was foolish enough to come to a rupture she would be crushed by Napoleon, but that she would force Russia also to take part in the war, for the latter having pledged her word would unite her troops with those of France; that the enfranchisement of Europe, which the Austrian cabinet was incessantly talking about, would not be effected; that no more would be gained by occasioning a new effort of him whom they called an overwhelming Colossus than to make him more overwhelming still, and to give England, another overwhelming Colossus by sea, the means of postponing the peace which was so urgently needed; that as for him, peace was all he desired (including the Danubian provinces, he might have added); that peace must be had at last; that he would regard as an enemy whoever rendered it more remote, and that he would employ against such an offender, be it who it might, the whole strength of his empire. Alexander put aside all idea of a family alliance with Austria; for he would not have committed the indecorum of bestowing on an archduke a princess he had almost promised to Napoleon.

The Austrian minister was confounded by these frank declarations. The higher circles of St. Petersburg, though certainly less ardent than those of Vienna, had made him expect a different result. He had found every body of the European party and opposed to France, though they were afraid of speaking openly for

fear of vexing the emperor. He had, moreover, ascertained that the imperial family entertained the same feelings, and he had hoped for a better reception from the emperor. A more practised ambassador would have seen that beneath these very genuine feelings, which were to a certain extent shared by Alexander himself, there lay the interests of the nation which were just then associated with those of France; that if the Russian aristocracy and the imperial family might indulge in language which accorded best with their prejudices, the emperor and his cabinet had a different conduct to pursue, and that if they could acquire a fine territory, their course was plainly to let the courtiers and the women talk on, and to attend to the business of the empire by trying to secure in this commotion the long-coveted banks of the Danube.

Understanding nothing of these apparent contradictions, the excellent prince Schwarzenberg filled St. Petersburg with his lamentations, and sent despatches to his government which ought to have made her pause, had it been possible yet to arrest her precipitate course. Alexander, seeing he had produced a certain impression on the representative of Austria, hoped that the latter would effect something with his own court, but not reckoning on this with much confidence, he made his preparations for a speedy war. Being most desirous of terminating the war in Finland as soon as possible, he sent a reinforcement which raised the number of men acting in that province to about 60 thousand. He gave orders for marching against the centre of Sweden across the Frozen Sea. A column was to wind round the gulf of Bothnia and march by Uleaburg against Tornea and Umea. Another was to march from Wasa across the gulf of Bothnia on the ice and meet the first column at Umea. A third and principal column was also to make its way across the ice by the isles of Aland to Stockholm. The guard and two divisions were to remain between St. Petersburg, Revel, and Riga, to protect the shores of the Baltic from the English. Four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, forming 60 thousand men, were to enter Gallicia, to hold the balance of events much rather than to second the French armies. Lastly, as was natural, the greatest efforts of Russia were directed towards Turkey, for if Alexander desired to be a moderator in the west, in the east he chose to be a conqueror, and he sent eight divisions to the Lower Danube, one of which was a reserve consisting of third battalions. It was to take up a position midway between Transylvania and Wallachia, so that it might either second the invading army in Turkey, or join the army in Gallicia, and take part in some way or another in the events which should arise in that quarter. This division was reckoned by M. de Caulaincourt as one of those which was devoted to the service of the alliance. The whole body of troops acting in this direction amounted to about 120 thousand men. Thus to end the conquest of Finland, make head against the English, conquer the mouths of the Danube, and moderate events in Germany, were the several employments to which Alexander destined

the 280 thousand active troops at his disposal. If he did no more he imputed it to his finances, of the state of which he complained constantly to M. de Caulaincourt, talking incessantly of the five wars he was about to have on his hands, and though always proud in his bearing, yet becoming almost humble when money was in question, and requesting aid to enable him to contract loans in France or in Holland.

The conduct of Russia greatly disconcerted the cabinet of Vienna, which had expected to find her less refractory, because it had judged of the cabinet by the language of the aristocracy. However, though it regarded the mission of prince Schwarzenberg as a failure, it flattered itself that the Russian cabinet could not long resist the opinion of the nation, especially when strengthened by a first victory of the Austrian arms. The 60 thousand men ordered for Gallicia were considered as a mere corps of observation, to which it would be enough to oppose very inferior forces, with orders likewise to observe rather than act. Neither the language then, nor the armed demonstrations of Russia, were taken as an argument against war; on the contrary, it was resolved to hurry everything forward, so as to gain over the French forces, still dispersed from Magdeburg to Ulm, that first victory which was to bring all the powers to side with Austria. The latter was in one of those situations in which, being no longer able to retreat, one takes every circumstance, adverse or favourable, for a reason for advancing.

Preparations for war and diplomatic movements having occupied the month of February and a part of the month of March, it was resolved to take the field in the beginning of April, the earliest period when war is possible in Austria, grass having then but just begun to cover the ground. The plan of the campaign was laid down at Vienna. In the first place it was settled that only the least forces of the empire should be made to act in Italy and Gallicia. Fifty thousand men were to be sent under the archduke John to second the insurrection of the Tyrol, and to occupy by their presence the French forces in Italy. Eight or ten thousand men were to act against general Marmont in Dalmatia. The archduke Ferdinand, with 40 thousand men, was to hold in check the Saxo-Polish army assembled under the walls of Warsaw, and to observe the Russians who were marching into Gallicia.

The principal body, that which contained the best and most numerous troops, was to act in Germany by the Upper Danube, and attempt the bold enterprise of surprising the French before their concentration. It was the archduke Charles who was to command it as generalissimo, and had organised it as minister of war. Nothing, consequently, had been neglected. It was a force of about 200 thousand men, strong especially in infantry, which the archduke had taken pains to render excellent; strong also in artillery, which had always been very good in Austria, but not so well provided with cavalry, which the archduke Charles had not augmented, but which, though not numerous, was as well trained as it was

brave. It was divided into six *corps d'armée* and two *corps de réserve*, distributed between Bohemia and Upper Austria. Behind this main body the reserve and the Hungarian rising were to cover Vienna, and if Vienna were lost they were to retreat into the heart of Hungary, where uniting with the remains of the active army they were to prolong the war. This second body, consisting of more than 200 militia men unused to war, but tolerably well trained, swelled to above 500 thousand men the resources of Austria, which had never before made such a display of force.

The question next to be determined was, how to employ the 200 thousand men of the main body, who were to act in Germany and strike the first blow. The Aulic council, reputed to be the ordinary cause of the disasters of Austria, because it was said to paralyse the authority of the generals, had been deprived of its influence in favour of the generalissimo, without there resulting much more unity in the command; for unity can only subsist where there reigns a strong will, directed by a steadfast mind. The archduke, though a prudent, enlightened, brave prince, and the best captain of Austria, had not the force of mind and character necessary to secure unity of command; and the conflict of opinions which had been complained of in the Aulic council was about to be repeated around him between the leading officers of his staff, with the improvement, it is true, of being exercised nearer to the field of battle; and this improvement was certainly not to be despised.

The archduke's staff were divided between two opinions as to the best plan to be pursued. The one was to take Bohemia for a point of departure, and supposing the French still scattered over Saxony, Franconia, and the Upper Palatinate, to debouche on Bayreuth, that is to say, on the centre of Germany, beat them in detail, and raise up the population of Germany by this sudden apparition and prompt success. This bold plan, which conducted the Austrians by Bayreuth and Wurzburg to the very gates of Mayence, had the advantage of leading them to the Rhine by the shortest route, carrying confusion into the cantonments of the French, and the liveliest emotion into Germany. But for the very reason that it was bold, it supposed in its execution a character that is in general possessed only by captains of a superior order, who are usually fortunate, and confident because they are fortunate. There was none of that kind then in Germany or elsewhere, except in France. This plan, moreover, supposed a degree of advancement in the military preparations of Austria, which its plodding administration had not succeeded in giving them. It was not until the beginning of March that the troops destined for Bohemia were concentrated there. Many regiments wanted their third battalions, and the artillery had not arrived. This plan of surprising the French would, no doubt, have been a good one, if adequately executed; but if they were not sufficiently surprised it might turn out disastrously, for if they should have had time enough to move from the Elbe to the Danube, and rally

between Ulm and Ratisbon, the Austrian army would be exposed to have them on its left flank, making way to Vienna by the Danube, dispersing all the detachments it had left in Bavaria, and perhaps even breaking its line of operations. With a general so fertile in unexpected manœuvres as Napoleon, this latter chance was much to be apprehended.

The second plan was humbler and safer. It was to take the ordinary route, that of the Danube, by which the French would naturally arrive on account of the facility of communication along that great river; to confront them on that route with the enormous mass of 200 thousand men, and to take advantage of their less prepared state, not to surprise them, but to beat them before they had rallied their numbers sufficiently to dispute the victory. This plan afforded no opportunity for any of those sudden manœuvres of Napoleon's, which commonly baffled all calculations, and exposed to no risk but that of the field of battle, always perilous enough against such a captain and such soldiers.

These two plans were long debated between two officers of the archduke Charles's staff, general Meyer and general Grünn, and divided the opinions of the ablest tacticians of Austria. But, as always happens in such cases, the decision of the question was left to events, and nothing was settled until spies had reported the march of general Oudinot on Ulm and of marshal Davout on Wurzburg. It was then perceived that the Austrians would arrive too late for the successful execution of the first plan, and that by debouching by Bohemia on Bayreuth they would have the French on their left flank, reaching Vienna by the Danube. It was therefore suddenly resolved to move back into Upper Austria the corps which were originally to have assembled in Bohemia. But in this instance, again, the usual effects of feeble command displayed themselves: some portion of the first plan was retained; and the second was only adopted with a reduction of the main body of forces which should have been employed for its execution. Thus some 50 thousand men were left in Bohemia under generals Bellegarde and Kollowrath, and about 150 thousand were moved into Upper Austria to be marched across Bavaria to meet the French at Ratisbon. The first of these bodies was to debouche by the Upper Palatinate on Bamberg, and extend its left towards Ratisbon. The second was to invade Bavaria and ascend the Danube, extending its right towards Ratisbon, that the two masses communicating with each other along the river might be able, if need were, to form a junction, though with many chances of failing in that operation. In this way the Austrian army advanced astride of the Danube as it were, wavering between two plans, still with the hope of acting before the French, and guarding against a flank movement on their part by pouring part of the Austrian forces in Bohemia into Bavaria. General Meyer, who is said to have advocated the first plan, was sent from the head-quarters of the archduke Charles to those of the archduke John, to employ in

Italy the talents that were rejected in Germany, and general Grünn, the author of the second plan, remained alone with the archduke Charles as his principal adviser.

In consequence of this new system, the first corps, which had formed at Saatz under lieutenant-general Bellegarde, and the second, which had formed at Pilsen under general Kollowrath, of the artillery, retained the same rallying points, and had orders to debouche with 50 thousand men by the extreme frontier of Bohemia on Bayreuth in the beginning of April. The corps of Hohenzollern, of Rosenberg, and of the archduke Louis, which had formed at Prague, Piseck, and Budweis, and the first *corps de réserve* of prince John de Lichtenstein, which had formed at Iglau, and which was composed of grenadiers and cuirassiers, received orders to pass from Bohemia into Austria by the route from Budweis to Lintz, to cross the Danube by the bridge of the latter town, and to be before the Inn, the frontier of Bavaria, about the beginning of April. There they were to unite with lieutenant-general Hiller's corps, formed at Wels on the Traun, and with general Kienmayer's second *corps de réserve*, formed at Enns on the Ens. These six corps were to march together on Bavaria, having the Danube on their right, thus tending to meet Bellegarde and Kollowrath's left towards Ratisbon. Orders were likewise given to commence hostilities in Italy and Poland in the beginning of April, as well as in Bavaria and Bohemia.

Now it was not possible, without carrying dissimulation far beyond all tolerable limits, to continue talking of peace whilst putting armies in march, and sending them orders to cross the frontier within a fortnight. This would have been too much like the conduct of the English at sea, who usually seized the enemy's traders without any previous declaration. Besides, victory was not so sure that one might venture to violate the law of nations in the hope of doing so with impunity. Orders were consequently given to M. de Metternich to make a preliminary declaration to the French cabinet, which might serve as a transition between the language of peace and the actual fact of war.

Accordingly, on the 2nd of March, M. de Metternich presented himself at Paris to M. de Champagny, the minister for foreign affairs, and declared to him, in the name of his court, that the sudden arrival of the Emperor Napoleon in Paris, the call to the princes of the Confederation to assemble their contingents, certain newspaper articles, and sundry movements of French troops, determined it to raise its armies above the peace footing on which they had been kept until then, but that it only adopted this resolution because it was forced to it by the conduct of the French government, and that it took these indispensable precautions without yet departing from its pacific intentions.

M. de Champagny replied to this communication with coldness and incredulity, saying that this change from a peace footing to a war footing was six months old, Austria having been actually en-

gaged for six months in preparing for hostilities; that the Emperor Napoleon had not been duped in the matter, and had made preparations on his own side; that the alarm now affected could not be real, for when the French were occupying Silesia with formidable armies, Austria had not thought herself menaced, whereas, now that the greater part of the French troops had been removed into Spain, she affected the liveliest uneasiness; that this could not be the language of good faith; that evidently the English policy had prevailed at Vienna; that the Austrian government believed itself ready, and acted because it supposed the moment was favourable for action, but that France was not to be surprised, and Austria could have only herself to blame for the consequences of the war should they prove disastrous.

Having to explain himself more fully, M. de Metternich then complained both of the silence observed towards him by the Emperor Napoleon, and of the ignorance in which Austria had been left during the negotiations at Erfurth. He appeared to attribute solely to a want of friendly explanations the misunderstanding that threatened to end in war. M. de Champagny haughtily replied that the Emperor deigned no longer to speak with an ambassador whom the court of Austria deceived, or who deceived the court of France, for nothing he had promised had been fulfilled: neither the suspension of military preparations, nor the recognition of king Joseph, nor the return to pacific dispositions; that explanations were therefore useless with the representative of a court whose word could no longer be relied on; that it was not M. de Metternich personally who was treated so coldly, but the representative of a government unfaithful to all its promises; that Austria had saved the English by crossing the Inn in 1805, when Napoleon was preparing to cross the Straits of Calais; that it had just saved them once more by hindering Napoleon from pursuing them to Corunna; that it had thus twice hindered the triumph of France over her rival; that it should pay the penalty, and should this time find Napoleon neither less prompt, nor less prepared, nor less terrible than formerly.

After some other complaints of the same nature, the two ministers separated without any overture which afforded the least hope of peace, M. de Metternich appearing to deplore war, for his sagacity foresaw its disastrous consequences, and his situation in Paris made him regret his departure from that capital; M. de Champagny appearing not to fear a fresh conflict, and moreover displaying the anger of a devoted subject who never could see any fault in his master.

All hope of peace being now at end, Napoleon was seized with that extraordinary ardour that possessed him whenever events became serious, and on the 3rd and 4th of March he gave his orders with unparalleled activity. Believing as he did at first that Austria could not take the field before the end of April or the beginning of May, he had assigned as mustering places—Augsburg for general Oudinot, Metz for the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand division,

Strasburg for the Boudet and Molitor divisions, and Wurzburg for marshal Davout. He now chose others nearer to the enemy, and hastened the despatch of men and *materiel* to these new points. Ulm was made the mustering place of the Boudet, Molitor, Carra St. Cyr, and Legrand divisions. The first two, already *en route* from Lyons to Strasburg, were ordered to diverge towards Befort, and go straight to Ulm, crossing the Black Forest by the shortest road. The Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions had orders not to stop at Metz, and to march by Strasburg to Ulm without losing an instant. Their reinforcements and their *materiel* were immediately despatched to meet them on their road. Fortunately these troops were old enough not to be in danger of being disorganised through such precipitation. Oudinot's corps, already on its march to Augsburg, was not so well constituted. From an accidental assemblage of grenadiers and voltigeurs, it had had to pass to a formation of fourth battalions. The Emperor despatched ten days earlier the grenadiers and voltigeurs taken from the guard to form the two *compagnies d'élite* of these fourth battalions, and the fusiliers draughted from the depôts to form the four centre companies. But the utmost that could be hoped for was, that at the opening of hostilities this corps would have four companies to a battalion instead of six, two divisions instead of three, and 20 thousand men instead of 30 thousand. Besides this, it would have to form almost in presence of the enemy. But the military spirit of the time, the experience of the officers, soldiers, and generals, and the fervour that animated and sustained everybody, would make up for all deficiencies.

Napoleon did not change the place of muster appointed for the corps of marshal Davout, still called the army of the Rhine. He sent to it in all haste the reinforcements necessary to complete the first three war battalions, and the detachments which were to serve as nuclei of the fourth battalions. Each of the divisions of cavalry and infantry, having to pass by Wurzburg, would find there the men and the *materiel* belonging to it. He only ordered marshal Davout, whose head-quarters were at Wurzburg, to move his divisions immediately into the Upper Palatinate, so as to have one soon at Bayreuth, one at Bamberg, one at Nuremberg, and one at Ratisbon, in order to confront the Austrian troops in Bohemia. So pressed for time was Napoleon, that in order to hasten the departure of recruits, he had recourse to a very irregular measure, which, under any other administration than his, would have been attended with serious inconvenience, and produced strange confusion. Certain depôts abounded with conscripts, ready trained and clothed, whilst others were without any. He ordered the conscripts, who were ready, to join the regiments that wanted men, whether they belonged to them or not. Only care was to be taken, when they joined, to change their buttons for others with the appropriate numbers. Napoleon, moreover, took the precaution not to make known to the officers of the depôts the destination of the conscripts

required of them, lest taking no more interest in them they might give them inferior equipments. He prescribed the same arrangements for the light cavalry, sending off all the chasseurs and hussars who were ready, without caring whether or not they joined their own regiments, only desiring that resemblance of uniform should be attended to as much as possible. However, as hussars could not be mixed with chasseurs on account of the extreme difference of equipment, and as there were more hussars than could be employed, he formed of them squadrons of guides to serve in the head-quarters of each *corps d'armée*, so as to relieve the light cavalry from escort service, which obliges it to squander its strength in numerous detachments.

We mention these details in order to give an idea of the expedients to which Napoleon was reduced, in consequence of having sent his principal resources into Spain. After having attended to these various matters, he applied himself to organising the fifth battalions. These he intended, as we have said, to serve both in their ordinary capacity as depôts, and also as reserves, whether to protect the coasts from the assaults of the English, or to set at liberty a certain number of fourth battalions then employed at the camp of Boulogne, or to meet the various contingencies of the war. Having already demanded 80 thousand men on account of the conscription of 1810, he resolved to levy 30 thousand more, in order to raise the effective of the fifth battalion to 1200 men at least; and he also resolved to take 10 thousand strong men for his guard from the classes of the preceding years, notwithstanding the reiterated calls that had been made upon them. He ordered that such of the fifth battalions as should be first formed should be united provisionally into demi-brigades of two, three, or four battalions each, at Pontivy, Paris, Boulogne, Ghent, Metz, Mayence, Strasburg, and Milan. As for the 10 thousand conscripts of the anterior classes, these were to be employed in giving a quite new development to the imperial guard. To the regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs composing the old guard, he had added in 1807 two regiments of fusiliers, which had served very well. He now determined to create four regiments of tirailleurs and four of conscripts, which would make the infantry of the guard amount to at least 20 thousand men, and the whole body to 25 thousand, including its magnificent cavalry and its artillery, now increased by forty-eight pieces. The young soldiers of that gallant body would soon equal the old ones in military spirit, whilst they had the advantage over them in point of youth and physical vigour. No conception more thoroughly attested Napoleon's profound knowledge of armies, and the inexhaustible fecundity of his organising genius. Furthermore, he made all arrangements for a forced march of the old guard from Bayonne to Paris, and from Paris to Strasburg.

He had only addressed a word of advice to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine; but from the 2nd of March he gave

them orders as head of the Confederation. He demanded 40 thousand men of Bavaria, in order to have 30 thousand, whom he put under the command of old marshal Lefebvre, who knew German, and who under fire was always worthy of the grand army. The king of Bavaria would have had his son command the Bavarian troops, but Napoleon would not consent. "Your army," he said, "must fight in earnest in this campaign, for it concerns the conservation and even the extension of the aggrandisements which Bavaria has received. Your son may be able to command when he shall have made six or seven campaigns with us. Meanwhile, let him come to my head-quarters. He will be received there with all the consideration due to him, and he will learn *our trade*." By way of compromise Napoleon granted the young prince the command of one of the Bavarian divisions. Napoleon appointed Munich, Landshut, and Straubing, as mustering places of these three divisions, far enough behind the Inn to prevent their being surprised by the Austrians, and sufficiently in advance of the Lech and the Danube to cover our musterings. Of the king of Wurtemberg he demanded 12 thousand men, who were to muster at Neresheim, and serve under the orders of General Vandamme, the choice of whom was objected to by the king of Wurtemberg, but confirmed by Napoleon, who wrote in these terms to the king: "I know General Vandamme's defects; but he is a true soldier, and in this difficult calling much must be forgiven in consideration of great qualities." Of the grand duke of Baden he demanded a division of 8 to 10 thousand men, and a like force of the duke of Hesse Darmstadt. They were to muster towards the end of March at Pforzheim and Mergentheim. As for the minor princes, the dukes of Wurzburg, Nassau, and Saxony, he required of them a division composed of their joint contingents, which was to repair to Wurzburg, Marshal Davout's head-quarters. Of the king of Saxony, he demanded 20 thousand Saxons in advance of Dresden, and 25 thousand Poles in advance of Warsaw. These contingents amounted together to a nominal 110 or 115 thousand men, and to a net total of 100 thousand, 80 thousand of whom were Germans and 20 thousand Poles. Marshal Bernadotte, coming from the Hanse Towns with the French Dupas division, was to take the Saxons under his command, and was then to join the grand army on the Danube. The Poles, covered by the vicinity of the Russians, sufficed to guard Warsaw. As the events of the war might induce the temporary abandonment of Dresden and Munich, Napoleon sent word to the two monarchs to be ready to quit their respective capitals, and retire towards the centre of the Confederation; offering, if they felt inclined for a short visit to France, to place at their disposal all the imperial dwellings magnificently provided. He furthermore gave orders to his brother Jerome to muster 20 thousand Hessians; and to his brother Louis, 20 thousand Dutch; upon neither of which forces he counted much, be-

cause Jerome administered his new kingdom without economy, and Louis administered his with quite Dutch parsimony.

These forces being thus prepared were organised as follows by Napoleon. He had not all his marshals at hand, for four of them, Ney, Soult, Victor, and Mortier, were serving in Spain. Among those he could dispose of there were three he prized more than all the rest; these were Davout, Lannes, and Massena. He resolved to divide the mass of the French forces between them, giving 50 thousand men to each. Massena had already commanded more considerable forces, but Davout and Lannes had not yet had that honour, of which, however, they were altogether worthy. Marshal Davout was to retain the three old divisions of the army of the Rhine, those of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, a division of light cavalry, and a fourth division of infantry under general Dumont, composed of the fourth battalions of that body; the whole forming 50 thousand veteran soldiers, the best without comparison which France possessed at that period. They were placed between Bayreuth, Amberg, and Ratisbon, having the latter for their rallying point. The St. Hilaire division, detached from the army of the Rhine, with a portion of light cavalry and the cuirassiers of general Espagne, joined to Oudinot's three divisions, was to form another corps of 50 thousand men under the illustrious marshal Lannes, and to concentrate at Augsburg. Napoleon added to it a brigade of 1500 or 2000 Portuguese, selected from the best troops of that nation cantoned in France, who were weary of inactivity, and were better placed with the army than in the interior. He also added to it the Corsican chasseurs and the chasseurs of the Po, a brave and tried body of men. The Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor divisions, a fine division of light cavalry, the Hessians, and the Baden troops, were to form another corps of the same strength, and were to muster at Ulm under the heroic Massena. The cuirassiers and carabineers under general Nansouty, a numerous division of light cavalry, and the dragoons organised as we have elsewhere stated, were to compose a reserve of 14 or 15 thousand cavalry under marshal Bessières, in the absence of Murat. With the addition of the guard, 20 thousand strong, the principal mass concentrated between Ulm, Augsburg, and Ratisbon would amount to 190 thousand French, including artillery. The Bavarians under marshal Lefebvre formed in advance an excellent auxiliary corps of some 30 thousand men; and another was formed in the rear by the troops of Wurtemburg, Baden, and Hesse, under marshal Augereau. Further still in the rear were the Saxons, commanded by prince Bernadotte. Consequently, there were five French corps, two being reserves, having one auxiliary corps in advance and two in the rear, the whole made up of old and young soldiers, animated by the breath of Napoleon, perfect as regarded bravery, but far from perfect as to experience and age; but, such as they were, quite competent to uphold the glory of France at its existing elevation. Prince Berthier was appointed major-general, and M. Daru intendant, or commissary-

general of this army, Napoleon constituting himself its commander-in-chief. It was designated the army of Germany instead of grand army, the grand army unfortunately being no longer in Germany or Italy, but in Spain.

Napoleon's plan was to march straight from Ratisbon to Vienna by the highway of the Danube, and to send down by the river his *matériel*, his sick, and all his baggage—a plan which inferred, in the first instance, some terrible blow dealt on the Austrians. With this view he had a quantity of boats purchased on all the rivers of Bavaria, to be sent down successively to the Danube in proportion as he should pass the several confluents of that great river. It was also with this view that he had added to the guard 1200 of the best seamen of the Boulogne flotilla.

It was at Ratisbon, then, that he intended to concentrate his forces, neglecting the Tyrol and leaving the Austrians to entangle themselves there as much as they pleased, being sure of enveloping and capturing them between his army of Germany and that of Italy, if they did not make haste to retreat. He gave orders, however, to execute works at Augsburg, to deepen the ditches and fill them with water, to palisade the walls, and construct *têtes de pont* on the Lech, so as to cover his right flank by a fortified post whilst he was marching with the left in advance. This was the only precaution he thought of on the Tyrolese side, and it perfectly sufficed.

Ratisbon was chosen as a point of departure, on the supposition that the Austrians would not assume the offensive before the end of April. Should they take the field earlier, Napoleon had fixed his eyes on a less advanced point of departure in Bavaria, such as Donauwerth or Ingolstadt, at which the musters from Augsburg and Ratisbon might form a junction, and he resolved to have magazines of provisions and ammunition at both those towns. Thus Ratisbon in case of deferred, and Donauwerth or Ingolstadt in case of immediate, hostilities, were to be his first head-quarters. Major-general Berthier was despatched in advance with these instructions. M. Daru received similar instructions for the movements of the *matériel*. Expresses were established between Augsburg and Strasburg on the one side, and between Wurzburg and Mayence on the other, to connect the telegraphic lines of the frontier, and to transmit news daily to Paris from the theatre of war. Special relays of post-horses were kept that Napoleon might rapidly clear the distance between the Seine and the Danube. Thus prepared, he awaited the movements of the Austrians, intending to remain at Paris as long as possible, in order to animate the war administration by his will, before going to animate by his presence the army destined to fight under his orders.

Some further arrangements were made with regard to Italy, Spain, and the navy. Napoleon repeated his orders to Murat to march a brigade to Rome in order to disengage the Miollis division. He traced out for prince Eugene the direction in which he was to attack the Austrians, and ordered him to mask with some light

troops the road from Carniola by Laybach, and to move the five French divisions, Seras, Broussier, Grenier, Lamarque, and Barbou, from Udine to Ponteba, in order to debouche by Tarvis on Klagenfurth in Carinthia, the direct road from Lombardy to Vienna. He had despatched some vessels from Toulon for the Adriatic, with orders to keep the best under sail and to unrig the others, in order to procure 12 or 15 thousand French sailors at Venice, who would be very useful for the defence of the place. He enjoined his sister Eliza, governante of Tuscany, to watch over the tranquillity of that country, for discontent was already beginning to infect Italy. He sent her a column of French gendarmes, in order to organise an Italian gendarmerie; and directed that the castles of Florence, Sienna, and Leghorn should be put in a state of defence, to serve at need as places of refuge from new Sicilian vespers,—so much did his own foresight acknowledge the dangers of his political imprudence.

As for Spain, he ordered Joseph to continue the preparations for the Portuguese expedition, which marshal Soult was to execute with four divisions, and not to send marshal Victor into Andalusia until marshal Soult should have passed Oporto. He recommended that particular care should be taken of the Valence, Leval, Dessoles, and Sebastiani divisions, left in Madrid as the mainstay of the Spanish monarchy, and, above all, that marshal Ney with his two divisions should vigourously keep down the north of the peninsula. He gave general Suchet Moncey's old corps, which had just finished the siege of Saragossa, with orders to prepare to march on Valencia as soon as general St. Cyr should have terminated his operations in Catalonia. He moved the fifth corps, commanded by marshal Mortier, from Saragossa to Burgos, that it might at need either support marshal Ney against the north of Spain, should that region become troublesome, or return into France, if the war in Germany required fresh reinforcements.

Lastly, Napoleon ordered admiral Wuillaumez to sail from Brest with two 120-gun ships and six seventy-fours, and touch at L'Orient and Rochefort, where he was to be joined by vice-admirals Troude and Lhermitte, each with a division. After conducting them to the West Indies, where they were to land provisions, munitions, and recruits, and to receive colonial produce in exchange, he was to return to Europe and join admiral Ganteaume at Toulon, to take part in various expeditions in the Mediterranean. Whilst admiral Wuillaumez was executing this cruize, admiral Ganteaume was to quit Toulon with his squadron, and convey a considerable store of powder, projectiles, and corn, to Barcelona. On the Scheldt vice-admiral Allemand had orders to take the squadron out of Flushing, and keep it in the river always in readiness for sail, which could not fail to puzzle the English, and occupy a notable portion of their force. Napoleon, moreover, directed the navy administration to collect a certain number of gun-boats at the mouths of the Scheldt and the Charente, to guard all the channels and keep watch against

the probable attempts of the English to destroy the squadrons moored in those latitudes. The minister Decrès was to set out for the coast on the day Napoleon departed for Germany, in order to superintend the punctual execution of these several orders.

Suddenly, whilst Napoleon was thus making his last arrangements, it became known that the Austrians had had the audacity to seize at Braunau a French courier bearing despatches from the legation at Vienna to that at Munich. This courier was a retired French officer settled at Vienna, who, leaving that capital at the moment of impending war, had been charged with several despatches for the ministers of his nation. The seizure of these, notwithstanding the bearer's strong protest, and in spite of the seals of the two embassies, appeared to Napoleon tantamount to a rupture. He gave way to the most violent anger, caused M. de Metternich to be vehemently interpellated, and ordered, by way of reprisals, the immediate arrest of the Austrian couriers on all the roads. His orders being strictly and instantly executed, very important despatches were intercepted on the Strasburg road. Their attentive perusal satisfied him that hostilities would begin in the middle of April. The imminence of the danger was confirmed by M. de Metternich's demanding his passports, and Napoleon ordered major-general Berthier to proceed to Donauwerth, either to assemble the army at Ratisbon if there was time, or to make it fall back behind the Lech to Donauwerth if time failed him, leaving Ratisbon to be occupied by one of marshal Davout's divisions. This done, Napoleon remained with his eye upon the telegraph, ready to set out at the first signal.

Hostilities began a few days earlier than he had expected. Orders had, in fact, been given in Italy, Bavaria, and Bohemia, to open the campaign on the 9th or 10th of April. Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, who commanded the 50 thousand men destined to debouche by Bohemia, passed the frontier of Upper Westphalia at two points, Tirschenreit and Wernberg. The four corps of generals Hohenzollern, Rosenberg, archduke Louis and Hiller, and the Jean de Lichtenstein and Kienmayer reserves, forming with the artillery a mass of about 140 thousand men, were along the Traun on the 1st of April, and on the 9th of April they were along the Inn, the Franco-Bavarian frontier, the violation of which was to be decisive of war, and to bring on one of the bloodiest campaigns of the age. On the evening of the 9th the archduke Charles, who had put himself at the head of his troops, and was accompanied by the emperor, who had come from Lentz to be nearer the theatre of war, sent one of his aide-de-camps to the king of Bavaria, with a letter announcing that he had orders to advance and treat as enemies whatever troops should resist him. He was willing to believe, he said, that no German force would offer any impediment to a liberating army which came to deliver Germany from its oppressors. This letter was the only declaration of war addressed to France and her allies. The king of Bavaria's only reply was to quit

his capital and go to Augsburg, and the Bavarian troops, encamped on the Isar at Munich and Landshut, had orders to resist. Marshal Lefebvre had already taken command of them to lead them against the enemy.

On the morning of the 10th of April the whole Austrian army put itself in motion to cross the Inn and begin the war. It did not know very well where the French where, but it was informed there were some of them at Ulm, Augsburg, and Ratisbon, whither marshal Davout was marching. It hoped to surprise them in that state of dispersion, reach the Danube before their concentration, cross it between Donauwerth and Ratisbon, form a junction by its right with Bellegarde's corps, and sweep victoriously over Upper Westphalia, Swabia, and Wurtemberg. Hiller's corps, that of the archduke Louis, and the second reserve, forming a mass of 58 thousand men, and having the prince generalissimo at their head, crossed the Inn at Braunau, on the morning of the 10th of April. Hohenzollern's corps, 27 or 28 thousand strong, crossed it at the same moment below Muhlheim. Lastly, the fourth corps, with the first reserve, 40 thousand men in all, effected its passage at Scharding, not far from the point where the Inn falls into the Danube. On the extreme left Jellachich's division of about 10 thousand men, after crossing the Salza, proceeded to pass the Inn at Wasserburg, and march on Munich. At the extreme right the Vecsay brigade of 5 thousand men, all light troops, marched along the Danube to clear the ground for the army on its right, and to occupy Passau at the junction of the Inn and the Danube. Aware of the importance of that fortress, Napoleon had incessantly urged the Bavarians to put it in a state of defence, and had even sent French officers with the necessary funds for the execution of the works. But nothing had been done in time, and the Bavarian commandant could not help surrendering to the Austrians. It was a *point d'appui* much to be regretted, which had been yielded to them through negligence, and which they might afterwards use to very great advantage.

Having crossed the Inn the Austrians marched in three columns towards the Isar, where they were to encounter the Bavarian troops and exchange the first musket-shots. Though they had applied themselves to render their army more prompt in its movements they advanced slowly, first from habit, next in consequence of the bad weather, and lastly, from the encumbrance of their baggage. Intending to wage a war of invasion, and not possessing the art of finding subsistence everywhere like the French, they had thought of substituting for their immense victualling depôts rolling magazines, which were to accompany them in all their movements. In this way they hoped more easily to imitate Napoleon's suddenly and generally decisive concentrations. Besides these magazines there was a very fine bridge apparatus, and an immense artillery *matériel*. They remained, therefore, for several delays between the Inn and the Isar, and did not arrive before the latter until the 15th. Until then they had seen only patrols of Bavarian cavalry, which they

had affected not to attack in order to prolong the pleasing illusion that they should encounter no hostilities on the part of the Germans. The archduke made ready to cross the Isar before Landshut on the following day, the 16th, and now at last all illusion was at an end, for the Bavarians lined the river with all the appearance of men resolved to defend themselves.

He made some change in the disposal of his columns for this important operation, which was the first of the war, and which for that reason was to be made prompt and decisive. He detached Hiller's corps from his left towards Moosburg, to protect the operation which was to be made before Landshut from all opposition from Munich. He moved Hohenzollern's corps up to that of the archduke Louis, which had been left alone by the detachment of Hiller's, and he ordered them both to force the passage of the Isar opposite Landshut. He posted the two reserves in the rear in column. He ordered prince de Rosenberg's corps, which held the right, to pass the Isar at Dingolfing, where there was no resistance to be apprehended; and to send its light troops to Ebelsbach, to discourage the enemy from holding out at Landshut, when they saw that the Isar had been crossed lower down. Lastly, the Vecsay brigade, already sent forward along the Danube, was to push on to Straubing, very near Ratisbon, in order to procure intelligence of the French.

On the morning of the 16th archduke Charles, personally directing the corps of the archduke Louis, the advanced guard of which was commanded by general Radetzki, advanced upon Landshut to cross the Isar there. When one comes by the Braunau road, as the Austrians did, one descends by wooded hills to the banks of the Isar, which flows through the pretty town of Landshut, and then through verdant meadows. The town is half on the slope of the hills, half on the border of the stream, which divides into two arms in passing through it. Deroy's Bavarian division occupied Landshut with orders to dispute the passage. After evacuating the upper town and all that portion which stands on the right bank of the river, it cut down the bridge over the large arm, filled the Seligenthal suburb with sharpshooters, and drew up in order of battle on the wooded heights of Altdorf, opposite those by which one debouches on Landshut. General Radetzki, advancing from the upper town to the edge of the large arm and opposite the broken bridge, was received with a brisk fire of sharpshooters, to which he replied with that of the sharpshooters of the regiment of the Gradiscans. The archduke, on his side taking advantage of the heights to use his formidable artillery, played with it upon the faubourg of Seligenthal, on the other bank of the Isar, which he laid in ruins and rendered untenable by the Bavarians who were lodged there. He then had the footway of the bridge replaced on the uprights, which were still standing, and crossed it without encountering any resistance in the evacuated faubourg. Towards noon the corps of the archduke Louis debouched with a numerous

cavalry, followed at a little distance by Hohenzollern's corps, and deployed before the Bavarian division of Deroy, which was drawn up in order of battle on the opposite heights of Altdorf. A brisk cannonade took place between the Austrians and the Bavarians; but the latter, receiving intelligence that the Isar had been passed above at Moosburg and below at Dingolfing, withdrew in good order through the woods by the high road from Landshut to Neustadt on the Danube. The loss on either side amounted to about a hundred men. The Bavarians, though divided between two feelings, their displeasure at fighting for Frenchmen against Germans, and their old jealousy of the Austrians, who wanted to take the Tyrol from them, nevertheless behaved very well. They fell back upon the Danube, in the forest of Dürnbach, to which the division of the prince-royal coming from Munich, and that of general De Wrede coming from Straubing, had already retired. They were there near the French, and awaited them with extreme impatience.

Archduke Charles had crossed the Isar with two corps, those of archduke Louis and prince Hohenzollern. He was immediately followed by his two reserves, the Jean de Lichtenstein and the Kienmayer corps. He had, moreover, occupied Moosburg on his left with general Hiller's corps, and Dingolfing on his right with De Rosenberg's. He was therefore beyond the Isar, with the six *corps d'armée* destined to operate in Bavaria, and with a mass of about 140 thousand men. He had but a little way to go to encounter the French, for between the Isar and the Danube the distance is but a dozen leagues, with no considerable stream intervening. But to march that dozen of leagues he had to cross small streams, such as the Abens on the left, and the big and little Laber on the right, steep banks, woods, and marshes. Much consideration was necessary before venturing into that dangerous region, with the chance of running at any moment against the French army, always very formidable, though not yet having Napoleon at its head. On his left archduke Charles had Augsburg and Ulm, on his right Ratisbon. All he knew was that there were French at Augsburg and at Ulm, he could not tell how many or of what kind; and others at Ratisbon, better known, being marshal Davout's corps, the arrival of which in that direction had long been announced. The Austrian commander's plan was to advance straight before him across the country between the Isar and the Danube, and to strike the latter at Neustadt and Kelheim, by pursuing the road which leads from Landshut to those two points. At Neustadt and Kelheim he would find himself between the two known musters of French, that of Augsburg and that of Ratisbon; and he might fall upon the latter, beat marshal Davout, take Ratisbon, and form a junction with general Bellegarde. Having then at his disposal nearly 200 thousand men, it would be easy for him to march to the Rhine across Wurtemberg, sweeping the French before him, surprised and beaten before they had

been able to come together. But it was necessary to cross that almost impenetrable country before the concentration of the French and the arrival of Napoleon, and it was already somewhat late to execute this ambitious project—a very good one it must be owned, if it was as well executed as it was well conceived.

On entering that region archduke Charles had on his left the Abens, running directly towards the Danube, and falling into it after passing through Siegenburg, Biburg, and Abensberg. On his right, passing to his front, flowed the big and the little Laber, which he was to cross near their source, for they rise in the environs and fall into the Danube. Thus he had to advance between the Abens, with which he was to move parallel on his left, and the little and big Laber, which he was to cross on his right, marching across woods and marshes to reach the Danube by the two causeways from Landshut to Neustadt and Kelheim. If he did not choose to advance to these towns, he might make for Ratisbon by a shorter route, by taking the Eckmühl road to the right, which, after crossing the swampy bed of the big Laber at Eckmühl, rises over wooded gorges, and then descends into the plain of Ratisbon, in the midst of which flows the Danube, which here changes its direction to the east, having run in a north-eastern direction from its source to Ratisbon.

Archduke Charles resolved on the 17th to pursue the two roads from Landshut to Neustadt and Kelheim. He directed general Hiller to march from Moosburg to Mainburg on the Abens, to guard himself against the French who were known to be at Augsburg, while Jellachich's division, further to the left, was to come from Munich to Freising and join this same Hiller's corps, of which it was a dependency. A little less to the left archduke Louis was to advance by the Neustadt road and pass through Pfanffenhausen and along the Abens, in order to watch the Bavarians posted in the forest of Dürnbach. In the centre and along the road from Landshut to Kelheim by Rottenburg, the Hohenzollern corps, after having passed the two Labers, was to march on Kelheim, followed by the two reserves, whilst on the right the Rosenberg corps and the Vecsay brigade were to attempt a reconnaissance of Ratisbon by the cross road to Eckmühl.

Thus with two corps on the left, three in the centre, and a sixth on the right, at distances of twenty leagues, archduke Charles advanced from the Isar to the Danube across the rough country we have described, and which is comprised between Landshut, Neustadt, Kelheim, Ratisbon, and Straubing. He ordered lieutenant-general Bellegarde, who had debouched in Upper Westphalia, to press hard on marshal Davout's rear towards Ratisbon, in order to prepare for the general junction of all the Austrian forces.

The archduke marched steadily on the 17th, and with more speed than usual, but still too slowly for the circumstances. He advanced on Pfaffenhausen on the one side, on Rottenburg on the other. The bad weather, his moveable magazines, his great bridge equi-

page, and his artillery *matériel*, dragged over roads made swampy by the rain, accounted for this slowness, if they did not justify it. The only skirmish during the march was with the Bavarian light cavalry, which was now encountered without scruple, since the Austrians had already fought at Landshut against the Germans of the Confederation of the Rhine.

On the 18th archduke Charles, still badly supplied with intelligence from his left, having only learned that on that side there were Bavarians behind the Abens and French towards Augsburg, but better informed on his right, where he knew that marshal Davout was approaching Ratisbon, was thus made certain that the French were divided into two masses, and became confirmed in his intention of falling first upon marshal Davout. Uncertain as yet whether he should go straight to Kelheim on the margin of the Danube and thence descend along the river-side to Ratisbon, or whether he should go at once to Ratisbon by the Eckmühl cross-road, he made a further move, the corps of Hiller and the archduke forming his left along the Abens, Hohenzollern and the two reserves forming his centre round Rohr, Rosenberg forming his right towards Lancqwaid on the big Laben, and the Vecsay brigade at the extremity of his line pushing forth reconnaissances by way of Eckmühl and Egglofsheim on Ratisbon. The most decisive events were approaching, for the archduke was surrounded on all sides by French and Bavarians in a country of almost impenetrable obscurity, in which he might at any moment find himself suddenly in face of the enemy. Three or four hundred thousand men, Austrians, French, Bavarians, Wurtemburgers, Badeners, and Hessians, were about to hurtle together in that close space for five consecutive days with enormous pertinacity, the advantage being destined to remain not alone with the bravest, for both sides were brave, but with that side which could best make its way through that chaos of woods, marshes, hills, and valleys.

Whilst the Austrians, having thus the advance of the French, were preparing to surprise them, the latter fortunately from their warlike habits and their assurance in danger, were not men to let themselves be disconcerted even before they were in possession of all their advantages. The field of battle, on which they arrived from the opposite side, appeared to them inversely, but quite as confused. On our right and on the left of the Austrians, marshal Massena, concentrated on Ulm with the Boudet, Molitor, Carra St. Cyr, and Legrand divisions, was marching on Augsburg to form a junction with Oudinot's corps. Marshal Massena, by order of major-general Berthier, had taken the command of all these troops, which scarcely exceeded 55 or 60 thousand men, the reinforcements not having arrived. At five-and-twenty leagues thence towards Ratisbon, consequently on our left and to the right of the Austrians, marshal Davout debouched with the army of the Rhine, composed of the Morand, Friant, Gudin, and St. Hilaire divisions, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, and the Montbrun light horse, amount-

ing to about 50 thousand men, the best soldiers in the army. General Espagne and General Nansouty's heavy cavalry had already quitted him, the former to join Oudinot's corps, the latter to form the cavalry reserve. We see that the distribution into three corps was not yet effected, for the St. Hilaire division ought to have been then with general Oudinot, to complete the corps of marshal Lannes, and Massena ought to have had only his four divisions with the Hessians and Badeners.

Lastly, between these two masses, but nearer Ratisbon than Augsburg, towards Kelheim and Neustadt, were the Bavarians, covered by the Abens, and posted in the forest of Dürnbach to the number of 27 thousand men. The Wurtembergers were arriving from Ingolstadt to the number of 12 thousand. There was, therefore, a scattered mass of 140 to 150 thousand men, of whom 100 thousand were French and 40 to 50 thousand were Germans. The imperial guard was not yet on the ground: the reinforcements covered the roads of Swabia and Wurtemberg with long columns of men, horses, and *matériel.*

Major-general Berthier had remained a long time at Strasburg to superintend the organisation of the army, not believing that the moment for action was come. On the 11th of April, being made aware at Strasburg of the march of the Austrians to the Inn, he had set off for the banks of the Danube, and had arrived on the morning of the 13th at Gmünd, and on the evening of the same day at Donauwerth. In consequence of the contradictory intelligence he received on the way, he had often given contradictory orders, always striving to accommodate matters to Napoleon's plan, which consisted, as we have stated, in assembling the army in the first place at Ratisbon, if time allowed, or at Donauwerth, if hostilities began sooner than was expected. Having arrived at Donauwerth in the evening, the major-general learned that marshal Davout occupied Ratisbon, that marshal Massena and general Oudinot were at Augsburg, that the Austrians had marched slowly, that Napoleon's plan consequently was still capable of being executed; and then, placing under the orders of marshal Davout all the forces round Ratisbon, under those of marshal Massena all that were round Augsburg, he thought it right to concentrate the army at Ratisbon, and ordered general Oudinot to proceed thither. But suddenly receiving on the 14th a very ambiguous despatch from Paris, in which Napoleon, foreseeing the anticipated movement of the Austrians, advised him to muster at Augsburg, at the same time leaving marshal Davout at Ratisbon with a part of his forces, he countermanded the orders he had issued to general Oudinot, and remained in presence of the enemy until the 17th, with the army divided into two masses, the one at Ratisbon, the other at Augsburg, with the Bavarians between both. In the interval, he employed himself in putting the corps in order, but he did not venture to take any decided step before the arrival of the Emperor.

Fortunately, Napoleon was informed in good time of what was

passing, thanks to the means of communication he had prepared beforehand. On the evening of the 12th he was made acquainted with the passage of the Inn, and entered his carriage that night. On the 15th he stopped some hours at Strasburg, and some at Stuttgard on the 16th; saw by the way and reassured the German kings his allies, and arrived on the morning of the 17th at Donauwerth, time enough to repair everything.

Though it was not less difficult for him than for the archduke Charles to ascertain the truth amidst a quantity of contradictory reports and in so thick a country, he had learned from the Bavarians the passage of the Austrians at Landshut, and with his usual sagacity he guessed that the main body of the Austrians was advancing to the Danube in the hope of passing between the French at Augsberg and those at Ratisbon. Some moments having sufficed for him to unravel this fact, he formed his determination with incredible promptitude.

Two plans presented themselves to him. If he could have known everything very exactly, which never happens in war; if he could have guessed, for instance, that the archduke was about to move on Ratisbon with several corps ill-connected together, he would have had nothing to do but let him proceed to Ratisbon, where marshal Davout with 50 thousand soldiers would have detained him the necessary time, and then with the mass of forces round Augsburg, with Oudinot, Molitor, Boudet, the Bavarians, and the Wurtembergers, that is to say, with 90 thousand men, he might have fallen on the Austrian commander in the rear, have placed him between two fires, and taken his army prisoners to a man. This, however, would have been braving many chances, for Napoleon would have left to the archduke the advantage of a concentrated position, which would have been contrary to the true principles of war, which he more than any other captain had professed and illustrated by immortal examples. The archduke in fact, when placed between the two masses of the French, might have beaten them one after the other, as Napoleon had done by many an enemy on similar occasions. Besides, for the success of such a plan it would have been necessary to know more than Napoleon knew as to the situation of things, as to the moral and physical state of the French and Austrian armies, as to what was to be feared from the one and hoped from the other; lastly, as to the march of the enemy, for the bolder one wishes to be the more one needs to know with whom and with what he has to do. Having, therefore, thought for a moment of this plan, he preferred the second, which was safer. It was to take advantage of the time that remained to him and concentrate the army, bringing Davout from Ratisbon and Massena from Augsburg to Neustadt. Then with 140 or 150 thousand men under his hand, Napoleon would be certain to bear down everything, happen what might, for the chances are never very formidable against a well-concentrated army, which can bring its whole mass to bear on any side on which it is attacked. But this concentration by means of a double march,

Davout's and Massena's, in face of the enemy, likewise presented serious dangers. To surmount these, Napoleon applied all his genius in executing one of the finest operations of his long and prodigious career.

Having arrived at Donauwerth on the 17th, without guard, aides-de-camp, horses, or staff, he immediately gave his orders, transmitting them by the first officers at hand, for major-general Berthier was at that moment at Augsburg.

First he ordered Massena to quit Augsburg on the following morning, the 16th, and go down by the Pfaffenhofen road to the Abens on the left flank of the Austrians, whence he would afterwards direct the march of the marshal towards the Danube or the Isar, towards Neustadt or Landshut, according to the position the army might occupy on his arrival. He enjoined him to leave at Augsburg a good commandant, two German regiments, all the sick and fatigued, with provisions and all necessaries for a fortnight; to make believe that he was marching into the Tyrol, and then descend towards the Danube in all haste, for never, said the Emperor, have I had more need of your devoted zeal. The despatch concluded with these words, *Activity and speed.* At the same moment he gave orders to marshal Davout to quit Ratisbon immediately, leaving there a regiment to defend the town, to ascend the Danube with his *corps d'armée*, move cautiously but resolutely between the river and the mass of the Austrians, and join him by Abach and Ober Saal, in the environs of Abensberg, where the Abens falls into the Danube. Marshal Davout, after what he had detached to form the other corps, might retain about 50 thousand men, fortunately very capable of encountering any number of Austrians. These being marched to the Abens, behind which lay the Bavarians, and whither were directed the Wurtembergers, the Nansouty and Espagne cuirassiers, the Demont division, composed of the fourth battalions of Davout's corps and the grand park of artillery, Napoleon would have in hand about 90 thousand men, quite enough to enable him to await Massena, who was to arrive with 40 or 50 thousand. This last junction effected, he would be in a condition to destroy the great Austrian army, whatever its position, or manœuvre how it might.

These arrangements having been settled, and communicated to those who were to execute them, Napoleon left Donauwerth for Ingolstadt, to be near the point of concentration he had chosen. His orders had not far to travel to Augsburg, and Massena was able, on the same day, to begin his preparations for marching on the following morning, the 18th. But it was more than double the distance from Donauwerth to Ratisbon, and it was not until late in the evening that Marshal Davout received the orders that concerned him. He was then in the environs with four divisions of infantry, one of cuirassiers, and one of light horse, altogether, as we have said, about 50,000 thousand men. Generals Nansouty and Espagne, with the heavy cavalry and part of the light, and general Demont,

with the fourth battalion and the great park, had taken the left of the Danube.

In concentrating round Ratisbon Davout had had several difficulties to encounter. The Friant division, in its march from Bayreuth to Amberg, had been for a while engaged with Bellegarde's 50 thousand men; it had bravely sustained the assault, repulsing the advanced guards of the Austrians; and whilst it was resisting them the rest of the corps, preceded by the St. Hilaire division, had moved away towards Ratisbon, along the Wils and the Regen. The whole day of the 17th, on which Napoleon despatched his orders, had been spent in exchanging a brisk cannonade with the Austrians under the very walls of Ratisbon, in order to give general Friant time to rejoin. The Morand division, occupying Stadt-am-hof, beyond the Danube, checked them by its superb bearing, and returned them many a cannon-shot. The projectiles shot from the heights, enfilading the streets of Ratisbon, killed some men among our troops which were passing through the town to cross the Danube. A shell even burst between the legs of marshal Davout's horse, killing or wounding the horses of his aides-de-camp. The old soldiers of the Morand, Gudin, Friant, and St. Hilaire divisions shared in the highest degree the passions of the French army, and they were exasperated. A French sharpshooter, under the marshal's eyes, ran upon an Austrian sharpshooter, and, after braving his fire, plunged his sword in his breast.

It cost Davout the whole day of the 18th completely to rally the Friant division, and to move the whole body of his troops to the right of the Danube, whilst the Morand division remained in order of battle under the walls of Ratisbon, to hold Bellegarde's Austrians in check, and cover the passage of the river. The St. Hilaire and Gudin divisions passed on that day from the left to the right bank of the Danube. So did the St. Sulpice heavy cavalry, whilst the light horse, under the brave and intelligent Montbrun, executed reconnaissances in all directions, on Straubing, Eckmühl, Abach, to get news of the archduke; for Davout was placed between the 50 thousand men from Bohemia and the main Austrian body coming from Landshut by Eckmühl. The object of these reconnaissances was to explore all the roads on the right bank, by which Davout proposed to ascend the course of the Danube. He might, no doubt, have done so by the left bank, to which the Austrians had not yet penetrated, and which was covered with our detachments and convoys; but the roads on that side were impracticable, and led rather far from the point of concentration chosen by Napoleon between Obersaal and Abensberg. Marshal Davout preferred the right bank, though exposed to the enemy, because the roads there were practicable, and led more directly to the point aimed at. He knew well that the archduke would move along it during his march; but his troops were so steady that he had no fear of being driven into the Danube; he was certain that if jostled they would give back shock for shock, and not fail the more to meet the Emperor at the rendezvous appointed.

It was necessary to ascend the back of the wooded heights that separate the valleys of the big and little Laber from the Danube, to cross them and descend the opposite slope, in sight of the Austrians, to reach the plateau of the Abens at Abensberg, whither Napoleon was striving to bring together the scattered portions of his army. Divers routes presented themselves for this purpose. On marshal Davout's right was the highway from Ratisbon to Ingolstadt, running continuously along the margin of the Danube, and leading by Abach and Obersaal to Abensberg. It was large and in fine condition, but pressed in between the heights and the Danube. Davout might have marched by it, but had he been surprised by the enemy in such a defile, he would have been exposed to a disaster. He reserved it for his baggage and his heavy artillery waggons, and sent a battalion of infantry in advance to secure it by occupying the principal passes. On his left was the cross-road from Ratisbon to Landshut, leading over the big Laber at Eckmühl. This, too, was a fine wide road, but it led right into the midst of the enemy, and was only to be chosen if a great battle was to be desired, which was not the case. Marshal Davout sent forward by it his vanguard, composed of four regiments of chasseurs and hussars and two battalions of the 7th light infantry, commanded by general Montbrun, to observe the Austrians, and occupy them during the march that was about to be executed. Between these two highways there were village roads leading from one height to another, and these were reserved for the bulk of the army. The Friant and Gudin divisions, forming a first column, preceded and followed by the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, were to march by Burg Weinting, Wolkering, Saalhaupt, and Ober Feking. The St. Hilaire and Morand divisions, forming a second column, preceded and followed by Jacquinot's chasseurs, were to march by Ober Isling, Gebraching, Peising, Tengen, and Unter Feking. These two columns, thus advancing side by side, were to reach the back of the heights which separate the big Laber from the Danube, join the baggage column at the issue from the defile of Abach towards Obersaal, and debouche opposite Abensberg, near the Bavarians, with a chance even of not being seen by the Austrians, so woody, hilly, and obscure was the country. The vanguard taking the high road from Eckmühl to Landshut, and consequently exposed to the risk of meeting full front with the main body of the Austrians, who were coming from Landshut, was to advance cautiously, and after having served to screen the two columns of infantry, was to make a deflection to the right, in order to reach the point assigned for rendezvous to the whole *corps d'armée*.

Marshal Davout gave orders to march on the morning of April 19. In the course of the 18th the troops were clear of Ratisbon, and the Friant division itself, having crossed the bridges in the evening, passed the night with the rest of the army on the right bank of the river. To the 65th of the line marshal Davout committed the perilous task of defending Ratisbon against the large armies that

were about to attack it from both banks. He ordered them to shut the gates, barricade the streets, and defend themselves to the uttermost until he relieved them, which could not fail to be soon.

At daybreak on the 19th, the four columns began their difficult march, the baggage on the right along the Danube, two columns of infantry in the centre, by village roads, the vanguard to the left on the highway from Ratisbon to Landshut by Eckmühl. Starting so early and traversing wooded hills, the French at first perceived no enemy. The encounter, however, could not long be delayed, for it was impossible but that hundreds of thousands of men, manœuvring within three or four leagues of each other, should come at last in contact. At that moment, in fact, the archduke Charles having passed the day in the camp at Rohr, on the plateau which separates the Abens from the big Laber, at the opposite side of the very hills the French were engaged in crossing, had at last resolved on his proceedings. Learning more and more positively as he advanced that marshal Davout was at Ratisbon, he determined to march there on the 19th, his arrangements being as follows. General Hiller, forming the extreme left with his own corps and Jellachich's division, had orders to come from Mamburg to Siegenburg to join the archduke Louis, who had been left before Abensberg with his own corps and the second reserve choir to guard the Abens. Archduke Charles, followed by the Hohenzollern corps, with the exception of some battalions placed in observation at Kirchdorf under general Thierry, by Rosenberg's corps, the first reserve and the Vecsay brigade, making together 70 thousand men, was to march on Ratisbon after leaving more than 60 thousand on his left under general Hiller and the archduke Louis. Thus, whilst Napoleon was making the greatest efforts to concentrate his army, the Austrian commander-in-chief was dispersing his from Munich to Ratisbon, over more than thirty leagues.

He put himself in motion on the morning of the 19th, at the same time as marshal Davout, and in a nearly similar order of march. Two columns of infantry, the one consisting of the Hohenzollern corps, the other of Rosenberg's, and the grenadiers of the reserve, were to quit the camp at Rohr and advance across the heights over which the French were marching, the first column by Gross Muss, Hausen, and Tengen, the second by Lancqwaid, Schneidart, and Saalhaupt. The Vecsay brigade, a brigade borrowed from the archduke Louis, the light cavalry and the heavy cavalry detached from the reserve, were to march on Ratisbon by the road from Landshut by Eckmühl, and probably to have an affair with the vanguard under general Montbrun.

Our men had started at daybreak. Of our four columns, that of the baggage moving along the side of the Danube, and sheltered by the heights and by the mass of our infantry divisions, could not encounter any enemy. The two columns of infantry, both preceded and followed by cavalry, marched for some time without discovering anything. At nine o'clock in the morning the head of the two columns crossed the heights, descended on the other side, and only

had a glimpse of some Austrian sharpshooters. The Gudin division, which formed the head of our left column, and which had sent out the sharpshooters of the 7th to a distance, was alone engaged with the Austrian sharpshooters of prince de Rosenberg. The village of Schneidart was rather hotly contested. But our troaps having orders to march did not stop; and, whilst the tirailleurs of the 7th kept up their fire, Morand and Gudin defiled by order of marshal Davout, who had galloped up to hasten the march of the troops. The two divisions hurried on to Ober Feking and Unter Feking, where they were to fall in with the baggage column as it issued from the defile of Abach, very near the general rendezvous. The tirailleurs of the 7th followed Gudin after having fought gallantly, and abandoned Schneidart to the Austrians, who thought they had taken it by force of arms. But as the Austrians continued to advance, the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, which formed the rear of our two columns of infantry, could not fail to encounter them. Whilst Rosenberg's corps, after its skirmish with the 7th light infantry, traversed Schneidart and moved on Dingling, Hohenzollern's corps entered Hausen just as the last companies of the 7th evacuated it, and occupied a mass of wood that extended in a horse-shoe form opposite Tengen.

At that moment general St. Hilaire, passing through Tengen with his division, perceived opposite him on the verge of the wood the Austrian masses of Hohenzollern, preceded by a cloud of tirailleurs. The 10th light infantry having driven back the latter, marshal Davout, who was at that moment with general St. Hilaire, ordered the 3rd of the line on the right and the 57th on the left, to storm the wooded heights that formed a semicircle in front of him, in the centre of which stood the farm of Roith. The 3rd advanced rapidly, charging its arms under fire. But having attacked with too much precipitation, and before having had time to form, it did not succeed, and was obliged to retreat under a shower of grape and balls. Meanwhile the 57th, having formed its attacking columns, put itself on the left of the 3rd, and drove the enemy from the heights he occupied in advance of the wood. The 3rd being soon brought back into line, supported this movement, and the two regiments succeeded in driving back the Austrians into the woods and in establishing themselves firmly on the disputed ground. During this time the three other regiments of the division, the 10th, 72nd, and 105th, were drawn up right and left behind Tengen, ready to support the first two. Unfortunately, the artillery was delayed by the bad state of the roads, and there were but six pieces to set against the mass of the enemy's artillery. Marshal Davout,* seeing the battle well esta-

* I have often had much difficulty in unravelling the truth from amidst the contradictory assertions of witnesses who report military events: I have never had more than on this occasion, and especially with respect to the battle of Tengen. We have the sober, clear, and moderate narrative of general Stutterheim, and many others by Germans. We have on the French side general Pelet, and the manuscript narratives of generals St. Hilaire, Friant, and Montbrun,

blished at this point, hastened to the Gudin and Morand divisions, which had already defiled, to satisfy himself that they had arrived without accident at Unter and Ober Feking, to place them at his extreme right, and thus hinder the enemy, of whose position he was ignorant, from taking that course to the Danube.

At the opposite extremity to the left, general Friant, whose march had been retarded by the state of the roads, had debouched on Saalhaupt between noon and one o'clock, and hearing heavy firing in the direction of Tengen, had hastened to take up a position to the left of the St. Hilaire division with the intention of supporting it. He made the 15th light infantry and the 48th of the line advance under the orders of general Gilly, to enter the wood and clear the flank of the St. Hilaire division. He placed in the plain between Saalhaupt and Tengen the second brigade of the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, with the 33rd, 108th, and 111th, to secure the extremity of his line. General Piré, who commanded a regiment of light cavalry, was ordered to connect the division with general Montbrun's vanguard towards Dingling.

As soon as he was within musket-shot general Gilly proceeded to clear the wood on the left of the St. Hilaire division. The chef de bataillon Sarraire entered it with four companies of the 15th and dislodged the Austrians. The 15th and the 48th thus took up their position on the flank of the St. Hilaire division, and the voltigeur companies of all the regiments stepped out and began to exchange a tremendous fire with the Austrian sharpshooters.

Whilst these movements were taking place on the wings of the St. Hilaire division, the battle on its front had several times changed aspect. The 33rd on the right, and the 57th on the left of the horseshoe enclosing the farm of Roith, had lost a great many men and exhausted their ammunition, which could not easily be replaced, the artillery waggons not having yet arrived. General St. Hilaire ordered up the 72nd in place of the 33rd, and the 105th in place of the 57th, and the fire began again with extreme violence. Prince Hohenzollern pushed forward the Manfredini and Wurzburg regiments, led by prince Louis of Lichtenstein, which made immense efforts to debouch by the horseshoe of which the French occupied the middle. All the officers were wounded in these attempts. Marshal Davout having returned to the St. Hilaire division, had placed himself at the centre with a battalion of the 53rd, and fell upon all who attempted to debouch by the extremities, making prisoners at every fresh move of the Austrians.

and better still, an account by marshal Davout himself. All these narratives contradict each other as to places, hours, and the troops engaged. After having read them again and again, as many as five or six times each, I have come to understand the facts as I have stated them, and I think the account I have given is as near the truth as possible. What I am sure of is, that I have preserved the true character of the event, and that is what is most important in history. The notes I have collected on this matter would form a memoir like those which are drawn up for the Academy of Inscriptions.

The enemy's generals then resolved to make an attempt on St. Hilaire's left, at the point of junction with the Friant division. Prince Louis de Lichtenstein, putting himself at the head of the Wurzburg regiment, and seizing a flag, debouched in column, marching straight against the French. General Gilly with the grenadiers of the 15th and a battalion of the 111th, met prince Louis at the bayonet's point and drove him back. The prince returned to the charge, received several shots, and was put *hors de combat*. The Austrians were withdrawn. In front of the St. Hilaire division prince Hohenzollern made a fresh attempt, but our artillery had just then come up, and its fire checked the assailants. The 10th light infantry then charged into the wood and forced the Austrians to fall back upon Hausen. This movement was supported by our whole line, and the Austrians were on the point of being driven into Hausen, when prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, at the head of the Kaunitz regiment, stopped the furious pursuit of the French. The prince was wounded in saving his *corps d'armée*.

The day was drawing to a close, and in the confusion of this rencontre the French were no more willing than the Austrians to risk a more general engagement. It was enough for marshal Davout that he had accomplished his task by arriving safe and sound at the environs of Abensberg. His right, formed by the Gudin and Morand divisions, having arrived at the rendezvous, and his left, formed by St. Hilaire and Friant, being master of the field of battle, he contented himself with bivouacking there as victor, and awaiting Napoleon's orders for his ulterior movements. His march had been successful on all points; for the brave Montbrun having encountered Rosenberg's corps, had gallantly resisted it, and fell back in the evening on the *corps d'armée* without having sustained any check.

The archduke Charles, stationed on the heights of Grub, with twelve battalions of grenadiers belonging to the first *corps de réserve*, had remained a passive spectator of the battle. Seeing a fight on his left with Hohenzollern, and on his right with Rosenberg, he feared he had the main body of the French before him; and wishing to rally all his troops before risking a general engagement, he had let the fight go on without succouring the Hohenzollern corps. His intention was to renew the conflict on the following day, after having made archduke Louis join him from his post before Abens, and made general Hiller take up the position thus left vacant.

The day had been very bloody, for there had been fighting not only at Dinzling, between Montbrun and Rosenberg, and at Tengen, between St. Hilaire, Friant, and Hohenzollern, but also between the intermediate posts left by the Austrians and the French to connect the two extremities of their lines. Our loss was 200 men of general Montbrun's vanguard, 300 of the Friant division, 1700 of the St. Hilaire division, a few men only of the Morand division, and one or two hundred of the Bavarian horse—in all, 2500

men. The Austrians lost 500 at Dinzling, about 4500 at Tengen, and some hundreds at Buch and Arnhofen—in all nearly 6000.* A considerable number of their soldiers were missing. The general result was of very great importance as regarded the position of the two armies, for marshal Davout, who might have been stopped in his march, and perhaps thrown into the Danube, had fortunately slipped through between the river and the Austrians, had reached the environs of Abensberg with his right, and victoriously assailed the centre of the Austrians with his left. Had the archduke Charles marched in closer order, had he hesitated less for fear of the ground and of Napoleon, he might have routed the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions with his reserve of grenadiers, or at least have severely injured them. But he saw in the whole *mêlée* only reasons for waiting till matters became more clear, and till his left had come up.

Napoleon made a different use of the advantages gained by marshal Davout. Arriving from Ingoldstadt at Vohburg on the night of the 19th, he learned the events of the day, and immediately mounting his horse he gallopped to Abensberg to reconnoitre the ground in person. From that plateau he perceived that the Austrians had only a chain of posts, neither numerous nor well placed, to connect the masses that had fought at Tengen with those which were spread along the Abens. He did not know exactly where was the archduke Charles with his main body, whether before Tengen, over against the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, or along the Abens before the Bavarians; but he saw clearly that the Austrian commander had strangely extended his line; and availing himself of the advantages of concentration which began to be on his side since marshal Davout's successful movement, he thought of making the Austrians suffer the consequences to which they had exposed themselves by their imprudent dispersion. He therefore made the following arrangements on the spot. Leaving marshal Davout the victorious St. Hilaire and Friant divisions with Montbrun's light troops (in all 24 thousand men), he took from him for the moment the Morand and Gudin divisions, bivouacked between Unter and Ober Feking, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the Jacquinot chasseurs, and put them under the temporary command of marshal Lannes, who had just arrived. Bidding marshal Davout stand fast at Tingen and resist any attack whatever that might be made on him, for the army was about to make that point its pivot in order to break the enemy's centre and drive it back upon Landshut, he ordered marshal Lannes to march straight forward with the 25 or 26 thousand men at his disposal and storm Rohr, which seemed to be the centre of the Austrian position. Having himself under his hand the Wurtembergers, who were at that moment debouching on the field of battle, he placed them towards Arnhofen, between

* I repeat once for all that these numbers (and others of the same kind) can only be approximate; but I have taken all possible pains to make them as near the truth as I could.

Lannes and the Bavarians, which latter he ordered to cross the Abens at Abensberg and go and storm Arnhofen. The Wrede division especially, posted behind the Abens from Biburg to Siegenburg, was to wait until the enemy's line was in motion to pass the Abens by force and debouch to our right on the left flank of the Austrians. Each of these attacks was directed against one of the detached posts of the Austrians, which formed a long chain from the Abens to the Laber. It was Napoleon's design, after forcing all these posts, to push on to Landshut and seize the archduke's line of operation, either by falling on his rear, or upon the prince himself, if he fell back in person on Landshut. To render the operation more sure he hastened to modify the order of Massena's march. He had made him descend on Pfaffenhofen perpendicularly to the left flank of the Austrians, having it in view to bend his march either to the Isar or the Danube, according to circumstances. Thinking he had forces enough by him, since he had marshal Davout at Tengen with 24 thousand men, marshal Lannes, about to storm Rohr with 25 thousand, marshal Lefebre preparing to attack Arnhofen and Offensteten with 40 thousand Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and the Demont division and the Nansouty cuirassiers, who were arriving at the rear, he sent Massena forward to Landshut by Freising and Moosburg, ordering him to be there early on the following day, the 21st, in order to hinder the return of the Austrians to that place. It was possible, if Massena arrived in time, that he might carry everything between the Danube and the Isar.

Whilst Napoleon was making arrangements for thus employing the 20th, archduke Charles, stopped in his movement on Ratisbon by the encounter with the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, equally uninformed as his adversary respecting the march of the enemy, but not guessing so well as he what he had to fear, had imagined that the violent resistance he had just met with indicated the presence of Napoleon at Tengen with all his forces, and had resolved to call up the corps of his brother Louis, which had been left before Abens, directing general Hiller, who had had to march all the 19th, to occupy the position quitted by the archduke Louis. He therefore resolved to await on the 20th between Grub and Dinzling, the junction of his left, in order to renew the fight. He left his brother at liberty, however, to interpret this order, and to fight wherever he might be, if he was attacked from the direction of the Abens.

And this conjecture was realised. On the morning of the 20th the archduke Louis perceived masses debouching, some from the Abens by Abensberg and Arnhofen: these were the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, Demont and Nansouty; the others from the Ratisbon road by Reising and Buchhofen: these were Morand, Gudin, Jacquinot, and St. Sulpice. He saw he was about to be seriously attacked, and instead of manœuvring to rejoin his brother

he thought of defending himself where he was, until Hiller's corps should come to his aid.

At that moment Napoleon saw defile before him on the plateau in front of Abensberg, the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, who were going to put themselves in line, and whom the pride of fighting under that great man filled with quite French feelings. He harangued them one after the other (Wurtemberger and Bavarian officers translating his words), and said that he was making them fight not for himself, but for themselves against the ambition of the house of Austria, which was enraged at not having them as of yore under its yoke; that this time he would soon restore them peace and for ever, with such an increase of power that for the future they should be able to defend themselves against the pretensions of their old dominators. His presence and his words electrified his German allies, who were flattered to see him amongst them, entirely trusting to their honour, for at that moment he had no other escort than some detachments of Bavarian cavalry.

Between eight and nine o'clock the whole line was in motion from left to right, from Ober Feking and Buchhofen to Arnhofen and Pruck. Lannes on the left advanced with his 20 thousand foot and 5 thousand horse on Bachel, on the road to Rohr, through a country covered with wood and intersected by numerous defiles. He encountered the Austrian general Thierry, followed by his infantry alone, for his cavalry marching with more speed, were already near Rohr. Lannes ordered the Jacquinot chasseurs to charge, whereupon the Austrian infantry made all haste to seek the cover of the woods, but were overtaken before they could reach them, and sabred before they could form in square. They retired in disorder, running from one clump of trees to another, and leaving behind them many killed and prisoners. It was a pitiable route, the mass of the assailants being so disproportioned to that of the assailed.

At Rohr generals Thierry and Schusteck, having formed a junction, endeavoured to aid each other. Lannes' two divisions of infantry marched against them with the chasseurs and the cuirassiers at their head. Kienmayer's hussars vigorously charged the Jacquinot chasseurs, but were broken up by a countercharge of French cuirassiers, and obliged to fall back on the village of Rohr. At that moment Morand's infantry assailed the village. The 30th, supported by the cuirassiers, attacked it in front, whilst the 13th and 17th were manœuvring to surround it. Seeing this, generals Thierry and Schusteck retreated again, and after an ineffectual volley, fell back on Rottenburg by one of the two causeways which lead from the Danube to the Isar, that from Kelheim to Landshut. Beyond Rohr, the country being more open and retreat more difficult, the Austrian cavalry made noble efforts to cover its infantry. The Kienmayer hussars had just been joined by four squadrons of Levenehr's dragoons detached from the second reserve corps. Both charged at every rencontre with the most brilliant bravery. But if they had some advange over our hussars, our cuirassiers, dashing

upon them, sabred them unmercifully. All the infantry found on the road was taken. In this way Rottenburg was reached towards the close of the day, the disorder continually increasing among the Austrians. General Thierry, having dismounted from his horse to rally his troops, was surprised by fresh charges, and lost three whole battalions. Kienmayer's hussars and Levenehr's dragoons paid for their gallantry by almost complete destruction. Generals Thierry and Schusteck, after having lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners between 4 and 5 thousand men, would have perished with all their forces if fortunately for them general Hiller had not afforded them very timely aid. Instead of descending the Abens to Siegenburg and Biburg, where archduke Louis was engaged, general Hiller perceiving from a distance the route of generals Schusteck and Thierry, had turned off to the right and perpendicularly to the road from Neustadt to Landshut, and continuing his march in the same direction on that from Kelheim to Landshut, he had taken up a position at Rottenburg.

Lannes might have attacked Hiller's corps with the forces at his disposal and have worsted it. But he had executed a long march without having been joined by the right, composed of the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and the day being far advanced, he halted to await further orders. He had lost barely 200 men against 4 or 5 thousand killed or taken prisoners from the enemy, and he had collected cannon, baggage, and almost all the wounded of the battle of Tengen who were spread over the villages he had passed through. Whilst Lannes was thus routing the Austrian generals Thierry and Schusteck, the Wurtembergers and Bavarians were most vigorously assailing the position of Kirchdorf, which was strongly defended by the troops of generals Reuss and Bianchi, under archduke Louis. Victory was more sharply contested at this point, for the Austrian troops were more numerous, in a very strong position, and though well attacked, yet not so well as they might have been by the Morand and Gudin divisions.

The Wurtembergers had marched on Offenstetten, connecting themselves by their left with marshal Lannes, by their right with the Bavarians. The latter had marched by Pruck on Kirchdorf. The Austrian general, Banchi, had fallen back from Biburg on Kirchdorf to join the troops of prince de Reuss, whilst archduke Louis was cannonading Siegenburg to prevent Wrede's Bavarian division from debouching beyond the Abens. The battle grew very hot round Kirchdorf, where the Austrians defended themselves with great energy. The Bavarians were several times repulsed, sometimes with musketry, sometimes at the point of the bayonet. But in the afternoon the Wurtembergers, having carried a village that covered the right of the Austrians, and general Wrede having at the same time crossed the Abens on their left, archduke Louis was constrained to retire to Pfaffenhausen by the road from Neustadt to Landshut. The Bavarians hotly pursued him, and did not halt until very late at the environs of Pfaffenhausen, before the Aspre

grenadiers, who formed the remainder of the second reserve corps, and who rendered to generals Reuss and Bianchi the service which general Hiller had rendered to generals Thierry and Schusteck. The loss of the Austrians on that side was about 3 thousand killed or taken prisoners, that of the Bavarians and Wurtembergers about a thousand.

The battle of the 20th, to which Napoleon gave the name of the battle of Abensburg, though much less keenly contested than that of the 19th, cost the Austrians about 7 or 8 thousand men, which made a total of 13 or 14 thousand men for the two days. But as a manœuvre it was of immense importance, and decided the fate of that first part of the campaign, for it separated the archduke Charles from his left by forcing back the latter upon the Isar, whilst he himself was about to be backed against the Danube towards Ratisbon. Regarded in this light, it was worthy of all the encomiums that could be bestowed on it. When Napoleon arrived that evening at Rottenburg he was intoxicated with joy. He saw his adversary driven back on the Isar at the very beginning of the operations, and the Austrians disheartened, like the Prussians after Jena. He did not clearly see yet all that fortune had in store for him, for he could not collect, from the replies of the prisoners, where were the several archdukes; but supposing that archduke Charles might be in front of him on the Landshut road, he resolved to march on that town in order to surprise and defeat him at the passage of the Isar, if Massena arrived in time at that point. He determined, therefore, to proceed thither on the following day, the 21st, and to push matters to extremities with the Austrians. From what he had seen during the day he was inclined to believe that their whole force was flying towards the Isar, and that marshal Davout, who had become his left pivot, would have only to march straight before him to pick up the remains of the fugitives. In this belief he ordered him to drive back the few troops he supposed to be placed before Tengen, so as to follow the movement of the whole French line on the Isar, and ultimately to fall upon Bellegarde at Ratisbon, when an end had been made of archduke Charles. He did not suspect that what seemed to be the few troops before Tengen was the archduke Charles himself, with the main body of the Austrian forces.

The archduke had waited all the day of the 20th for the renewal of the battle of Tengen, and the junction of his brother Louis. But neither having taken place—on the contrary, many French being seen on the two roads from the Danube to the Isar—he began to be apprehensive for his left, and in order to try and rally it, if no disaster had befallen it, he took up a position on the wooded heights that separate the big and the little Laber from the valley of the Danube, athwart the road leading from Landshut to Ratisbon by Eckmühl. The whole reserve of cuirassiers had orders to place themselves on the back of those heights at the entrance of the plain of Ratisbon, the grenadiers at the summit, and the Hohenzollern and Rosenberg corps on the slope next the Laber, right and left of Eck-

mühl. In this position the archduke was backed against Ratisbon, faced Landshut, and was ready to change his line of operation if his left was absolutely cut off from him, and to reinforce himself with Bellegarde's corps if he were deprived of Hiller's. On his part, lieutenant-general Hiller, who besides his own corps commanded that of archduke Louis by right of seniority, seeing himself hard beset on the Neustadt and Kelheim roads, thought he could not too soon reach Landshut, for he despaired, with reason, of rejoining archduke Charles, and he feared that Landshut itself, where the whole *matériel* of the army, with a vast number of wounded, had just been collected, had been carried by the enemy. In consequence he ordered the columns on the two roads to make a night march to Landshut so as to arrive there very early in the morning.

On the night of the 20th the Austrians poured on upon Landshut from the two roads. The French, almost as early as the Austrians, burst upon it like two torrents.

After sleeping a few hours on a chair, without undressing, Napoleon was in the saddle at daybreak of the 21st, to direct in person the pursuit along the Landshut road. Though still ignorant of the presence of archduke Charles at Eckmühl, he had made further reflections on that subject, in consequence of which he had detached the Demont division, the Nansouty cuirassiers, and the Bavarian divisions of general Deroy and the prince-royal, on his left towards the big Laber, not wishing, in so uncertain a situation, to leave marshal Davout reduced to a force of 24 thousand men. With the 25 thousand under Lannes he continued to pursue the corps of Hiller and archduke Louis along the road from Rottenburg to Landshut, whilst the Bavarian general de Wrede pursued them by the Pfaffenhausen road. He reckoned on the arrival of Massena at Landshut with at least 30 thousand men.

Marching with Morand's infantry, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the light cavalry, he arrived very early at Landshut, having picked up at every step fugitives, wounded, cannon, and heavy baggage. On arriving at Altdorf at the debouché of the woods, whence the view commanded the verdant plain of the Isar and the town of Landshut, an indescribable confusion was perceived. The Austrian cavalry was passing towards the bridges with their infantry, both arriving by the two roads before mentioned. The obstruction was further increased by the *matériel* of the army, and notably by a superb train of pontoons brought on waggons for passing the Danube, and even the Rhine, had heaven favoured this levy of bucklers against France. Bessières, who had come up suddenly like Lannes and the Emperor, and had only an aide-de-camp or two at hand, was leading the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, the Jacquinot chasseurs, and 15th light infantry of Morand's division. Perceiving the spectacle before him, he ordered his chasseurs to charge the Austrian cavalry, which defended itself bravely, notwithstanding the disorder, and the swampy and slippery state of the ground; but the French cuirassiers, charging it *en masse*, obliged it to give way. The Aus-

trian generals then made it hastily pass the bridges, in front of which they drew up their infantry against us, to give time for the baggage to defile; and they placed the Aspre grenadiers in Landshut itself, and especially in the elevated quarters of the town. But the whole Morand division soon came up. The 13th light and the 17th of the line attacked the Austrian infantry, whilst the French cavalry charged it again. It could not withstand these reiterated attacks, and was compelled to fall back in all haste upon the bridges, in order to pass them in time. It did effect its retreat, leaving in the meadows many prisoners, a considerable number of artillery carriages, and the train of pontoons before mentioned. The 13th and a battalion of the 17th threw themselves into the suburb of Seligenthal, which they carried under a most severe fire of musketry. It remained for them to cross the great bridge over the main branch of the Isar. The Austrians had set it on fire. General Mouton, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, at the head of the grenadiers of the 17th, whom he animated by voice and gesture, led them on sword in hand to the blazing bridge, crossed it under a hail of bullets, and ascended with them the steep streets of Landshut situated on the other bank of the Isar. At that moment Massena arrived with the Molitor and Boudet divisions, one of Oudinot's divisions, and the light cavalry of general Marulaz, too late to hinder the retreat of the Austrians, but soon enough to precipitate it. At sight of this overwhelming combination of forces, the Austrians evacuated Landshut, abandoning to us, besides an immense *matériel*, 6 or 7 thousand prisoners, and some dead or wounded. Their line of operation then was forced from them, and with it they had lost all the military wealth one loses when the principal road is seized by which one has marched against the enemy.

Whilst Napoleon was executing this triumphant pursuit, with his centre augmented by a part of Massena's forces, cannon was heard on his left where Marshal Davout was once more encountering the masses of archduke Charles. The cannonade, in fact, was extremely loud, though at the distance of eight or nine leagues from Landshut, and was of a nature to disquiet Napoleon, who, though believing he was pursuing the bulk of the Austrian army, was not certain that he had not left marshal Davout a large part of it to contend with. Had the latter only the army of Bohemia to deal with, even that would be much for the two divisions at his disposal. What had actually happened was as follows:

Having, as we have seen, received orders on the preceding evening to sweep before him the slight forces that were supposed to have been left on the Laber after the battle of Abensberg, he had put himself in motion in the morning, at the very moment Napoleon was marching on Landshut. The St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, after resting on the 20th from the battle of the 19th, had quitted Tengen on the 21st, at five in the morning, following the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg, which were going to take up the positions assigned to them by archduke Charles on the

slopes of the hills between the valley of the big Laber and the plain of Ratisbon. The vanguard of our two divisions, in debouching from the valley of the Tengen into that of the big Laber, encountered the rear of the Austrians on a woody plateau between Schneidart and Päring. The tirailleurs of the 10th moved forward to repulse those of the enemy, whilst our hussars charged his light cavalry. The Austrians were forced to give way, and presently our flying artillery galloped up, poured a shower of grape after them, and obliged them to retreat with all speed. The Rosenberg and Hohenzollern corps, fearing that they had to do with a considerable part of the French army, thought it advisable to fall back immediately, in order not to lose time or the means of occupying the posts designed for them on the road from Landshut to Ratisbon, right and left of Eckmühl. Our two divisions advanced then, that of St. Hilaire on the right, along the margin of the big Laber, that of Friant to the left, along the foot of the wooded heights that form one of the sides of the valley. These heights being filled with Rosenberg's sharpshooters, the Friant division suffered much more severely than the St. Hilaire, which had the open valley of the Laber to traverse. Wishing to relieve himself from these sharpshooters, general Friant sent out from the regiments a considerable number of voltigeurs, who, led by the brave engineer, captain Henratz, dislodged the Austrians, and cleared the woods on our left. As the divisions continued their march two villages presented themselves—Päring, at the foot of the rocks, Schierling, on the edge of the stream. Both were to be carried. Whilst our tirailleurs were penetrating into the woods, general Friant pushed forward the 48th on the village of Päring. As he was giving his orders with his usual resolution and ability, having marshal Davout at his side, his horse was knocked down by a cannon-ball. Immediately mounting another, he had the village of Päring taken under his own eye at the point of the bayonet, and made 400 prisoners there. At the same moment general St. Hilaire made an equally vigorous and successful attack on Schierling, and likewise took there some hundreds of prisoners. Just then the Bavarians, the Demont division, and the Nansouty cuirassiers, were seen approaching from Landshut, by the very provident orders of Napoleon. The bridges of the Laber were repaired with all haste, in order to effect a communication with these very welcome reinforcements. It was mid-day, and the very hour when Napoleon entered Landshut.

Whilst Friant and St. Hilaire were thus advancing, Rosenberg and Hohenzollern had proceeded to take up a position on the heights bordering on the big Laber, just at the point where they are traversed by the cross-road from Landshut to Ratisbon. This road, crossing the big Laber here in front of the castle of Eckmühl, rose in successive inclinations through the woods, and then emerged by Egglofsheim on the plain of Ratisbon. To the left of that road, above Eckmühl, were two villages (Ober Leuchling and Unter Leuchling), leaning one on the other, and commanding a small

ravine that debouches into the great Laber. Rosenberg's corps had posted itself in these two villages. Hohenzollern's occupied the road itself, along the inclined plains above Eckmühl, with an advanced guard beyond the big Laber, in the direction of Landshut. It was very distinctly seen in that strong position, barring the route it was ordered to defend.

Marshal Davout approached, and deployed in face of the Austrians, within a cannon-shot of them, having Friant on his left, before the villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling; St. Hilaire and the Bavarians on his right, in the low grounds adjacent to the big Laber. Whilst he was thus deploying, a column of Hungarians advanced, as if to make a sortie against us. Marshal Davout having at hand a battery of flying artillery made it fire immediately, and with such effect that the Hungarian column fell back in disorder. The marshal then took up a position within a short cannon-shot of the Austrians, and a tremendous cannonade began on either side. It lasted several hours without results; for the Austrians, having no other orders than to cover the approaches to the plain of Ratisbon, were not likely to assume the offensive; and marshal Davout, surmising that he had considerable forces before him—probably the archduke himself at the head of his main army—did not choose to come to a decisive engagement without the Emperor's orders, and without sufficient means. He contented himself then with securing his position for the night, and making it convenient for the next day's attack, if, as he was convinced would be the case, Napoleon gave orders for it, with means proportioned to the difficulty. At night he put a stop to the useless firing, and the Austrians gladly followed the example, to take the rest of which they had great need. General Friant established himself opposite Ober Leuchling, with his left resting on the woody summits that separated us from the plain of Ratisbon. General St. Hilaire, bearing slightly to the left, established himself before Unter Leuchling, separated from the Austrians by the little ravine which ran into the big Laber. The Bavarians and the cavalry spread over the plain on the margin of the river. The events of this day, made up of rear-guard conflicts, storming of positions, and a long cannonade, cost the Friant division 1100 men; the St. Hilaire division, 300; total 1400; and the Austrians at least 3000. Adding to these, for the taking of Landshut, 300 men on our side and about 7000 on that of the Austrians, our reckoning for killed, wounded, and prisoners was 1700, and that of the Austrians 10 thousand. The number of men, whom this disheartening series of disasters induced to quit their colours, was very great on the enemy's side.

The day's work being done, marshal Davout immediately sent general Piré to the Emperor, to give him an exact account of what had taken place, and of as much as could be perceived of the position and force of the Austrians in that maze of woods and streams which lay between Landshut and Ratisbon. Anxious about the cannonade heard on his left, towards Eckmühl, the Emperor

had not lain down, that he might receive the reports that would of course be sent to him from all sides. With his prodigious penetration he had already partly discovered the state of things, and he was beginning to have no doubt as to the enemy's position. In fact, Massena, on his march from Augsburg by Pfaffenhausen to Landshut, had fallen in with no more than a body of some thousand flankers, whom he had driven before him in disorder beyond the Isar. The masses of the archduke Louis and of general Hiller, which had been pursued through the town of Landshut, neither by their number nor by any other sign, denoted the presence of the main army. Marshal Davout's last engagement, news of which arrived in the night, cleared up all remaining doubts. Napoleon plainly discerned that he had on his left, along the road from Landshut to Ratisbon by Eckmühl, either the archduke Charles himself with the main body of his forces, or, at least, the army of Bohemia, removed by the Ratisbon bridge from the left to the right of the Danube. In the former case he ought to move to Eckmühl with all his forces; in the latter, he ought considerably to reinforce marshal Davout. On the strength of what he had heard of the battle of Leuchling, Napoleon, at two in the morning, sent off the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the Wurtembergers, under general Vandamme. Both these bodies had removed a little in the rear of Landshut, and had consequently a shorter distance to retrograde towards Eckmuhl. He also sent general Piré to marshal Davout, to announce this reinforcement, and to promise others more considerable when all was certainly known.

The indications, which would have been vague and indefinite for any but him, were momentarily accumulating, and at last his conviction was settled. Among other facts made known to him, there was one that dissipated all his doubts; this was the taking of Ratisbon by the Austrian army.* The reader remembers that Napoleon had ordered marshal Davout to leave a regiment in Ratisbon to guard the town, which would have been a fault, since a regiment was not sufficient, had it not been urgently necessary to march to Abensberg with the greatest possible mass of forces. Davout then had left the 65th, an excellent regiment, commanded by colonel Coutard, with orders to barricade the gates and the streets of the town, for Ratisbon had no other fortification than a mere wall, and to defend the place to the last extremity. Colonel Coutard had had to do on the 19th with the army of Bohemia, and had so well resisted it with his musketry that he killed 800 of the enemy. But on the following day, the 20th, the army of the archduke Charles

* A long series of letters he wrote during the night, and which has remained unknown to historians, displays with the greatest precision the series of views he successively entertained until his mind was made up, and he gave his final orders for the battle of Eckmühl. This correspondence of a few hours is one of the most curious and instructive spectacles as regards the study of the human mind. I have read it several times with attention, and I have deduced from it the facts I relate.

appeared before him on the right bank of the river coming from Landshut, and he was without cartridges, having spent them in the fight of the preceding day. Marshal Davout, being informed of this, had sent him two chests of ammunition, which fell into the enemy's hands, and not a single packet of cartridges entered Ratisbon. Beset by two armies, not having a shot to fire, and not being able to defend himself from the top of the walls or the barricades with his bayonets, colonel Coutard was constrained to surrender. Archduke Charles was then master of Ratisbon, of the two banks of the Danube, and of the point of junction with the Bohemian troops, which partly indemnified him for having been separated from archduke Louis and general Hiller, but did not indemnify him either for the 24 thousand men already lost in three days, or for the loss of his line of operation, or, above all, for his moral ascendancy wholly gone and passed over to his adversary's side. When Napoleon was made aware of the misfortune of the 65th he was filled with a desire for vengeance, and, at the same time, convinced that archduke Charles was on his left, since the 65th had been caught between two armies; that marshal Davout had before him, at Eckmühl, the greater part of the Austrian forces, and that he himself must instantly make a move to the left with all the forces he could command, to support marshal Davout, and overwhelm archduke Charles. He had already sent off in the night, as we have said, general St. Sulpice with four regiments of cuirassiers, and general Vandamme with the Wurtembergers. He immediately despatched marshal Lannes with general Nansouty's six regiments of cuirassiers, and the two fine divisions of generals Morand and Gudin, ordering him to march all night so as to reach Eckmühl towards noon, and be able to afford his troops an hour's rest before battle. Doing nothing by halves, because he did not discern the truth by halves, Napoleon further resolved to march in person with marshal Massena and his three divisions, to which he added general Espagne's superb division of cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, with the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions much reduced by the engagements of the 19th and 21st, with the Bavarians and Demont's division, numbered from 32 to 34 thousand men: Generals Vandamme and St. Sulpice brought him 13 or 14 thousand, and marshal Lannes 25 thousand, which made a total of 72 thousand. Napoleon, accompanied by Massena and Espagne's cuirassiers, was about to swell to 90 thousand the total of fighting men before Eckmühl, more than enough to overpower archduke Charles, even were he already joined by the Bohemian army. Napoleon sent word to marshal Davout that he would arrive with all his forces between twelve and one o'clock, that he would announce his presence by several salvoes of artillery, and that on hearing that signal he should begin the attack forthwith.

Napoleon made some further arrangments before his departure for Eckmühl. He gave marshal Bessières, who was to pursue the two corps of Hiller and archduke Louis beyond the Isar, besides

the Marulaz light cavalry and a portion of the German cavalry, Wrede's Bavarian division, and Molitor's fine French division. The Boudet division, one of Massena's four, and the Tharreau division, Oudinot's second, remained to be disposed of. Napoleon echeloned them between the Isar and the Danube, from Neustadt to Landshut, to watch everything that might happen between the two rivers, and to move either to Neustadt on the Danube, if a part of the army of Bohemia threatened our line of operation, or to Landshut on the Isar, if archduke Louis or general Hiller attempted to repair their mischance by facing round against marshal Bessières.

Having given these orders, Napoleon galloped off accompanied by marshal Massena, for Eckmühl, one of the battle-fields immortalised by his genius. It was daybreak on the 22nd when he started. There had been incessant fighting since the 19th, and it was about to be renewed on that memorable day with more vehemence and larger bodies of combatants.

On both sides all was ready for a decisive action. Archduke Charles could no longer indulge any hope of recovering his left from beyond the Isar, nor ought he to have had any other desire than to form a junction with the Bohemian army—a move which the taking of Ratisbon facilitated. But he wished in his turn to attempt something which, in case of success, might have turned the chances in his favour, and cut Napoleon off from his line of operations, as he had cut the Austrians off from theirs. He conceived, therefore, the singular project of making an attack in three columns on Abach, in the same direction that marshal Davout had taken in his march from Ratisbon to Abensberg. Having his back now to Ratisbon and his face to Landshut, he had only to make a movement by his right on Abach to execute this plan, whereby he would have been placed on the French line of communication; and as there was at Abach only general Montbrun's vanguard, it would have been possible to break through and debouche on our rear. But whether from fear of what might result from any bold enterprise in presence of such an adversary as Napoleon, or from anxiety for the fate of an army on which depended the safety of the monarchy, the archduke proceeded to the execution of this new scheme in so hesitating a manner as must have rendered its success impossible. In the first place, in order to give general Kollowrath, detached from the Bohemia army, time to cross the Danube, he decided that the attack should not take place until between twelve and one o'clock, the time fixed on by Napoleon for forcing the passage of Eckmühl. He distributed the troops into three columns. The first, consisting of Kollowrath's corps with part of the Vecsay brigade for a vanguard, was to march from Burg Weinting on Abach. It was 24 thousand strong. The second, made up of the Lindenau division and the rest of the Vecsay brigade, and commanded by prince John of Lichtenstein, was to march by Weilhoe on Peising. It was 12 thousand strong, and had the commander-in-chief at its head. The third, nearly 40 thousand strong, composed of Rosenberg's corps, which was placed

in the villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, in face of marshal Davout, of Hohenzollern's corps, which was barring the Eckmühl road, and of the grenadiers of the reserve and the cuirassiers, who were guarding the entrance of the plain of Ratisbon by Egglofsheim, was to remain in its place and defend the road from Landshut to Ratisbon against the French, whilst the first two columns were making their attempt on Abach. So then the archduke was preparing to assume the offensive with his right, 36 thousand strong, whilst his left, 40 thousand strong, would stand on the defensive midway up the heights which separate the big Laber from the valley of the Danube. Napoleon, on his side, marching on Eckmühl to the support of marshal Davout, was about to fall on that left with all his forces, the two hostile commanders thus acting on each other's means of communication, but the one with hesitation, the other with irresistible vigour. That left of the archduke's which was to contest with us the road from Ratisbon to the environs of Eckmühl, was disposed as follows. Rosenberg's corps was stationed midway up the heights bordering on the Laber, behind the two villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, flanking the Ratisbon high road. A little further and lower was Hohenzollern's corps, occupying the margin of the great Laber, the castle of Eckmühl, and the slopes of the Ratisbon road above it. On the reverse of the hills in the plain of Ratisbon was the whole mass of the cuirassiers and grenadiers in front and rear of Egglofsheim. It was then in front of the two villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, then on the Eckmühl road, ahd lastly, on the plain of Ratisbon, that the action was to take place.

Until eight o'clock a thick fog enveloped that rural scene which was soon to be drenched with the blood of thousands of men. As soon as it cleared away both sides prepared for action. Marshal Davout placed the Friant division on his left over against the wooded heights, against which rested Ober and Unter Leuchling, on his right the St. Hilaire division, to attack those two villages in front. More to the right and lower down on the margin of the Laber he had ranged the Bavarian and Wurtemburg cavalry, and behind these the divisions of French cuirassiers, which were already arrived. The Austrians, on their side, posted themselves as strongly as they could on the heights. Prince Rosenberg barricaded the village of Unter Leuchling, the more menaced of the two, and posted part of his forces in the two villages, the rest on a woody plateau which commanded them. To connect himself with the Eckmühl road, which ran in his rear, he deployed the Czartoryski regiment on a hill side with a large quantity of artillery, so as to sweep the whole valley by which the French were to present themselves. The Biber brigade of Hohenzollern's corps, was deeply massed along the road above Eckmühl, whilst Wukassovich occupied the other bank of the big Laber with several detachments, awaiting the French who were coming from Landshut. Not a musket or a cannon-shot was fired before noon; only there were seen frequent movements of men and horses, and the masses of the Austrian army marked with long white

lines the wooded hill-sides and the moist and verdant meadows. Towards noon dense columns appeared in the direction of Landshut. These were the Morand and Gudin divisions preceded by the Wurtembergers, and followed by marshal Lannes and Massena and by Napoleon himself, all coming up at a gallop. The French troops from Landshut debouched by Buchhausen from a chain of hills facing Eckmühl, and forming the opposite side of the valley of the big Laber. There was no need for the appointed signal, for the battle began at once on the meeting of the vanguards. The Wurtembergers, on debouching from Buchhausen, were met with grape and charges of Wukassovich's light cavalry. They were driven back, but soon rallied by the brave Vandamme, and, supported by the Morand and Gudin divisions, they took Lintach, lined the Laber opposite Eckmühl, and connected themselves by their left with the Demont division and the Bavarians. On their right the advanced posts of the Gudin division spread themselves out between Deckenbach and Zaitzkofen, opposite Eckmühl and Roking.

At the sound of the first cannon-shot fired by the vanguard the intrepid Davout put his two divisions in motion. The French artillery at first poured out a storm of projectiles on the whole front of the Austrians, and obliged them to shut themselves up in the two villages. The Friant and St. Hilaire divisions advanced in order, the former to the left upon the woods on which rested the right of Rosenberg's corps, the latter to the right upon Aber and Unter Leuchling, both of which were within a musket-shot. A most destructive fire of musketry was opened on the St. Hilaire division as it moved upon the village, but made no impression on that veteran body, which was led by the brave St. Hilaire, surnamed in the army *the knight without fear and without reproach.* Ober Leuchling, which was more sunk in the ravine and of easier access, was first taken. Unter Leuchling, which was steep and barricaded within, was vigorously defended by the Austrians. The 10th infantry, which was ordered to attack, being exposed to the fire both of the village and of the wood above it, lost in a moment 500 men between killed and wounded. It forced its way into the village notwithstanding, bayoneted all who resisted it, and made several hundred prisoners. The Bellegarde and Reuss-Graitz regiments that had been posted in the villages then retired to the wooded plateau in the rear, and there defended themselves with fresh vigour. During this time the Friant division on the left had attacked the woods adjacent to the villages, and driven back their defenders, the Chasteler, archduke Louis, and Cobourg regiments, forming prince Rosenberg's right. After a very destructive fire of sharpshooters, the 48th and the 111th, led by general Barbanègre, charged and drove before them with the bayonet all the Austrian troops in the woods. Rosenberg's corps thus pushed on one side towards the woods which crowned the chain, on the other beyond the two villages on the wooded plateau that commanded them, was

backed against the opening through which ran the Eckmühl road, and there it tried to maintain its ground. At that moment, low down to the right before Eckmühl, the attacks were beginning with equal vigour. Whilst the Bavarian cavalry, supported by our cuirassiers, was charging the Austrian cavalry in the meadow, the Wurtemberg foot had rushed forward to take Eckmühl from the Wukassovich infantry, which they did in spite of a dense fire from the walls of the castle. The slopes of the road up the mountain were then seen covered with deep masses of infantry and cavalry. On the left were the remains of Rosenberg's corps defending the plateau above the two Leuchlings; to the right were the wooded heights of Roking, on which a part of the Biber brigade was posted. It was necessary therefore to carry these points, and so outflank on both sides the masses that barred the road.

Napoleon, accompanied by Lannes and Massena, ordered the decisive attack, whilst general Cervoni, a brave officer who was holding a map open before them was killed by a cannon ball. Lannes led the Gudin division to the right against the Roking heights. Crossing the great Laber at Stangelmühle the division on one side ascended the heights directly, on the other extending its movement to the right it passed round them, and took them one by one from the Biber brigade, which contested the ground foot by foot. On the road, which was of rather steep ascent, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg horse charged the Austrian light cavalry, which, having the advantage of the ground, rushed down upon our allies and swept them away to the margin of the Laber. The French cuirassiers coming to their aid galloped up the slopes, overthrew the Austrian horsemen, and reached the summit of the road at the moment when Gudin's infantry appeared above their heads masters of the Roking heights. Seeing the French cuirassiers galloping up the road and knocking the Austrians over in spite of the disadvantage of the ground, the Gudin infantry clapped their hands and shouted, "Vivent les cuirassiers!"

On the left the struggle was continued between the St. Hilaire and the Bellegarde and Reuss-Graitz regiments, which contested with each other the wooded plateau above Leuchling. St. Hilaire at last forced his way across it towards the road, driving the two regiments before him. Seeing this, the brave generals Stutterheim and Sommariva charged with Vincent's *chevaux legers* and the Stipsicz hussars upon St. Hilaire's infantry, but was met at the point of the bayonet and driven to the edge of the Ratisbon road, the summit of which was then occupied by St. Hilaire on one side, whilst Gudin's infantry crowned it on the other. The Austrian horse, now accumulated on the road, made fresh efforts against the mass of our cavalry, charged, was charged in its turn, and ended by yielding the ground.

Every impediment was now overcome, and the Ratisbon road belonged to us, for Friant on the left, traversing the wood which

surmounted the chain, was already descending on the other side, and Gudin on the right, having also crossed that chain, was beginning to debouche on the plain of Ratisbon towards Gailsbach. Rosenberg and Hohenzollern's troops, outflanked right and left, retired behind the mass of Austrian cuirassiers, ranged in order of battle at Egglofsheim. Our cavalry followed them at full trot, having on its left the Friant and St. Hilaire infantry, and Gudin's on its right. It was seven in the evening, night was coming on, and behind the Bavarian and Wurtemberg cavalry the ten regiments of the Nansouty and St. Sulpice cuirassiers debouched *en masse*, making the earth resound under their horses' hoofs. A terrible collision was inevitable between the two cavalries, the one wishing to cover the plain upon which archduke Charles was then falling back, the other wanting to possess itself of that plain in order to terminate its victory beneath the walls of Ratisbon. The Gottesheim cuirassiers were the first to charge. The French cuirassiers, coolly awaiting them, met them with a discharge of all their fire-arms, and then a portion of them charging in their turn, took them in flank, broke, and pursued them. Then the Austrian cuirassiers, surnamed the emperor's, came to the aid of the Gottesheimers, and were also driven back by ours. The brave Stipsicz hussars strove to support their heavy cavalry, and did not hesitate to assail our cuirassiers. After a gallant effort they were overthrown like the others, and the whole mass of the Austrian cavalry fled in disorder beyond Egglofsheim to Kofering. Whilst our men were galloping along the road, the Austrians, finding the plain swampy, endeavoured to regain the road, and thus became mingled with the mass of our cavalry. A multitude of single combats then took place by the uncertain light of the moon, and nothing was heard but the clashing of sabres on their cuirasses, the shouts of the combatants, and the tramp of horses. Our cuirassiers wearing double cuirasses, which covered them all round, could more easily defend themselves than the Austrians, who, having only breastplates, fell in great numbers, mortally wounded by the thrusts dealt them behind. Never within twenty years had there been such a scene of carnage.

Night had now fallen, and it became a matter of prudence to stop the fight. By advancing there was a chance of meeting the archduke's army falling back in disorder on Ratisbon, and throwing it into the Danube; but on the other hand, it might be found drawn up in order under the walls of the town, and capable of arresting the victors, who debouched promiscuously by several issues from the valley of the Laber. Napoleon now came up with Massena and Lannes to Egglofsheim. After a few minutes' deliberation the more prudent course was adopted, and he left it open till the morrow, either to fight another battle if the archduke made a stand before Ratisbon, or to pursue him across the Danube if he retreated beyond that river. He, therefore, gave orders to bivouac on the spot. This was wise, for the troops were spent with fatigue,

especially those which came from Landshut. There were none, indeed, come up but the Wurtembergers, Morand and Gudin. Massena's three divisions were still in the rear.

This decisive battle of the 22nd, known as the battle of Eckmühl, cost us about 2500 men put *hors de combat*, most of whom belonged to the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions, which, by their conduct on these four days, obtained for their commander the glorious and well-merited title of prince of Eckmühl. It cost the Austrians about 6 thousand killed and wounded, a great number of pieces of artillery, and 3 or 4 thousand prisoners, collected at night in the villages passed through in following up the retreat of the Austrian army. By this battle archduke Charles was finally separated from Hiller and archduke Louis, and driven back in disorder on Bohemia, after the loss of his line of operation, Bavaria, and the high road to Vienna.

For the first time in four days Napoleon could take some rest, and very little he took, for he wished to complete the series of these grand operations on the following day. He foresaw that there would be no battle to fight, for that archduke Charles would cross the Danube in all haste; but it was his intention to make that a work of difficulty and disaster.

The archduke, who had halted in his movement on Abach upon learning the disaster of his left, had no other course open to him than to cross the Danube, and rejoin the army of Bohemia, half of which he had rallied under Kollowrath, and then to march down one bank of the river whilst Napoleon was marching down the other. To give battle with the Danube at his back would have been contrary to the rules of war, and quite inexcusable in the state of the Austrian army, which, though it had behaved very well, had returned to a sense of its inferiority as compared with the French army. Besides this, the Austrian cavalry was not numerous enough to contend with the French for the possession of the vast plain of Ratisbon. It was therefore resolved that Kollowrath's corps, which had been marched to Abach in the morning and back to Burg Weinting in the evening, should cover the retreat; for not having fought yet it was less fatigued than the others. The bulk of the army was to pass through Ratisbon and over the town bridge, whilst the reserve corps crossed by a bridge of boats lower down, and that the cavalry should occupy the French by skirmishing with them in the plain. These arrangements were carried into effect on the 23rd, with tolerable order and success. Long before day the several *corps d'armée* traversed Ratisbon, whilst general Kollowrath, retiring slowly towards the town, gave the archduke's troops time to defile. The grenadiers were collected below Ratisbon, to effect their passage; the cavalry manœuvred between Ober Traubling and Burg Weinting.

The French, too, were very early in motion. As soon as there was light enough to see by, the light cavalry was sent forward to reconnoitre, and, being attacked by the Austrian cavalry, another

mêlée ensued, in which all arms fell into frightful confusion. In this gallant service the Austrian cavalry lost nearly a thousand men, but retiring upon the town, through which they defiled at a gallop, they drew our attention in that direction, and away from the bridge of boats over which the grenadiers were passing. A detachment of light cavalry at last caught sight of it, and Lannes' artillery galloped up and began to play on the Austrians. A great number of grenadiers were shot or drowned, the bridge was destroyed, and the blazing boats were carried down the Danube; but the bulk of the troops effected their retreat with the loss of only some hundred men. Marshal Davout on the left, with the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions, and marshal Lannes on the right, with the Morand and Gudin divisions, and the cavalry in the centre, did not debouche on the town until the last Austrian battalions were passing through it. The gates were immediately shut against our voltigeurs.

Napoleon was determined to enter it that very day, both to avenge the mischance of the 65th and to get possession of the bridge, by which he might pursue archduke Charles. The town was only surrounded with a wall, with towers at intervals, and a ditch. It could not give occasion for a regular siege, but, if defended by numbers, it might hold out for some hours, or even days, and for so long delay the pursuit. Napoleon ordered the whole mass of Lannes' and Davout's artillery to be ranged in line, to batter down the walls. The unfortunate town was immediately assailed with volleys of shot and shells, and took fire in several places.

Impatient to overcome this resistance, Napoleon approached the town amidst a fire of sharpshooters, kept up by the Austrians from the walls and by the French from the edge of the ditch. Whilst he was looking through a telescope he received a ball in the instep, and said, with the coolness of an old soldier, "I am hit!" The wound might have been dangerous; for, if it had been higher up, the foot would have been shattered, and amputation would have been inevitable. The surgeons of the guard took off his boot and dressed the wound, which was not serious. At the news that the Emperor was wounded, the soldiers of the nearest corps broke spontaneously from their ranks, and gathered round him with the loudest expressions of affection. There was not one of them but thought his own existence bound up with his. Napoleon shook hands with those that were nearest to him, assuring them that it was a mere nothing, and immediately mounted his horse and rode along the front of the army, which received him with delirious joy and enthusiasm. The soldiers hailed in him the fortunate victor of Eckmühl, whose person death had just grazed, to show them all that he shared danger with them, and that if he was prodigal of their lives he was not thrifty of his own. He passed before the regiments that behaved best; called out from the ranks the officers and even the privates who had distinguished themselves by their bravery, and bestowed rewards on them all. There were privates who received grants of 1500 francs a year.

But victory was to be completed, and Napoleon sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to Lannes to expedite the taking of Ratisbon. The intrepid marshal had approached the Straubing gate, and had directed all his artillery against a projecting house which rose above the wall. The house was knocked down and the ruins fell into the ditch, which it partly filled up. Still there were two escarpments to cross, one on either side of the ditch. Ladders were procured, and were placed at the edge of the ditch by grenadiers of the 85th; but every time one of them appeared he was instantly brought down by the well-aimed balls of the Austrian sharpshooters. After some men had been thus struck the rest appeared to hang back. Thereupon Lannes advanced covered with decorations, seized one of the ladders and cried out, "You shall see that your marshal, for all he is a marshal, has not ceased to be a grenadier." But his aides-de-camp, Marbot and Labédoyère, sprang forward and snatched the ladder out of his hands. The grenadiers followed them, took the ladders and descended into the ditch in crowds. The enemy's shots, fired upon a larger number of men at once, and with more precipitation, were not so well aimed. The ditch was crossed, and the wall, half broken down by our cannon, was scaled. The grenadiers of the 85th, following MM. Labédoyère and Marbot, thus entered the town and opened one of the gates to the 85th, which marched a column into Ratisbon. The town was ours. Our men rushed along the streets under the fire, making prisoners in all directions. But suddenly they were stopped by a cry of terror uttered by the Austrians. "Take care, we shall all be blown up!" cried an officer. There were some barrels of powder left in a street which were in danger of being fired by the shots exchanged on either side. The belligerents stopped with one accord, and rolled the barrels away so as to spare each other a mortal peril. The Austrians then withdrew and left the town to our troops.

This day, again, cost the enemy about 2 thousand men *hors de combat,* and 6 or 7 thousand prisoners. It was the fifth since the opening of the campaign. Let us recapitulate the proceedings of those eventful days. On the 19th of April marshal Davout, going up the Danube side from Ratisbon to Abensberg, met archduke Charles at Tengen, and stopped him there. On the 20th, Napoleon combining half Davout's corps with the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers, and summoning Massena to the common rendezvous at Abensberg, broke the Austrian line at Rohr, and separated archduke Charles from general Hiller and archduke Louis. On the 21st he continued the movement, and definitively separated the two masses of the enemy, by taking Landshut and the Austrian line of operations, whilst on the same day marshal Davout, forming the pivot of his movements on the left, again encountered archduke Charles at Leuchling, and held him in check. On the 22nd, learning that archduke Charles had not retired by Landshut, but was at Eckmühl on his left before marshal Davout's corps, he suddenly moved down on Eckmühl, and giving battle on the extremity of the enemy's line,

beat the Austrians and drove them back on Ratisbon. On the 23rd he terminated this five days' struggle by taking Ratisbon, and driving into Bohemia archduke Charles's force, now combined with the Bohemian army, but separated from that of Hiller and archduke Louis. Besides the advantage of opening for himself the road to Vienna, which was defended at the most by 36 or 40 thousand disheartened men, of having taken the immense mass of *matériel* which was found on the enemy's principal line of operation, of having driven archduke Charles into the defiles of Bohemia, where he would long remain paralysed, and of having restored to his armies all their former ascendancy, Napoleon had destroyed or taken about 60 thousand men and more than a hundred pieces of cannon. Of these 60 thousand men, nearly 40 thousand had been struck by the fire of infantry or the sabres of our cavalry.* And all this Napoleon had achieved by conducting himself in accordance with the true principles of war, amidst an incredible confusion of places and men. No doubt, had he risked more, had he left the archduke to march upon Ratisbon without calling marshal Davout to him, Napoleon might have thrown himself on the enemy's rear by Lancqwaid and Eckmühl, and perhaps have taken the whole Austrian army in one day. But besides that it would first have been necessary to guess the secret of that situation which no man could have done, Napoleon would thus have violated the true principles of war by remaining divided in presence of a concentrated enemy, whom he would have afforded the chance of a great triumph. On the contrary, by making Davout on his left and Massena on his right converge to a common point, he put himself in a condition to meet all contingencies, and he was enabled to cut the enemy's line before him, make his way into Landshut, then bear down to the left, and finally defeat the great Austrian army at Ratisbon. May we venture to add, that it was better to have triumphed a little less whilst conforming to the true principles of war, which are, after all, only the rules of good sense, than to have triumphed more in consequence of risking too much. Napoleon would never have fallen if he had always governed his policy as on this occasion he made war. Be that as it may, those terrible blows he had dealt prostrated Austria, kept down Germany, and awed Europe. Napoleon had never better merited the favours of fortune, which in these five days seemed once more fully restored to him.

* I state these numbers after due abatement made for the exaggerations of the bulletins.

BOOK XXXV.

WAGRAM.

COMMENCEMENT of Hostilities in Italy—Unexpected Entry of the Austrians by Ponteba, Cividale, and Gorice—Surprise of Prince Eugene—He falls back on Livenza—General Sahuc's Vanguard beaten at Pordenone—The Army loudly calls for Battle—Yielding to their Demand, Prince Eugene consents to fight at Disadvantage—Battle of Sacile lost on the 16th of April—Retreat on the Adige—Rising of the Tyrol—The French Army reorganised behind the Adige under the Direction of General Macdonald—Retreat of Archduke John in consequence of the Events at Ratisbon—He is keenly pursued by Prince Eugene—Forced Passage of the Piave, and considerable Losses of the Austrians—Events in Poland—Joseph Poniatowski fights an obstinate Battle with the Austrians under the Walls of Warsaw—Gives up that Capital in pursuance of a Convention, and carries the War to the right Bank of the Vistula, and deals the Austrians several heavy Blows—Insurrectionary Movements in Germany—Desertion of Major Schill—Napoleon's Conduct after the Events at Ratisbon—His Uneasiness at the News from Italy, too long withheld from him by Prince Eugene—He advances into Bavaria—His Reasons for not pursuing Archduke Charles into Bohemia, and for marching on the Austrian Capital by the Valley of the Danube—Admirably arranged March—Passage of the Inn, the Traun, and the Ens—Archduke Charles attempts to return from Bohemia into Austria is prevented at Lintz by Massena—Tremendous Battle at Ebersberg—The Troops that defended Upper Austria are obliged to recross the Danube at Krems, and leave Vienna uncovered—Arrival of Napoleon under the Walls of Vienna—Entry of the French into Vienna after a short Resistance—Effect of this Event on Europe—Napoleon's Views for the complete Destruction of the Enemy's Armies—His Strategy—It is necessary to cross the Danube to reach Archduke Charles, who is encamped opposite Vienna—Preparations for that difficult Passage—In the mean time the Army of Italy has resumed the Offensive—Archduke John retires with Forces diminished by one half across the Noric and Julian Alps into Hungary and Croatia—Evacuation and temporary Submission of the Tyrol—Napoleon finally resolves to cross the Danube and complete the Destruction of Archduke Charles—Difficulty of that Operation—Choice of the Island of Lobau, in the Danube, to diminish the Difficulty of the Passage—Bridges thrown over the Danube on the 19th and 20th of May—The Army begins to pass—Is immediately encountered by Archduke Charles—Battle of Essling, one of the most terrible of the Age—The Passage, frequently interrupted by a sudden Rise of the Danube, is rendered impossible by the breaking down of the great Bridge—Heroic Struggle of the French Army on the 21st and 22nd of May to escape being thrown into the Danube—Death of Lannes and of St. Hilaire—Memorable Conduct of Massena—After an ineffectual Resistance of Forty Hours the French are allowed to return quietly to Lobau—Character of that tremendous Battle—Inertness of Archduke Charles and prodigious Activity of Napoleon

on the Days following the Battle of Essling—Efforts to re-establish the Bridges—Utility of the Seamen of the Guard—Napoleon applies himself to create new Means of Passage, and to bring up the Armies of Italy and Dalmatia in order to end the War by a general Engagement—Successful March of Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont to join the Grand Army on the Danube—Victory of Raab, won by Prince Eugene over Archduke John on the 14th of June—Taking of Raab—Junction of Prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont with the Grand Army—Alternations in Tyrol, Germany, and Poland—Napoleon's Precautions with regard to those several Countries—Inaction of the Russians—Napoleon's Preparations for a great Battle nearly mature—Prodigious Works executed in the Island of Lobau in the Month of June—Extraordinary Scene of the Passage of the Danube on the Night of the 5th of July—Sudden Debouché of the French Army beyond the Danube before Archduke Charles could offer any Opposition—The Austrian Army having fallen back on the Position of Wagram, defends itself there against an Attack by the Army of Italy—Momentary Panic on the Evening of the 5th—Plans of the two Generals for the Battle of the next Day—Memorable Battle of Wagram on the 6th of July—Formidable Attack on the left Wing of the French Army—Napoleon's Promptitude in shifting his Forces from right to left, notwithstanding the great Extent of the Field of Battle—The Austrian Centre is broken—The Plateau of Wagram carried by Davout—Nearly equal Losses on both Sides, but decisive Results in favour of the French—Disorderly Retreat of the Austrians—Pursuit to Znaïm, and Battle under the Walls of that Town—The Austrians ask for a Suspension of Hostilities—Armistice of Znaïm and Negotiations for Peace opened at Altenburg—Napoleon's fresh Military Preparations to support the Altenburg Negotiations—Fine Encampment of his Armies in the Centre of the Austrian Realm—Character of the Campaign of 1809.

BOOK XXXV.

WAGRAM.

THE Austrians had intended to assail the French armies whilst still dispersed from the Vistula to the Tagus, and, notwithstanding the customary slowness of their movements, they would, perhaps, have succeeded, if Napoleon, arriving unexpectedly, had not baffled by his presence, his promptitude, and his energy, that dangerous plan of surprise. In five days fighting he had broken up their principal force, and thrown back its severed fragments on both banks of the Danube. But though he had by his personal qualities made up for all that was still wanting to his armies, he could not do so where he was not present, as in Italy, whither archduke John was marching with the eighth and ninth corps, and in Poland, whither archduke Ferdinand was marching with the seventh.

In Italy the commencement of the campaign was not fortunate, and it would certainly have exercised an injurious influence over the general course of events if our successes had been less signal between Landshut and Ratisbon. In that country the rash and inconsistent spirit of archduke John, opposed to the prudent but inexperienced mind of prince Eugene, obtained a temporary triumph over the valour of our soldiers. Archduke John, as usual with those who command in a province, would have fain drawn everything thither, and have converted Italy into the chief theatre of war. But as he could not hinder the Danube from being Napoleon's direct road to Vienna, neither could he hinder the bulk of the Austrian forces from being on the Danube instead of the Tagliamento. Jealous of his brother, the archduke Charles, and surrounded by a staff who were jealous of the commander-in-chief's staff, he had raised many a dispute about the plan to be pursued. He wished, in the first place, to enter directly into the Tyrol by the Pusther Thal, passing from the sources of the Drave to those of the Adige, to descend by Brixen and Trent on Verona, and thus to break down all the advanced defences of the French by arriving at once on the line of the Adige through the mountain road opened to him by the insurrection of the Tyrolese. Not having the fear of finding general Bonaparte or the intrepid Massena on the plateau of Rivoli, and being able to reckon on the zealous co-operation of the Tyrolese, he had excellent reasons for adopting such a project,

which had, among other advantages, that of keeping him within reach of Bavaria, and in a position to take part in the operations on the Danube. But, as always happens in the case of plans debated between rival authorities, a middle course was adopted, which consisted in invading the Tyrol with a detached corps, and Upper Italy with the bulk of the army. It was in accordance with these views that the forces destined to operate in Italy were distributed. The eighth corps mustered at Villach in Carinthia under general Chasteler, who was at first designated as its commander; the ninth at Laybach in Carniola, under count Ignatius Giulay, ban of Croatia. General Chasteler, being well acquainted with the Tyrol, was detached from the eighth corps with 12 thousand men, and ordered to operate by the Pusther Thal, advancing from east to west, whilst the bulk of the army moved in the same direction on the plain. With his 12 thousand men and the co-operation of the Tyrolese, general Chasteler was strong enough for the Bavarians, who were barely 5 or 6 thousand, in the Tyrol. Whilst he was proceeding by Lienz and Brunecken to Brixen, the eighth and ninth corps, marching from Villach and Laybach, were to debouche on Udine. These two corps, including artillery, amounted to about 48 thousand men, excellent soldiers. Twenty thousand men of the landwehr, well clothed, well disposed, but imperfectly trained, were to guard the frontier, cover it with campaigning works, and form with their best battalions a reserve for the active army. A detachment of 7 or 8 thousand men, to which was to be joined the *rising* of Croatia, was to keep watch on Dalmatia, whence it was feared that general Marmont might succeed in debouching. However, as the hope was entertained of surprising the French in Friuli as well as in Bavaria, and as it was known that by reason of family complaisance, which prevailed in Napoleon's court no less than in the eldest courts of Europe, prince Eugene had obtained the command of the army in Italy, to the exclusion of Massena, its natural chief, the Austrians flattered themselves they should soon be on the Adige, or even on the Po, and keep general Marmont shut up in Dalmatia. A summons to surrender was already prepared for the latter, and it was thought the only trouble he could give was that of discussing and signing a capitulation.

It was not alone on force of arms that reliance was placed for a victorious advance on Italy, but also on secret practices carried forth from the mountains of Tyrol to the straits of Messina. Supported in their rash attempt by the persuasion that Europe, and France too, were weary of Napoleon's power, the Austrians counted not only on Tyrol, which had always been attached to Austria, but on the old Venetian states, which still groaned for their recent downfal, on Piedmont, become, in spite of itself, a French province, on the states of the Church, some of them converted into departments of the empire, others witnesses to the pope's thraldom; and lastly, on the kingdom of Naples, deprived of its ancient sovereigns, separated from Sicily, and longing to recover its dynasty and its terri-

tory. Secret intelligence had been arranged in all these countries with the nobles, who were dissatisfied with the system of equality introduced by the French, and with the priests, who regretted the supremacy of the Church, or deplored the contumelious oppression exercised over the holy father. However, though French domination was disagreeable to the Italians, as being that of foreigners, and though it cost them much blood and treasure, it possessed for the greater number of them advantages which they did not overlook, and which the evils of war had not made them wholly forget. The Italians were not, therefore, so easily moved as the Tyrolese, whose impatience for the return of the Austrian flag was extreme. Nothing could afford an idea of the attachment they then bore to Austria. Those simple mountaineers, habituated to the purely paternal government of the house of Hapsburg, had passed, in 1806, with abhorrence, under the yoke of Bavaria, their detested neighbour. The latter feeling itself disliked by its new subjects, repaid them hate for hate, and treated them with a harshness that had only exasperated their resentment. Accordingly, they had never ceased to send emissaries to Vienna, promising to rise at the first signal, and, by their relations with the Grisons and with Switzerland, to effect a movement which would soon spread to Swabia on the one side and Piedmont on the other. Their ardour had even contributed to mislead the court of Austria, and make it believe that there were in all Europe only Tyrolese or Spaniards panting to cast off the yoke of the modern Attila. M. de Hormayer, a very active *employé* in the department of foreign affairs at Vienna, holding in his hand the threads of these Tyrolese, German and Italian intrigues, was appointed to accompany archduke John, and set in motion the secret springs of policy whilst the archduke was moving the open springs of war. The English had, of course, been made privy to these hopes and secret practices, and had promised to co-operate actively with the Austrians as soon as the latter should have invaded Lombardy as far as Pavia, and opened the coast of the Adriatic from Trieste to Ancona.

All was ready for action in Carinthia on the same day as in Bavaria, namely, the 10th of April. On that day, whilst the advanced guards of archduke Charles were crossing the Inn, those of archduke John presented themselves at the passes of the Carnic and Julian Alps, without any previous declaration of war. It was deemed sufficient to send a trumpeter to the advanced posts of the French at Ponteba with a declaration, on the part of archduke John, to the effect that he was entering Italy, and that if his passage was opposed he would employ force. Half an hour afterwards detachments of cavalry and light infantry fell upon our advanced posts, and even carried some of them. Using still less ceremony towards the Bavarian possessors of the Tyrol, general Chasteler entered on the preceding day, the 9th of April, the mountainous country called the Pusther Thal, which separates Carinthia from the Italian Tyrol.

Two great roads presented themselves to the Austrians for in-

vading Friuli; the one which leads from Vienna through Carinthia, descends the Carnic Alps to the Tagliamento, and runs by Villach, Tarvis and Ponteba, to Osopo; the other which starts from Carniola, descends the Julian Alps to the Izonzo, which it crosses between Gorice and Gradisca, and abuts on Palma Nova or Udine. Napoleon had taken precautions on both roads against Austrian invasion by constructing the fort of Osopo on the first-named; on the second, the important fortress of Palma Nova. But both of these, though quite adequate as *points d'appui* for an army, could not supply the absence of one, and were, in fact, but difficulties for an invader, not invincible obstacles. Prince Eugene's troops not having yet assembled, it was easy to defile under the cannon of Osopo and Palma Nova, blockade them, and pass on.

Archduke John used neither of these roads, but preferred one that lay between them, and which, passing by the sources of the Izonzo, debouched by Cividale on Udine. It was a difficult road, especially for a numerous army encumbered with a bulky *matériel*, but for that reason it seemed less likely to be defended than the two others. He entered upon it therefore with the bulk of his army, and sent only two advanced guards along the roads from Carinthia and Carniola. Colonel Wockmann, an able officer, was to force the pass of Ponteba with some battalions and squadrons, whilst general Gavassini, passing the Izonzo with a detachment above Gradisca, was to march on Udine, the point to which the several portions of the Austrian army were to converge.

All these arrangements were superfluous, for prince Eugene, not expecting to be attacked before the end of April, had at hand only the Seras division before Udine, and the Broussier division before Ponteba. He himself was engaged in personally inspecting his advanced posts, in obedience to Napoleon's advice that he should visit the places where he should have to fight battles. The Austrians, therefore, had only mere advanced posts to drive in on all the roads where they presented themselves. On the 10th compelled the advanced guard of the Broussier division to fall back to Portès, general Gavassini crossed the Izonzo without difficulty, and the main body debouched with equal facility on Udine, where there was but a solitary French division.

Prince Eugene, surprised by this sudden apparition, and little habituated to command, although already well trained to war under his adopted father, was highly excited by a situation so new to him. Of eight divisions which composed his army, he had with him only the two French divisions of Seras and Broussier. There were a little in his rear the French divisions of Grenier and Barbou, together with Severoli's Italian division, and still further, near the Adige, Lamarque's French and Rusca's Italian division, besides the dragoons, who formed the bulk of his cavalry. As to the sixth French division, that of Miollis, it was still far behind, retained by the position of affairs at Rome and Florence. In such an exigency prince Eugene had but one course to take, which was to effect a

rapid concentration, by retreating upon the main body of his forces. Odious as a retrograde movement must be, it was necessary to decide on it with promptitude, since no resolution should ever be deemed unpleasing which leads to a good result. It is true that, to brave appearances, a general must be already in possession of an established reputation, whereas prince Eugene was still young, and without other distinction than that derived from the well-merited love of his adopted father. He decided, then, on a retreat, but with a regret which soon proved fatal, by preventing the completion of his design to concentrate the army. He ordered the Seras and Broussier divisions to recross the Tagliamento, and proceed to the Livenza, whither the Barbou, Severoli, Lamarque, and Grouchy divisions were to make a rapid march. General Seras effected his retreat without fighting; general Broussier had some sharp engagements with colonel Wockmann, who skilfully disputed the valleys of the Upper Tagliamento, but he retreated, leaving the ground strewed with dead. Happily the Austrians, though desiring to surprise us, failed to use all possible diligence. They occupied four days in marching from the frontier to the Tagliamento. This allowed for the process of concentration, an opportunity by which an experienced general would have profited better than did prince Eugene.

When recrossing the Tagliamento to reach the Livenza, he was again joined by the Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli divisions; and then, being but slowly pursued by the Austrians, he halted between Pordenone and Sacile. Arrived there, he was imprudent enough to leave at Pordenone, too far from him and from all support, a strong rear-guard, composed of two battalions of the 35th and a regiment of light cavalry, under the orders of general Sahuc. This officer, who in this instance displayed little of the vigilance necessary to the advance-guard in a forward march, and to the rear-guard in retreat, instead of scouring the country to keep the army clear from surprise, did not even take that precaution for the force he himself commanded, but shut himself up with it in Pordenone. The Austrians, hearing of a French rear-guard at this place, advanced with a detachment of infantry and a considerable body of horse, under general Nugent—an extremely able officer, eminent among the war party. With his cavalry he completely surrounded Pordenone, cutting off all communication with Sacile; with his infantry he attacked the place itself, and surprised the French asleep and feebly guarded. Suddenly assaulted, they were unable to maintain the defensive, and sought refuge in a precipitate flight; but, instead of finding the road from Pordenone open to their retreat, they were assailed on every side by numerous troops of horse. Our hussars endeavoured to cut their way through, by charging at full gallop. Some escaped, others were sabred or made captive. As to the infantry, it looked for safety only to a valiant resistance. The two battalions of the 35th, an old Italian regiment, formed in squares, and received the Austrian cavalry in a

manner that would have repulsed any less powerful force. They shot several hundreds, and strewed the ground with the bodies of men and of horses; but soon their ammunition was exhausted, and their bayonet points alone remained to resist the finest cavalry of Austria. Five hundred of our unfortunate soldiers expiated, under the Austrian sabre, the blunder of their general; all the rest were made prisoners.

This melancholy occurrence greatly incensed the French army, and diminished its confidence in the commander-in-chief. On the other hand, it augmented the ardour of the Austrian troops, who, for the first time during a long period, saw the French retreat before them, and began to entertain hopes of victory. What prince Eugene should have done under these circumstances, since he had begun a retreat, was to continue it, until he found a solid line to defend, and all his forces united behind that line. He would thus have retrieved the discredit of some days of humble attitude, and would have imparted an aspect of dignity to his retrograde movement. But he was young, and most sensitive on the point of honour. The remarks of the soldiers, who retained all the pride of the old army of Italy, cut him to the heart. Much as they loved the young prince, the son of their renowned leader, they judged for themselves; they saw his inexperience, and complained of it aloud; showed no greater deference for the generals under him, and demanded to be led against an enemy who had insolently pursued them, and from whom they had never been used to fly. To the clamours of the soldiers was added the despair of the people, who were old subjects of Venice, attached for the most part to France, terrified by the approach of the Austrian army, and praying to be rescued from its vengeance. Eugene assembled his generals, whom he found equally disconcerted with himself; for they had learned, under Napoleon, to fight as heroes, but not to command. They were ready to die, but not to decide whether a conflict should be hazarded. The wisest course, then, to take was to continue the retreat, until all the troops were rallied upon a ground where they could give battle with advantage. By marching as far as the Piave they should have brought to the field, successively, five divisions of French and one of Italian infantry, besides two magnificent divisions of dragoons, and the royal Lombard guards, which was a serviceable troop. They would have found also in the Piave a line admirably adapted for defence; but Eugene had neither sufficient experience, nor sufficient reputation, to resist steadily the clamour of the army. Piqued by the silence of his generals, and by the indiscretion of his soldiers, he resolved to halt before the Livenza, between Sacile and Pordenone, upon a ground unknown to him, which offered no advantageous post, and upon which his troops had not had time to concentrate.

On the evening of the 15th, after the disaster at Pordenone, he gave orders to halt and resume offensive measures at all points. He had, in his retreat thus far, united with the Broussier and Seras

divisions, those of Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli, which had joined him before the Livenza. These altogether amounted to about 36 thousand men, some of them old soldiers of the army of Italy, others young but already trained, and forming the fourth battalions of the armies of Naples and Dalmatia. The Austrian force, on the other hand, numbered about 45 thousand of their choicest troops. The disproportion was therefore great. It is true that prince Eugene reckoned upon a reinforcement of 10 thousand foot and horse, which generals Lamarque and Grouchy, then on their way to join him, were to bring. But this addition was not certain, and besides the ground was very unfavourable. To our right we had between Tamai, Palsa, and Porcia, villages, fences, an inundated soil, numerous canals, all strongly defended by the Austrians. In the middle, the ground suddenly rising, formed a ridge which ran right before us, and along which lay the road from Sacile to Pordenone. We had in our possession upon this road the village of Fontana Fredda, opposite Pordenone, taken in the morning by the Austrians. Finally to our left, at the dip of the ridge, the country stretched in a plain to the foot of the Alps. On that plain stood two villages, that of Roveredo, occupied by the French, and that of Cordenons, where the Austrians were bivouacking. So then on the right, ground intersected and cut up and obstructed by obstacles of various kinds; in the centre, a broad road leading direct from our line to that of the enemy; to the left, a plain: such was the ground to be disputed. It is true there was one favourable circumstance which should have been inferred, had Eugene possessed Napoleon's faculty of surmising the truth from the smallest indications; this was the division of the Austrians into two masses, the one formed of the eight corps, and stationed in the villages of Tamai, Porcia and Palze, behind the obstructed ground on our right; the other formed of the ninth corps and of the cavalry, stationed on the plain to the left, at Cordenons. Now between Cordenons and Pordenone there was more than a league of ground, ill kept and ill defended. This circumstance once perceived, we should have set on the Seras and Severoli divisions to attack Tamai, Palze, and Porcia, on our right, so as to attract the Austrians thither; then with the Grenier and Barbou divisions, stationed in the centre upon the high-road, and the Broussier division stationed on the left on the plain, we should have formed a mass of 24 thousand men, marched by the high-road through Fontana Fredda upon Pordenone, invested the last-named town, cut it off from Cordenons, where the ninth corps was stationed, and thus divided the Austrian army into two: this once accomplished, the struggle between the eighth corps and our right wing would have been soon ended, and the sooner the more that corps had entangled itself in the difficult ground which formed that portion of the battle-field.

Unfortunately, prince Eugene, with the chief officer of the staff,

Vignolle, displayed the same want of reflection in planning the battle as in their determination to offer it, and ordered exactly the contrary of what the position of the enemy and the kind of ground seemed to require. Without even reconnoitring either the one or the other they decided that on the next day, the 16th of April, at dawn, generals Seras and Severoli should march from Tamai on Palse and Porcia, which they should endeavour to take at any risk; that in the centre upon the high-road, the Grenier division, should station itself in front of Fontana Fredda, but make no hostile demonstration, until generals Seras and Severoli should have overcome the numerous and difficult obstacles which they had to encounter; that to the left general Broussier, crossing the plain of Roveredo to join general Grenier, should likewise await that event; and lastly, that to the rear general Barbou should support the French line. It was an ill-devised plan, which allowed the Austrians time to rectify their position, whilst our right wing was exhausting itself against mere physical obstacles, and whilst our centre, our left, and our rear-guard were losing their time in doing nothing. Thus it is, and with such management that the precious blood of the soldiery is often wasted and the fate of empires trifled with! Thus it is that kings and republics confide, the one to incompetent sons or brothers, the other to favourites of the multitude quite as incompetent, the lives of men and the welfare of states! Prince Eugene was a brave soldier, full of modesty and devotedness, suited some day to lead on a division with credit, but not to command an army, or above all, to direct a campaign.

Our soldiers, unconscious of whither they were being led, but well content to attack an enemy they had not accustomed themselves to dread, marched resolutely forward at daybreak on Sunday the 16th of April. The French under Seras, the Italians under Severoli, courageously assaulted Palse and Porcia, and overthrew the first obstacles which opposed them. The archduke John was then at mass with all his staff. This prince, although possessing more experience, and at the same time more pretensions than the modest prince Eugene, on this occasion displayed no more judgment than his adversary; for after having on the evening before surprised the French at Pordenone, he now exposed himself to be surprised on the same spot. He immediately mounted horse with his staff, rushed to the front of Pordenone, and beholding before him, upon the road to Fontana Fredda, general Grenier in our centre, and general Broussier to our left, forming masses which the open ground rendered still more apparent, he imagined that we were about to double our left upon our centre, our centre upon our right; could only conceive, from what he fancied he beheld, the design of withdrawing the ninth corps from Cordenons to Fontana Fredda, in order to prevent us from executing the movement he imagined we desired to make; left the space between Cordenons and Pordenone still open, and seemed to concern himself

little about his eighth corps, occupied in skirmishing with generals Seras and Severoli, in the midst of the broken grounds which lay between Tamai, Palse, and Porcia.

Here then took place, under the direction of two commanders-in-chief, possessed of little discernment, and between soldiers of extreme bravery, a bloody and destructive conflict. The eighth corps of the Austrians, much more numerous than the Seras and Severoli divisions, had no intention of yielding up the ground, of which the latter had conquered a portion. General Colleredo attacked them with an Austrian division, took from them under a destructive fire Porcia and Palse, and thus turned the fortunes of the conflict. General Seras, who had taken care to keep back a reserve, now put himself at its head, led it forward and entered once more into the lost villages, bringing back into them both the French and the Italians. They established themselves in these unhappy villages, the theatre of so many calamities. ...Then the Austrians, taking advantage of the smallest obstacles, defended themselves from house to house, from fence to fence, opposing to our soldiers a resistance of which they had given no similar example since Marengo. General Grenier, condemned to inaction upon the high-road from Fontana Fredda to Pordenone, detached two battalions to the right to aid towards the decisive conquest of Porcia. General Barbou also sent two from the rear guard upon the same point. These reinforcements doubtless compensated for the inferiority of our right wing in comparison with the eighth corps against which it fought; but upon such ground as that, ground obstacles which it was as difficult to lose as to win, nothing was decided by them, since our left and our centre remained motionless.

On both sides they fought with fury, when the ninth corps advancing obliquely from Cordenons upon Fontana Fredda, came up with the Broussier division, which formed our left. The brave general Broussier had disposed in *echelons* the 9th, 84th, and 92nd of the line, superb regiments of four battalions, which composed his division. With perfect coolness he awaited the approach of the enemy's infantry, and closely firing upon it with extreme precision, overthrew almost a whole line. Then the magnificent Austrian cavalry, having taken advantage of the plain to charge upon him, he received them by forming a square, covered the ground with the dead, and, brave as they were, sent them back utterly disgusted with similar attempts. Meanwhile, the ninth corps, very numerous, outflanked our left, and seemed to menace Sacile, a town behind Fontana Fredda, where was the principal bridge over the Livenza. Had this bridge been taken, our most important point of communication would have been lost, and no way of retreat would have been left us but by some wretched bridges over the lower part of the Livenza. Prince Eugene, who was resolute only when under fire, was alarmed for his means of communication, and, while the issue was still undetermined, commanded a retreat, with as little reason as he had commanded a battle.

Our soldiers, after having killed as many as they had lost, retreated towards the Livenza, disheartened at the humiliating part which they were forced to play. Our right made for the bridge of Brugnera, which it was able to reach without disorder, pursuit being little to be feared over the rough and uneven ground on that side, as the Austrians were exhausted by the dreadful conflict they had sustained. All the attempts of the enemy during this retrogade movement were made upon our left, which retreated over an open space. Broussier's division, by its superb conduct, saved the army; now awaiting the enemy's infantry to fire at point blank distance, now receiving in square the cavalry, whose progress it stopped with the bayonet. When our centre and our rear guard had defiled through Sacile, it entered it the last, leaving the enemy themselves full of admiration for its gallant conduct.

Up to this point we had lost only our dead, our wounded, some dismounted artillery, and few prisoners. But in the night, prince Eugene, deeming it desirable to push the retreat as far as Conegliano to shelter himself as soon as possible behind the Piave, the bad weather, the incumbrance of gun-carriages and baggage, and their mingling with the troops, produced a disastrous disorder. The soldiers, unrestrained by the strict *surveillance* of their officers, spread themselves through the houses at the risk of being taken prisoners. The army which upon the battle field had lost about 3 thousand and some hundred men, a loss nearly equal to that of the Austrians, lost 3 thousand more as stragglers and prisoners. The confusion being presently increased by the terrific weather, which made the rivers overflow their banks, and rendered the roads impracticable, they arrived at length behind the Piave, in a state little creditable to that army of Italy which had formerly been so admirable. Fortunately, the Austrians, unaccustomed to vanquish, eager to enjoy their victory, and detained by the weather, which rendered pursuit to them as difficult as was retreat to us, remained several days without attacking prince Eugene. They thus allowed him time to recover his defeat and to stay its consequences. He had been joined on his way, but too late, by the division of infantry under Lamarque, and by Grouchy's division of cavalry. But there came to him besides, what in such a moment was more valuable than a reinforcement, a general—namely, the famous Macdonald, one of the best officers of the revolution, though he had lost the battle of Trebbia. His connexion with Moreau had condemned him to live for several years in a kind of disgrace, and to languish in inactivity, whilst his equals in age or in length of service, some even his inferiors, were pursuing a brilliant career.

The great demand then existing for generals and officers, through the long continuance of the wars, caused many of those long neglected to be sought out. Not wishing to send Massena into Italy on account of prince Eugene, whom he feared to place in a secondary position, Napoleon consented to send general Macdonald to be his guide and support. Macdonald, one of the most intrepid men

that ever graced our army, experienced, skilful, cool, with the power of making himself obeyed, was received with confidence by the soldiers, with displeasure by some of the generals, who beheld, with regret, a firm hand about to be laid upon them, and who, moreover, believing him to be in disgrace, deemed they should derive little advantage from performing service under his orders. General Lamarque in particular, who was notorious in the army for his captious spirit, openly complained, saying that the Emperor only sent general Macdonald in order to work his ruin, and that those who should serve under him would share his fate. Everything about the general, even to his military *tenue*, in which he adhered to the style of the early days of the revolution, was made a subject of unbecoming raillery by the young officers, upon whom fashion had already asserted her power. But a man of general Macdonald's character was not to be trifled with, and he soon drew back to their allegiance such as had been tempted to stray from it. At the same time prince Eugene, not wishing to acknowledge too publicly a tutor in the person of this officer, did not make him the chief of his staff, but created a suitable post for him, and distributed his army under three commanders, one for the left, one for the centre, and one for the right. The right wing, the most considerable and most important of the three sections, composed of the Broussier and Lamarque divisions and Pully's dragoons, was given to general Macdonald. The centre was given to general Grenier, and was composed of the Grenier division, which passed under the command of general Pacthod, and the Durutte division, which contained part of the Barbou division. The remainder of this last-named division had been left as a garrison in Venice. The left was conferred on general Baraguay d'Hilliers, and was composed principally of Italians, with a few Frenchmen to set them an example.

With the Seras division, the Italian guard, and Grouchy's dragoons, prince Eugene formed a reserve of 10 thousand men. The whole of his army amounted to 60 thousand men, out of whom general Macdonald alone had 17 thousand under his command, and could thus exert considerable influence upon the course of events, without at all bearing the semblance of commander-in-chief. But prince Eugene, as modest as he was discreet, never failed to consult him on all important occasions, and always had reason to be satisfied with his counsels. General Macdonald advised a slow retreat, and that in marching towards the Adige, where they might recover strength to reassume the offensive, they should move in a more orderly manner. To the Adige accordingly they repaired, recruited their strength, put themselves in order, and soon became more worthy of the army of Italy, whose glorious name they had for an instant compromised.

Things were in a still worse state in the mountainous heights which overlooked the plains of Upper Italy; and the Austrians obtained in the Tyrol still greater advantages than in the Friuli.

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General Chasteler had crossed the frontier a day sooner—that is to say, on the 9th of April—passing from Carinthia into the Tyrol, and advanced to Lientz. Although he had arranged with the secret leaders of the Tyrolese insurrection that they should wait for the 12th or 13th of April to commence operations, they had not been able to restrain themselves, and had broken out on the 11th. The motive, it is true, for this premature outbreak was very natural. The Bavarians, utterly incapable of disputing the Tyrol with the Austrian forces, now sought aid from local obstacles, by destroying the bridges. This the inhabitants would not allow, since they wished to preserve for their hills those indispensible means of communication with the plains. They had accordingly all risen at once, with a spontaneous ebullition which belongs alone to the most eager passion. In all the valleys of the Italian Tyrol, from Lientz to Brixen, from Meran to Brixen, and from Brixen to Rivoli, all all over those stupendous and beautiful mountains, there had been but one impulse, but one cry. On the other side of the great chain of the Brenner, in German Tyrol, the rising had been equally prompt and general. In that country, as well as in Switzerland, the innkeepers, who derive a subsistence from their relations with strangers, being the richest and most enlightened of the population, a man of this profession, named Andrew Hofer, had obtained an irresistible ascendancy over the minds of his countrymen. A few veterans, brought up in the service of Austria, were among the most active instigators of the revolt. Amongst them, one major Teimer had particularly distinguished himself. France had required the assembly of the whole Bavarian army upon the Isar, and there remained in Tyrol only about 5 thousand Bavarians, spread over both sides of the Brenner, from Brixen to Inspruck. Of French troops there were, in two columns, a collection of about 4 thousand conscripts, marching from Italy to Germany, to recruit the Boudet and Molitor divisions, the Espagne cuirassiers, and the chasseurs of Marulaz. These soldiers had never stood fire; they had been formed into temporary marching regiments, and were commanded by depôt officers for the most part old and worn out. More than 20 thousand enthusiastic and fearless mountaineers, all certain shots, joined to 12 thousand Austrians, arrayed against 4 or 5 thousand Bavarians, and 3 or 4 thousand French conscripts, were certain of not meeting with any prolonged resistance.

Indeed, on the approach of the Austrian general, Chasteler, all the Bavarian posts were taken from Lientz to Brunecken. Those that were able to escape having assembled upon the marshy plain of Sterzing, at the extreme point of the Italian Tyrol, near the foot of the Brenner, were there assailed by Andrew Hofer, and a large muster from the Meran. Surrounded on all sides, attacked with fury, they at length laid down their arms, and the war being a national one—nay, almost a war of races—scenes, directly opposed to the law of nations, soon multiplied to a most distressing degree. On both sides prisoners were slaughtered, and no one could tell

which party gave the first provocation. The Tyrolese alleged, in their own defence, that their hamlets had been burnt, their wives, old men, and children killed. The Bavarians replied that their prisoners had been assassinated, and that they had only acted on the defensive. However this may be, the most atrocious scenes were perpetrated after the defeat of Sterzing. From that time the Italian Tyrol was set free as far as Roveredo, where the French general, Baraguay d'Hilliers, was stationed with an Italian division.

At this period, the long line of French recruits, extending from Verona to Inspruck, found themselves separated in two by the insurrection. One part fell back upon Verona, where they were out of all danger, part crossed the Brenner, flattering themselves with the hope of meeting the advanced posts of the French at Inspruck. They were followed closely by Chasteler and Andrew Hofer, who were crossing the Brenner in order to accomplish the deliverance of the German Tyrol. But north as well as south of the Brenner, upon the Inn as well as upon the Adige, the insurrection was sudden and general. The Bavarian posts were assailed everywhere at the same moment; their occupants were some of them taken or slain, others driven back into Inspruck, and ultimately compelled to surrender that old centre of the Austrian dominions. The French reaching Inspruck just at the moment when the town was passing into the hands of the enemy, pursued by the victorious bands of the Italian Tyrol, and by the little army of general Chasteler, were unable to defend themselves, formed and commanded as they were. They were accordingly compelled to capitulate, to the number of about 3 thousand, which was the more vexatious, as besides the mere check thus received by our arms many corps were thereby deprived of most needful reinforcements. We had, besides, to deplore the barbarous treatment which some of these unfortunate Frenchmen, confounded with the Bavarians, received, and which excited Napoleon to fearful reprisals upon General Chasteler.

Chasteler, finding the German Tyrol delivered, thought it best to return with Andrew Hofer towards the Italian Tyrol, to assist in the operations of the archduke John. Returning by the Brenner upon Trent, he presented himself there with the whole levy from the Tyrol, and 7 or 8 thousand Austrians, in front of the position of general Baraguay d'Hilliers. The French general, having his position turned by lateral valleys, could not retain Trent, and fell back upon Roveredo. Again turned, he was compelled to fall back upon Rivoli, where, backed by the army of Italy, which was being re-organised, he had no serious assault to fear. Thus, in twenty days, the two Tyrols, as well as Friuli, had passed into the hands of the enemy.

It was not only in Italy, in Tyrol, and Bavaria, that contests were taking place, but all through Northern Europe, where the Austrian declaration of war had stirred every heart, inspired vain hopes, and awakened premature desires; premature, for that although Napoleon had already committed grand mistakes he had not yet com-

mitted those destined to prove his ruin, and until now his masterly genius was more powerful than the hatred of the nations who had risen up to oppose his ambitious spirit. The whole of Germany, as it has already been shown, was full of indignation against the princes bound to his car by fear or interest, and although the French dominion bore, concealed in its bosom, the germs of a modern civilisation, benefits which presented themselves under cover of a foreign invasion were indignantly rejected.

In Bavaria, a long standing antipathy to Austria, arising out of their proximity to each other, had greatly weakened these sentiments; but in Swabia, in the provinces once Austrian, in Franconia, in the little states, snatched from the mild rule of the ecclesiastical princes, even in Saxony, where the addition of a Polish crown flattered only the reigning family, in Hesse, where Jerome Napoleon held sway, the long pent-up feelings of hatred burst forth at the news of the daring attempt of the Austrians. In proportion as the distance increased from the Rhine and from the reach of France, so did boldness augment until it passed into hostile demonstrations. Already had insurgent bands come down from the mountains of Hesse upon the banks of the Elbe, and had even shown themselves at the gates of Magdeburg, apparently awaiting some sudden apparition from Prussia, from whom they hoped for a vigorous and patriotic effort.

Indeed, throughout all Prussia exasperation was at its height. To the general sufferings of the Germans were added in that country other sufferings peculiarly painful to the Prussian nation. Those famous battles, in which the independence of Germany had perished, had been lost by her. She had beheld the monarchy of Frederick the Great dismembered, and for a while its glory eclipsed; and, if she was as sensitive to physical as to moral calamities, she experienced, in the crushing military contributions she was compelled to pay, the agonising consciousness of a foreign dominion. Hence had audacity been pushed to greater lengths in Prussia than in any other country. A French convoy of artillery, on its way from the banks of the Vistula to Madgeburg, was assaulted, insulted, and grossly maltreated. At Berlin the Austrian war had been openly announced before it was declared; they had also predicted, from the outset, its successful termination, that the whole world would join in it, that if king Frederic William was so dejected and dispirited as to refuse to take part in it, they would of their own accord march to the support of the Austrian army. To such a length had their audacity been carried, that on the first commencement of operations, without waiting for the result, the commandant of Berlin had given for watchwords to the garrison, *Charles* and *Ratisbon*.

There was at Berlin a well-known officer of the name of major Schill, who, in 1806 and 1807, had successfully carried on a partisan warfare against us during the sieges of Dantzig, Colberg, and Stralsund. He was at the head of some cavalry, and formed part of the garrison at Berlin. His well known bravery and his avowed

hatred of the French, had rendered him the idol of the people. He it was, they said, that ought to raise the standard of revolt in the name of German freedom, and lend a helping hand to a prince of the house of Brunswick, the duke of Brunswick Oels, who at that time was going about in Saxony and Silesia, rousing all the inactive Prussian officers, and enticing them to Bohemia to form German guerillas. The fanaticism of the Spaniards was thus quickly shared by all, and it was deemed not impracticable to mould the slow and peaceful Germans into adventurers as active as the smugglers of the Peninsula. One night in the midst of this general excitement, it was reported that major Schill, who had been engaged for several days in reviewing his corps until a late hour of the night, had suddenly disappeared at the head of 500 horse, who constituted the cavalry of the garrison. It was said that he had marched towards the Elbe to join a vast assemblage from Hesse, and afterwards intended advancing to meet the Austrians, who were marching upon Saxony. This circumstance, as might naturally be expected, produced an extraordinary sensation. Every one persisted in believing that the Prussian government was an accomplice in the act. This, however, was a mistake; it was simply the national passion bursting forth in spite of itself. The ministers, utterly confounded, hastened to the French ambassador, making sincere protestations of regret, declaring they had been perfectly ignorant that conduct, as absurd as it was criminal, was contemplated; affirming with truth, that the king had no hand in the matter, and promising that the severest punishment should be visited upon those who had thus compromised against its desire the government of their country. But whilst they were thus speaking, the infantry, following the example of the cavalry, gave similar proofs of insubordination, and whole companies escaped to follow major Schill. Unfortunately, it was impossible to pursue these insurgents without cavalry, and major Schill had carried off all that was in Berlin. It was necessary, therefore, to wait until troops were procured, well-disposed and well-disciplined enough to obey the orders of their government, whatever they might be, for it was not for the army to decide upon the foreign, any more than upon the domestic policy of the country. But, in the meanwhile, these extraordinary proceedings caused a universal sensation throughout Germany, which the brilliant successes of Napoleon could alone extinguish.

The banks of the Vistula were the scene of no less weighty events. The seventh Austrian corps, commanded by the archduke Ferdinand, and 37 to 38 thousand strong, marched down the valley of the Vistula upon Warsaw. Formed in Gallicia, it had only a short distance to march before invading Poland; besides which, it started very early, like all the Austrian corps. Its operations, like those in Germany and Italy, began on the 10th of April. Prince Joseph Poniatowski—a hero who had long wasted his days on the lap of ease, and, like many a Pole, had been kept inactive at the feet of his beautiful countrywomen—awoke at the clash of the

French arms, and had espoused the cause of France, which he justly considered to be that of Poland, if ever Poland could be restored. He commanded the Polish army. Napoleon, entirely taken up with preparing the mighty blows which he intended to inflict with his own hand on the house of Austria, had had but little time to devote to that army. The whole amount of regular troops they had contrived to collect was but 15 thousand men, and a small Saxon detachment left at Warsaw. Napoleon had troubled himself little about this inferiority of strength in Poland, thinking himself to decide everything at Vienna, and, though he did not reckon on any great co-operation on the part of the Russians, believing, nevertheless, that their presence alone upon the frontiers of the grand duchy would suffice to paralyse the Austrian corps under the archduke Ferdinand. But the Russian co-operation was even less than he expected. The emperor Alexander had taken care, whilst observing as much as decency required the stipulations of the treaty of alliance, to send his principal forces to Finland and Moldavia, to finish the conquest of the one and commence that of the other. He had only set aside for the Austrian war 60 thousand men, who at this time were hardly gathered together, for various reasons, for the most part well founded, but liable enough to be misinterpreted. In the first place, Russia, like Napoleon himself, did not believe in the near approach of hostilities, and had, therefore, not been sufficiently rapid in its preparations. Again, its government, which had had so much trouble to assemble sufficient forces in Finland, in a cause pre-eminently Russian, knew not how to be more active in an interest exclusively French. The season, besides, had been dreadful, and floods of rain had made the vast territories between the Niemen and the Vistula almost impracticable. Moreover, the emperor and M. de Romanzoff, both of them already a little cooled with regard to the French alliance, were, nevertheless, the only persons in Russia who desired it, and they had to combat the wishes of every one to make themselves obeyed when aid to Napoleon was required. Correspondences had even sprung up between the Russian and Austrian officers, wherein the former expressed all sorts of sympathy for the latter, and an earnest desire to march, not against them, but with them. It was, indeed, no easy task to persuade the Russians to march against the Austrians and with the French, in order to assist in the re-establishment of Poland. It was true that the reward of this assistance was to be Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and that if the sacrifice was great, the reward was also great. However, the aid of the Russians was not of much moment, so long as Napoleon remained victorious upon the Danube; and the worst consequence of their insufficient assistance was the mistrust thereby engendered between the two emperors and the two empires.

This explains how prince Poniatowski, who had a right to count on the indirect, if not the direct assistance of 60 thousand Russians, (and it is certain that if they had marched on Gallicia they would

have detained the Austrians there), found himself on the 10th of April with archduke Ferdinand upon his hands, as Napoleon had archduke Charles, and prince Eugene archduke John. Archduke Ferdinand, marching down the course of the Vistula, which takes its rise between Silesia and Gallicia, advanced along the left bank upon Warsaw, showering upon the inhabitants protestations of a most amicable nature. In the conventional language of his party he declared that they came to deliver all nations, the Poles among others, from a dominion almost as irksome to its friends as to its enemies.

The Poles were not the people to be deceived by language such as this. They knew but too well that the old copartitioners of their country could never become her deliverers, that France alone could be their friend—afriend not always able to protect them, but sincere, because it was impossible she should be otherwise. So prince Poniatowski advanced steadily with 12 thousand men to meet the archduke Ferdinand. These were the same Poles who had first taken arms with us, in 1807, and who, besides their own natural bravery and their ardent patriotism, possessed the germs of a military education received in our schools. Unfortunately, they were so disproportioned in number to the Austrians, that the most that could be expected of them was an honourable and energetic, but not victorious defence. Prince Poniatowski, after a few skirmishes with cavalry, resolved to dispute the approaches to Warsaw with the bulk of his troops. The 19th, the same day on which marshal Davout fought the battle of Tengen, the Polish prince halted at Raszyn, a position formed, like all those capable of an advantageous defence in his country, of wood interspersed with marshes. For eight hours he contested the possession of these woods and marshes with 12 or 15 thousand Poles against 30 thousand Austrians, lost about 1200 or 1500 men, killed and wounded, but destroyed many more of the enemy, and, fearing they might be beforehand in reaching Warsaw, retreated towards that capital.

Should he attempt to defend Warsaw, deprived as it was of all means of resistance, and thus expose it to infallible destruction? Or was it better to evacuate it in pursuance of a convention which should soften the conditions on which the enemy should occupy it, and which would leave him the opportunity of retreating unharmed into positions easier to maintain? Such was the serious and painful question which prince Poniatowski had to solve after the conflict at Raszyn. The hottest spirits among the Poles were eager for an obstinate resistance, without concerning themselves about the consequences. The inoffensive mass of the inhabitants dreaded a catastrophe. The most enlightened patriots, and not the least brave, advised a retreat into the triangle of the Narew and the Vistula, between Modlin and Sierock, behind the strong works constructed by the command of Napoleon. Committing themselves to that impregnable fastness, with the secure retreat of the marshes of Pultusk, they might save the capital though leaving

it for awhile in the hands of the enemy. Seldom is such a sacrifice judicious; it was so, however, on this occasion, as the result proved. Prince Poniatowski sorrowfully yielded up Warsaw, after having stipulated for honourable conditions. He crossed to the right bank of the Vistula, between Modlin and Sierock, with the intention of attacking every corps that should dare to cross the river in sight of him, and firmly resolved to defend by petty conflicts the unfortunate country he could no longer defend by regular battles. The attitude he assumed, his noble language while making this sacrifice were such as to fire rather than cool the zeal of the Poles. They flocked to him, therefore, to assist him in recovering the capital he had for a while yielded to the Austrians. Thus, then, in Italy we had fallen back upon the Adige; in Tyrol we were assailed on all sides; in Germany, we were threatened and insulted by an indignant populace; in Poland, our allies were losing their capital which the treaty of Tilsit had restored to them.

Such was the news that came upon Napoleon in the flush of his victory at Ratisbon, and but slightly moved him. He had reckoned little on the assistance of the Russians, and cared only to prove to Europe that they were on his side, and not on that of the Austrians; and of that fact the march of their armies, however slow, left no possible doubt. As to the grand duchy of Warsaw, he knew that at Vienna he should make or unmake anew all the states of his last creation, and that it mattered little whether they stood or fell during his victorious march upon the capital. But the occurrences in Italy somewhat affected him; because they uncovered his right flank, exposed his Italian dominions to the horrors of war, and tarnished the youthful reputation of his adopted son, whom he so tenderly loved. One circumstance in particular almost changed his displeasure into anger. Prince Eugene, fearing more his adopted father than the opinion of the world, had scarcely dared to give him an account of his reverses, and had contented himself with writing; "My father, I need your indulgence; fearing your censure if I retreated, I accepted the offer of battle, and I have lost it." Not a single explanation followed these brief words, to tell in what condition things actually were; and this silence had been prolonged for several days, which considerably embarrassed Napoleon, who knew not what his losses actually were, what progress the enemy had made in Italy, or what danger menaced his right flank during his march upon Vienna. "You have been beaten," Napoleon replied in several letters; "be it so. I ought to have known how it would be when I named as general a young man without experience; whereas I would not allow the princes of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, to command the soldiers of their own nations. As for your losses, I will send you wherewith to repair them; the advantages gained by the enemy I shall know how to neutralise; but, to do this, I must be put in possession of every particular, and I know nothing! I am compelled to seek in foreign bulletins for the facts of which you ought to inform me. I

am doing that which I have never before done, and what must, of all things, be most repugnant to a prudent general: I am marching with my wings in the air, unconscious of what is passing on my flanks. Fortunately I can brave all risks—thanks to the blows I have struck—but it is miserable to be kept in such a state of ignorance." Napoleon added these remarkable words, which we quote, because they concern the fame of one of the greatest of his lieutenants, Massena: "War is a serious game, in which are staked one's reputation, one's troops, and one's country. A man should reason and examine himself, in order to learn whether or not he is fitted by nature for the art. I know that in Italy you affect to despise Massena. If I had sent him this would not have occurred. Massena possesses military talents before which you should all bow; and if he has faults they must be forgotten, for every man has some. In confiding to you my army of Italy, I have committed an error. I should have sent Massena, and have given you the command of the cavalry, under his orders. The prince royal of Bavaria admirably commands a division under the duke of Dantzig! I think that, if circumstances become urgent, you should write to the king of Naples to join the army; you will give up the command to him, and put yourself under his orders. It is a matter of course that you should have less experience in war than a man whose occupation it has been for eighteen years. Burghausen, April 30, 1809."

Napoleon, knowing well that all the hope of his enemies, and all their courage would vanish before the astounding news of the events at Ratisbon, resolved to push vigorously onward, and whilst so doing to stop first, and afterwards to drive back the forces that manœuvred on his flank or his rear. Then, as in 1805, to burst upon Vienna was the surest way to rupture all coalitions made or yet to be made.

Nevertheless, there suggested itself one of those serious questions on which the fate of empires depends, and which fall to the lot of great men such as Hannibal, Cæsar, Frederic, and Napoleon. Should he impetuously follow the broad way which led to Vienna, that of the Danube, leaving the archduke Charles on his left in Bohemia, driving before him the scattered forces of general Hiller and the archduke Louis, and forcing back archduke John on his right by the impetus of a victorious march upon the capital? or should he leave to Bessières the task of scattering with his cavalry and the infantry of Molitor the remains of general Hiller and the archduke Louis upon the Inn, whilst he himself pursued archduke Charles in Bohemia, and struck at the Austrians through the person of that prince and not through Vienna? Napoleon pondered this in his mind (as his correspondence evidences), but if it became a great captain like him to weigh every alternative, it no less became him not to hesitate after having duly deliberated, but to march at once to the real object he had in view, which was Vienna. It is very true that by instantly pursuing the archduke Charles

across Bohemia he would have had a chance of augmenting the disorganisation of the principal Austrian army, hastening its dissolution, and preventing it, after its losses had been repaired, from coming under cover of the Danube to dispute with him the possession of the Austrian empire on the bloody fields of Essling and Wagram. This is certain, and the panegyrists of the archduke Charles have from this concluded that Napoleon sacrificed everything to the pride of entering Vienna. But this is a false decision arrived at without any regard to the actual facts. It is quite true that the Austrian main army driven through Ratisbon beyond the Danube, was severely shaken, and that one more blow might have completed its destruction. But Napoleon's young army, although elated by success, was worn out by five days' battle. The only corps capable of enduring this prolonged fatigue was that of marshal Davout, and it too was exhaused, for upon it had fallen the main burthen of those five days. The rest were completely worn out. It would be necessary then with 50 thousand men to pursue the 80 thousand under archduke Charles, who, whatever could be done, would still be two days in advance, and would secure all the provisions still remaining in the exhausted villages of Bohemia, while the French would not find even a crumb of bread; who, moreover, though leaving behind on the road in his precipitate retreat his laggards and his wounded, would nevertheless save two-thirds of his men, and after having induced Napoleon to follow him, would infallibly return through Lintz to the Danube, cross that river, and reunite with the 40 thousand men of the corps of Hiller and archduke Louis, Chasteler's 10 or 12 thousand, and archduke John's 40 thousand, and would thus have on the real line of communication the best 140 thousand men in the Austrian army: a supposition by no means chimerical, since subsequently, though separated by Napoleon's presence on the Danube, the archdukes never ceased to aim at forming a junction with each other, the one purposing to come from Bohemia by way of Lintz, the other from Italy by Inspruck and Salzburg. It is evident, therefore, that if Napoleon had chosen to pursue the archduke into Bohemia, he would have left open the middle route, that of the Danube; that then the reunion of the archdukes would have been certain, and that those princes, by acting with a little boldness, might have returned to the Isar, or even to the Upper Danube, and have cut off the retreat of the French by bringing a combined force of 140 thousand men against Napoleon, who no longer had that number. To march along the margin of the Danube, and thus take the shortest course to Vienna, for the roads from Bohemia describe by Ratisbon, Pilsen, Budweis, and Lintz, a great arc, of which the Danube is the cord; to maintain himself on that road which was not only the shorter but the more central; by occupying it to separate the archduke who was in Bohemia from the archdukes who were in Bavaria and Italy; lastly, by remaining on that route to take good care of what is most precious to a general, namely,

his line of communication, that on which he has his sick, his ammunition, his provisions, his recruits, and by which it is possible for him to retreat in case of defeat, was then the only wise resolution, the only one worthy of the genius of Napoleon, and he adopted it without any hesitation.

Having resolved to take the Danube route and march straight on Vienna, Napoleon employed the most suitable means for the execution of his designs. The plan of the Austrians was not known to him; all he knew was that the larger part of them under archduke Charles were on the left of the Danube by Ratisbon, and the smaller under general Hiller and archduke Louis were on the right of the river by Landshut beyond the Isar. He concluded thence that whilst marching forward and sharply pursuing the latter portion, it would be necessary to take great precautions with regard to the former, which would be always on his flank or on his rear. Whilst guarding against whatever attempts it might make upon the safety of the army, he would have to move forward a mass sufficiently strong to overcome Hiller and archduke Louis, and rapid enough to anticipate them at the several passages over the Danube, and thus hinder the two armies of the enemy from meeting before Vienna for its protection.

It was on the 23rd, the day he entered Ratisbon, and on the 24th that Napoleon made all his arrangements. Previously on the 22nd, on quitting Landshut for Eckmühl, he had sent marshal Bessières in pursuit of the two beaten corps of general Hiller and archduke Louis, with such a force as ensured him against any forcible return of the fugitives. On the 23rd, during the cannonading of Ratisbon, he had directed that the line of the Danube should be so occupied as to prevent any junction between the archdukes, whether they attempted to pass from Bohemia into Bavaria or *vice versâ*. To this end Napoleon ordered Massena to descend to Straubing with the Boudet, Legrand, Carra St. Cyr, and Claparède divisions. Thus two columns were to pursue the Austrians on the right of the Danube: that of marshal Bessières, which had orders to march by the centre of Bavaria, and to press hard on Hiller and archduke Louis at the passage of all the affluents of the Danube; and that of marshal Massena, which was to move along the river, and occupy before the archdukes the important passages of Straubing, Passau, and Lintz, which formed the points of communication between Bavaria and Bohemia.

Having taken these precautions on his front and his right, Napoleon disposed of marshal Davout's corps to guard his left and his rear against any possible attack by archduke Charles. Napoleon gave back to Davout the fine Gudin and Morand divisions, which he had borrowed for the affair of Abensberg, and took from him the St. Hilaire division, which, with Oudinot's two divisions, was to form the corps of marshal Lannes. The Friant, Morand, and Gudin divisions, habituated to serve with marshal Davout since the camp of Boulogne, and which had always remained out of France

since that period, formed a real family, under the eyes of a father of inflexible character but devoted to his children, and were a finished model of infantry suited for war on a grand scale. They never pillaged, and because they did not they never wanted anything; they never had a man behind, never retreated, and beat every enemy that came before them. With Montbrun's cavalry, they still counted, notwithstanding their losses, 29 or 30 thousand men. Napoleon ordered marshal Davout to quit Ratisbon on the 24th, march upon the tracks of archduke Charles to the frontiers of Bohemia, try to know whether he had crossed them, and, that being ascertained, return to the Danube, and march down along its right bank, whilst Montbrun, with his light cavalry, was moving parallel with him on the opposite side, constantly exploring the Böhmer Wald, a long chain of wooded mountains separating Bohemia from Bavaria. Marshal Davout then, after having fully informed himself respecting the movements of archduke Charles, was to follow the general march of the army along the Danube, behind marshal Massena, and to occupy Straubing when Massena marched on Passau, and Passau when he moved to Lintz. General Dupas, with a French division of 4 or 5 thousand men, and the contingents of the minor princes, in all 10 thousand men, had orders to repair immediately to Ratisbon, and replace marshal Davout, whom he was to follow from thence, and replace successively at Straubing, Passau, and Lintz. Finally, prince Bernadotte, with the Saxons, had orders to quit Dresden, which was not threatened by any enemy, cross the Upper Palatinate, and enter Ratisbon, to replace the Dupas division. In this way the Danube could not fail to be well guarded, since the two best corps in the army, those of Massena and Davout, escorted by two allied corps, were to follow its course; whilst, through the centre of Bavaria, a strong advanced guard, under marshal Bessières, was to press on the heels of Hiller and archduke Louis. Napoleon resolved to march himself with the St. Hilaire and Demont divisions, the disposable half of Oudinot's corps, the guard which had just arrived, and the fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, and to escort Bessières by Landshut, in order to support him if he met with any difficulty on the part of Hiller and archduke Louis' corps, or to bear down upon the margin of the river if archduke Charles attempted to recross it on our flank or our rear. To complete this series of precautions, Napoleon detached the Bavarians on his right, with orders to occupy Munich, bring back their king thither, drive away the Jellachich division—which, as the reader remembers, had been detached from Hiller's corps—force it from Munich on Salzburg, and then enter the Tyrol, and replace it under the dominion of the house of Bavaria. This last measure, by replacing the Bavarians at home, had the advantage of clearing the march of the army on the Italian side, and guarding it from any attack by archduke John. The troops marching along the river-side had orders to stop the boats, collect them on the right side, and form convoys of them.

for the transport of stores, invalids, and recruits; to prepare ovens, flour, and biscuits at all points; and to put Straubing, Passau, and Lintz in a state of defence, so as to be able to guard the river with small forces, when the several *echelons* should have been passed.

Napoleon's next care was to procure the necessary reinforcements for the several corps, whether to repair their losses or to complete their proposed effective. In the recent engagements we had lost 12 or 15 thousand men, a third of whom only were to reappear in the ranks; and the corps had entered into action before having received their full numbers. The old divisions had not received the conscripts due to them from the depôts, and in the new corps, like Oudinot's, formed of fourth battalions, several of these battalions had only two, three, or four companies, instead of six. Lastly, the recruits coming from Italy, for the corps which had their depôts in that country, had been stopped in the Tyrol, and had to be replaced with others. Napoleon gave orders that the necessary supplies of men should be promptly forwarded by the well-guarded route of Bavaria, and that the cavalry should receive the horses of which they stood in much need. Napoleon had just been joined by the grenadiers, chasseurs, fusiliers, and tirailleurs of his guard. He repeated his orders for the prompt organisation of the four regiments of conscripts of that guard, and of the new detachment of artillery, which was to raise its pieces to the number of sixty. He wrote to the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, announcing to them his brilliant successes, and appealing to their zeal for the recruiting of their forces. To his brothers, Jerome and Louis, he wrote to urge the mustering of their forces, in order to provide for the security of Germany against the insurrectionary movements which were breaking out on all sides. He gave orders that the king of Prussia should be required to explain himself as to the strange adventure of major Schill; and in announcing his victories to M. de Caulaincourt, he sent him no letter for the emperor Alexander, wishing to signify to that monarch, by such silence, what he thought of the sincerity of his co-operation. He, moreover, forbade our ambassador to listen to a single word as to the future fate of Austria, or as to the conditions of peace, which might be the result of such rapid victories.

Whilst his troops were advancing before him, Napoleon remained at Ratisbon, to despatch the numerous orders requisite for the conduct of such great operations, and the government of the empire, which he did not neglect though absent. He stayed in Ratisbon from the evening of the 23rd April until the 26th, when he went to Landshut, to rejoin the army and command it in person. Having met the guard and the cuirassiers on the way, he marched with those fine troops in the track of Bessières and Lannes, who were advancing, as we have said, by the centre of Bavaria, whilst, on the right, the Bavarians were skirting along the foot of the Tyrolese

Alps, and on the left, Massena, Davout, Dupas, and Bernadotte, were moving down the margin of the Danube one after the other.

During this time the Austrian generals were adopting nearly the plan of retreat imputed to them by Napoleon. Archduke Charles, driven with about 24 thousand men into the Upper Palatinate, had, in fact, no other course open to him than to retreat as fast as possible through Bohemia, recross the Danube at Lintz or at Krems, form a junction there with Hiller and archduke Louis, and even, if possible, bring archduke John to the same point through the insurgent Tyrol. General Hiller and archduke Louis, on their part, had nothing better to do than to contest the lines of the Inn, the Traun, and the Ens, confluents of the Danube, and thus delay Napoleon's march, and give archdukes Charles and John time to rejoin them, and cover Vienna with all the forces of the monarchy. This was, in fact, the plan which archduke Charles adopted and prescribed to his brothers, thereby completely justifying Napoleon's march along the Danube, since it placed him on the direct road to Vienna, between all the archdukes, so as to isolate them from each other, and anticipate them at all points of concentration.

Conformably to the plan fixed, archduke Charles, on quitting Ratisbon, took up a position at Cham, at the entrance of the defiles of Bohemia. He established himself between the two roads from Furth and Roetz to Pilsen, having Rosenberg's corps on his left, Hohenzollern's on his right, Kollowrath's in the middle, prince John of Lichtenstein in the rear with the grenadiers and cuirassiers, and Bellegarde's corps detached to the convent of Schoenthal. The position at Cham was very strong, and was worth defending in case of a keen pursuit. Prince Charles waited there for the coming up of his *matériel* and of his laggards and missing men. Marshal Davout followed him thither by Nittenau, not with the intention of giving him battle, but with that of observing his march and ascertaining his projects. Wishing, however, to maintain the ascendency in arms, he drove in the advanced posts of the Austrians nearly to Cham, and assumed the attitude of an enemy ready to come to action. Whether it was that the archduke did not wish to run the risk of another battle, or that he thought he had waited long enough, he decamped, leaving marshal Davout a great number of waggons, and many wounded, whom the latter made prisoners. His purpose being to retreat, it would have been better to have done so sooner; for, having quitted the environs of Ratisbon on the morning of the 24th, and remained in position at Cham until the 28th, he lost two days out of four, whereas it was of the first importance to him to reach the bridge of Lintz, by which he might form a junction with the corps of Hiller and the archduke Louis. His march through Bohemia, by Pilsen, Budweis, and Lintz, was a great round, whilst Napoleon went direct to the important point of Lintz by an excellent road, and with the help of the river for the transport of his heaviest baggage. The

Austrian commander would, therefore, have done well to make haste, even at the risk of leaving many of his men behind him, for it was better to arrive at Lintz with diminished forces than not to arrive there at all.

Be this as it may, archduke Charles retreated into Bohemia, determined to collect all the reinforcements he could by the way, and to regain the right bank of the Danube as soon as possible. Doubting, however, that he should be able to march fast enough, he sent forward general Klenau, with nine battalions, and general Stutterheim with some light troops, to go by the shortest routes and destroy the bridges of Passau and Lintz on the Danube, if they could not occupy them. Having taken these precautions, and unable to help yielding to discouragement at sight of a war that began so badly, he proposed to the emperor of Austria to make a pacific overture to Napoleon, under pretext of an exchange of prisoners. The emperor Francis, who had consented to war without being impelled to it by any decided conviction, and who saw how much his brother was already discouraged, did not refuse to take this pacific step, only he made it a condition that there should not be too much weakness manifested at the very opening of hostilities. Archduke Charles, in consequence, made general Grünn, the chief officer of his staff, write a letter, in which, after congratulating the Emperor Napoleon on his arrival at the French head-quarters —a fact, he modestly said, he had been enabled to discover by the turn of events—he proposed to him an exchange of prisoners to assuage the evils of war, and said how happy he should be if, from the commencement of hostilities, it were possible to give them a less harsh and violent a character. He then continued his march through Bohemia, after having enjoined his brother John to pass into Bavaria, and his brother Louis and his lieutenant, Hiller, strongly to contest that country with the French, in order to give time to all the Austrian forces to effect their junction behind the Traun, in the environs of Lintz.

As soon as he had seen archduke Charles strike off into Bohemia, marshal Davout turned back to Ratisbon, recrossed the river, and proceeded along its course on the right bank, following marshal Massena to Passau, and being followed to Ratisbon by general Dupas.

Meanwhile, general Hiller and archduke Louis, even before they had received orders to contest possession of the Bavarian territory step by step, had, of their own accord, resolved so to do; and believing that Napoleon was intent on pursuing archduke Charles, they had determined to make an offensive movement against the advanced guard of marshal Bessières, in order to effect a diversion in favour of the commander-in-chief. This resolution was honourable and judicious, for they might surprise Bessières before he was joined by the reinforcement which Napoleon was sending him, and whilst he was in that state of imprudent confidence which victory often inspires.

The two Austrian generals had still about 50 thousand men, including the remains of Kienmayer's reserve and Jellachich's division. General Jellachich was at Munich, with orders to retire on Salzburg. Deprived of his co-operation, and joined by a regiment of Mitrowski's and by some Stipcitz hussars, they had some 38 or 40 thousand men. Marching against marshal Bessières, who had barely 13 or 14 thousand, and who was advancing with extreme rashness, they might cut him to pieces. Accordingly, on the morning of the 24th, before archduke Charles had finally effected his retreat into Bohemia, and whilst marshal Bessières was advancing beyond the Isar, having Marulaz with his light cavalry at the head of his column, general Wrede's Bavarians in the centre, and Molitor's infantry in the rear, the two Austrian generals advanced with the intention of driving the vanguard of the French into the marshes of the Roth near Neumarkt. They presented themselves in three columns, and first encountered the cavalry of general Marulaz, which charged them several times with great gallantry, but could make no impression on a body of 30 thousand resolute men. The cavalry being worsted, general de Wrede had his turn, and had, with 6 or 7 thousand foot, to resist more than 30 thousand. The Bavarians were not unworthy to cope with the Austrians, though they were inferior to them; but it was impossible for them to contend against the mass which assailed them in front and on their flanks. Their only retreat over the moist and woody country that borders on the little river Roth, was a weak and trembling wooden bridge, incapable of sustaining the heavy masses that traversed it with hurried steps. Behind was the town of Neumarkt, where Bessières was at table, whilst his advanced guard, driven back upon his centre, was in danger of being cut to pieces. Fortunately, general Molitor, an infantry officer formed in the school of the Rhine, and the first of the lieutenant-generals of that time, arrived with his division. He recognised the danger, and imparted it to marshal Bessières, who, looking upon it as an affair of infantry, had the discreet modesty to leave it in the hands of general Molitor. The latter instantly crossed the bridge of the Roth with his four regiments, and perceiving on the left a wooded height whence the retreat might be protected, he hastened to occupy it with the 2nd of the line, precipitating from the top to the bottom an Austrian troop that was posted on it. He then ranged the 16th and 37th regiments on the right, in an advantageous position for using their fire. At that moment the light cavalry was retreating with loss across the Roth, and general de Wrede was engaged with the enemy, who were intent on destroying one of his battalions. But suddenly the attitude of the Molitor division cooled the ardour of the Austrians. The rolling and well-aimed volleys of the 16th and 37th, and the strong position of the 2nd, checked them, and they were forced to let the Bavarians repass the Roth in quiet. The 16th and 37th regiments then defiled,

protected by the 2nd, which had a tremendous engagement with the Austrians. So obstinately bent on fighting was that brave regiment, that general Molitor had great difficulty in withdrawing it. Before recrossing the bridge it charged several times with the bayonet, and thus forced the Austrians to let it operate its retreat, which it effected last of all with an *aplomb* that extorted the admiration of the enemy themselves.

This affair cost the Bavarians some hundreds of men, and general Marulaz some horses. It might have been disastrous for the whole advanced guard but for Napoleon's forethought in affording marshal Bessières the support of general Molitor. However, though checked on the banks of the Roth, general Hiller and archduke Louis would not have renounced their offensive movement if they had not learned in the night the whole extent of the commander-in-chief's disasters, and his retreat into Bohemia, and if they had not recognised the necessity of themselves retreating, for Napoleon could not fail to fall soon upon them with irresistible masses. They resolved, therefore, to fall back upon the Inn, and thence upon the Traun, which they hoped to defend better than the Inn, because they should have more time to strengthen their position on it; besides that they had some chance of finding one of the archdukes there—either Charles or John.

Things were in this state when Napoleon came up with the guard and the cuirassiers, preceded by Lannes, with the troops of generals St. Hilaire, Demont, and Oudinot. He sent marshal Bessières forward, and gave the pursuit the force of a torrent which had burst its dykes. The whole mass, from right to left, marched on the Inn—the Bavarians, by Munich and Wasserburg, on Salzburg; marshal Lannes, by Muhldorf, on Burghausen; marshal Bessières, by Neumarkt, on Braunau. Supporting this movement along the Danube, marshal Massena entered Passau, which he took by a *coup de main* from the Austrians, who, no more than the Bavarians, had had the forethought to consolidate their position there.

On the 28th and 29th of April the French had arrived on all points at the line of the Inn, and were busy on every road in reconstructing the bridges which the Austrians had broken down or burnt to the water's edge whenever they had had time.

Napoleon having entered Burghausen on the 28th, was obliged to wait two days for the rebuilding of the bridge, which was of great importance, and which had been completely burnt. Having received the pacific letter of the archdude Charles, he sent it to M. de Champagny, who was at head-quarters, and desired him not to reply to it. Full of confidence in the result of the campaign—not foreseeing the difficulties he might subsequently encounter—he fancied he held in his hand the destiny of the house of Austria, and would not be stayed in his ambitious designs by any hasty impulse of generosity. He therefore enjoined silence—at all events for the moment—reserving it to himself to reply subsequently, according to circumstances.

Marshal Massena having entered Passau, and marshal Davout following close after him, whilst the whole army was stationed upon the Inn from Braunau to Salzburg, it was necessary to march upon the Traun without delay. This was the line it was most essential to secure, for it corresponded to the *debouché* of Lintz, by which archduke Charles might join general Hiller and archduke Louis. This line being pre-occupied, there remained for the Austrian commander a second and last chance of a junction in front of Vienna, which was to reach in time the bridge of Krems, and occupy St. Polten to protect the capital. Napoleon resolved to deprive him at once of the first of these two chances, by eagerly pressing forward to Lintz. Having reached the Inn with all his corps, and having rebuilt the bridges on the 30th of April, he commanded a general movement to be made on the 1st of May. He desired Massena to march rapidly from Passau upon Efferding, from Efferding upon Lintz, and on arriving here to seize first upon the town of Lintz, then upon the bridge over the Danube if it was not destroyed, and, Lintz once occupied, to go straight to the river Traun, which flows two leagues below. The Traun, which is one of the most important lines the Austrians have to defend when they want to arrest the progress of an army marching upon Vienna, flows, like the Ens, from the Northern Alps, and falls into the Danube a little below Lintz. It flows along the foot of a plateau which extends as far as the Danube, and upon which an army could advantageously post itself to oppose the progress of an invasion. Hence the bridge over the Danube, that which served as a military communication between Bohemia and Upper Austria, was situated not at Lintz itself, but at Mauthausen, below the confluence of the Traun with the Danube. It was thus sheltered by the Traun and by the plateau of which we have above spoken, on the summit of which stood the town and castle of Ebersberg.

Massena then received orders on the 1st of May to pass quickly from Passau to Lintz, from Lintz to Ebersberg. But as the difficulty might be considerable if the 36 thousand men yet remaining to the two Austrian generals took up their quarters at Ebersberg, Napoleon thought proper to approach the Traun at several points at the same time,—at Ebersberg, at Wels, and at Lambach. He consequently directed all his columns upon the Traun, so as to arrive there on the morning of the 3rd of May. General de Wrede having with his division traversed Salzburg, and having been replaced there by the rest of the Bavarians, was to proceed by Straswalchen to Lambach, on the Traun. Marshal Lannes, with the troops of general Oudinot, St. Hilaire, and Demont, was to proceed to Wels, to cross the Traun there just above Ebersberg. Lastly, marshal Bessières, with the guard, the cuirassiers, and light infantry, was either to cross at Wels, or to turn towards Ebersberg, if he heard such a cannonade as indicated a serious opposition in that direction. Major-general Berthier had orders to inform Massena that if the obstacles he encountered were too great, the passage

of the Traun effected above him, either at Wels or Lambach, would afford him aid towards overcoming them. He was, however, enjoined in these new orders, as in the preceding ones, to neglect nothing that should bring about the speedy capture not only of the town of Lintz and its bridge over the Danube, but also the bridge of Mauthausen, situated, as we have said, at the confluence of the Traun, under protection of the castle of Ebersberg.

Our columns advanced in the order indicated. They were all, on the 1st of May, beyond the Inn, after having rebuilt the bridges over it, Massena crossing from Passau to Efferding, Lannes and Bessières from Burghausen and Braunau upon Ried. They collected on their route a considerable number of carriages, and about three thousand prisoners. Massena, who was marching with the Danube on his left, met all along his road with the rear guard of general Hiller and archduke Louis, and could discern on the other side of the river the troops of the archduke Charles coming through the defiles of Bohemia to occupy or destroy the bridge of Lintz. He felt, therefore, at every step the importance of anticipating the Austrian commander-in-chief either at Lintz or at Ebersberg, not so much for the purpose of availing himself of those points of transit as in order to keep them from the enemy, and to prevent the union behind the Traun of all the forces of the Austrian monarchy.

On the evening of the 2nd of May, Massena exchanged some musket-shots before Efferding with the rear guard of general Hiller, took some prisoners, and prepared to march the next day upon Lintz. On the morning of the 3rd he set out, preceded by the Marulaz light horse, and followed by the Claparède division of Oudinot's corps. He appeared before Lintz at the dawn of day. To enter, rout a few posts that hastily retreated, and take possession of the town, was but the work of a moment. The detachments of Klenau and Stutterheim, despatched by archduke Charles to occupy the passage, had succeeded only in destroying the bridge of Lintz and bringing the boats to the left bank. Being in possession of Lintz, Massena was certain that the junction of the archdukes could not be effected by the bridge at that spot. But the bridge in reality the most favourable for the junction was that of Mauthausen, situated two leagues further down, and protected, as we have before said, by the Traun. As long as we were not masters of that, it was possible for the archduke Charles to make use of it to unite with general Hiller and archduke Louis; and it was uncertain whether the detachments seen beyond the Danube were the outposts of the great Austrian army, or mere detachments without support. It was ten o'clock in the morning. Massena did not hesitate a moment; traversed Lintz at double-quick step, and advanced to the Traun opposite Ebersberg, a position which suddenly presented itself under a formidable aspect.

In front was the Traun, flowing from right to left to where it projected itself between wood-covered islands into the immense bed of the Danube. Over it was a bridge more than 400 yards long, and

beyond it an escarped plateau; above which rose the little town of Ebersberg, and higher still the castle of Ebersberg, bristling with artillery; and lastly, in front of the bridge and on the escarpment of the plateau, a mass of troops amounting probably to between 36 and 40 thousand men. Such a sight would have made a serious impression on any but a man of Massena's temperament, and would have induced him to wait, especially if he made the very obvious reflection, that a few leagues above Ebersberg many French columns were that day or the next to force their passage and turn the position. But this certainty did not do away with the possibility that, in the course of the day, the archdukes might effect a junction by the bridge of Mauthausen if it was left in their power. There was, then, a real advantage in taking it from them at once by seizing upon the town and castle of Ebersberg. Besides, it is by the impulses of a man's temperament, still more than by his reason, that his decisions are shaped in war; and Massena, on meeting with the enemy, with whom he had not yet had an opportunity of having a hand-to-hand encounter, felt but one desire—that of throwing himself upon him and seizing a position considered decisive. From these motives he commanded an instantaneous attack.

In front of the bridge of Ebersberg, around the village of Klein Munchen, were stationed some Austrian sharpshooters and a few troops of light cavalry. General Marulaz charged and dispersed both. The horsemen recrossed the bridge, the sharpshooters placed themselves in the gardens and houses of Klein Munchen. Claparède's first brigade, commanded by the intrepid Cohorn, marched behind the light cavalry of Marulaz. General Cohorn, of whom we have already had occasion to speak, was descended from the famous Dutch engineer of the same name, and carried within a puny body one of the most impetuous and energetic souls which God ever gave to a warrior. He was well fitted to execute the impetuous will of Massena. No sooner was he arrived at the spot than he placed himself at the head of the voltigeurs of his brigade, attacked the village of Klein Munchen, seized first upon the gardens, then threw himself into the houses, killed or took prisoners all their occupants, pushed on beyond the villages, gained the entrance of the bridge, which was at least 400 yards long, loaded with fagots for burning, and riddled by the shots of the enemy. Any other than Cohorn would have halted and waited for orders from Massena; but the daring general, sword in hand, rushed foremost on the bridge, crossed it at double-quick step, killed or captured all who stood in his way, left, indeed, many of his own men dead or dying on the planks of the bridge, but finally cleared it, and led on his attacking columns against the plateau, which was covered with the masses of the Austrian infantry. Cohorn, under a shower of balls, climbed with the same impetuosity the steep ascent to Ebersberg, penetrated into the town, debouched on a large open space commanded by the castle, and at last compelled the Austrians to fall back upon the heights behind. Unfortunately, they retained possession of the castle, and poured from its

walls a destructive fire upon the little town now become our prize.

During this series of daring deeds, Massena, who had remained at the foot of the position, took his measures to support Cohorn, who had hitherto had to do only with the advanced guard of the Austrians, but who would soon have to deal with their whole force. In order to oppose the formidable artillery of the plateau, he brought up the guns of the whole *corps d'armée*, and placed them as advantageously as possible. Our artillery officers, as skilful as intrepid, sought to compensate by the precision of their fire and the judicious planting of their guns for the disadvantage of their position. A fearful cannonade then took place from one side to the other of the Traun. This done, Massena despatched across the long defile of the bridge Claparède's two other brigades, those of Lesuire and Ficatier, ordering them to ascend the plateau and make their way into Ebersberg to the assistance of general Cohorn. Then he despatched a crowd of aides-de-camp in order to hasten the arrival of the Legrand, Carra St. Cyr, and Boudet divisions, whose assistance was greatly needed in order to a happy issue out of this formidable encounter. He himself remained in the midst of flying balls and bullets, giving his orders and providing for everything.

Lesuire and Ficatier, with their two brigades, arrived opportunely, for general Hiller, again marching forward, had attacked Cohorn with a considerable force, and had compelled him to re-enter Ebersberg, and afterwards to evacuate the great square. The French once more took possession of it, drove off the Austrians, and endeavoured to seize the castle, which they approached without being able to enter. But the Austrians, who felt the importance of the post, returned in greater numbers (which they could easily do, since they were 36 thousand against 7 or 8 thousand), bore down *en masse* upon the castle, from which they repelled the French, entered the town, passed through it, and once more emerged upon the great square. The brave Claparède, with his lieutenants, then sought refuge in the houses which surround it on three side, established themselves there, and from the windows poured forth a shower of balls upon the enemy. The possession of these houses was furiously contested, the artillery of the castle firing upon the Austrians as well as upon the French. The unfortunate little town was set on fire by shells, and the conflagration soon became so great that it was almost impossible to breathe.

This frightful massacre continued, and fury having equalled the courage of the combatants on either side, victory seemed on the point of being decided by superior numbers. The French were about to be driven into the Traun and punished for their audacity, when fortunately the Legrand division came in sight, led on by its intrepid general. At the head of his two veteran regiments, the 26th light infantry and the 18th of the line, he reached the bridge, encumbered with dead and wounded. To cross it, a heap of corpses, some perhaps of the wounded still breathing, had to be thrown into the

Traun. At length it was traversed, and beyond it fresh impediments were encountered, in the shape of combatants driven back in confusion, and wounded men being carried off. An officer was endeavouring to explain the position to general Legrand, when the latter cut him short, saying, "I do not want advice, but room for my men." Room was made, and he advanced with one of his regiments to the right to outflank the Austrians, who had surrounded Ebersberg; another to the centre, through the main street of the town. Whilst several of his battalions, formed into attacking columns, repelled the Austrians who surrounded the town, the others passed through the middle of it, and succeeded in debouching upon the great square, cleared it at the point of the bayonet, and thus rescued Claparède, who was reduced to the last extremity. Legrand then attacked the castle under a murderous fire. The gates being barred, he forced them open with the axe, penetrated into the castle, and killed all within it. From that moment Ebersberg was ours, but it was only a heap of smoking ruins, from which arose an intolerable stench of burning corpses. Our men hastened to leave behind them a spot as frightful to behold as it was hard to win, and marched against the Austrians, who were drawn up in order of battle upon a line of hills in the background, and who, perceiving afar off on the plain between Lintz and Ebersberg the approach of the long files belonging to the division of Carra St. Cyr and Boudet; perceiving, besides, to their right, a mass of French cavalry, who had crossed the Traun at Wels, thought it not prudent to prolong the furious contest, and then retired, thus abandoning to us the confluence of the Traun and the important pass of Mauthausen. But the bridge had disappeared at that place as well as at Lintz, the outposts of archduke Charles having destroyed it and sent the boats to Krems.

The cavalry which had been perceived was a thousand horse, which Lannes, after having passed the Traun without difficulty, had despatched under general Durosnel to turn the position of the Austrians. It is certain, then, that if Massena had been able to guess that archduke Charles would not be at Mauthausen with his army, and that passages already effected a little higher up would have supplied means for compelling the surrender of Ebersberg, he ought to have spared the blood shed in this terrible attack. The field of carnage was hideous, and the town of Ebersberg was so much in flames that the wounded could not be withdrawn. To prevent the fire from reaching the bridge, it had been necessary to cut off the approach at either end, so that the communication was interrupted for several hours between the troops who had already crossed and those coming to their aid. This conflict cost us 1700 killed, drowned, burnt, or wounded. The Austrians lost 3 thousand put *hors de combat*, 4 thousand prisoners, and many flags and cannon, and went away appalled at so much daring. We had, therefore, much to compensate for our losses on this terrible day, and its effect was great no less morally than physically.

Napoleon had galloped up on hearing the loud cannonade. Though

well inured to the horrors of war, all his senses were shocked at that abominable spectacle, which was not sufficiently justified by necessity; and but for the admiration he felt for Massena's warlike genius, and the value he always set on energy, he would perhaps have expressed blame for what had occurred. He did nothing of the kind, however, but would not remain in Ebersberg, and took up his quarters outside it, amongst his guard.

The archduke Charles, in spite of his settled purpose to come to a junction with his brothers behind the Traun, by Lintz or Mauthausen, had neither marched quickly enough nor had sufficiently calculated his movements to arrive at Lintz in serviceable time. He had only reached Budweis, in Bohemia, when Massena was so impetuously advancing beyond Lintz and Ebersberg, and the only crossing-place left open to him was that of Krems. General Hiller and the archduke Louis were proceeding thither by Enns, Amstetten, and St. Polten, destroying in their progress all the bridges on the rivers which flow from the Noric Alps to the Danube. As to the archduke John, it was still less likely that he could arrive soon enough, or that he should even venture into the Alps, leaving prince Eugene on his left, and exposing himself on his right to the risk of encountering the army of Napoleon, into which he would have fallen as into an abyss. He was, therefore, not to be reckoned on. But it would be enough to create some favourable chance were archduke Charles to combine, through Krems, with general Hiller and archduke Louis, who were retreating along the Danube; for after having employed considerable time in collecting stragglers, assembling the landwehr, and incorporating the third battalions of the Gallician regiments, he had with him more than 80 thousand men, and could, united with his two lieutenants, who possessed at least 30 thousand, bring 110 thousand fighting men into the field at St. Polten. It would then be possible to dispute the victory with Napoleon; and if it were gained, the French empire, instead of being overthrown in 1814, would have been destroyed in 1809.

Napoleon, delighted at having taken from the archdukes their principal chances of a junction, by occupying Lintz and Mauthausen, hastened to march upon Krems, to take from them their last resource, and to reach Vienna before any obstacle could prevent his entry.

After the Traun, our forces came upon the Ens, which runs parallel with that river, washing in its course the other side of the plateau which had just been crossed. But all the bridges were completely destroyed upon the Ens, and not less than four-and-twenty or forty-eight hours were required to rebuild them. This was an unfortunate circumstance, but perfectly inevitable. Although on the morning of the 4th of May Lannes was at Steyer, upon the Ens, with the Demont and St. Hilaire divisions, and Bessières occupied the town of Ens with the light infantry, Oudinot's corps, and one of Massena's divisions, they were com-

pelled to wait the whole day of the 5th for the reconstruction of the bridges, which had been burnt down to the water's edge. It was not until the morning of the 6th that they were able to cross the Ens and march on Amstetten. Bessières, with the cavalry and Oudinot's infantry, passed first, soon followed by Massena, and by Lannes, who joined the principal column, since only one road remained from that point for the army between the foot of the Alps and the Danube. In the evening they entered Amstetten, without firing a shot.

Next day the army continued its march to Mölk, a fine position on the Danube, crowned by the magnificent abbey of the same name, where Napoleon established his head-quarters. There remained only one day's march to reach Krems, where stands the bridge of Mautern, the last by which archduke Charles could effect a junction with general Hiller and archduke Louis. There was already a certainty of reaching it without impediment, for no indications could be seen of the presence of a great army. On the 8th, our advanced guard moved to St. Polten, an important and well-known position of the flanks of the Kahlenberg, which is an offset of the Alps extending to the Danube, and behind which is situated Vienna. There it was that the great muster of the Austrians should have taken place if the archdukes had had time to come together, for at St. Polten, protected by an excellent military position, are found the point of junction of the roads to Bohemia, Italy, Upper and Lower Austria, and the pass leading to Vienna through the gorges of the Kahlenberg. But the only force seen was rear guards in retreat, some on our left falling back towards the bridge at Krems to shelter themselves behind the Danube, others in front of us falling back through the Kahlenberg on Vienna. It was evident then that there was no great battle to be fought in front of the capital, and the only difficulties remaining to be encountered were those of an assault on Vienna if it was defended. These difficulties might, indeed, become very embarrassing, if archduke Charles arrived in sight of Vienna before us by the left bank of the Danube, crossed the river by the Thabor bridge, and offered us battle under the walls of that great city. Fortunately what had occurred gave little reason to fear this.

In fact, archduke Charles, having lost at least two days at Cham, and some others again on the road from Cham to Budweis, for the sake of rallying and reinforcing his army, had not reached Budweis until the morning of the 3rd of May, just when Massena was taking Ebersberg. In the vain hope of a junction at Lintz, for which, however, there was very little warrant, he had advanced from Budweis to Freystadt, near the Danube, instead of marching straightway on Krems, which would have spared him a fresh detour, and a fresh loss of time. On approaching the Danube he had become aware of the occupation of Lintz and the Traun, and the consequent impossibility of effecting the desired junction in that direction. He had therefore resumed the route through the interior

of Bohemia by Zwoeltel, still cherishing the false hope of reaching Krems and St. Polten before us. In case, however, of his not arriving there, he had authorised the two generals who had the defence of the right bank of the river to pass over to the left, should they find themselves too hardly pressed upon; only they were to detach to Vienna the forces requisite for securing the capital from a *coup de main*. These instructions they had carried into effect on arriving at St. Polten. Fearing that they should be attacked by superior forces before reaching Vienna, and suffer a fresh defeat as at Ebersberg, they had recrossed the Danube, as in 1805, by the bridge at Krems, destroyed that bridge, removed all the boats to the left bank, and sent a strong detachment by the direct road to Vienna.

Such had been the proceedings of the Austrian generals which the mere aspect of things sufficed to reveal, for, as we have said, on the left were seen large bodies of troops passing the Danube at Krems, and in front were columns moving towards Vienna through the gorges of the Kahlenberg. Bent on arriving forthwith at the Austrian capital, Napoleon issued orders to the following effect from his head-quarters at the abbey of Mölk.

Marshal Lannes was to march to Vienna on the 9th of May with the infantry of generals Oudinot and Demont. Marshal Massena was to follow them immediately, whilst the bulk of the cavalry was to line the bank of the Danube, in order to baffle any attempt of the enemy to cross it. The light cavalry was distributed between Mautern, Tulln, and Klosterneuburg, along the windings of the river round the foot of the Kahlenberg. The cuirassiers were cantoned in the rear between St. Polten and Siegardskirchen. These precautions taken on our left, general Bruyère, on our right, was, with his light cavalry and a thousand German infantry, to go up the road to Italy by Lilienfeld, to disarm the mountains of Styria and watch the operations of the archduke John. Napoleon followed Lannes and Massena with the guard and a part of the cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, already arrived from Passau at Lintz, was ordered to proceed from Lintz to Mölk, from Mölk to St. Polten, so as to resist any attempts that might be made to cross the river at Krems in our rear, or else to march upon Vienna, if a general battle were to be fought under the walls of that capital. Nevertheless, as Passau and Lintz were nearly equal in importance to Krems, general Dupas was to remain at the former awaiting the arrival of marshal Bernadotte; and general Vandamme, with the troops of Wurtemberg, was charged with the defence of Lintz. Napoleon at the same time took the utmost precautions to secure the arrival of his convoys by the Danube. All along the shore we occupied he provided for them ports for repose, where they might shelter themselves and receive intelligence. These convoys, composed of boats collected on the Danube and its tributaries, were laden with biscuits, stores, and fatigued men. Besides Passau and Lintz, points already occupied, Napoleon fortified Ips, Waldsee, Mölk, and Mautern. Thence his convoys were to take the land

route by St. Polten, since that was the shortest and the only safe one, for beyond that point the Danube ran too near the Austrians and too far from the French. Lastly, not judging it enough for his protection to forbid the passage of the river, but believing, on the contrary, that the best means of securing his rear was to have the means of passing the Danube so as to occasion the enemy the same apprehension as we felt for ourselves, and thus compel him to divide his forces, Napoleon ordered the construction of two bridges of boats, one at Lintz, the other at Krems, with whatever materials could be found.

Having relieved himself of these cares, on the 9th Napoleon gave the word to march upon Vienna by way of Siegardskirchen and Schönbrunn. Lannes and Bessières advanced in the foremost line, Massena second, the guard and the cuirassiers third. Marshal Davout brought up the rear, leaving behind the posts we have mentioned to the left on the Danube, and to the right on the roads to Italy.

On the evening of the 9th general Oudinot halted at Siegardskirchen. At dawn on the 10th the Conroux brigade belonging to his corps debouched by the Schönbrunn road before the suburb of Maria Hilf, just a month after the commencement of hostilities. This offensive march, at once so skilful and so rapid, was worthy of comparison to that upon the same field in 1805, and to that across Prussia in 1811. Nothing in history was superior to it. It was now ten o'clock, and Napoleon rode up to direct in person the operations against the capital of Austria, which he desired to take forthwith, but to take without destroying it. Here, as at Madrid, he had a thousand motives for procuring the opening of the gates by other means than by fire and sword.

The archduke Charles had lost time in useless manœuvres, and was not at hand on the morning of the 10th to relieve Vienna. Nevertheless, that capital was capable of defence. We have already described it and its fortifications, and shall now only recapitulate some principal points of that description. The centre of Vienna, that is to say the old city, is encircled by a fine regular line of fortifications, which in 1683 resisted the assault of the Turkish arms. Since that period, the unremitting increase of population had called into existence several magnificent suburbs, each no less extensive than the ancient town. These were protected by a terraced wall of no great height, zigzag, without advanced works, yet equal to resist an attack of several days. Lastly, there was at Vienna what Napoleon had always considered the most potent means of defence—prodigious quantities of wood supplied by the Alps and the Danube. The Viennese could therefore entrench themselves, and among a people violently animated as they were against their enemy, there would be no lack of workmen. The arsenal of Vienna contained 500 pieces of artillery. Hungary could contribute immense supplies of provisions, and, thanks to this combination of means, it was possible to prolong the defence until the archdukes arrived

with reinforcements. It is inconceivable, therefore, why the Austrians, having to do with Napoleon—that renowned conqueror of capitals—had not thought of putting Vienna in a state of defence.

Much has been said of the faults committed by the archduke Charles in the course of this campaign. That of having neglected to put Vienna in a state of defence was certainly the most serious. General Hiller and the archduke Louis, shut up in the heart of this capital, behind all the fortifications which might have been repaired or erected, would have rendered it impregnable. The armies of Italy and Bohemia, afterwards assembled under its walls, would not have been easy to subdue. To gain a great victory over Napoleon in the open field would certainly have been a rash hope, especially if that decisive action was to be come at by means of bold and skilful manœuvres; but to accept a decisive battle at the head of the whole imperial army of Austria, and under the walls of the capital, would have been to prepare for Napoleon the only check which could then have endangered his triumphant fortunes.

Instead of that, no preparations for defence had been made at Vienna; whether from negligence, from reluctance to adopt such precautions, or fear of converting the capital into a field of battle, they had not thought of protecting the suburbs by means of the terraced wall which hemmed them round, and were contented with mounting guns on the ramparts of the old central fortress, which could make no use of them without firing on the suburbs. The only additional defenders provided were some of the mob, who had muskets put into their hands, and who only increased the garrison by some 2 or 3 thousand brawlers. The garrison itself was commanded by archduke Maximilian, and consisted of some battalions of landwehr, some depôts, and a detachment of Hiller's corps—altogether, 11 or 12 thousand men. Their ardent but inexperienced young commandant had not studied the strong or the weak points of the important post he had to defend, and all his patriotism was exhaled in proclamations as violent as they were idle.

No sooner had Colbert's infantry and the cavalry under general Conroux (Tharreau division) appeared at the entrance of the Maria Hilf faubourg, which was closed by an iron gate, than a sort of popular tumult broke out in the adjacent streets. The populace had been deceived with assurances that the French were beaten, the archduke was victorious, and his prolonged stay in Bohemia was only part of a system of skilful manœuvres; that no doubt Napoleon might detach a division to Vienna to menace the capital, but that any such attempt would be speedily punished by the return of the victorious archduke; and that therefore, if any demonstration of the kind was made, the Viennese should resist it as a mere insolent bravado on the part of the enemy. Accordingly, the populace took to running about the streets with yells of rage, more alarming to the peaceable inhabitants than to the invaders. The houses and the shops were immediately shut. A flag of truce having been sent to head-quarters, the bearer of it was assailed and wounded. His

horse was taken, and employed in bearing about in triumph a butcher's boy who had committed this violation of the law of nations. During this time general Tharreau's column had halted before the gate of the faubourg, waiting for it to be opened. Suddenly a French officer, captain Roidot, climbed over the gate, and, sword in hand, compelled the keeper to give up the keys. Our columns then entered, the cavalry at a gallop, the infantry at double-quick step, driving the garrison back on the old central town. No sooner had they reached the esplanade that lies between the faubourgs and the ramparts of the old city, than the guns on the latter discharged volleys of grape, that wounded some of our men, and among them general Tharreau. The French invested the place on all points, summoned it to surrender, and received in reply a discharge of cannon-balls, that only did mischief to the handsome houses of the faubourgs.

Seeing, after all, that however vigorously the attack was prosecuted the affair could not be terminated in one day, Napoleon went and took up his quarters at Schönbrunn, to wait for the coming up of the main body of his army. He nominated as governor of Vienna general Andréossy, who had been his ambassador to Austria, and both knew that capital and was known to its inhabitants. Napoleon meant to show by this appointment that it was not his intention to have recourse to harsh measures, for he would not have selected for their instrument a man who had lived several years among the Viennese. He also issued a proclamation, reminding the inhabitants of the excellent conduct of the French army in 1805, and promising them as good treatment if they behaved towards the French in a manner to deserve it.

General Andréossy immediately proceeded to the faubourgs, and in each of them organised municipalities composed of the principal inhabitants, formed a burgher guard for the maintenance of order, and endeavoured to establish communications with the old town, with a view to put an end to a defence which could only be disastrous to the Viennese themselves. The fire having continued and caused some damage, the faubourgs proposed to send a deputation to archduke Maximilian to call for a cessation of his imprudent resistance. Before proceeding on its mission the deputation waited on Napoleon, to hear from his own lips what words of promise they were to convey to the inhabitants of the fortified town. It then entered the interior of Vienna on the morning of the 11th of May. The reply to this conciliatory overture was a fresh cannonade. Napoleon's patience was now exhausted, and he resolved to employ fire and sword, but in a way as much as possible to spare the unfortunate faubourgs the consequences of a combat which was about to take place between the old and the new town.

Our troops had arrived by Siegardskirchen and Schönbrunn before the faubourg of Maria Hilf. Napoleon rode round the southern portion of the fortifications with Massena in search of another point to assail, and found one to the east, at the spot where

they join the Danube. There a secondary branch, detached from the great arm of the river, flows along the walls, supplying the ditches, and dividing the old city from the celebrated promenade of the Prater. Batteries erected in that quarter against the fortified town would be answered with a fire that would tell only upon very thinly-scattered dwellings and on the islands of the river. Besides, by crossing that arm the assailants would get possession of the Prater, and by going up a little to the north-east they would cut off Vienna from the great Thabor bridge, which leads to the left bank. In this way the city would be severed from all outward aid; archduke Charles would lose all possible chance of entering it, and its defenders, especially archduke Maximilian, the courage to shut themselves up in it, for they would be sure of being taken to the last man within forty-eight hours.

Napoleon immediately ordered some swimmers of the Boudet division to plunge into the branch of the Danube which was to be crossed, and fetch some boats from the left bank. They did so under the command of general Boudet's brave aide-de-camp, Sigaldi, and brought back, under fire of the enemy's advanced posts, boats enough to enable two companies of voltigeurs to cross to the opposite bank. They took the small building in the Prater called the Lusthaus, which might serve as an entrenched post, and made it the *tête de pont* of the bridge that was speedily formed with boats collected in the neighbourhood. At the same time, Napoleon had fifteen pieces of artillery planted on the bank we occupied, which battered the opposite one, and enfiladed the avenue leading up to the Lusthaus. By this means the two companies of voltigeurs could be supported until the completion of the bridge enabled more numerous forces to join them. A battery of twenty howitzers was at the same time set up at the extremity of the faubourg of Landstrass, near the branch of the river which had just been crossed.

At nine in the evening, after a fresh summons to surrender, and whilst the operation of crossing the water was still in progress, a destructive fire was opened on the fortified town. In some hours 1800 shells were discharged upon it. The streets are narrow, the houses lofty, the population densely accumulated, as in all fortified enclosures in which space is wanting, and conflagrations soon broke out in all quarters. The populace vociferated in the streets, and the opulent classes, distracted between their dread of the mob and of the foreigners, knew not what to desire. To hinder the French from crossing the small arm of the Danube, two battalions of Austrian grenadiers were sent by night to the Lusthaus, to seize that *point d'appui* for the bridge made by our men. But Boudet's voltigeurs were on their guard. Posted in the Lusthaus, under cover of felled timber, they received the two battalions with volleys of musketry at point-blank distance, whilst our artillery poured grape on their flank and put them to the rout. They retreated to the upper part of the Prater.

From that moment the passage of the river branch and the investiture of Vienna were insured. Archduke Maximilian, frightened at the prospect of being made a prisoner, quitted the capital on the morning of the 12th, taking with him the best part of the garrison, leaving to general O'Reilly, his second in command, only a handful of indifferent troops and some of the armed populace. After having crossed the Danube, he broke down the Thabor bridge. General O'Reilly had but one course to pursue, if he would not have the city burned to no purpose—that was to capitulate. On the morning of the 12th he asked for a suspension of the firing, which was granted, and he signed a capitulation which guaranteed for person and property a respect which Napoleon piqued himself on observing, and from which he would not have deviated, even though the town had made no conditions. On the following day, May 13, the French entered Vienna.

Thus, in thirty-three days, Napoleon, surprised by sudden hostilities, had with one stroke of his trenchant sword cut in two the mass of the Austrian armies at Ratisbon, and with a second burst open the gates of Vienna. He was now established in that capital, and master of the main resources of the monarchy; but his work was far from being yet done either in Austria or in Germany. A great difficulty remained to be overcome—one of the greatest that can be encountered in war—namely, to cross a vast river in the face of the enemy, and to give battle with that river behind him. This difficulty Napoleon had been unable to prevent, and it resulted inevitably from the nature of things. On leaving Ratisbon he had been obliged to take the route which was shortest, which kept the archdukes separated from each other, and put himself in a position to succour prince Eugene in case of fresh disasters in Italy. He was consequently obliged to march along the right bank of the Danube, abandoning the left bank to the Austrians, but securing to himself exclusively the means of crossing from the one to the other.

Having now arrived at Vienna, he was about to have the archduke Charles before him, reinforced by the remains of Hiller and archduke Louis' *corps d'armée*, but weakened by the necessity of leaving forces in his rear; yet able, nevertheless, to bring 100 thousand men into action whenever the French should cross the Danube against him. In 1805, after the events of Ulm, the Austrians arrived at Vienna with only the wreck of their force, and they had the Russian grand army at Olmutz. Under those circumstances it was natural that they should go to a distance of forty leagues from their capital to join the Russians, and try the fortune of war at Austerlitz. But on the present occasion, having the bulk of their forces opposite Vienna, and no aid to look for at a distance, they had but one course to pursue; namely, to force Napoleon to violate the laws of war, by crossing the river before them, and giving battle with that river at his back. It was now not at Austerlitz; it was there, opposite Vienna, on the left bank of the Danube, between Essling, Aspern, and Wagram, names of immortal renown, that

the fate of one of the greatest wars of modern times was to be decided. We shall see by-and-by what efforts Napoleon made to conquer the difficulties of this gigantic operation; for the laws to be violated had been laid down in times when belligerents had to cross rivers 200 or 300 yards wide with armies of 30 or 40 thousand men. But the problem now to be solved related to a river 1000 yards wide, and to an army of 150 thousand men, crossing with 500 or 600 guns in the teeth of an equal force. But the genius that had conquered the Alps could conquer the Danube too, wide and impetuous though it was. Many important matters, however, were to be attended to before such an operation could be attempted.

Napoleon had to establish himself firmly in Vienna, in such a manner as to avail himself of the great resources of that capital, to have no uneasiness as to his means of communication, and to cause both the belligerent armies in Italy to approach Vienna; securing the junction of the one with himself and hindering that of the other with archduke Charles. This was a difficult problem, and it was admirably solved.

Napoleon had entered Vienna with the troops of generals St. Hilaire, Demont, and Oudinot, under marshal Lannes; the Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, Molitor, and Legrand divisions, under Massena; the guard and the cavalry reserve. Being obliged to make head against the enemy, whether before Vienna, when in the act of passing the Danube, or higher up, at Krems, for instance, should the archduke present himself there for the purpose of assailing our rear, he so stationed Davout's corps that in one day it could be moved wholly either to Krems or Vienna. With this view he made St. Polten its head-quarters, where two divisions were to be concentrated, whilst the third was spread from Mautern to Mölk. In this way, by mustering towards one or other of these places on the Danube, marshal Davout's 30 thousand men might resist any attempt to force the passage of the river, and give time, if necessary, for the army to come down from Vienna on the threatened point. They might likewise, by marching to Vienna in one day, raise the main army to at least 90 thousand men; a force sufficient for a decisive battle with archduke Charles.

It was possible, however, that the danger should present itself further in the rear; at Lintz or even at Passau. Though this was less probable, on account of the distance, Napoleon left general Vandamme at Lintz with 10 thousand Wurtembergers, and with instructions to reconstruct the bridge at that town, form *têtes de pont*, and make continual *reconnaissances* in Bohemia. He, moreover, stationed marshal Bernadotte, just arrived with the Saxons, at the important point of Passau. Though created prince of Ponte Corvo on the ground of his relationship to the Emperor (he had married a sister of the queen of Spain), Bernadotte was a discontented man; he thought his station at the head of the Saxons unworthy of him, and sent in extremely unfavourable and even unjust

reports of those troops; for though they were not equal to French troops, and though they experienced the feelings that were already moving in the hearts of all Germans, it was not the less true that they were capable of standing their ground against the Austrians, and doing their duty as well as the Bavarians and Wurtembergers. With some Frenchmen to support them and set them an example, they might have almost equalled their instructors themselves. So to satisfy prince Bernadotte, whose complaints annoyed him, Napoleon made two parts of the Dupas division, and leaving the German troops of the minor princes at Ratisbon under general Rouyer, he sent the French brigade to Passau under general Dupas. Bernadotte had therefore at that point 4 thousand French and 15 to 16 thousand Saxons, making together an excellent corps of about 20 thousand men. Thus with 6 thousand Germans at Ratisbon, 20 thousand Saxons and French at Passau, 10 thousand Wurtembergers at Lintz, and 30 thousand French veterans at St. Polten, Napoleon was guarded in an infallible manner on his rear, whilst at the same time he retained the means of giving battle in front of him.

It was not, however, his intention always to employ so many troops in guarding his communications, and he proposed, when the Bavarians should have subdued the Tyrol, and when the Austrians should have evacuated Italy, to bring still more forces to the decisive point, namely, Vienna. To this end he gave orders for immense works, such as might be defended for several successive days by very small bodies of men with much artillery, to be constructed at Ratisbon, Passau, Lintz, Mölk, and the abbey of Gottweit near Mautern. At Ratisbon there was little to be done, since there was a stone bridge there, and it was only requisite to put the town wall in a better state of defence. But at Passau, situated at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, he ordered very important works, which were to be the commencement of those which he intended subsequently to require of Bavaria, in order that she might have a fortress of the first class in that place against Austria. He decided that bridges should be built there over the Danube and the Inn, with a *tête de pont* on each river, with an intrenched camp for 80 thousand men, ovens for 100 thousand rations a day, a considerable store of victuals and ammunition, and very spacious hospitals. The object of these precautions at Passau was to procure, in case of a retrograde movement, a strong *point d'appui* for the army behind the two lines of the Danube and the Inn; for this captain, who in politics had the imprudence never to admit a supposition of adverse fortune, always supposed it in war, and took admirable precautions against it. At Lintz, another point of transit from Bohemia, he also ordered a bridge with a double *tête de pont*, ovens, stores, and hospitals. At the fine abbey of Mölk, which was not one of the issues from Bohemia, but which advantageously commanded the Danube and contained vast buildings, he gave orders to construct with wood and earthwork a small fort mounting sixteen guns, and which might very well be defended by 1200 men. It was also to contain a

hospital for several thousand invalids. A similar post was to be erected at the abbey of Gottweit, opposite Krems, on an elevated position, whence might be descried everything that presented itself within a range of several leagues on both banks of the Danube. Lastly, at Krems a bridge was to be established by means of boats collected along the river, with a double *tête de pont*, so that the passage might be closed against the enemy whilst it was kept free for our own use. In this way Napoleon had all the approaches to the Danube guarded both defensively and offensively, and in such a manner that the enemy could be kept in continual alarm. Moreover, in case of retreat, there was a series of *echelons* on a road dotted with magazines and hospitals to which the sick and wounded might be sent on in advance. Lastly, there was a series of ports for the convoys by water, and a body of works on the line of communication, which might be defended by small numbers of men, so as to provide for the possibility of a rapid concentration upon occasion of a great battle. So much can the vigilance of genius accomplish towards assuring the most difficult and delicate operations.

Precautions were also requisite to the right in the mountains against the agitation which was spreading from the Tyrol to Styria. Napoleon had ordered marshal Lefebvre to put down the insurrection in Tyrol with 24 thousand Bavarians, after having left 6 thousand in Munich. That work done, the Bavarians were to proceed to Passau to replace the Saxons, who might then move to Vienna. Nearer to him in Styria Napoleon had already sent out general Bruyère with a thousand horse on the Italian road by Lilienfeld. He directed his aide-de-camp, Laureston, to observe that route, giving him for that purpose, besides general Bruyère's thousand horse, 2 or 3 thousand Badenese infantry, good soldiers, who, as they spoke German, might soothe the people of the country as well as intimidate them, and quiet them with promises of good treatment. General Laureston was to advance as far as Mariazell and return to Vienna by Neustadt.

Another advantage of this movement was that of reconnoitring the Italian roads by which archduke John was to be expected soon. That prince, not having joined archduke Charles either at Lintz or at Krems, could only meet him in the vicinity of Vienna, marching thither through Carinthia, Styria, and Hungary by Klagenfurth, Grätz, and Œdenburg. Napoleon had two things to do with respect to him: the first was to hinder him from falling suddenly on Vienna by the Leoben and Neustadt road; the second was to constrain him to make the widest possible detour to join archduke Charles; to oblige him, for instance, to pass by Güns, Raab, and Komorn, rather than by Œdenburg and Presburg, for the longer the road he took the more chances Napoleon would have of rallying his Italian army to him, and of hindering archduke Charles from rallying his, on the day of the decisive battle. It was by skilfully extending his posts around him by means of his numerous cavalry that Napoleon attained this twofold end.

Thus, whilst general Lauriston was to come by Mariazell and establish himself at Neustadt, on the direct road to Italy, general Montbrun was taken from marshal Davout, who had no longer need of him, and placed in *reconnaissance* with two brigades of light cavalry at Bruck, several marches beyond Neustadt, on the same road. General Colbert, with the troops of the same arm, was cantoned from Neustadt to Œdenburg, and general Marulaz along the Danube to Presburg and below it, both having orders to be always in *reconnaissance* round the lake of Neusiedel, in the direction of Hungary. Behind them the heavy cavalry was cantoned from Hamburg to Baaden, with orders to support them at need. In consequence of this well-stretched net, nothing could appear of which immediate warning would not be given, and at the same time the archduke was forced to describe a very wide circle, and to strike the Danube at Komorn rather than at Presburg, which diminished his chances of co-operating at the great battle to be fought under the walls of Vienna.

Whilst Napoleon was making every arrangement for insuring victory in that battle, his armies in Italy and Poland were, like him, occupied in marching and fighting. The Austrians, who had arrived so full of spirit, though so slowly, at the Adige, had halted before that line, not daring to attack it, first on account of its natural strength, then on account of the army of Italy, which had been reorganised and reinforced, and lastly on account of the uncertainty which prevailed at that period respecting the events in Germany. It was quite natural, that before attempting an extremely hazardous operation beyond the Adige, archduke John should desire to know whether or not his brother, the commander-in-chief, had been successful on the Danube. Prince Eugene, advised by general Macdonald, had made use of this delay to familiarise with the sight of the enemy, not his soldiers, who had no need of this, but himself and his lieutenants, intimidated by the defeat of Sacile. To this end he had made frequent *reconnaissances* on the Upper Adige, which had often turned into real battles. In one of these *reconnaissances* on the 1st of May, general Macdonald perceived on the horizon a vast number of waggons, apparently retrograding towards Friuli. At that time nothing was yet known at prince Eugene's head-quarters about the events at Ratisbon, and uneasiness was felt for Germany as well as for Italy. But general Macdonald, concluding that such a movement could only be attributed to defeats sustained by the Austrians in Bavaria, galloped up to prince Eugene, and, grasping his hand, cried out, "Victory in Germany; the time is come to march!" The prince returned the pressure of the general's hand with joy. Both galloped to the advanced posts, saw with their own eyes, and soon learned by all the reports that the Austrians were retreating. Thus did Napoleon's potent impulse make itself felt at a distance. His victorious march in Bavaria obliged archduke John to wheel round and retrace his steps to Friuli. The Austrian prince would willingly have crossed the Alps to aid his

brothers on the Danube, but durst not, for though he might possibly have taken Napoleon in flank, which would have been a great advantage in case of the convergence of all the archdukes to the same point, he also ran the risk of falling alone into his hands and being stifled in his grasp. Under these circumstances, archduke John made haste to retreat, with the intention at most of appearing in time under the walls of Vienna, and more probably with that of joining his brother below that capital by way of Styria and Hungary. Be that as it may, the Austrian army began its retreat on the 1st of May, and was immediatetly pursued by prince Eugene. The spirits of the French rose as that of the Austrians fell. The latter having now no other object than to evacuate the country, but languidly contested the ground, whilst the French attacked with the vivacity of men who had to avenge former defeats. Every evening many prisoners and quantities of baggage were brought into the lines of the French, whilst none were brought into those of the Austrians.

Prince Eugene marched in the order we have described, with three corps and a reserve; Macdonald on the right in the plain, Grenier in the centre on the main road of Friuli, Baraguay d'Hilliers on the left along the mountains, the reserve in the rear; the whole amounting to about 60 thousand men. Grouchy and Pully's dragoons galloped on in front, to take such detachments or convoys as were ill guarded. The roads were still bad, the bridges destroyed, and the march less rapid than could have been desired.

The prince advanced on the southern side of the Alps, from the Adige to the Brenta, from the Brenta to the Piave, as Napoleon did on the northern side from the Isar to the Inn, and from the Inn to the Traun, and nearly at the same time. On the evening of May 7 he reached the Piave, all the bridges of which had been broken down by the enemy. It was resolved to ford it, and to fall upon the Austrians, who seemed to make a halt, apparently for the purpose of giving their baggage time to defile. The next day Grouchy and Pully's dragoons crossed with an advanced guard of infantry, and charged the Austrians. The latter gave way at first, but as they had their baggage to defend they rallied, and bore down *en masse* on the advanced guard of prince Eugene, who, being himself at the advanced posts, beheld with dismay his cavalry and infantry driven back in disorder on the Piave. Fortunately the right, under Macdonald, came up in all haste, dashed boldly into the water, and took up a position beyond it. Then came general Grenier, and both marched together against the Austrians, who were quickly routed, and left in our hands a quantity of cannons and baggage, 2500 killed or wounded, and a nearly equal number of prisoners. Two thousand had already been taken between the Adige and the Piave. This made nearly 7 thousand soldiers lost by archduke John in a few days.

On the 9th of May the prince entered Conegliano; on the 10th he arrived at the Tagliamento, which was forded at Valvassone.

The cavalry was sent to the right to Udine, to raise the blockade of Palma Nova; the main body marched to the left, up the course of the Tagliamento, towards San Daniele and Osopo. On arriving at the passes of the Carnic Alps, by which they had debouched, the Austrians were again compelled to make a stand in order to save their baggage, and they incurred a further loss of 1500 men, killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. On the 11th and 12th of May, when Napoleon was taking possession of Vienna, there was no enemy left in Italy. Archduke John, who had entered that country with about 48 thousand men, quitted it with 30 thousand at most.

On the other side of the Alps the Austrian prince made a new division of his forces. He despatched from Villach to Laybach, by the cross-road from Carinthia to Carniola, Ignatius Giulay, ban of Croatia, with some battalions of the line, eighteen squadrons, and several batteries, with orders to call out the Croat *rising*, and then to support general Stoïchovich, who was acting against general Marmont, and thus to cover Laybach against the French armies of Italy and Dalmatia. Having sent off this detachment, archduke John had only about 20 thousand men left. His purpose was either to proceed by Villach to Lilienfeld and St. Polten, in order to co-operate in the long-projected junction of the archdukes, or if there was no longer time for that, to recal Chasteler and Jellachich by way of Leoben, and march thence with them on Grätz, in order to affect his junction with the Austrian grand army in Hungary. But he was keenly pursued by the victorious prince Eugene, and he was about to fall upon the network of cavalry stretched by Napoleon from Bruck to Presburg.

Archduke John's march dictated that of prince Eugene. The latter was obliged to watch simultaneously over the movements of archduke John and of the ban of Croatia, in order that the junction of the former with archduke Charles might take place as late, and with the least forces possible; and that the latter might not hinder the junction of general Marmont with the French army of Italy. It was difficult to accomplish these ends if the march were continued in a single mass, for, however rapidly and well the prince manœuvred, it was possible that if he marched immediately to Vienna to reinforce Napoleon, the archduke John and the ban might fall on Marmont with their combined forces; and that if, on the other hand, he made a detour to Laybach in order to support general Marmont, archduke John would seize the opportunity to hasten to Presburg, and throw into the balance the decisive weight of the Austrian army of Italy. Under these considerations, prince Eugene adopted a course very suitable to the circumstances. He gave general Macdonald 15 or 16 thousand men, excellent troops, which were to take the road to Laybach, raise the blockade of Palma Nova, occupy Trieste, combine with Marmont, and return, thus increased to 26 or 27 thousand men, to join the army of Italy at Grätz, on the road to Vienna. He himself, with from 30 to 32

thousand, took the road which would lead more directly to Napoleon. There were disadvantages, nevertheless, in this plan, for had archduke John been a real general, he might, by manœuvring between those two bodies, have beaten them one after the other. But that clever prince conceived a multitude of ideas in war, and followed out none of them perseveringly. Besides, his troops were dispirited, and incapable of those rapid movements which require, on the part of the soldiers, as much confidence in the general as obedience to his designs. Prince Eugene's plan was, therefore, not so objectionable as it might have been in face of a different adversary. The two portions of the army of Italy separated on the 14th of May, not to unite again until they met on the plains of Wagram.

At that moment general Marmont, with 10 or 11 thousand veteran soldiers, sent into Illyria after the battle of Austerlitz, was traversing the hilly regions of Croatia, on his way to Carniola and Styria to join the grand army. Between his columns he had a convoy of provisions carried on horses of the country, which were to convey his sick and wounded when the grain with which they were loaded had been consumed by the army. After having dispersed the bands of general Stoïchovich, he advanced cautiously, not knowing when or where he might suddenly fall in with greatly superior numbers either of friends or foes. Both he and general Macdonald were eagerly seeking news of each other, which neither succeeded in obtaining.

The events in Italy had induced similar events in Tyrol. General Chasteler, drawn from the Italian into the German Tyrol by the danger of the Austrians on the Danube, had hastened to Inspruck, and from thence to Kufstein. He had pushed forward some advanced posts on the Salzburg road by Lofen and Reichenthal. Another Austrian corps, that of Jellachich, which, in the beginning of the campaign had marched parallel to Hiller's corps, had pursued in its retreat, as well as in its advance, the road along the foot of the mountains. It had fallen back on Salzburg, and thence on Leoben, after having defended the posts of Luegpass and Obtenau against de Wrede's division. The combined forces of Jellachich and Chasteler amounted to 16 or 17 thousand men, exclusive of the Tyrolese; and, if well commanded, and resolved to shut themselves up in the mountains, they might have created a disagreeable diversion on our right and in our rear. But they had received instructions to join the acting masses. They were divided into several corps independent of each other, were on bad terms with the Tyrolese, and could not, therefore, become very formidable. After having driven back Jellachich's corps into the valley of the Upper Ens, by means of de Wrede's division, marshal Lefebvre recalled that division, returned to the fort of Kufstein, which was well defended by a Bavarian garrison, raised the blockade, and, being joined by Deroy's division from Rosenheim, advanced with both divisions into German Tyrol, which he had orders to bring under subjection. Though hardly capable of conducting a grand opera-

tion, the old marshal was admirably fitted for carrying on a series of small engagements with spirit and intelligence. He everywhere repulsed the Austrian advanced posts, and at last, on the 13th of May, he encountered general Chasteler in the position of Worgel. The latter was entrenched on some heights, having the Austrian troops behind the works, and in the distance, on his wings, the Tyrolese insurgents, who plied their rifles with great accuracy of aim, and rolled down enormous rocks. The old marshal, after disadvantageously sustaining a combat of sharpshooters on his two wings, attacked the enemy in front, carried Chasteler's position under a tremendous fire, took about 3 thousand prisoners, dispersed the cloud of insurgents, and completely routed the Austrians. Then, burning some Tyrolese villages on his way, he marched to Inspruck, which offered to surrender on certain conditions; but he succeeded in entering the town without granting any terms, in consequence of the disagreement of the Tyrolese, some of whom were for surrendering, others for resisting to the utmost. Master of Inspruck, he might consider himself secure of the submission of the Tyrol; but Hofer, the innkeeper, and major Teimer, withdrew to the inaccessible summits that divide German from Italian Tyrol, ready to descend thence again, if a favourable opportunity recurred. Generals Chasteler and Jellachich, with greatly diminished forces, set out on a furtive retreat to Hungary across the road from Friuli to Vienna, at the risk of meeting in that perilous course either the van or the rear of prince Eugene's army.

Thus, after a first misfortune in Italy and a lively commotion in Tyrol, everything was succeeding to the satisfaction of the conqueror, whose fortunes, for a moment shaken, were revived by the potency of his genius. Matters were no less improved in Poland, where prince Joseph Poniatowski had been acting with equal skill and good fortune. Having surrendered Warsaw and the left bank of the Vistula to the Austrians, he had promised himself that he would make them pay for that advantage as soon as they attempted to pass over to the right bank, of which he held possession. Some Austrian corps did attempt to cross the Vistula, and these he surprised and destroyed. Then, whilst archduke Ferdinand, eager to seize fresh triumphs, continued to march down the left side of the river from Warsaw to Thorn, and ineffectually assailed the latter fortress, prince Poniatowski marched up the right bank to Cracow, to conquer that ancient metropolis of Polish nationality, and raised the standard of insurrection in Gallicia. There, too, men's hearts beat secretly for the independence of Poland; and had the Russians seconded the brave Poniatowski, by crossing the Vistula at Sandomir or Cracow, they would have cut off archduke Ferdinand's retreat, and he would never have recrossed the frontier he had so rashly invaded.

Such were the events in Italy, Austria, and Poland, up to the 15th or 18th of May. The occupation of Vienna, after the tremendous operations at Ratisbon, had restored Napoleon's fortunes

to their full ascendency. Germany, though secretly fermenting, controlled herself better than at the beginning of the war. Major Schill, who had been forced to abandon the Upper Elbe and retreat to the Baltic coast, met everywhere with friendly hearts, but nowhere with hands ready to second him. Prussia, intimidated by the news from the Danube, at first denied, then admitted, sent pursuers after major Schill, and addressed protestations of friendship and devotedness to the French cabinet. Napoleon, having well secured his establishment at Vienna, and skilfully staked out his route by the presence of the Germans of the minor principalities at Ratisbon, of the Saxons at Passau, the Wurtembergers at Lintz, and Davout's corps at St. Polten, resolved to bring things to a conclusion by crossing the Danube and falling on archduke Charles, who had placed himself in face of him with his main army. Being able to avail himself of marshal Davout's force, and thus to command 90 thousand fighting men, he had it in his power to terminate the war without waiting either for prince Eugene, or for general Macdonald, or for general Marmont. His adversary's force, including some battalions collected in Bohemia, and the remains of Hiller and archduke Louis' corps, did not exceed 100 thousand men. There was nothing in that to intimidate Napoleon. To cross the Danube, then, in the face of that army, was still the difficulty to be overcome towards terminating the war.

But how was such a river to be crossed in such a season, with such great masses, and in defiance of masses no less considerable? This was the problem on which Napoleon meditated incessantly. In the first place, should he cross under the walls of Vienna? That first question was solved in his mind. To fall back to Krems, for instance, in order to conceal the operation of crossing from the enemy, was impossible, for Vienna would instantly have called up archduke Charles, unless it had been kept down by a force which would have been missed on the day of battle. Napoleon would, therefore, have incurred the risk of losing the capital, the resources it contained, his means of communication with prince Eugene, and his moral ascendency in arms. To descend lower was still less practicable, for to the danger of departing from Vienna would be added the still graver one of elongating his line of operation, creating for himself, in consequence, a point the more to guard, and depriving himself of 25 or 30 thousand men, who were indispensable if a battle was to be fought. Vienna was therefore the point of passage. The two adversaries were attached to it: Napoleon, for the reasons we have stated; archduke Charles, because of the presence of Napoleon.

But the passage might be effected a league higher or lower without violating the important considerations above mentioned. The engineer officers had surveyed the river from Klosterneuburg, the point where it issues from the mountains and flows into the magnificent plain of Vienna to the environs of Presburg, and they ascertained that the difficulty of the passage varied greatly in

different parts. Before and a little below Vienna the Danube divided into a multitude of arms, and became broader, but less rapid and deep. Lower than Ebersdorf, towards Presburg, the channel again contracted and became less broken, deeper, and more rapid, and confined between steep banks, which was a serious impediment to the establishment of bridges.

Napoleon chose for his operation the part of the Danube nearest Vienna, preferring to deal with the river where it was wide rather than rapid and deep, and especially where it was divided into several arms and studded with islands, whereby the difficulty was diminished, as a burden is rendered more manageable by dividing it. He thought especially how he might make use of the islands forming the partition between the branches of the river. If, for instance, there was one such large enough to contain a numerous army, where it might be safe from the view and from the cannon-balls of the Austrians, and beyond which there would be a narrow arm to cross in order to debouche before the enemy, the difficulty of the passage would be thereby greatly diminished. Even though to reach it it were necessary to cross the largest mass of the waters of the Danube, the attempt was worth making, because the most perilous part of the operation of crossing to the enemy's side would be executed under the protection of the island, its woods and its depth. There were two islands which answered to the required conditions: that of Schwarze Laken, opposite Nussdorf, above Vienna, and that of Lobau, two leagues below, opposite Enzersdorf. Napoleon wished to double the chances of success by using both of them. But the attempt made upon the first named, rather as a demonstration than as a serious enterprise, failed for want of sufficient strength and sufficient care. General St. Hilaire sent thither 500 men and a field-officer, without having noticed a jetty which connected the island of Schwarze Laken with the left bank, which was occupied by the Austrians. Our 500 men, carried over in boats, and thinking themselves covered by the small branch on the other side of the island, kept their ground against the fire of musketry and cannon, but were presently assailed unexpectedly by several battalions which had passed over the small jetty. After a heroic resistance, not being able to recross the broad arm, they were killed or taken prisoners. For this misfortune there was some compensation, inasmuch as it drew the attention of the enemy in the direction of Nussdorf and away from the island of Lobau, by which Napoleon was resolved to make his main effort to cross the river.

The island of Lobau, for ever celebrated for the prodigious events of which it became the theatre, was most admirably adapted to Napoleon's purposes. It was partly wooded, and presented in the direction of its length a continuous screen of fine trees between the enemy and us. It was very spacious, for it was a league long and a league and a half wide, so that, even in the middle of it one was safe from the Austrian cannon-balls. Once

arrived in the island of Lobau, there was no more to be crossed than an arm of the river sixty fathoms wide—a matter of great but by no means extraordinary difficulty. To reach the island it was necessary to cross the great Danube formed of two vast arms, one of them 240 fathoms wide, the other 120, separated by a sand-bank. To throw a bridge over such a mass of water was an exceedingly difficult operation, but it was practicable, since it was not to be effected in presence of the enemy. It was only the last bridge over the sixty fathom branch, separating Lobau from the left bank, that was to be so set up. The operation, thus divided, had a chance of success. There remained but one really serious difficulty, that of collecting materials. There were requisite from seventy to eighty boats of large size, several thousand planks, and powerful cables to hold the bridge fast against an extremely rapid current. Now the Austrians, who had readily foreseen that the crossing of the Danube would be the main operation of the war, had, on quitting Vienna, manifested forethought on this matter alone. They had burnt or sunk most of the large boats, and sent down to Presburg those they had not destroyed. There was abundance of wood, but ropes were scarce. In a word, means for mooring were almost entirely wanting. The bridges previously existing before Vienna were on piles, and consequently had never required moorage like bridges of boats. It would have been necessary either to drive piles for fastening the boats to, which would have occupied a long time, and would have been perceived by the enemy, or to procure strong anchors. Now, strong anchors were not used in the navigation of that part of the Danube, and none could be procured but with great difficulty. It was only at Presburg or Komorn that a sufficient supply could be had. Napoleon, however, strove to supply by various means what he lacked in materials, and was greatly aided in his efforts by generals Bertrand and Pernetti, the former of the engineers, the latter of the artillery.

As for boats, some were discovered in Vienna; for those which descended the Danube in convoys were in general of an unsuitable build, or they had been retained for the bridges of Passau, Lintz, and Krems. A certain number were raised from the bottom of the river, and were carefully repaired. In this way about ninety were obtained, some of which were to bear the bridge and others to be employed in carrying materials. With much search, some cordage was discovered in that city; for the navigation of a river like the Danube necessarily inferred the constant existence of a considerable stock. Planks were procured by cutting and sawing the timber with which the country abounded. As for anchors, they might have been forged in the ironworks of Styria, not far from Vienna; but as that would have occasioned a great loss of time, Napoleon proposed to supply the place of anchors by sinking very heavy weights in the river, such as cannons of large calibre, found in the arsenals of Vienna, or chests filled with cannon-balls. If the

river did not rise suddenly, as happens when the hot season begins very early, that expedient might suffice. He trusted to it, and the weights which were to serve instead of anchors were arranged beforehand, so that at the last moment there should be nothing to to do but to throw them into the river.

Everything being ready at Vienna towards the 16th and 17th of May, the materials were brought down the river to the island of Lobau, opposite Ebersdorf. At the same time orders to concentrate were given to the troops which were to fight beyond the Danube. The whole cavalry, except a division of chasseurs left on the look-out upon the Hungarian frontier, was recalled from Presburg and Œdenburg to Vienna. Among the regiments recalled were the fourteen regiments of cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, who was at first to have come with his whole corps to Vienna, received orders to bring only two divisions thither—those of Friant and Gudin—and to distribute the Morand division between Mölk, Mautern, and St. Polten, to withstand the attempts of Kollowrath's corps, which archduke Charles had stationed at Lintz. With the corps of Lannes and Massena, the guard, the cavalry reserve, and two-thirds of Davout's corps, Napoleon could bring about 80 thousand men into the field against the Austrians; and that was enough, for the archduke was not in a condition to muster more than 90 thousand.

The materials and the troops arrived on the 18th and 19th of May at the little town of Ebersdorf. Massena's corps was the first moved to that point, and especially its best division—that of Molitor. On the 18th the operation began under the eyes of Napoleon, who had removed his head-quarters from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf. The Molitor division was ferried in boats over the two great branches of the Danube to the island of Lobau. Some Austrian advanced posts occupied the front of the island opposite Ebersdorf. General Molitor drove them back, and did not pass beyond the middle of the island, in order not to give the enemy to suppose that there was a serious enterprise in hand. He contented himself with ranging his troops behind a small channel, not more than twelve or fifteen fathoms wide, easily fordable, and which flows through the island only when the waters are extremely high. Whilst he was thus operating, general Pernetti's artillerymen were labouring at the construction of the great bridge. There were used for it nearly seventy large boats; and it was only after repeated efforts that they could be moored, being continually swept down by the current, which was unfortunately increasing, in consequence of a somewhat alarming rise in the waters. At last the boats were fixed in their places, and the workmen could proceed to form the roadway of the bridge with planks. The whole day of the 19th, and half the 20th, were spent on that great work, which being accomplished, the passage to the island of Lobau was insured, extraordinary accidents apart. A wooden bridge was thrown over the small channel running through the middle of the island, which,

though usually dry, was now beginning to fill, in consequence of the flood. The Boudet division (one of Massena's four) immediately crossed over, and joined Molitor's. Then came Lasalle's division of light cavalry and several trains of artillery. This was enough to sweep the island, which Molitor promptly did. He made some prisoners. Our men crossed the whole breadth of the island, and arrived at the last branch, which was sixty fathoms wide, much like the average breadth of the Seine in Paris. The remainder of the operation was quite practicable, even in face of an enemy, unless, indeed, he fell *en masse* on the troops who were executing it. But the archduke Charles evidently was not yet aware of what was doing, and nothing had yet been encountered but an advanced guard.

General Molitor found a most favourable spot for the passage, and pointed it out to the Emperor, who quite approved of it. It was a re-entrant angle, formed towards us by the branch of the river that was to be crossed, so that, by planting artillery right and left of it, the ground on which we had to land might be so swept with grape that it would be impossible for the enemy to remain there. This was immediately done, but it was not even necessary, for there were only some sharpshooters on the tongue of land on which we had to debouche. Lieutenant-colonel Aubrey, belonging to the artillery, was ordered to establish the second bridge on the afternoon of this day, the 20th. The pontoon equipage taken at Landshut had been kept for that purpose. M. de Sainte Croix, aide-de-camp to Massena, and M. Baudru, aide-de-camp to Bessières, embarked in boats with 200 voltigeurs, drove off the Austrian sharpshooters, and fastened the cable on which the bridge was to rest. Fifteen pontoons were enough, the breadth of water at that point not being more than fifty-four fathoms, and in three hours the communication was established. Immediately after, general Lasalle passed over to the left bank with four regiments of cavalry, and was followed by the voltigeurs of the Molitor and Boudet divisions. After crossing the bridge they found a small wood extending from left to right, and terminating at the two sides of the angle formed by the river. The wood was beaten, and some Austrian detachments that occupied it were driven out. Beyond the wood the ground expanded, and there was seen on the left the village of Aspern, on the right that of Essling—places immortal in history. A sort of shallow ditch, filled with water only when the river overflows, stretched from one of these villages to the other. The cavalry could cross it, for it was rather a depression of the soil than an actual ditch. General Lasalle galloped over it with his cavalry, scattered the enemy's advanced posts, and swept the plain of Marchfeld, which, by a gentle slope of two or three leagues, rises insensibly to heights bearing other immortal names—those of Neusiedel and Wagram.

It was a warm clear spring day, but drawing to its close, and nothing could be perceived in the fading light but a strong

advanced guard of cavalry. It seemed disposed to fall upon general Lasalle, who retired behind the ditch above mentioned, and thus avoided a useless engagement. Some hundreds of our voltigeurs, lying in ambush in the hollow of the ground, received the Austrian cavalry with a point-blank fire, covered the field with their wounded, and obliged them to retire. Thus began, on the evening of the 20th of May, the bloody battle of Essling!

The Danube was crossed, and if the Austrians, whose advanced guards had been seen, presented themselves on the following day, there was a reasonable assurance that the French would have time to debouche and deploy before the enemy could attempt to throw them into the river. An accident, however, was not impossible. In fact, that afternoon of the 20th, whilst our men were crossing the small arm of the river, the great bridge over the two principal arms was broken, some of the boats having yielded to the violence of the current. A sudden rise of three feet, produced by the melting of the Alpine snows, had caused this accident, and might cause it again. The light cavalry of general Marulaz was cut in two by the rupture of the bridge: one portion reached the island, whilst the other remained at Ebersdorf. Fortunately generals Bertrand and Pernetti set to work with extreme activity, and the great bridge was repaired in the course of the night.

Without being quite resolved to give battle with such uncertain means of passage as he possessed, Napoleon did not wish to abandon the result of the operation commenced; and it was decided that this important communication should be retained, and should subsequently be rendered safer and less intermittent. The tongue of land formed by the small arm of the river was a most convenient ground on which to debouche, and the two villages, Aspern on the left, and Essling on the right, connected by a sort of ditch, were valuable *points d'appui* for the deployment of an army. Such a position was therefore worth the pains of keeping, whether the battle was postponed or not. The Molitor division consequently passed the night at Aspern, the Boudet division at Essling. Lasalle's cavalry bivouacked between the two villages in front of the little wood. Napoleon took up his quarters with his guard at the same place, and as usual with him slept soundly without undressing. Several officers sent out to reconnoitre during the night brought in contradictory reports. Some alleged that the Austrians were in Marchfeld quite ready for battle; others maintained that we had no enemy's army before us, and that what was seen was at most a strong advanced guard of cavalry. In this state of uncertainty the French awaited the morning, everything being prepared for battle if the army succeeded in crossing, or for retreat into the island of Lobau, if the Danube could not be crossed with sufficient forces.

The great bridge having been repaired in the night, the cavalry of general Marulaz, general Espagne's cuirassiers, the Legrand division of infantry, and a part of the artillery, were enabled to

pass over on the morning of the 21st. But the existence of only one bridge over each arm, and the breadth of the island of Lobau, made the operation very tedious. Towards noon, major-general Berthier having ascended the steeple of Essling, clearly discerned the army of archduke Charles descending the inclined plain of Marchfeld, and describing a vast semicircle round Aspern and Essling. Berthier surpassed all men of his day in judging by the eye the extent of a tract of ground and the number of men that covered it. He estimated the Austrian army at about 90 thousand men, and saw plainly that it was coming with the intention of overwhelming the French whilst engaged in passing the river. Having been informed on the 19th of the apparition of the French in the island of Lobau, it was not until the next day that archduke Charles had thought of making a *reconnaissance* at the head of his cavalry. Having then satisfied himself as to their intentions, he had not put his men in motion until the morning of the 21st, so as to get them into line in the afternoon of the same day. Had he appeared on the evening of the 20th or on the morning of the 21st between Aspern and Essling, that portion of the French army which had already crossed the river would have been in immense danger.

The major-general immediately sent his report to the Emperor, who saw in it only the fulfilment of what he had himself wished for—namely, an opportunity of once more beating the Austrian army, and having done with it. But suddenly news was brought him of a fresh rupture of the great bridge, caused by the hourly-increasing flood. The Danube, which had risen three feet on the preceding day, had now risen four more. All the moorings were giving way to the current. At that moment (the afternoon of the 21st) Napoleon had with him only the three infantry divisions —Molitor, Boudet, and Legrand, the light cavalry divisions of Lasalle and Marulaz, Espagne's division of cuirassiers, and part of the artillery, altogether about 22 or 23 thousand men; all excellent troops it is true, but not numerous enough to give battle to an army of 90 thousand men. He therefore gave orders to abandon Aspern and Essling, and to recross the bridge over the smaller arm, but not destroy it, since the angle in the river made it easy to protect the bridge with a formidable mass of artillery. Protected by a water-course sixty fathoms wide, and now become very rapid and very deep, the French might remain on the island until the consolidation of the bridge and the subsidence of the waters made it possible to prepare for a sure and decisive operation. This order was beginning to be executed, when the generals of division raised very natural objections to the abandonment of such points as Essling and Aspern. General Molitor pointed out to the Emperor that the village of Aspern, in which his division had passed the night, was of immense importance; that to recover it would cost torrents of blood, whereas an inconsiderable force would be sufficient to defend it for a long time against great efforts, and that he ought to reflect well upon it before he resolved on such a sacrifice. The case was

just the same as to Essling. If those two posts were abandoned, the intention of crossing the river at that most favourable point must be given up, the urgent operation of the passage must be postponed for an indefinite period, the works already executed must be forsaken, and, in a word, the most serious inconveniences must be incurred. Whilst Napoleon was weighing these observations, word was brought him that the great bridge was completely repaired, the waters were subsiding, the ammunition waggons were beginning to defile, and he might feel assured of having all his resources at hand in a few hours. Provided he had another score thousand men, especially the cuirassiers, and his ammunition-chests well filled, Napoleon feared nothing, and he joyfully seized the opportunity, which he had been on the point of losing, of shattering the Austrian grand army. In consequence, he ordered general Boudet, who had not quitted Essling, to defend it vigorously; and he authorised general Molitor, whose division had already quitted Aspern, to re-enter it by force before the enemy had time to secure his position there. Marshal Lannes, though his corps had not yet crossed the Danube, took the command of the right wing, that is to say of Essling, and of the troops that were to arrive there. The cavalry was put under his orders, whereby marshal Bessières, its commander, became subordinate to him. Massena had charge of the left wing, that is to say of Aspern, which the Molitor division was about to reoccupy. The Legrand division was to be stationed in the rear of Aspern, with the Marulaz light cavalry. Lasalle's division of light cavalry, and Espagne's division of cuirassiers, filled the space between Aspern and Essling. All the artillery was placed in the intervals. A swarm of tirailleurs was spread over the sort of ditch before mentioned, which was the dry bed of a watercourse that formerly flowed from Aspern to Essling, and there waited until the Austrians should come within musket-shot. Thus, from 22 to 23 thousand men were about to give battle to 90 thousand.

Archduke Charles had divided his army into five columns. The first, under general Hiller, was to advance along the Danube by Stadlau, attack Aspern, and try to carry it in concert with the second column; the latter, commanded by lieutenant-general Bellegarde, was to march by Kagran and Hirschstatten on Aspern; the third, commanded by Hohenzollern, marching by Breitenlee on the same point, was also to attack it, for the more certainty of taking it; the fourth and fifth columns, formed by Rosenberg's corps, were to complete the semicircle traced round the French army, and were to attack, one of them Essling, the other the little village of Enzersdorf, situated beyond it. As Enzersdorf was not strongly occupied by the French, and seemed unlikely to require any great efforts to take it, the two columns had orders to exert their combined strength on Essling. To connect his three columns on the right with his two on the left, the archduke had placed prince Lichtenstein's reserve of cavalry in order of battle between those two masses. Much further in the rear, at Breitenlee, the

grenadiers *d'élite* were stationed as a second reserve. The remains of archduke Louis' corps, much weakened by the detachments left on the Upper Danube, were stationed on the look-out at Stamersdorf, opposite Vienna. Kollowrath's corps, as we have seen, was at Lintz. The five acting columns, with Lichtenstein's cavalry and the grenadiers, might amount to about 90 thousand men, with nearly 300 pieces of cannon.

Though the archduke had brought large forces together against Aspern, the point which it was essential to carry since it covered the little bridge, nevertheless the semicircle drawn round Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf was weak in the middle, and might be broken by a charge of our cuirassiers. The Austrian army, being then cut in two, would have the chances turned against it. Napoleon saw this at the first glance, and resolved to profit by it as soon as his principal forces should have crossed the Danube. For the moment he thought only of taking good care of his *débouché*, by vigorously defending Aspern on his left, Essling on his right, and protecting the space between with his cavalry.

No sooner had Napoleon authorised general Molitor to reoccupy Aspern and general Boudet to keep Essling, than the conflict began about three o'clock with extreme violence. Hiller's advanced guard under general Nordmann had marched to Aspern, and had entered it after the retreat of Molitor's division. What was worse, it had entered a wooded meadow to the left of Aspern, which extended from that village to the Danube, and was embraced by a small branch of the river so as to form a sort of isle. Having possession of that island, the enemy might pass between Aspern and the Danube, turn our left and make for the little bridge, the only issue we had by which we could advance or retreat. General Molitor, at the head of the 16th and 67th of the line, first-rate regiments, commanded by two of the best colonels in the army, Marin and Petit, charged into the high street of Aspern to dislodge the Austrians. The street was very wide, for the Austrian villages are large and solidly built. They drove all before them, and cleared the environs of the church at the end of the street. General Molitor then placed his two regiments behind an earthen breastwork which surrounded Aspern, and waited for Hiller's column, which was coming to the aid of his advanced guard. He let it come up within point-blank distance, then opened a fire that brought down a considerable number of men in its ranks, and, charging it at the point of the bayonet, put it to the rout, and completely cleared the ground. General Molitor then made a skilful use of the two other regiments of his division. With the 37th he retook the island before mentioned on the left, and availed himself of all the accidents of the ground to make it inaccessible. He placed the 2nd to the right at the entrance of the village to hinder the position from being turned. To aid these operations, Massena ranged the Legrand division to the right and the rear of Aspern, ready to charge when necessary. The four French and two German regiments of horse under general

Marulaz formed the connexion with the cavalry of generals Lasalle and Espagne towards Essling. In that direction the Boudet division had as yet had to do only with Rosenberg's advanced guards, which were on the march to Enzersdorf.

But this was only the prelude of this frightful day. Hiller soon returned to the charge, aided by Bellegarde's column, and both together attacked the village on the side next the Danube and on the centre. The 16th and the 67th of the line, posted in advance of Aspern, kept up an uninterrupted fire at a very short distance, and laid thousands of enemies low at the foot of the breastwork. But the Austrian columns, continually repairing their losses, advanced up to the breastwork, and rushed over it in spite of Molitor's two regiments, which they forced to retreat into the village. General Vacquant even succeeded in getting possession of the end of the high street in which the church was situated. Seeing this, the intrepid Molitor made a dash at general Vacquant with the 2nd, and a horrible *mêlée* began. The Austrians and the French alternately beating and beaten, swept up and down the long street of Aspern from one end to the other. Fresh troops were approaching from without, for Hiller and Bellegarde's columns amounted together to at least 36 thousand men, against whom general Molitor had to contend with 7 thousand. To keep them off, Massena sent against them the six regiments of light cavalry commanded by general Marulaz, one of the ablest cavalry officers formed in our long wars. Marulaz broke several of the squares formed by the Austrian infantry to receive him, but was stopped by deep masses beyond them, and forced to return to his position, taking with him some pieces of cannon he had captured. But though he was unable to drive the enemy off the ground, he held him in check and hindered him from throwing all his force into Aspern. Meanwhile, general Molitor, barricaded in the houses with three of his regiments, made use of everything that came to hand to aid his resistance—waggons, ploughs, and other implements, and defended his post with a fury as great as that with which the Austrians assailed it.

During this fierce conflict at Aspern, Lannes was making the most skilful arrangements for the defence of Essling, which was attacked feebly at first, and afterwards with great violence, when the fourth and fifth columns of Rosenberg's corps had come together. The fifth, which formed the Austrian extreme left opposite our extreme right at Enzersdorf, after carrying that scarcely-defended position, debouched from it to assail Essling. The fourth then put itself in motion, and both together began their attack on our second *point d'appui*. Lannes received them as had been done at Aspern, covering himself with an earthern breastwork that surrounded Essling, whence he mowed down the assailants with musketry and grape, and stopped them at the foot of the breastwork.

But the battle was about to become more terrible, for Hohenzollern's column, which was the third, and formed the middle of the Austrian line, was coming at last into action, supported by the

cavalry reserve under prince John de Lichtenstein. It was marching on our centre, and might, by passing between Aspern and Essling, sever the communication between those two points, insure their conquest, and render our defeat inevitable. Seeing this, Lannes resolved to make a powerful effort with his cavalry. He had at his command Espagne's four regiments of cuirassiers and Lasalle's four of chasseurs, all under the orders of marshal Bessières. Without heeding the latter's rank, he sent him an imperious order to charge, and *charge home.* Though hurt by this expression, for he was not used, he said, to charge otherwise, Bessières advanced with Espagne, the first officer of heavy cavalry in the army, leaving Lasalle in reserve to second him. At the head of sixteen squadrons of cuirassiers, Bessières and Espagne took the enemy's artillery, putting the men who served it to the sword, and then fell upon the infantry and broke several of its squares. But after driving in the first line they found a second, on which they could make no impression, and they were themselves suddenly attacked by the Austrian cavalry sent against them by archduke Charles. Surprised during the disorder of the charge they had just executed, our cuirassiers were put to flight, when Lasalle, with that rapid perception and action which distinguished him, pushed forward the 16th chasseurs to their support so opportunely, that the Austrians, intent upon the pursuit of our cuirassiers, were themselves borne down, and a good number of them put to the sword. In the tumult the brave Espagne was killed with a biscayan. Bessières, with his aidè-de-camp Baudru, was surrounded by the hulans, and, after firing off his two pistols, was defending himself with his sword, when he was rescued by Lasalle's chasseurs. The cuirassiers rallied and charged again and again, still supported by Lasalle. The Austrian infantry was stopped, and Hohenzollern was hindered from breaking our centre between Essling and Aspern, and sending a reinforcement to the two columns assailing the latter.

But those two columns were of themselves sufficient to overwhelm the 7 thousand men of Molitor's division, half of whom were already *hors de combat.* The rest were only enabled to hold their ground by the heroism of colonels Petit and Marin, and of general Molitor himself, who incessantly set the example to their soldiers, and put themselves at the head of every onset. At last general Vacquant, being well seconded, succeeded in penetrating into Aspern, and getting possession of it almost entirely after a conflict of five hours. General Molitor was about to be driven out of that village, which it was of such moment to keep, for if we had lost it we would have been driven back upon the bridge over the small arm, and perhaps into the Danube. Fortunately, the restoration of the great bridge enabled a brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers and the Carra St. Cyr division of infantry to cross over towards the close of the day. With these resources against unforeseen contingencies, Massena could bring into action the Legrand division, which he had stationed as a reserve behind Aspern. Placing Carra St. Cyr

in the rear, with orders to watch the bridge, he entered Aspern at the head of the Legrand division. The heroic Legrand, with the 26th light infantry and the 18th of the line, the same regiments with which he had taken Ebersberg, charged through the main street of Aspern, drove Bellegarde's troops to the other end of the village, and obliged Vacquant to shut himself up in the church. In the centre, Lannes ordered fresh charges of cavalry. The Espagne division had lost a fourth of its effective; but Nansouty, with the St. Germain brigade of cuirassiers, took its place, and prolonged the resistance, which in that place could only be maintained with cavalry. The Austrian infantry was again broken by the charge of our cavalry, but the latter was again assailed by that of the enemy, and Marulaz, relieving Lasalle, repeated with the 23rd chasseurs what the other had done two hours before with the 16th. He supported our cuirassiers, repulsed those of the enemy, and then charged several squares. Having broken into one of these, he was unhorsed, and was on the point of being killed or made prisoner, when his chasseurs, hearing his shouts, rescued him, gave him a horse, and returned, passing over the bodies of a line of infantry.

The battle had lasted six hours: at Aspern and Essling foot soldiers were obstinately contending for the possession of burning ruins; between the two villages masses of cavalry were disputing the plain with their swords. Archduke Charles, thinking he had done enough in stopping the French army at the *débouché* of the bridge, and flattering himself that he should hurl it into the Danube on the following day, determined to suspend the firing, in order to give his men time to rest, draw his masses together, and bring into line the reserve of grenadiers left at Breitenlee.

Napoleon was present in person at this first battle, under the fire between Aspern and Essling, and his confidence remained unabated. Though half the Molitor division lay dead in the houses and streets of Aspern, and though a fourth part of Espagne's cuirassiers and of the chasseurs of Lasalle and Marulaz had fallen by the cannonade, he had no fear for the result if he could have another 20 thousand men and his ammunition brought over the Danube. The waters were still rising, and the flood swept down enormous trees torn up by the roots, boats that had been left high and dry on the banks, and large burning mills, which the enemy had set on fire in hopes of destroying our only means of passage. Every moment it was necessary to turn aside these floating masses, or to repair the breaches they caused in our bridges. The latter were further weakened by the continual passage over them, and sometimes the boats were almost sunk under the weight of the artillery waggons, and our soldiers had to cross the river with their feet in the water, which added to the tediousness of the operation. Generals Pernetti and Bertrand, however, were still confident they should maintain the passage, and that the requisite forces should be across the river by the following day. Napoleon therefore ordered that the

troops which had been engaged should take the rest of which they had so much need. He bivouacked behind the wood in advance of the small bridge, in order to be present at the passage of his forces, which were to employ the whole night in defiling. Just as he was himself about to rest he was interrupted by a violent altercation between two of his chief lieutenants, Bessières and Lannes, the former of whom complained of the language in which the latter had signified his orders. Massena, who was on the spot, was obliged to interpose between those gallant men, who, after having braved for a whole day the cross-fire of 300 pieces of cannon, were ready to draw their swords for the sake of their offended pride. Napoleon allayed their quarrel, which was to be terminated next day by the enemy in the saddest way for themselves and for the army.

The passage of the troops continued during part of the night with frequent interruptions; but about midnight the great bridge broke again for the third time. An additional rise of seven feet had taken place, making a total rise of fourteen feet. Fortune then seemed again to desert Napoleon, or rather the nature of things, which will not bend to the will of mighty conquerors, seemed to give him fresh warning. But if it was a fault to attempt the passage of the river in the season of sudden floods, and with an insufficient *matériel*, it was now no time to draw back. Before daybreak the bridge was repaired, and over it passed St. Hilaire's fine division and Oudinot's two (the three together forming Lannes' corps), the infantry of the guard, a second brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers, the whole artillery of Lannes and Massena's corps, a reserve of artillery belonging to the cuirassiers, two divisions of light cavalry, and the little Demont division, formed of Davout's fourth battalions. Thus the 23 thousand men with whom the battle had begun on the preceding day were increased on the morning of the 22nd to 60 thousand—a number sufficient for victory. Unfortunately the artillery was not sufficient; for Lannes, Massena, and the heavy cavalry had together no more than 144 pieces of cannon, and the Austrians had 300. However, some 30 thousand of our men, with fifty pieces of cannon, had maintained their ground against the Austrians on the preceding day; 60 thousand, with 150 guns, ought this day to beat them. The thing was certain if ammunition did not fail, and supplies of this continued to arrive, the bridge being maintained in a practicable condition.

At daybreak both armies were on foot, and the sharpshooters began to exchange shots at four o'clock in the morning. Napoleon, who had scarcely slept, was on horseback, surrounded by his marshals, and giving them orders, with full confidence that he should terminate the war that day. Massena was to occupy Aspern entirely, and dislodge general Vacquant from the church. Lannes was to repulse all assaults that might be made on Essling, and then, taking advantage of the form of the enemy's line, which was that of a vast semicircle, he was to break it by a sudden and vigorous effort of our right; marshal Davout, two of whose

divisions were at Ebersdorf, being shortly expected to follow Lannes, and cover him on the right during that operation.

With these instructions, Massena and Lannes proceeded to their respective posts. Feeling the necessity of well connecting Aspern with the Danube, Massena had posted the whole Molitor division in the little island on the left, where, though reduced from 7 thousand men to 4 thousand, its own valour would enable it to maintain its ground with such feeble defences as that post possessed, including a small canal, some trees, and a breastwork of earth which Lazowski, the engineer, had thrown up in the night. The Legrand division, which had fought in Aspern towards the close of the preceding day, remained there still. Massena gave it the support of Carra St. Cyr's division, which was relieved in its guard of the little bridge by Demont's division. Napoleon also sent to Aspern the tirailleurs of the imperial guard, with four pieces of cannon, in order that the young soldiers of that recently-formed troop might first see fire under the intrepid Massena.

At Essling, leaving general Boudet to the task of defending the interior of the village, Lannes stationed to the left and in advance, in the interval between Essling and Aspern, first St. Hilaire's division, then more on the left, towards the centre, Oudinot's two divisions, the cuirassiers, the hussars, and the chasseurs. The latter served as a link of connexion with Massena's corps at Aspern. In the rear, at the centre, the fusiliers of the guard and the old guard itself remained as a reserve, but formed a bend towards Essling, to close the open space between that village and the Danube, by which the enemy might be tempted to penetrate, since he was master of the little town of Enzersdorf. This danger was further provided for by a strong battery of 12-pounders, which was placed on the other side of the small arm of the river, and raked the ground in question. The artillery was planted in the intervals of this line of battle to second the efforts of every arm.

It was in this order that the battle began again in the morning. Massena having ordered general Legrand to dislodge general Vacquant from the church at the western extremity of Aspern, and having sent him two regiments of the Carra St. Cyr division, the 24th light and the 4th of the line, colonel Pourailly, an excellent officer, marched as fast as he could for the dead bodies heaped together in the main street of Aspern. Hiller and Bellegarde, who still had orders to act against Aspern, were on the ground at an early hour. Whilst the 24th was engaged with them, it was taken in flank from a side street, by a column which was traversing the village in an opposite direction. The 4th, commanded by the brave colonel Boyeldieu, making a detour to the right, broke the enemy's column, and took its two battalions prisoners. The 24th and the 4th, led by Legrand, then drove the Austrians out of the church and the cemetery. Meanwhile, the Molitor division, from its covert in the little isle, shot down all the Austrian sharpshooters that ventured within range of its musketry.

The moment was come for executing the offensive movement designed against the Austrian centre; for whilst Hiller and Bellegarde were repulsed from Aspern, Rosenberg's two columns were kept at a distance from Essling by the fire of the Boudet division; and in the middle of the semicircle of the Austrian army there was only Hohenzollern's corps, feebly connected with that of Rosenberg by Lichtenstein's cavalry, and supported at a great distance by the reserve of grenadiers. It was doubtful that the Austrian centre could withstand a mass of 20 thousand infantry and 6 thousand horse which Lannes was going to throw upon it.

At the signal given by Napoleon, Lannes advanced with his right foremost against the centre of the Austrians, leaving Boudet in Essling. St. Hilaire's division marched first, regiment by regiment, in close columns—an arrangement which has the disadvantage of giving more prise to the cannon-ball, but which presents a solidity that defies all shocks. More to the left, and a little in the rear, Claparède and Tharreau's two divisions came next, in the same order, and presenting successive *echelons*. Still more to the left and the rear, the cavalry formed the last of these *echelons* directed against the enemy's centre.

Lannes put them in motion with the vigour he displayed in all his attacks. The 57th of the line of St. Hilaire's division, on our extreme right, charged the Austrian infantry, and forced it to give way. The whole division supported the 57th, and, as the other regiments, formed in so many close columns, came each within range of the enemy, they halted and fired, and then advanced again, gaining ground from the troops opposed to them. Oudinot's two divisions, in their turn, took part in this offensive movement, and presently the Austrians, being assailed by the whole line, began to retire in disorder. At this sight, archduke Charles, like many another captain wavering in council but brave on the field of battle, hastened forward in person, to prevent the catastrophe that threatened his centre. He ordered up the grenadiers that were at Breitenlee, and sent word to Bellegarde to fall back from Aspern towards Essling, in order to strengthen the middle of his line. Whilst awaiting the execution of these orders, he seized the flag of Bach's regiment, and led it back under fire. His bravest officers were struck down by his side; among the rest, count Colloredo.

Lannes, who, like him, headed his soldiers in person, seeing the Austrian infantry disordered, let loose upon them Bessières and his cuirassiers, who, charging Hohenzollern's corps, broke several squares, and took prisoners, cannons, and flags. We were now all but arrived at Breitenlee, where archduke Charles had placed his reserve of grenadiers. Success now seeming certain, Lannes sent a staff-officer, César de Laville, to acquaint Napoleon of his progress, and ask him to cover his rear whilst he was advancing in the plain, and leaving so large a space between him and Essling.

Laville found Napoleon at a place called the Tuilerie, between Essling and Aspern, coolly regarding the grand spectacle of which

he was the director. He did not express anything like the satisfaction he might have been expected to feel at such a communication. The fact was, an unfortunate accident had occurred. After incredible efforts on the part of Bertrand and Pernetti to keep open the passage across the Danube, the flood had at last completely broken the great bridge between Ebersdorf and the island of Lobau, just at the moment when six fine regiments of artillery, Davout's two divisions, and the artillery waggons, were preparing to cross. A squadron of cuirassiers were severed in two, and swept with the boats down the stream; some to the right, others to the left. The want of troops, however, was not the worst consequence of the rupture of the bridge, for the 60 thousand already passed over were enough to beat the Austrians. What was most to be regretted was the want of ammunition, a prodigious quantity of which had already been consumed, and of which there would soon be a scarcity.

At this sad news, brought by M. de Mortemart, Napoleon became too prudent, perhaps, after having been too rash. He feared he should be left on that vast field of battle with no other means of offence against the enemy besides bayonets and swords; and also that, having sent all his troops into action, excepting the foot guard and the fusiliers, who were covering Lannes' rear, he should have no resource against a sudden turn of fortune, which, with the river behind him, could not but be disastrous. He therefore resolved upon a painful sacrifice, and renounced an almost certain victory, in order not to expose himself to risks which prudence forbade him to brave. Having formed this resolution in an instant, with the firmness of a thorough soldier, Napoleon ordered M. de Laville to return as fast as possible, and tell marshal Lannes to suspend his movement, and fall back gradually, without too much emboldening the enemy, on the Essling and Aspern line. He was also to recommend the marshal to be sparing of his ammunition.

On receiving this order, Lannes and Bessières were compelled, to their deep regret, to halt in the midst of the vast field of Marchfeld, inundated with fire. The archduke, just before so hard pressed towards Breitenlee, saw our columns suddenly become stationary, without being able to divine the cause. He took advantage of that respite to move from his right to his left a part of Bellegarde's corps, and to draw up in line behind Hohenzollern's corps the sixteen battalions of grenadiers that formed his reserve, besides an enormous mass of artillery, for he had nearly 300 guns, and could bring together 200 of them upon that threatened point. Relieved, then, from his first confusion, he opened a tremendous cannonade upon Lannes. The St. Hilaire division, the most advanced of the three, received a continual fire of grape in front and flank. It retreated slowly, with the steadiness becoming the veteran regiments composing it and the chivalric St. Hilaire who commanded it. Unfortunately that brave officer, one of Napoleon's old friends, fell mortally wounded by a biscayan. His division,

though struck with grief, still remained steady. Lannes hastened to take the place of St. Hilaire, and bring back his division to less exposed ground. He continued the retreat, but like a lion whom it was dangerous to pursue. The corps that ventured to press upon him too nearly were fiercely charged, and driven back at the point of the bayonet. Passing from St. Hilaire's division to Oudinot's two, Lannes led them with the same vigour in presence of an enemy whom our retreat filled with confidence. Unfortunately, Oudinot's soldiers suffered more than the rest, because it was thought too hazardous to make such young troops deploy in face of the enemy. Being ranged in deep columns, whole files of them were mowed down with cannon-balls.

Gradually Lannes brought back his line as far as the ditch running from Essling to Aspern, which formed a sort of shelter, behind which his infantry could be covered. His artillery, though inferior in number to the enemy's, and worse supplied, was left alone on the salient part of the ditch to stop the advance of the Austrian columns. Hiller's corps and part of Bellegarde's were now moving on Aspern, Rosenberg's two columns were again approaching Essling, and Hohenzollern's, reinforced by part of Bellegarde's, the grenadiers and Lichtenstein's cavalry, were preparing to make an effort against our centre, similar to that which Napoleon had essayed against the centre of the Austrians.

The latter design being simultaneously perceived by Napoleon and by Lannes, they asked the St. Hilaire and Oudinot divisions and the cavalry to devote themselves once more for the safety of the army. Having stationed the St. Hilaire, Claparède, and Tharreau divisions in the first line, the cuirassiers in the second, and the old guard in the third, Lannes allowed the dense mass of Hohenzollern's corps and the grenadiers to approach within half-musket shot, and then poured in upon them such a fire of grape and musketry as soon thinned their ranks. He then launched the cavalry against the Austrian infantry, which gave way in several places, and opened like a breach in a wall. The brave prince John de Lichtenstein made a counter-charge with his cavalry against that of Bessières. But Lasalle and Marulaz came with their chasseurs and hussars to the aid of our cuirassiers, and presently nothing was to be seen on the broad plain but a confused mass of 15 thousand French and Austrian cavalry furiously charging each other,—united when they dashed forward, disunited when they returned, and rallying incessantly to charge again.

After this long *mêlée* the enemy's movement against our centre seemed suspended, and Hohenzollern's corps halted as if paralyzed before the breastwork running from Essling to Aspern. Our artillery, partly dismounted, remained on the further side of the ditch firing with precision, but slowly, on account of the scarcity of ammunition, and exposed to the fire of more than 200 pieces of cannon. Our infantry sheltered in the ditch, our cavalry forming a screen in the rear, and filling the space between Essling and

Aspern, sustained an incessant cannonade with wonderful impassibility. An imperious necessity commanded this; for it was only by holding out to the close of the day that our men could escape being driven into the swollen Danube. At this moment a dreadful calamity befel the army. Whilst Lannes was galloping from one corps to the other, encouraging his soldiers, an officer, who was alarmed at seeing him exposed to so much danger, entreated him to dismount for the greater safety. He followed the advice, though it was far from his habit to be careful of his life, and, as if destiny were a master whom there was no escaping, he was that instant struck by a cannon-ball that shattered both his knees. Bessières and the chef-d'escadron César de Laville, raised him up bathed in blood, and almost senseless. Bessières, whom he had used very ill on the preceding day, pressed his weak hand, but with averted face, for fear of offending him by his presence. He was laid on a cuirassier's cloak and carried half a league to the little bridge where an ambulance was stationed. The news soon spread through the whole army, and filled it with deep sorrow. But it was no time for tears, for the danger was every moment increasing.

The enemy's efforts, baffled in the centre, turned with fury upon the wings against Aspern and Essling. Hiller and Vacquant now make reiterated attacks on the unfortunate village of Aspern, which is but a mass of ruins and corpses. The tirailleurs of the guard, notwithstanding their youthful ardour and the efforts of their veteran officers, are driven out of the village. Immediately Legrand with the wreck of his division, and Carra St. Cyr with the half of his, retake that heap of smoking ruins under the eyes of Massena, who stands amongst them broken down with fatigue, but elevated above the weaknesses of human nature by the force of his soul. Legrand, who is charged with the execution of his orders, appears everywhere, with the point of his hat cut off by a cannon-ball, and often obliged to use his sword to parry the thrusts of the enemy's bayonets. On the left, Molitor flings into the branch of the river behind which he is posted the Austrians, who attempt to gain a footing on the little island. Thanks to this heroic resistance, Aspern remains ours. But the archduke cherishes a last hope, that of taking Essling. He surrounds that position with Rosenberg's columns, and commands in person a furious attack of the grenadiers upon the centre of the village. Bessières, who has taken the place of Lannes, sees this new danger and prepares to ward it off. Napoleon, to aid him, sends him the fusiliers of the guard, a superb body of men, formed during the campaign in Poland and Spain, and near attaining that perfection which is found between the extreme youth and the extreme age of the soldier. Their commander was general Mouton. "Brave Mouton," said the Emperor, "make one more effort to save the army; but make a finish of it, for after these fusiliers I have nothing left but the grenadiers and chasseurs of the old guard, a last resource, to be expended only in case of a disaster." Mouton obeys, and sets out

in the direction of Essling, where the attack of the Austrian grenadiers seems most to be apprehended. Bessières, who is nearer the spot, sees the danger on the right between Essling and the Danube, and does not hesitate to change the direction given by the Emperor. He sends part of Mouton's four battalions into Essling, and part to the right between the village and the river. This succour was urgently needed, for in front Essling was threatened by the grenadiers, and on the right by Rosenberg's columns, which were ready to pass between Essling and the Danube. It was general Boudet who still defended Essling. Five times had the grenadiers returned to the attack, led by field-marshal d'Aspre, and five times had they been repulsed by musketry and the bayonet. Nevertheless, on the right of the village, which was not numerously defended, Boudet was outflanked by one of Rosenberg's columns, and obliged to retreat into a granary, a large building battlemented like a fortress. There he kept his position with indomitable tenacity; but, being assailed on all sides, he was on the point of succumbing, when Mouton came up with the fusiliers of the guard. Those gallant youths wrested part of the village from Aspre's grenadiers, and stopped Rosenberg's soldiers along the space extending to the Danube. But this one act of energy was not enough against an enemy four times more numerous, and resolved to make the utmost efforts to succeed. Rapp, however, comes up with two more battalions of these same fusiliers, and proposes to general Mouton to make a general charge with the bayonet. With a mutual grasp of the hand they agree on this final effort, and rush headlong on the Austrians, sweep them back in an instant from one end of the village to the other, drive Aspre's soldiers in confusion upon Rosenberg's, and clear Essling of them all. At the same moment the artillery at Lobau pours a raking fire of grape on the masses that had passed between the village and the river. Thus Essling was delivered.

The conflict had now lasted thirty hours, and archduke Charles, despairing of the possibility of forcing us into the Danube, and finding his own ammunition also beginning to fail, determined to suspend this bloody battle, one of the most frightful of the age, and to close the day by discharging his remaining shells and balls on the troops stationed between Aspern and Essling. So whilst in Aspern generals Hiller and Bellegarde were still pertinaciously contesting some ruined remains of that unhappy village, archduke Charles put an end to the attacks on our right and our centre, and only moved his artillery forward to cannonade our lines. A danger of this kind could only be met with passive coolness. Our artillery, in a great measure dismounted, remained as before on the bank of the ditch, firing from time to time. Behind it was the infantry, partly covered by the form of the ground, and further in the rear our fine cavalry deployed, presenting two fronts, one from Essling to Aspern to cover the centre of the position, the other at right angles to this, to cover the space between Essling and the river. Lastly, the

imperial guard, presenting two fronts parallel to those of the cavalry, remained motionless under the cannonade, and nothing was heard amidst the thundering of the artillery but this word of command given by the officers, "Close up!" In fact, there was nothing to be done but to repeat that manœuvre until night, for it was impossible either to drive off the enemy or to escape by the bridge leading to the island of Lobau. Such a retreat by a single issue could only be effected under favour of darkness, and in the month of May there were many hours yet to wait for that friendly obscurity. During the whole day Napoleon had not quitted the angle formed by our lines from Aspern to Essling, and from Essling to the river, a space swept by so many cannon-balls. So long as there was any reason to apprehend a fresh attack, he had been deaf to all entreaties to shelter a life on which the lives of all depended. But now that the exhausted enemy did nothing but cannonade, he resolved to make a personal inspection of the island of Lobau, in order to choose the best site there for the encampment of his army, and make all other necessary arrangements for retreat. Secure of the possession of Essling, which was occupied by the remains of the Boudet division and by the fusiliers, he sent to Massena to inquire if he could rely on the possession of Aspern; for so long as those two points remained to us, the retreat of the army was insured. The staff-officer, César de Laville, who took the message, found Massena seated on a heap of rubbish, harassed with fatigue, with bloodshot eyes, but with unabated energy of spirit. On receiving the message he stood up and replied, with extraordinary emphasis, "Go tell the Emperor I will hold out two hours—six—twenty-four—so long as it is necessary for the safety of the army."

Satisfied as to these two points, Napoleon immediately proceeded towards the island of Lobau, after sending orders to Massena, Bessières, and Berthier to join him as soon as they could quit their posts, in order to make arrangements for the retreat, which was to be effected that night. The little arm of the Danube was now become a great river, and the mills thrown in by the enemy had several times endangered the bridge by which it was crossed. The aspect of its banks was of a nature to wring the heart. Long files of wounded men, some dragging themselves along as they could, others carried on the arms of soldiers, or laid on the ground until they could be removed to the island; dismounted horse soldiers throwing off their cuirasses to march more at ease; wounded horses flocking instinctively to the river to quench their thirst, and entangling themselves in the cordage of the bridge so as to endanger its safety; hundreds of artillery waggons half broken, an indescribable confusion and piteous groans, such was the scene that presented itself to Napoleon. He dismounted, took some water in his hands to cool his face, and then perceiving a litter made of branches of trees, on which Lannes lay with his legs amputated, he ran to him, pressed him in his arms, spoke hopefully of his recovery, and found him, though heroic as ever, yet keenly affected at seeing himself so soon

stopped in that career of glory. "You are going to lose," said Lannes, "him who was your best friend and your faithful companion in arms. May you live and save the army." The malevolence which Napoleon had but too much provoked, at that time propagated a report of reproaches which Lannes was said to have cast upon him in his last moments. Nothing of the kind, however, took place. Lannes received his master's embrace with a sort of convulsive satisfaction, and mingled no word of bitterness with the expression of his grief. There was no need he should do so. A single look of his recalling all he had so often said as to the danger of incessant wars, the sight of his two shattered limbs, the death of another hero of Italy, St. Hilaire, struck down on that day, the horrible hecatomb of forty or fifty thousand men laid low, were not these so many reproaches, keen enough and easy enough to understand? After pressing Lannes in his arms, and saying surely to himself what the dying hero had not said—for the genius that has committed faults is its own severest judge—Napoleon mounted his horse again, and rode to the island of Lobau. After exploring it in all directions, he satisfied himself that the army would find in it an intrenched camp in which it would be unassailable, and might take shelter for two or three days until the great bridge was repaired. The Austrians could not cross the small branch of the river in defiance of Massena, who would be there to dispute the passage; and the breadth of the island was too great to allow of their cannon-balls reaching our soldiers. And then, by employing all the boats that were on the right bank, the army might be supplied with all necessaries for subsistence and defence.

These matters having been promptly settled in his own mind, Napoleon returned at night to the small branch, where, with Massena, Bessières, Berthier, some general officers, and Davout, who had arrived in a boat, he held a council of war. Napoleon was not in the habit of assembling that sort of council in which a vacillating mind seeks, but finds not, resolutions which he is unable of himself to arrive at. On this occasion he wanted, not to ask advice of his lieutenants, but to give it them; to fill them with his own thought, and revive the spirits of those that desponded; and it is certain that, although their soldierly courage was unshakable, their minds did not sufficiently embrace the difficulties and the resources of the situation to escape being in some degree surprised, confused, and depressed. The fortitude that supports disasters is rarer than the heroism that braves death. Napoleon, calm and confident, because he saw in what had occurred a mere accident, by no means irreparable, called on the officers present to express their opinion. From the language held before him, he could infer that those two days had made a deep impression, and that some of his lieutenants were for recrossing forthwith not only the small branch, but the island and the large branch also, in order to join the rest of the army as soon as possible, at the risk of losing all the cannon, all the artillery, and cavalry horses, 12 or 15 thousand

wounded men, and the honour of our arms. No sooner had such a thought been suggested, than Napoleon interposed with the authority that belonged to him; and, with the unfeigned confidence he derived from the extent of his resources, thus expounded his own views. The day had been a severe one, he said, but it could not be considered a defeat, since we remained masters of the field of battle; and it was doing wonders to retire safe and sound after such a conflict, sustained with a huge river at our back and with our bridges destroyed. As for our loss in killed and wounded, it was great—greater than any we had before suffered in our long wars—but that of the enemy must have been a third greater. It might, therefore, Napoleon thought, be assumed for certain that the Austrians would be quiet for a long time, and leave him leisure to wait the arrival of the army of Italy, which was approaching victoriously through Styria; to bring back to the ranks three-fourths of his wounded; to receive the numerous reinforcements that were on the march from France, and to build wooden bridges over the Danube as solid as structures of stone, and which would make the passage of the river an ordinary operation. Napoleon went on to say, that, after all, when the wounded should have returned to the ranks, it would be only 10 thousand men less on our side to set off against 15 thousand on the adversary's, and two months more in the duration of the campaign; that at 500 leagues from Paris, maintaining a great war in the heart of a conquered monarchy, in its very capital, there was nothing in an accident of that kind that ought to astound men of courage,—nothing but what was very natural, nay, even fortunate, if one took account of the difficulties of the enterprise, which was no less than crossing in the teeth of a hostile army the largest river in Europe to go and give battle beyond it. There was no reason, therefore, he maintained, for alarm or discouragement. There was a retrograde movement which was proper and necessary; namely, to recross the small arm of the Danube to the island of Lobau, there to wait for the subsidence of the waters and the reconstruction of the bridges over the large branch—an easy movement, which would be performed by night without inconvenience, without losing a single wounded man, a single horse, or a single cannon; above all, without losing honour. But there was another retrograde movement, both dishonouring and disastrous: that was, to repass not only the small but the great arm, scrambling over the latter how they could, with boats which could carry only sound men, without one cannon, one horse, one wounded man, and abandoning the island of Lobau, which was a precious conquest, and the true ground for ultimately effecting a passage. If they acted in that way—if, instead of 60 thousand, which they numbered at their departure, they went back 40 thousand, without artillery or horses, and leaving behind them 10 thousand wounded men, who might be capable of service in a month, they would do well not to show themselves to the Viennese, who would overwhelm their vanquishers with scorn, and soon

summon the archduke Charles to expel the French from a capital where they were no longer worthy to remain. And, in that case, it was for a retreat not to Vienna but to Strasburg that they should have to prepare. Prince Eugene, now on his march to Vienna, would find the enemy there instead of the French army, and would perish in that trap; our dismayed allies, made treacherous by weakness, would turn against us; the fortune of the empire would be annihilated, and the grandeur of France destroyed in a few weeks. In a word, Napoleon foresaw, and distinctly foretold, as certain to be realised in a fortnight, all that his policy brought upon him five years later, if, instead of retiring with dignity into Lobau, the French were weak enough to make a precipitate retreat over the Danube, leaving behind their wounded comrades, their *matériel*, and their honour. Besides, to act as he advised, would cost but little efforts. Massena would hold out at Aspern until midnight, would then defile with the army over the small bridge, defend Lobau next day against the attempts of the enemy, and wait behind the small arm of the Danube for the victuals and ammunition which would be sent to him in boats. During this time the large bridge would be reconstructed, and if, contrary to all probability, archduke Charles dared to make an attempt to cross the river at Presburg or Krems, and dispute possession of Vienna with us, marshal Davout would confront him with his 30 thousand men, who were as good as 60 thousand Austrians, with the remainder of the cuirassiers, the cavalry of the guard who had not crossed the river, the Wurtembergers, the Bavarians, and the Saxons. "So, Massena and Davout," said he to them, "you live, and you will save the army, and show yourselves worthy of what you have already done." Massena, who was often a grumbler, and who even bitterly blamed the haste with which the Danube had been crossed, was now delighted with such a display of good sense and fortitude, and, grasping Napoleon's hand, he exclaimed, "You are a man of courage, sir, and worthy to command us! No, we must not fly like cravens who have been beaten. Fortune has not been kind to us, but we are victorious, nevertheless; for the enemy, who ought to have driven us into the Danube, has bitten the dust before our positions. Let us not lose our victorious attitude; let us only cross the small branch of the Danube, and I pledge myself to drown in it every Austrian who shall attempt to cross it in pursuit of us." Davout, on his part, promised to defend Vienna from any attack, by way of Presburg or Krems, during the renovation of the bridges, after which the army, combined on one bank, would no longer have anything to fear from archduke Charles.

Every man felt his heart rise within him after this council. Massena, who was to take the command in chief of the army, returned to Aspern, whilst Napoleon proceeded to cross the main branch between eleven and twelve at night. The danger was great, by reason of the darkness and the enormous floating masses rolled along by the flood. But, with the confidence of Cæsar amidst the

billows, Napoleon embarked in a small boat with Berthier and Savary, and arrived safely at Ebersdorf on the opposite shore. Immediately he gave orders to collect there all the barges that could be had, and send them off to Lobau, freighted with biscuits, wine, brandy, cannon and musket cartridges, and dressing materials for the wounded. The boats detached from the large bridge sufficed for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Massena was taking measures at Essling and Aspern for the retreat. The direct attack on those points had ceased. The Austrian cannonade grew slower as the night advanced, and only did occasional mischief here and there. Our weary adversaries sank down overpowered on that field of carnage, whilst our critical position compelled us to maintain all our vigilance, though our fatigue was as great as that of the Austrians. At midnight Massena began the retreat with the imperial guard, which was nearest to the river. Every corps was to defile by the small bridge, carrying off its wounded and its cannons, and leaving behind only its dead, the number of which was unhappily great. After the guard came the heavy cavalry; and, as many of the men had thrown off their cuirasses, Massena had them picked up by the dismounted soldiers, wishing to leave the enemy but as few trophies as possible. Part of the light cavalry remained in line, with the voltigeurs, in order to make a feint of resistance in front of Aspern and Essling. Next in order were the St. Hilaire, Oudinot, Legrand, and Carra St. Cyr divisions; and at last, at daybreak, generals Boudet and Molitor, quitting Essling and Aspern, plunged into the wood which covered the bend of the river, escorted by a swarm of their tirailleurs. The harassed enemy did not perceive the retrograde movement of our troops. It was not till towards five or six in the morning, that, seeing our advanced posts gradually disappear, he conceived a suspicion of our retreat, and thought of pursuing us. He did this slowly, and without giving us much trouble. As soon, however, as he had entered Essling, and reached the edge of the river, he caught sight of the little bridge over which our last columns were passing, and he immediately turned the fire of his cannon and his sharpshooters in that direction. Massena remained on the left bank with some of his staff, resolved to be the last man to cross the bridge. It was pointed out to him that our posts were beginning to be sharply pressed, that he might be suddenly assailed, and that it was time to unmoor the bridge, and put an end to this unparalleled resistance. He would listen to nothing, as long as he saw any relic to be saved on the river-side. Going about in all directions, he assured himself with his own eyes that he was not leaving behind one wounded man, one cannon, or a single object of any value, to gratify the pride of the enemy. He had search made again for any muskets or cuirasses that might be lying about; and he had all the wounded and straggling horses driven into the river and forced to swim across it. At last, when there was no further duty to be performed, and

the bullets of the enemy's sharpshooters were whistling round him, he embarked, last of all, as gallantly as when he quitted Genoa in an open boat under the fire of the English squadron. He ordered the cables to be cut; the bridge was soon swept by the stream to the other bank, and in a few minutes he was in Lobau, the Austrians contenting themselves with watching the voluntary retreat of their adversaries.

Thus ended this battle of two days,—one of the bloodiest of the age, and the first in the series of those abominable carnages of the latter times of the empire, in which numbers equal to the population of a great city were destroyed in one day. The amount of killed and wounded cannot easily be determined with accuracy; but it may be estimated at 26 or 27 thousand on the side of the Austrians, and 15 or 16 thousand on that of the French. The want of surgical appliances in the island of Lobau necessarily rendered the wounds of our men extremely dangerous. What accounted for the enormous difference in the losses sustained on either side was, that the Austrians had always fought without cover, whereas we had been sheltered during part of the two days by the conformation of the ground. As for prisoners, none were made on either side, except a few hundreds taken in Aspern and Essling and sent to Lobau. It was a battle without other result than an abominable effusion of blood, greater on the enemy's side than on ours, and which left us all our means of passage, since the island of Lobau remained ours. The worst consequences of those days at Essling were what the world would say of them. Our enemies would not fail to publish in Germany and all over Europe that the French were beaten, cut to pieces, and in full retreat. Now Napoleon, fighting in the midst of the continent, which was ready to rise against him, obliged to maintain himself in the enemy's capital, where 400 thousand inhabitants were only awaiting the signal for insurrection, and needing secure roads in his rear for the arrival of his reinforcements, could not dispense with the *prestige* of his invincibility. Physically, he was the stronger, since he had lost less than his adversary, and had steeled the courage of his young army in a formidable trial; morally, he was weaker, since his enemies were about to boast over his alleged defeat, which was in reality a victory. As for his conduct as a general, it was impossible not to admire his choice of Lobau, which rendered possible an operation in any other case impracticable, and enabled him to come off by the easiest of retreats from a position from which the only probable issue seemed to be drowning or captivity. But Napoleon deserved blame for his haste to cross the river in such a season before he had got together adequate means. Still there were so many motives to prompt his impatience to occupy both banks of the Danube, that he may be pardoned for having relied too much on fortune in his wish to save time. His real fault, his stupendous fault, was that unbridled policy which, after having carried him to the Niemen, whence he had only returned by dint of miracles, had next carried him to the Ebro and the

Tagus, whence he had returned in person, leaving his best armies behind him, now hurried him to the Danube, where he contrived to maintain himself only by other miracles, the series of which might cease at any moment and give place to disasters. This, we say, was his capital fault, for the general committed no errors except under the constraint exercised over him by the most imprudent of politicians.

As for archduke Charles, whose conduct has since been severely criticised, and especially by his countrymen, he displayed great energy, whatever may have been said to the contrary; and if it is thought strange that he did not hurl the French army into the river, those who thus talk forget the strength of the positions chosen by his adversary, and the impossibility of wresting Aspern and Essling from 60 thousand Frenchmen, commanded by Lannes and Massena, and reduced to the necessity of conquering or perishing; and they forget the advantages of Lobau, to which retreat was easy whilst Aspern and Essling remained to us, and which then became an inviolable asylum. To attempt to force the small arm of the Danube, in face of Massena without a bridge, or even with one, would have been a rash enterprise, for not venturing upon which the Austrian commander has been blamed by men who would have been incapable of executing it. What has been alleged against the archduke with more reason by certain impartial judges is, that during the battle he extended a great deal too much the semicircle round the French, so as to expose himself to the risk of having his line broken; and that by greater concentration on his right, and by employing all his forces to cut his way through at Aspern, he might, perhaps, have had more chance of cutting us off from the Danube. On the other hand, it must be observed, that if he had acted in this way, he would probably have been met at Aspern by all the forces which in that case would not have been required elsewhere. After so tremendous a battle, and such heroic efforts, we must admire such gallantry and be silent, whatever may have been the result, before deeds of such energy as men have rarely equalled.

It was during the days following the battle that archduke Charles might have executed things he did not even attempt. The French army was then in a critical position, being partly in the island of Lobau, partly on the right bank of the Danube, with the principal stream dividing its two positions. This was an opportunity such as Napoleon would not have failed to seize. Admitting that it was impossible for the archduke to cross over to the island of Lobau in the teeth of Massena and his 45 thousand men, there was infinitely less reason why he should not attempt one of those passages above or below Vienna which Napoleon regarded with so much apprehension, and against which he took so many ingenious precautions.

Had archduke Charles marched to Presburg, crossed the Danube there, and gone up the right bank to attack marshal Davout, who had not 40 thousand men to act against him, he would no doubt have had a fair chance of doing us a mischief. But he would also

have run some risk, for he would have needed not less than two days to go down the Danube, and two to go up on the opposite side, and there was much probability that in those four days the temporary repair of the great bridge would have enabled the French army to return to the right bank. In that case archduke Charles would have had 80 thousand men to fight, with but 70 thousand at the most on his side, for the battle of Essling had cost him 26 or 27 thousand. He might, therefore, have been cut to pieces or driven with great loss into Hungary. There remained another operation to be tried, as hazardous as this one, but still more decisive had it succeeded. This was to go up the course of the Danube, fall in with Kollowrath's 25 thousand men, and with a force thus raised to 95 thousand cross the river at one of the points between Krems and Lintz, forcing a passage against Bernadotte's Saxons or Vandamme's Wurtembergers, and debouche on Napoleon's rear. In this case the passage would be less certain, since it would be disputed, but by troops whom there was a great chance of beating; it would be effected with an additional 25 thousand men; it would bring about a concentration superior to any Napoleon could at that moment accomplish; it required only a space of two or three days; it afforded opportunity for beating in detail before their junction the Saxons, the Wurtembergers, and Davout's divisions, dispersed between St. Polten, Vienna, and Ebersdorf; lastly, in case of success, it would place Napoleon in the position of general Melas after the battle of Marengo. But also, by placing such an adversary and such an army in such an extremity, it would provoke them to extraordinary efforts, and be consequently attended with immense danger. This plan, then, the more decisive but the more hazardous of the two, was the less likely to be adopted by the archduke.

The archduke adopted neither of these courses. It was not until the 23rd of May that he knew whether he was victorious or not; and though he sent off despatches in all directions declaring that he was so, his conviction of that fact was by no means well assured. His army, diminished by one-third, was exhausted with fatigue. For himself, he was not disposed to recommence the conflict. For the first time in his life he had stood before Napoleon without being beaten, and, quite astonished at this unusual triumph, he wished to enjoy it before he ran fresh risks. His losses, the insufficiency of his remaining forces, and the entire consumption of his ammunition, were motives for waiting and enjoying in quiet the pleasure of an unexpected success. It must be owned, too, that there were some weighty considerations in favour of this line of conduct. It might, in fact, be argued that his advantage lay in gaining time, that not to perish was a positive success for an army fighting in its own country within reach of all its resources, and surrounded by all the sympathies of Germany, which waited only an opportunity to declare themselves. It might be argued that Napoleon, on the contrary, at a distance of several hundred leagues

from his frontiers, living in the midst of a hostile population, in a conquered and exasperated capital, and maintaining himself there only by the *prestige* of his invincibility, had need of a constant succession of dazzling exploits, and of hastening matters to a close; that to pass the Danube was for him an indispensable condition towards any ultimate success, and that to have failed therein was a moral as well as a physical check; consequently, that it was better to persist in opposing to him the only sort of obstacle which had stopped him until then, and to persevere in a system of tactics which had succeeded, than to go and offer oneself to his blows, and risk the dubious chance of battle by attempting a hazardous passage above or below Vienna. Thus argued archduke Charles with much reason; and he would have done wisely if, in adopting such a plan, he had followed it out to all its consequences, and employed the time afforded him in reinforcing the Austrian army, rendering the Danube more and more difficult to cross, and raising up around Napoleon the resistances of all kinds which an advantage gained over him would naturally provoke. This, at least, is what he seemed at first bent on doing, applying himself to increase the strength of his position opposite Vienna, striving to augment the difficulties of any future attempts to cross the Danube, concentrating all the forces he could at that point, sending orders to archduke John to join him as soon as possible, and, above all, singing pæans in Germany, and writing word everywhere that the French had been beaten, destroyed; talking of thirty or forty thousand killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, so that, had all these stories been true, Napoleon would not have had one soldier left; talking, moreover, of an inevitable retreat of the French on Lintz, Passau, and even Strasburg, and promising to all a general and sure deliverance of Europe, and particularly if Germany would second Austria with a single effort. Fortunately for Napoleon, what the archduke could do best towards turning his victory to account, was to boast of the success he had achieved; and, vanity apart, it was something useful, as we shall soon see, to boast a great deal, and even beyond all bounds of truth or probability.

In fact, Napoleon had much less reason to be concerned about the physical than the moral consequences of the battle of Essling. He did not, however, make himself more uneasy than was needful about the matter; only he wrote everywhere to set opinion right with regard to the two days' engagement at Essling; and, above all, he took vigorous measures to repair that apparent or real check, so as even to derive from it unexpected and decisive results at no distant day.

The first danger to be provided against was an attempt on the part of archduke Charles to force a passage into the island of Lobau. Napoleon did not fear this much, provided the 45 thousand men there under Massena had victuals, ammunition, and hospital supplies. His first care, as we have seen, was to send them these on the night of the 22nd and the following day; and in thirty-six

hours Massena had plenty of cartridges for large and small arms, and biscuit enough to keep his soldiers from hunger. The deer which abounded in the island would furnish them with meat; and thus they had all that was necessary for defence and subsistence.

The second danger to which he had to direct his immediate attention was the possibility of a passage at Presburg, the only one which Napoleon regarded as at all probable, as being that which required least boldness. But, to provide against this, it was necessary to have previously overcome a great difficulty; for unless the bridge over the main arm was re-established, at least in a temporary manner, marshal Davout might have to resist archduke Charles with only two of his divisions and that part of the guard and the heavy cavalry which had not crossed the river. Davout's third division, stationed between St. Polten and Vienna, would evidently be indispensable to keep the capital in awe whilst the other two were fighting. It is true that Davout had pledged his head for it that, with 25 to 30 thousand men, he would stop any force coming from Presburg, and the fulfilment of this promise might be confidently expected of the stubborn victor of Auerstädt; but the position was a very critical one, and it was of vast importance to have the means of promptly assembling the whole army, if necessary, on the right bank. Napoleon applied himself to this task without ceasing. Fortunately the seamen of the guard had arrived from Strasburg. They were employed to accelerate the re-establishment of communications between the island and the right bank, a service which they performed with their usual zeal and ability. Part of the infantry of the guard was carried over in boats from the island to Ebersdorf. On the 25th, by means of the pontoons which had served for the passage of the small branch, and of the boats picked up in the river, a bridge was constructed, which would not have served for offensive operations, but was solid enough for the purpose of a retreat to be effected at successive intervals. Every detachment conveyed to the right bank put marshal Davout in a condition the better to resist an attack from Presburg; and as for that which might have been directed against the island of Lobau, it was manifestly not to be feared, since it had not been attempted on the 23rd or 24th.

After the guard, the Demont division crossed over to the main land; then the light cavalry, which was to be sent to reconnoitre round Presburg; then the heavy cavalry; and, lastly, Lannes' whole corps, which since his death had been put under the command of general Oudinot, and could not be in better hands. This business having been effected on the 27th of May, all cause for uneasiness was removed, for Davout had at least 60 thousand men at his disposal, and no attempt of archduke Charles upon the right bank could have had any chance of success. Napoleon ordered Lasalle and Marulaz to Haimburg, with nine regiments of cavalry, to check anything that might come from Presburg, whether it were the army of archduke Charles, or merely the Hungarian rising,

which was beginning to muster. He ordered Montbrun to Œdenburg, on the other side of the lake of Neusiedel, to watch the roads from Hungary and Italy by which archduke John might present himself in his retreat before prince Eugene. General Lauriston continued as before at Bruck, with the Badeners and general Bruyère's cavalry, to support prince Eugene on his march through Styria. Napoleon stationed the heavy cavalry in the rear, as he had done before, to support the light cavalry. Lastly, Davout, with the Friant, Gudin, and Demont divisions, Oudinot's whole corps, and the guard, 50 or 60 thousand men in all, was at Ebersdorf, ready to fall upon archduke Charles from whatever side he came.

Napoleon resolved to bring some more forces still to Vienna. Thinking that the Bavarians might suffice to defend their own country not only on the Tyrolese side but towards the Danube, he ordered marshal Lefebvre to send a Bavarian division to Lintz to relieve the Dupas division and the Saxons stationed there under Bernadotte. General Vandamme was to remain with the Wurtembergers at Krems, whilst Bernadotte, with his 18 thousand men, was to advance to Vienna to augment the forces accumulated there. Massena's corps, which we have not mentioned in this enumeration, was left entirely in the island of Lobau, to guard that spot, which, notwithstanding the use that had been made of it, still remained the most suitable for the passage of the Danube. Napoleon had already devised a means of using it in so novel a manner, that, although warned by a previous attempt, the enemy would be surely deceived by it. He had calculated that a month would be necessary to collect and employ the requisite *matériel*, and to let the flood season elapse, and that he should not be able to strike the blow that should end the war until the end of June or the beginning of July. The same space of time was also requisite to enable him to receive his reinforcements, organise his line of operation more completely, and bring prince Eugene's army under the walls of Vienna. He set himself, therefore, to prepare the accomplishment of these several designs with imperturbable coolness, incredible activity, and as proud a bearing as he could have displayed on the day following a great victory.

His first business was to prepare materials everywhere. Vienna was full of timber, which he ordered to be sorted and conveyed to Ebersdorf. The workmen of Vienna wanted work: he resolved to employ them, and to pay them with the Austrian paper-money, of which there was abundance in the public coffers which had been seized. He had boat-builders sent to Lobau, and had others even brought by post from France, whom he employed in making boats of all forms and sizes, according to a plan we shall describe in its proper place. Lastly, without losing a single day, he gave the following orders for the recruitment of the army. As he had taken care to fill the depôts by anticipating the conscription of 1810, or by a fresh call upon the anterior classes, he could now draw from them the men previously levied, with a certainty that their places would be

filled up by the men last called out. In consequence of this, he had all the ready trained conscripts put *en route* for Strasburg in marching battalions, bearing the numbers of the military divisions in which the depôts were situated. But he had a still surer means of procuring trained men, namely, to take them from the provisional demi-brigades which had been organised in the north, on the frontiers of the Rhine, and even in Italy, and consisted of fourth and fifth battalions. From these he ordered numerous recruits to be taken for Massena, Oudinot, and Davout's corps, some of them being sent directly to their regiments, and others incorporated in regiments to which they did not originally belong. Napoleon had already had recourse to this last measure; he now persisted in employing it in consideration of the urgency of the circumstances, and he applied to three regiments which had returned a year before from Portugal, and since remained on the coast of Bretagne, where they had been largely supplied with young soldiers. He drew from them 3 or 4 thousand men fully trained, who, being incorporated in other regiments, might serve to recruit those whose depôts lacked conscripts. In this way he marked out from 20 to 25 thousand conscripts to be furnished by the depôts in France, and 6 or 8 thousand by those in Italy. He adopted the same measures for the cavalry, which had considerable resources in its depôts, seeing that they had not yet been much drawn upon; and he had numerous marching squadrons sent from the Rhine to the Danube. He took special pains to remount the cavalry, for it had lost still more horses than men. He ordered the formation of two depôts, one in Bavaria for the purchase of German horses for heavy and medium cavalry, the other in Hungary, for the purchase of light cavalry horses. He directed particular attention to the augmentation of his artillery. That of the enemy had done him so much mischief at Essling, that, to increase his own, he had recourse to a device which experience did not justify—which was giving the infantry regiments cannons, to be worked by men from their own ranks expressly drilled for that service. The difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of artillerymen in good time from the depôts had induced him to adopt this expedient, which his superior tact would have rejected under any other circumstances; for it was easy to foresee that with regard to special arms, nothing could make amends for the want of long training, and that the infantry could never take such care of the *matériel* as a corps exclusively destined to that service. Napoleon resolved to give 200 guns to the infantry, at the rate of four to a regiment, employing for this purpose pieces of small calibre, such as 3 and 4-pounders. He determined also to raise the guard's reserve of artillery from the number of sixty pieces to eighty, by drawing the requisite companies of artillerymen from Italy and Strasburg. In this way he calculated on procuring 700 pieces of cannon—an overwhelming mass of artillery, equivalent to about four pieces for every thousand men, and surpassing all proportions previously admitted.

These various calls would bring about 40 thousand men from France and Italy within a month or two; a reinforcement more than equivalent to all the losses of the campaign—one which was not absolutely necessary in order to fight a decisive battle, for the recruitment called for after Ratisbon was now coming in—but which at any rate would enable Napoleon to continue the war, happen what might.

As to the imperial guard, Napoleon had with him the grenadiers and the chasseurs forming the old guard, and the fusiliers and tirailleurs forming the new. There were two regiments of conscripts of this force at Augsburg, one of grenadiers and one of chasseurs, undergoing instruction, and at the same time serving as a reserve against the movements in Tyrol and Swabia. Napoleon ordered these two regiments to be marched to Vienna, and to be replaced at Augsburg by two which were in the act of formation at Strasburg, so that the reserve at Augsburg might not be diminished. This reserve was of much interest to Napoleon, with a view to what might happen in his rear in consequence of the commotion caused by the battle of Essling. It consisted of the detachments sent to recruit the army which halted in succession at Augsburg; of the 65th, reorganised, since its misadventure at Ratisbon, both with conscripts and with prisoners of that corps recovered by exchange; and of six provisional regiments of dragoons, formed of the third squadrons of the regiments serving in Spain. Such of the provisional demi-brigades as were not to be dissolved and draughted into the army, assembled with the same view at Wurzburg, Hanau, and Mayence. The 35th, surprised at Pordenone, and which had behaved so gallantly on that unfortunate occasion, was recomposed in the same way as the 65th. Counting on 7 or 8 thousand men, with their *matériel*, to be furnished by the depôts in Italy, Napoleon sent general Lemarois to Osopo, to superintend their movements, knowing that for want of some responsible individual to have special charge of them, the most essential matters often fail to receive due attention, and that the neglect of a single detail sometimes leads to grievous catastrophes. A column of conscripts having been already taken prisoners in Tyrol, he directed that fresh columns, at least 4 thousand men strong, should be sent, under a general of brigade, to meet prince Eugene on his march to Vienna.

The viceroy had taken the road through Carinthia in pursuit of archduke John, and general Macdonald had taken that through Carniola in pursuit of the ban of Croatia. This pursuit had continued during the days immediately preceding and following the battle of Essling, with the same advantage for the French and the same losses for the Austrians. On the 16th of May, prince Eugene arrived at the entry of the gorges of the Carnic Alps, before the fort of Malborghetto, which barred all passage of his artillery, whilst archduke John encamped on the other side, in the position of Tarvis. Our troops entered the village of Malborghetto at the

point of the bayonet, and contented themselves with blockading the fort which barred the high road. The infantry and cavalry went on to Tarvis, where they arrived without artillery in presence of the Austrians, who had a great deal. Out of this awkward situation prince Eugene extricated himself by a bold stroke. After a careful search round 'Malborghetto, a position was discovered in which it was found possible to erect a battery of several guns. After the fort had been well battered it was stormed, our men gallantly scaling its regular fortifications under grape, with a loss of not more than one or two hundred men. Irritated by the difficulty they encountered, our soldiers put part of the unfortunate garrison to the sword, took the rest prisoners, and planted the French flag on the summit of the Carnic Alps, on the 17th of May. The prince marched the same day against Tarvis with his artillery. The Austrians, thinking us without cannon, attempted to defend the escarped banks of the Schlitza; but they were soon undeceived by the showers of grape that fell upon them; and being impetuously attacked by our troops, who were flushed by their recent successes, they lost 3 thousand men and fifteen pieces of cannon. At the same time general Seras, who had been detached on the route to Cividale, took the fort of Predel in the same vigorous style.

Thus pursued, archduke John could not throw himself into Upper Austria, as he had intended, and as he had been ordered to do when there had been hopes of a junction of the brothers at Lintz or St. Polten. The rapid march of the French left him no choice but to retreat into Hungary, where he might possibly do good service, either by reinforcing archduke Charles, or by hindering the junction of the army of Germany with prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont. The latter course was the one which better suited his inclination to isolate himself, and acquire a glory apart in this war. But his brother, the commander-in-chief, who wished to make all things concur towards the main action, was of a different opinion, and desired him to take up his position behind the Danube, at Presburg, leaving the Hungarian rising and the ban Giulay to deal with prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont. Thus placed between his own desires and his brother's instructions, archduke John retired to Grätz, to await the fresh orders he had solicited. Having lost nearly 15 thousand men in the campaign, and given 10 or 12 to the ban, he had hardly more than 15 thousand left when he marched to Grätz; but he relied on various junctions to furnish him again with an army. Thinking there was not much to be expected of the Tyrolese after the battle of Worgel, he had deemed it right to withdraw Chasteler, with his 9 or 10 thousand men, and Jellachich, with his 8 or 9 thousand, from the Tyrol, ordering them both to cut their way through the army of prince Eugene by falling unexpectedly on his van or his rear, so as to debouche by Leoben on Grätz. Supposing these two generals to leave some detachments in Tyrol, to serve as a support to the insurgents,

they could bring some 15 thousand men into Hungary; and these, added to the remains of his own force, would form for him an excellent corps of about 30 thousand men. With Giulay's 10 or 12 thousand, the Hungarian and Croat risings, and some battalions of landwehr, he hoped to procure a further muster of 50 or 60 thousand, and to keep the field against all the French forces of Italy and Dalmatia.

This was a dream like all the rest with which archduke John had continually beguiled himself during this campaign; and it took no account of all the difficulties to be overcome in order to effect so many junctions in presence of the forces of prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont. In obedience to orders, general Jellachich quitted the Tyrol in all haste, and on the 25th of May, three days after the battle of Essling, he arrived at the position of St. Michel, in advance of Leoben, whilst prince Eugene was a little to the right, in the direction of Grätz, observing archduke John's march towards Hungary. The cavalry patrols on either side soon discovered each other, and Jellachich had no means of avoiding battle. He took up a position on the heights of St. Michel, near Leoben, hoping that the nature of the ground would enable him successfully to resist much superior forces. But prince Eugene's army of 32 or 33 thousand men, all in high spirits, were not to be stopped by a force not equal to a third of their own numbers. They had to cross a river and climb mountains to reach Jellachich's 9 thousand men. This was done with extraordinary boldness, in spite of grape and musketry, and in a few hours Jellachich lost about 2 thousand killed and wounded, and 4 thousand prisoners. It was with great difficulty that, by dispersing his men in all directions through a country devoted to Austria, he saved 3 thousand, whom he led to Grätz to archduke John.

The chances were still less in favour of a junction with general Chasteler, who could only bring with him 5 or 6 thousand men, after leaving detachments in Tyrol, and was to find the route through Carinthia and Styria in the occupation of the French. Archduke John then found his forces raised at the most to but 18 thousand men by his junction with the wreck of Jellachich's corps, and knew not yet what would become of the ban Giulay, who, with his detachment and the Croat levies, had to do with Macdonald and Marmont. Thinking it prudent to approach Hungary, he stationed a garrison in the fortress of Grätz, and moved in the direction of Raab, still waiting for orders from his brother, and leaving prince Eugene to march victoriously to Vienna, whither no obstacle could hinder his arrival, since general Lauriston's detachment was waiting for him at Bruck. In the environs of that town the two French advance guards met and embraced, and the important fact of the junction of the armies of Italy and Germany was consummated.

General Macdonald's march from Udine to Laybach with his 16 or 17 thousand men had been not less happily accomplished. He

had crossed the Izonzo, turned and taken the fort of Prevald, and debouched on Laybach, taking prisoners a whole battalion encountered on his route. During this time one of his detachments occupied Trieste. On arriving at Laybach he found there a vast entrenched camp, constructed at great cost, and defended by a strong body of troops, that rendered its capture almost impossible. Macdonald hesitated to attack it with such a force as he possessed, fearing lest he should weaken himself by a fruitless attempt, and be afterwards unable to keep the field. He was, therefore, about to pass on, when he received from the panic-stricken commandant an offer to capitulate. He accepted the offer; and thus he had made, *en passant*, between 4 and 5 thousand prisoners, got possession of the fine works of Laybach, and regained the road to Grätz, where he hoped to fall in with the main body of the army of Italy. He arrived there on the 30th of May, having prosperously traversed a large extent of country, and increased the number of his prisoners to 7 thousand. He halted at Grätz, to wait the viceroy's orders, and sent out patrols along the roads of Carniola, to procure news of general Marmont, who, however, having with him 10 thousand of the best soldiers, had no reason to fear the troops of the ban, or the insurgent musters scattered along his line of march.

This junction, which yielded Napoleon a reinforcement of 45 to 50 thousand, and to the enemy not more than 15 to 18 thousand, supplied him with a sure means of revenging himself for the battle of Essling. Wishing to indemnify his adopted son for the hurt done to his reputation at Sacile, and to recompense him for his victorious march from Verona to Leoben, and deeming it of much importance to proclaim the vast advantages that would result from the junction of all the French armies, he published a glowing order of the day, in which he paid a just tribute of praise to the army of Italy, and set forth its exploits with a certain exaggeration which was not, after all, very far from the truth; for, since their departure from Verona, the prince and Macdonald had taken from the enemy, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, not less than 20 thousand men, against 4 or 5 thousand fatigued or wounded, whom they had left behind on their route.

Supposing that prince Eugene could furnish 30 thousand men present under arms, and general Macdonald 15, this would be (without counting general Marmont, who might be left, if needful, in Styria or Hungary) a force of 45 thousand men, and of 40 thousand, at least, added to the French army at Vienna. Adding to these the 100 thousand which would be made up by the junction of Davout, Massena, Oudinot, the cavalry reserve, the imperial guard, and the Saxons, Napoleon would have at hand, even before the arrival of his reinforcements, the enormous mass of 140 thousand men—quite sufficient for a decisive battle beyond the Danube. Archduke Charles was not in a condition to bring together an equal number of troops, or of as good quality, even had he Napo-

leon's art of concentrating his forces on the day of battle. Napoleon had then the means of finishing the war as soon as his immense preparations for crossing the Danube should have been completed. However, as he was resolved this time to make sure work, he was unwilling to come to a last decisive action until the Danube should have been surmounted with works of infallible solidity, and until prince Eugene, Macdonald, and Marmont, were ready to co-operate, directly or indirectly, in the operations before Vienna.

To this end were directed all his instructions to prince Eugene, whom, now that he had him within reach, he guided as a son and a pupil, whose talents he was as anxious to display in the best light as to secure his co-operation in the great events impending. "You have now," he said to him, in a series of admirable letters, "various ends to propose to yourself; first, to finish the pursuit of archduke John, so that there may remain on the right bank of the Danube and on the frontier of Hungary no gathering capable of annoying us during our manœuvres round Vienna; secondly, whilst forcing the archduke back against the Danube, to compel him to cross the river at Komorn rather than Presburg, so that the arc he shall describe being the longest possible, he may have less chance than you of being present at the approaching battle; thirdly, to separate archduke John from Chasteler, Giulay, and all those who might increase his strength, whilst you, on the other hand, will be joined by Macdonald and Marmont; fourthly and lastly, to occupy the river Raab, which falling into the Danube near Komorn, forms a barrier with which you may cover yourself against Hungary; and for that purpose to secure the fortress of Raab, which commands the river at its mouth, and that of Grätz, which commands it at its source, so that this line may be defended by a few detachments, whilst the army of Italy is arriving by a stolen march under the walls of Vienna to form one of the wings of the grand army." Such were Napoleon's chief instructions to prince Eugene. He also recommended him to make good use for himself and for the grand army of the vast resources of Hungary, in grain, forage, cattle, horses, and materials for navigation.

For the execution of these designs, Napoleon directed him, after allowing his troops some rest, to leave detachments at Klagenfurth and Leoben, and proceed to Œdenburg, west of the lake of Neusiedel, where he would find general Lauriston with 3 thousand men of the Baden infantry, and 4 thousand cavalry under Colbert and Montbrun; to proceed thence to the Raab, and push his *reconnaissances* beyond that river in order to ascertain what route archduke John was taking, and, once clear on that point, to manœuvre continually, so as to place that prince between marshal Davout, who was at Presburg, and the army of Italy, in order to hinder his falling upon Macdonald or Marmont; to keep his forces together so as to have 30 thousand men at hand (36 thousand with Lauriston) when he again encountered archduke John; to expedite the taking of the

citadel of Grätz, and the junction with Macdonald and Marmont; to keep a careful look-out in his rear, so as to catch Chasteler as he had caught Jellachich; to send on to Vienna or back to Osopo all his wounded and invalids, and others incapable of active service; to lay up vast stores of provisions, and send his empty ammunition waggons half-way to Vienna to be filled; and in fine, to be always ready, either to fight another battle with archduke John, or to co-operate along with Macdonald and Marmont in the grand final battle which was to be fought on the banks of the Danube against all the forces of the Austrian monarchy. Napoleon enjoined prince Eugene to treat the Hungarians well if they were peaceable and well-disposed to the French, but otherwise to subject them to the ordinary consequences of war; that is to say, to live at their expense, but in any case to deal more tenderly by them than by the Austrians. The Hungarians, indeed, deserved this difference of treatment, for they did not display the same animosity against the French as did the other subjects of the house of Austria. Though they had given many proofs of attachment to that house, they were yet opposed to its direct authority, and they beheld in Napoleon the representative of the French revolution, which had excited much sympathy among them. A rumour had soon spread all over the country that Napoleon contemplated the enfranchisement of Hungary as well as of Poland, and those among the Hungarians who were inclined to the new order of things, manifested a sort of liking for him, distinct from the admiration excited by his prodigious career. Nevertheless, the urgent efforts of the archduke Palatine, the presence of the court and its influence with the higher nobility, had counterbalanced the opposite influences, and Hungary had risen in response to the call of the archdukes, but rather, as many reports alleged, from interested motives than from enthusiasm for the imperial cause. Under pretext of the levy *en masse*, it was said Hungary sought to exempt herself from the regular contributions in men and horses she would have had to make, had she been treated like the other provinces of the monarchy. It must be owned she had not furnished by the levy *en masse* more than a score thousands of men, 7 or 8 thousand of whom were gentlemen cavalry, and 12 thousand indifferent infantry, composed of Germans, whom the nobles paid as substitutes for themselves in the rising.

Aware of these doubtful dispositions of the Hungarians, Napoleon addressed to them friendly proclamations, promising them independence at the peace, and exemption from all charges during the war, if they forbore to take up arms against him. The effect of these proclamations had not been to detach them from the house of Austria, but to cool their zeal for the Austrian government, and to dispose them to receive the French with less hostility. Napoleon's instructions to prince Eugene with respect to Hungary had reference to this state of things. The prince followed those instructions to the best of his ability, and almost as well as Napoleon could desire for the general result of the campaign.

The prince having learned that archduke John was at Kormond, on the Upper Raab, waiting for orders, marched to Guns, and then to Stein am Anger, to give him battle, at the same time sending word to general Macdonald to join him. The latter had halted at Grätz, to wait for Marmont, and was endeavouring to take the fortress which commanded the town, and, through it, the district. But the fortress was well armed, advantageously situated, and could only be besieged with heavy artillery, of which Macdonald was entirely destitute. He tried to batter the walls with shells, and then to intimidate the commandant, but all in vain. He was master, then, of the town of Grätz, and obliged to blockade the citadel, which formed its chief strength. On receiving prince Eugene's despatches, Macdonald set out to join him with the Lamarque division, Pully's dragoons, two battalions of the Broussier division, and the greater part of the artillery. He left general Broussier before Grätz with eight battalions only, two regiments of light cavalry, and ten field pieces, leaving him to do the work that ought to have been done by the whole corps—namely, to take the citadel of Grätz, effect a junction with the army of Dalmatia, and hinder Chasteler from escaping from Tyrol into Hungary. Fortunately the troops were excellent, and soon showed that they could resist vastly superior forces.

General Macdonald arrived on the 8th of June at Kormond, where he and prince Eugene were delighted to meet once more safe and sound, after a month of divergent and perilous movements through hostile countries. Their most natural course would have been to hold together thenceforth until they had finally beaten archduke John. But prince Eugene, feeling confusedly the impropriety of leaving general Broussier alone at Grätz, thought to make up for it by leaving general Macdonald alone at Papa, that he might be within reach of Broussier and Marmont; an arrangement which aggravated the fault committed, since the force was now about to be broken up into four detachments—viz., Marmont, with 10 thousand men; Broussier, with 7; Macdonald, with 8; prince Eugene, with 30. General Macdonald was sent to Papa, whilst prince Eugene marched down the valley of the Raab in pursuit of archduke John.

The latter, who had been, meanwhile, moving about between the Muhr and the Raab, had at last returned towards the Danube, in obedience to the reiterated orders of his commander-in-chief that he should leave to general Stoïchevich, ban Giulay, and Chasteler, the task of harassing the French in Hungary, throw a garrison into Presburg, and then post himself with the best part of the troops from Italy behind the Danube, in order to take part in the battle that was again to be fought there sooner or later. In accordance with these orders he had marched along the Raab, by Kormond, Sarvar, Papa, and the town of Raab, situated not far from the confluence of the river with the Danube, between Komorn and Presburg. Raab was a fortified town, but had been long neglected, and

was then in but an indifferent state of defence. There was an entrenched camp connected with it, which afforded a good position on the river. Archduke John was joined there by his brother, the archduke Palatine, and the Hungarian rising; and the two princes, with their combined force of 40 thousand men, resolved to give battle to prince Eugene before they abandoned the right bank of the Danube.

On the 12th and 13th of June they had been closely followed up by prince Eugene's advanced guards, and on the evening of the 13th they were posted round Raab, with a certainty of a very hot engagement on the following day if they did not consent to retreat. As the position seemed to them advantageous, they established themselves on a plateau, with their right resting on the Raab, their backs to the Danube, which flowed at the distance of some leagues in the rear, and their left to marshes of considerable extent. They employed the evening of the 13th and the morning of the 14th in rectifying their position, and in mingling the regular troops with those of the rising, in order to impart some of the firmness of the former to the latter. In this respect they acted upon a specific order from archduke Charles—an order which was very judicious, but which made them lose much time on the present occasion. They were not ready for battle before eleven in the forenoon of the 14th.

Fortunately for them prince Eugene, though he had pursued them with right good-will, was himself not prepared to attack them before eleven or twelve o'clock.

He had marched, like the Austrian princes, along the banks of the Raab, with his left to the river, where the Austrians had their right, and his right to the marshy plain where they had their left. He marched in several *echelons*, the Seras division forming the first on the right, the Durutte division the second on the centre, and Severoli's Italian division the third on the left. The Pacthod division and the Italian guard formed a double reserve in the rear. The cavalry was distributed on the wings. This arrangement was dictated by the nature of the ground and the distribution of the enemy's forces on the plateau about to be attacked. In the marshy plain on our right was seen the Hungarian cavalry, 7 or 8 thousand strong, making a very brilliant appearance, but not so formidable as they were handsome to behold. They were supported by regular hussars of less brilliant aspect, but proved in the Italian campaign; the whole being under the orders of general Mecszery. A little less to the right, inclining towards the centre, behind a muddy stream, was seen the infantry under Jellachich and Colloredo, occupying the very solid buildings of the large farm of Kismegyer and the village of Szabadhegy. Lastly, from that village to the Raab, that is to say towards our left, was Frimont's infantry, forming the right of the Austrians towards the river and the entrenched camp. The latter was defended by 4 or 5 thousand of the least

serviceable troops, and blockaded by general Lauriston with the Badeners.

After conferring with generals Grouchy, Montbrun, Grenier, Seras, and Durutte, prince Eugene made the following arrangements. Whilst Montbrun's cavalry deployed so as to mask the movements of our infantry, the Seras, Durutte, and Severoli divisions, advancing in *echelons*, were to attack the farm of Kismegyer and the village of Szabadhegy successively on both sides. The Pacthod division and the Italian guard, stationed as a reserve, were to support whichever of the three *echelons* had need of aid. Grouchy and Montbrun on the right were to assail the enemy's cavalry, whilst on the left Sahuc was to connect the army with Lauriston's detachment. Perceiving then, but rather late, the wisdom of Napoleon's principles, prince Eugene sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to general Macdonald to bring him from Papa the 8 thousand men who would be so welcome to him at that moment, for he had only 36 thousand against 40 thousand, established in a strong position. Fortunately Macdonald, foreseeing that he might be useful at Raab, whilst at Papa he was doing nothing either for Broussier or Marmont, had set out of his own accord, and was already visible in the distance, preceded by Pully's dragoons.

Towards noon the army was put in motion to attack the enemy's position. Montbrun deployed his four regiments of light cavalry, and executed his evolutions under a violent fire of artillery, and with admirable coolness, just as if he was exercising on a parade-ground. Then, when the Seras division, forming the first *echelon*, was in line, he put his regiments to the gallop and dashed in upon the noble cavaliers that had come hesitatingly to the aid of the house of Austria. However brave a nation may be, nothing can supply in it the want of experience in war. In an instant the glittering force dispersed before Montbrun's light horse, which was accustomed to cross swords even with cuirassiers, and left the left of the Austrians uncovered. There remained the regular hussars, which were worthy of measuring their strength with ours. They charged Montbrun, who immediately returned the brunt, and forced them to fall back on their *corps de bataille*.

During this time Seras' infantry, formed in two lines, had attacked the farm of Kismegyer. Before arriving at it the muddy stream had to be crossed, and this was more difficult than had been expected; for the stream was deep, and defended by brave and skilful sharpshooters. They succeeded, however, in crossing it, and marched against the large square farmhouse of Kismegyer, the walls of which were loopholed, and defended by 1200 of the best infantry. Meanwhile the second *echelon*, under Durutte, having also crossed the stream, attacked the village of Szabadhegy on the right, whilst the Severoli division assailed it on the left. The action was now going on along the whole line, and the Austrian artillery

and musketry poured a most destructive down-hill fire on our troops. Prince Eugene rushed from one end of the field of battle to the other, prodigal of his life, like a valiant officer who panted to compensate by his bravery for his deficiencies as a commander.

General Seras encountered such a tremendous fire of musketry from all the openings of the farmhouse, that in a few minutes he had 7 or 800 men laid low, sixty of whom were officers. He made the first line fall back on the second, to enable his men to recover themselves; and when his brave soldiers had taken breath, he led them back, sword in hand, burst open the doors with the axes of his sappers, and, rushing in with bayonets lowered, put to death some hundreds of the defenders of the farm, and took the rest prisoners. He then marched against the left of the Austrian line, which, falling back on the summit of the platform, still maintained a bold bearing. All this time the fighting had been equally obstinate at the village of Szabadhegy. The Austrians defended themselves stoutly behind the houses, and made us pay dearly for our conquest of the village. They fell back for a while, but to return to the charge. The bulk of the troops composing their centre and their right charged into the village, and drove out Durutte on the one side, and Severoli's Italians on the other, towards the stream. The first line of these two divisions retreated through the intervals of their second line, which, far from giving way, advanced against the village, bringing back the first line with it, and, with the help of the Pacthod division, finally drove the Austrians out of Szabadhegy. Our army now advanced right and left beyond the two *points d'appui* of the enemy's line which we had taken. It was the moment for the cavalry to act. Montbrun, Grouchy, and Colbert dashed after the Austrians to cut off their retreat. Montbrun broke several squares and made many prisoners, but was stopped by the firm bearing of the Austrian army, which retired in good order. On the left, the 8th regiment of chasseurs of Sahuc's division, being more in advance than the rest, rushed with extraordinary impetuosity on the Austrian right wing, just when it was withdrawing from Raab, and bore down all before it. It had already made several thousand of the enemy's infantry lay down their arms, and taken a great deal of artillery, when the Austrians, perceiving it was not supported, recovered from their confusion, fired upon it, and would have handled it severely, if the rest of the division, brought tardily up by its general, had not rescued it. This brave regiment retained, nevertheless, 1500 prisoners, and some cannons and flags.

The archdukes, seeing that the battle was totally lost, at last ordered a retreat, which, under favour of the ground and of the night, was not so disastrous as they might have feared, and was effected by St. Yrany towards the inundated lands of the Danube. This battle, which, gloriously for prince Eugene and the army of Italy repaired the defeat of Sacile, cost us 2 thousand killed and wounded, and the Austrians about 3 thousand men *hors de combat*,

2500 prisoners, and 2 thousand soldiers missing. It extinguished the archduke John and the archduke Palatine, secured the junction of generals Broussier and Marmont, and left us no longer exposed on the left bank to anything more formidable than some incursions of hussars, which might be sufficiently counteracted by a few detachments of cavalry. General Macdonald arrived on the field of battle towards the close of the day to embrace the young prince, in whose success he was strongly interested.

Whilst at this point Napoleon's plan was executed, with the exception of some slight faults of detail, in a manner so conformable to his intentions, the junction between Marmont and Broussier was also taking place. The latter general, left alone at Grätz, would have suffered severely if his troops had not been of the steadiest kind. After having begun by cannonading the citadel of Grätz with howitzers without avail, he had made several excursions into Croatia to distances of twelve or fifteen leagues in the direction by which Marmont was approaching, and each time, with 5 or 6 thousand men, he had fought little battles with ban Giulay, in which he had completely beaten him. But in these frequent départures from Grätz he had not been able sufficiently to guard the roads from Tyrol, and general Chasteler had passed between the posts of the army of Italy, and reached Hungary much more fortunately that general Jellachich. Just then general Marmont had advanced to the vicinity of Grätz, and sent word of his approach to general Broussier, who immediately proceeded down the valley of the Muhr in hopes of meeting him at Kalsdorf, leaving two battalions of the 84th in a faubourg of Grätz to guard the town But whilst he was marching down the right bank of the Muhr, the ban Giulay marched up the left bank at the head of 15 thousand men, half regular troops, half belonging to the Croat rising, and suddenly fell upon the two battalions left in Grätz. Though attacked by a whole army, the two battalions held out for nineteen hours with heroic courage under colonel Gambin. They killed 1200 of the enemy, made 400 or 500 prisoners, and gave general Broussier time to come to their succour. That general, hearing of Giulay's movement, returned in all haste, fell upon the ban's troops, routed them, and rescued the two battalions. Marmont's advanced guards at last appeared at a distance of one or two marches. So that corps of 10 thousand men, the best in the army after Davout's, was come to join the belligerent masses; all the forces of Italy and Dalmatia were now available for Napoleon; the corps of Stoïchevich and Giulay were entirely dispersed; and the two archdukes (John and the Palatine) were finally driven beyond the Danube.

There was enough in this to indemnify Napoleon for the battle of Essling; and he had need of it, for, encouraged by that famous battle, his enemies were busier than ever, and were again striving to raise the Tyrol, Swabia, Saxony, Westphalia, and Prussia. On hearing of the alleged defeat of the French at Essling, Hofer, the Tyrolese, and major Teimer had descended from the summits of

the Brenner, although they were much incensed against the Austrian government, which had taken from them the two corps of Jellachich and Chasteler. Their hatred to the house of Bavaria made up for what their love for the house of Austria had lost in warmth. The Bavarian general Deroy having been left alone to defend Inspruck, had found himself attacked from all the neighbouring heights by a swarm of mountaineers—bad soldiers in the plain, but excellent sharpshooters in the mountains, and very formidable adversaries for one who was forced to retreat. Having been obliged to make head against them for several days, general Deroy had exhausted nearly all his ammunition, and fearing, moreover, that he should be deprived of provisions in consequence of the strict blockade of Inspruck, he had retired with his division to the fort of Kufstein, abandoning the capital of Tyrol for the second time. This event, of slight importance in itself, had made a deep impression throughout Bavaria, and especially upon the court, which was greatly afraid of being compelled again to evacuate Munich. The inhabitants of the Vorarlberg were also very much aroused. On the banks of lake Constance, on the Upper Danube, and throughout all Swabia, the agitation was manifest, and it was evident, that if we sustained a defeat more real than that of Essling, our rear would be seriously threatened.

The Austrians, who had produced this state of things, had recently aggravated it by a measure extremely dangerous for us. They had given the duke of Brunswick Oels, son of the famous duke of Brunswick, the means of raising a corps composed of refugees from all the German provinces, particularly Prussians; besides which, they had given him some regular troops and some landwehr, the whole forming about 8 thousand men, and had despatched him from Bohemia towards Saxony, sending on before him the most unfounded rumours about the alleged victory over the French at Essling. They had at the same time sent another corps of about 4 thousand men, half regular troops, half landwehr, towards Franconia, and heralded its march with the same tales. The first corps marched from Prague, and entered Dresden without a blow, the court flying before it to Leipsic. The second marched from Egra to Bayreuth, taking advantage of the unguarded state in which the war on the Danube had left our allies of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. Their plan was to push on to Thuringia, combine there in one body under general Kienmayer, and enter Westphalia to drive out king Jerome. The latter, terrified at the impending danger, urgently applied at Paris for means of help which did not exist there, and by his cries of distress produced at last a sort of panic in the French capital.

The apparition of these columns excited a lively agitation in Germany, but called forth no insurrectional movement there, notwithstanding all the hopes of the kind with which the Austrians had flattered themselves, because Napoleon's *prestige* was still entire, and those even who spread the news of his defeat were not

so very well assured of it as to venture to take arms against him. Major Schill's fate was no encouraging example. That bold partisan, thinking that in disobeying the open orders of his government he obeyed its secret wishes, left Berlin as we have seen with a corps of Prussian cavalry, and took to scouring the country, in hopes of being seconded by the army and the people. Welcomed by everybody but followed by none, and disconcerted even by the severe declarations issued from Königsberg, he fled to Mecklenburg, and thence to Pomerania, and surprised the ill-guarded fortress of Stralsund, with the intention of sustaining a siege there. But soon assailed by a Dutch corps, and even by a Danish corps that volunteered to give Napoleon this proof of its attachment to him, he was unable to defend the fortress with cavalry, and endeavouring to escape by one gate whilst the assailants were entering by another, he was cut down by a Dutch horseman, and his troop was taken, destroyed, or dispersed. As yet this had been the sole fruit of the German insurrections. Great was the exasperation against us nevertheless, and there needed but one defeat, not fictive but real, to cause an explosion of the nations against us from one end of the continent to the other.

In Poland, prince Poniatowski's able management of the campaign had produced unexpected, but not very decisive results. The archduke Ferdinand was forced by prince Poniatowski's operations to make a rapid retreat, which might be interrupted and rendered disastrous by crossing over to the left bank of the river. A Polish corps of 5 thousand men, under general Dombrowski, proposed to adopt this plan, but was unable to execute it alone; the Russians, however, who had arrived in line towards the end of June, whereas they should have arrived in April, might execute this manœuvre, and not allow a single Austrian to return into Gallicia. Prince Poniatowski entreated them to do so, but found in them a manifest want of alacrity, which was not to be accounted for either by the weather or the overflow of the rivers, or by the imperfections of Russian administration. The true reason of their inaction was, that their aversion to destroy the Austrians for the benefit of the Poles was such as to make them even disobey the orders of their own government. Prince Gallitzen was severely reprimanded by Alexander, and showed somewhat less coldness to prince Poniatowski, but did nothing to overcome the resistance of his lieutenants, one of whom, prince Gortschakoff, even stated in a letter that he came with the hope of joining the Austrians, not the Poles. The latter having intercepted the letter, sent it to St. Petersburg with many others. Wherever the Russian and Austrian advanced posts met, they shook hands, and promised each other that they should soon be serving together. In short, the Russians seemed to have entered Gallicia only for the purpose of putting down the insurrection there. Under pretext of taking possession of the country they everywhere suppressed the new Polish, and reinstated the old Austrian, authorities.

Whilst the Russians were thus breaking their word, probably against the will of their sovereign, the Poles, on their part, were likewise, against the will of Napoleon, violating the pledge which had been given to the Russians, and were announcing in all their proclamations the approaching restoration of Poland. Yet Napoleon had strictly enjoined them to speak only of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and not to alienate the Russians from him by imprudent language. He had told them, again and again, that the day would come when, without breaking his engagements or bringing down upon himself more enemies than he could fight at once, he would complete their reconstitution by gradually enlarging the duchy of Warsaw; that he could not do everything at a blow; that he must have time and opportunity for the accomplishment of his work; and that to manifest their hopes prematurely at that moment would be uselessly exposing themselves and him to danger. In giving this advice, Napoleon was no more hearkened to by the Poles than Alexander was by the Russians. It must be owned, however, that had Alexander applied himself sincerely to command the obedience of his subjects, he might have been much more successful with them than Napoleon could have been with the Poles. But he was himself a Russian, and to work for the re-establishment of Poland, by helping the Poles against the Austrians, was almost as repugnant to him as to his soldiers. He was himself unconsciously the ringleader of the revolt against his own policy.

Such were the perplexities of all Europe whilst the archduke Charles and Napoleon were contending under the walls of Vienna. But the latter gave little heed to them, and cared only for what was passing around him between Lintz, Leoben, Raab, Presburg, and Lobau. For all the rest he contented himself with a few well-devised precautions. He sent general Cafarelli, war minister of the kingdom of Italy, to Milan, to fill the place left vacant by the absence of prince Eugene, and ordered him to employ all the detachments that could be spared for the purpose in blockading the Tyrol, by occuping the passes of the mountains. He directed prince Eugene to leave the Rusca division at Klagenfurth to effect the same blockade on the Carinthian side. The Bavarian general Deroy was to do the same on the Bavarian side, by occupying Rosenheim and Kufstein, so as to hem in the fire as it were, and prevent its spreading, leaving it for a future day to take more active measures against the Tyrolese, when he should have finished with the Austrian grand army. As for Swabia and the Vorarlberg, he had the means of keeping them down in the forces stationed at Augsburg. He ordered general Beaumont to post himself with some of these troops at Kempten, Lindau, and along lake Constance, in order to drive back any force that might attempt to issue from the mountain passes.

General Bourcier commanded the general depôt of the cavalry at Passau. He had there all the dismounted men, the detachments of recruits, the saddlery workshops, and a market for the purchase of

horses; and he took charge of the fatigued men and invalids until they were again fit for service. Napoleon ordered him to leave the depôt for a while to a competent deputy and advance to Bayreuth, taking with him two regiments of dragoons, 2 thousand strong, the horse regiment of Berg, and 2 or 3 thousand Bavarians, draughted from the fortresses of the Palatinate. General Rivaud, stationed at Wurzburg, at the head of two provisional demi-brigades, was to join general Bourcier at Bayreuth, and march with him against the small force which had issued from Bohemia. After finishing that short expedition, general Bourcier was to return to Passau and resume the command of the cavalry depôt. General Rivaud was to join four demi-brigades at Hanau, under marshal Kellermann, and proceed to Saxony to act against the Austrians who had entered Dresden. Napoleon wrote to Paris to Clarke, the minister of war, and to Fouché, the minister of police, severely reproaching them for the fears they had too easily conceived on the occasion of the events in Dresden and Bayreuth. "If some insignificant incursions alarm you to this degree," said Napoleon, "what would you do should serious events occur—such events as may occur in war without one being beaten? I am very far from pleased to see men in my service display so little force of character, and themselves setting the example of the most ridiculous terrors. There can be no serious events except on the theatre where I am operating, and there I am present to control them."

Prince Eugene being victorious at Raab, archduke John and the archduke Palatine being driven beyond the Danube, and the junction of the armies of Italy in Dalmatia being secured, Napoleon had but one object to engage his attention before his last battle, and that was to hinder the two archdukes from recrossing the Danube at Presburg or Komorn, and following the French armies of Italy and Dalmatia when the latter came to fight under the walls of Vienna. To this end it was necessary to hinder the Austrians from using the bridge at Presburg, and to occupy the line of the Raab, so that it might stop the Austrians for three or four days, which would be quite time enough for the armies of Italy and Dalmatia to move to Vienna. The Austrians had a bridge at Presburg, and a *tête de pont* at the village of Engerau; and they had retained the fortress of Raab after prince Eugene's victory on the river of that name.

Napoleon assigned to marshal Davout, who was before Presburg with one of his divisions, the task of taking Engerau, destroying Presburg bridge, and even if possible that of Komorn, situated much lower down. To prince Eugene he prescribed the taking of the fortress of Raab, which he regarded as the true consummation of his recent victory. He had all the artillery horses, that were not employed on the works in the island of Lobau, *echeloned* on the road to Presburg and Raab to convey heavy cannon thither, and bring back the corn with which Hungary abounded. Though no general was less cruel than Napoleon, he was nevertheless inexorable in the accomplishment of his designs, and he ordered all

the means of war to be used with the utmost rigour against Presburg and Raab, in order to get possession of those two points. The means prescribed were terrible, but the safety of the army and of the empire required them.

Towards the end of May, marshal Davout began by attacking with the Gudin division the entrenchments of Engerau, which served to cover a bridge of boats thrown across the river before Presburg, and resting on several islands. These entrenchments consisted of earthworks connected with the village of Engerau, and defended with many pieces of artillery. Marshal Davout attacked them with the vigour which his soldiers displayed on all occasions; but the Austrians, who appreciated the importance of the position, defended it with equal energy. They lost 1500 or 1800 men, and we 800 before that mere *tête de pont*. The works being carried, marshal Davout found himself on the margin of the river. The portion of bridge which abutted on one side was drawn back, but the remaining portions were fixed between entrenched islands, which it would have been necessary to take one after the other by an exceedingly difficult and tedious operation. All imaginable means were employed to destroy those portions of the bridge. Boats loaded with stones were sent down stream against them, and burning mills, as the Austrians had done at Lobau. But the Presburg bridge, which was no hasty structure, and which was guarded by boatmen who stopped the floating bodies carried down by the current, resisted all these attempts. Marshal Davout then, by order of the Emperor, set up batteries of howitzers and mortars, and let fall on the islands a horrible rain of fire and iron, in spite of which the Austrian soldiers remained at their posts with singular fortitude. Driven to extremities by this resistance, Napoleon gave orders that the town of Presburg should be summoned to surrender, and if it refused to do so, or at least to destroy its bridge, it should be ruined to its foundations. Marshal Davout, who was a perfectly honourable man, but a pitiless soldier, began this cruel execution without hesitation. After a summons to general Bianchi, the commandant of Presburg, he gave the word to fire, and in a few hours cast innumerable bombs into the unfortunate town. After having set it on fire in several places, he again summoned the commandant, requiring from him what he was bound to insist upon —the destruction of the bridge. General Bianchi replied that the preservation of the bridge being necessary for the defence of the Austrian monarchy, the town of Presburg would endure the last extremities rather than consent to the conditions proposed. Marshal Davout recommenced his fire, but seeing that it would remain ineffectual, for the Austrian general persevered in his resistance, he yielded at last to an impulse of humanity, and had recourse to other means in order to annul the communications between one bank and the other. After all, what was requisite in order to attain the end in view? To stop any Austrian corps which should appear in those parts for three or four days—a space of time sufficient for the con-

centration of the French troops under the walls of Vienna. The marshal therefore threw up a series of entrenchments connected with the fortified castle of Kittsee, the very extensive isle of Schutt, and the river and fortress of Raab. A few thousand men, with light cavalry to scour for them the isle of Schutt and the banks of the Raab, defending the entrenchments of Engerau, and falling back if these were forced on the castle of Kittsee, whilst the fortress of Raab likewise defended itself, might detain the enemy for the necessary number of days, and delay his arrival until all was decided under the walls of Vienna. These measures, approved of by Napoleon, were adopted, and rendered it unnecessary to continue the destruction of Presburg.

Meanwhile, general Lauriston, seconded by general Lasalle, had begun the siege of Raab, being covered by the army of Italy, which was thus enabled to rest from its fatigues. There was a want of large cannons, but Napoleon sent some from Vienna, with howitzers and 12-pounders. Fortunately, the places being in bad condition, and garrisoned by not more than 2 thousand men, could not long hold out. Immediately after the battle of the 14th the works were begun. The trenches were opened, besieging batteries built, and a breaching fire begun. In a few days the garrison offered to capitulate, and were granted easy terms, and the besiegers entered Raab on the 22nd of June, without having damaged its works, or spent much ammunition, or lost many men in taking it.

The fortress of Raab was put in a better state of defence, in accordance with Napoleon's precise and very detailed orders. War stores and victuals were laid up in it; a garrison was formed for it of all the fatigued men and invalids of the army of Italy; the necessary repairs were made in the works, and Napoleon bestowed on it an illustrious commandant. This was the count de Narbonne, formerly minister of war under Louis XVI., one of the last survivors of the old French nobility, and distinguished alike for his courage, his wit, and the elegance of his manners.

Napoleon had all the artillery that was useless at Presburg and Raab brought back to Vienna, and despatched the wounded men of the armies of Italy and Dalmatia to the hospitals of Lombardy and Upper Austria, not choosing to leave a single cannon or man as a prize for the enemy. He ordered prince Eugene, and generals Macdonald, Broussier, and Marmont to prepare to march at the first signal, to retain in the ranks no maimed or sick men, to have their artillery well horsed and well supplied, to spend a week in making biscuits for their troops, to procure cattle to accompany their march for the supply of meat; and, in short, to make all arrangements for reaching Vienna in three days at the utmost. Generals Marmont, Broussier, and Macdonald were *echeloned* so as to accomplish the distance in the same space of time. Marshal Davout had but two days' march to make. It was settled that prince Eugene should leave general Baraguey d'Hilliers with an Italian division before Engerau, to guard the approaches to Presburg,

whilst the army of Italy moved bodily to Vienna. Napoleon, not choosing to employ such troops as those of Montbrun and Lasalle on a mere *surveillance* of distant posts, *echeloned* them so that he might have them by him in forty-eight hours, and placed instead of them on the line of the Raab 12 or 15 hundred horse belonging to the marching regiments recently arrived. General Lasalle, who during the month of June had been incessantly inspecting the line from Presburg to Raab, and who knew its most minute details, had orders before he marched to place the posts himself, and give their commandants the requisite instructions for guarding themselves well.

Everything being thus prepared on this line, Napoleon took his measures on the Upper Danube. He had already drawn to him marshal Davout's corps, spread out at that moment from Vienna to Presburg, the Saxon corps of prince Bernadotte, and the French division of Dupas. He had left on the Upper Danube, to occupy St. Polten, Mautern, Mölk, Amstetten, Enns, and Lintz, only the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, both greatly reduced by this short but active campaign. The Wurtembergers under Vandamme were distributed between Tulln, Mautern, St. Polten, and Mölk. The Bavarians commissioned to defend Bavaria were general Deroy's division at Munich, Rosenheim, and Kufstein, and the two divisions of general de Wrede and the prince royal at Lintz. Though this force was not too much to guard Bavaria under existing circumstances, it was rather a strong muster at the particular point of Lintz, since archduke Charles, wishing on his part also to concentrate his troops, had brought count Kollowrath before Vienna, leaving only 6 or 7 thousand men upon the Danube between Passau, Lintz, Krems, Tullu, and Klosternenburg. Suspecting this circumstance from several *reconnaissances* made beyond the Danube by general Vandamme, Napoleon ordered marshal Lefebvre to keep de Wrede's excellent division in readiness to march with four-and-twenty guns. The divisions of general Deroy and the prince royal and the Wurtembergers, together with all the troops *en route*, and all those remaining in Augsburg, Passau, and Ratisbon, would be enough to maintain the security of our rear for some days. At Ratisbon was the Rouyer division, composed of the contingents of the minor German princes. There was evidently nothing to be feared on that side if the last battle was gained. If, contrary to all probability, it was lost, precautions were tolerably well taken at St. Polten, Mölk, Amstetten, Lintz, and Passau, that our sick and wounded might not be endangered, and that the army should find everywhere in its retreat provisions, ammunition, and perfectly solid *points d'appui*.

Besides devoting the month of June to preparing the concentration of his troops on Vienna, Napoleon employed it also in preparing the passage of the Danube, and rendering it this time so sure that the accident which had happened to his bridges during the battle of Essling could not possibly occur again. This is the place to make known by what gigantic works he had almost an-

nulled the difficulty of crossing a vast body of running water, in presence of the enemy, with masses of men such as till then no commander, ancient or modern, had ever had to move.

The bridge of boats over the principal arm of the river, and serving to communicate with the isle of Lobau, had been re-established some days after the battle of Essling, and had been consolidated with fresh boats picked up on the banks of the river by the seamen of the guard, and fixed with better moorings. It had, however, been again broken two or three times by the June floods, and it was not with uncertain, though much better-established means of communication, that Napoleon chose to venture beyond the Danube. He resolved then to connect the isle of Lobau with the mainland, so that it should make one piece with the right bank, which was to be our point of departure. This could only be effected by erecting a bridge on piles, which Napoleon resolved to do, however laborious such an operation would be on a river like the Danube below Vienna. Cæsar had executed a similar work eighteen hundred years before on the Rhine, but the difficulties were greater in our age, in consequence of the increased means of destruction possessed by the enemy. The engineer service was employed on this work, whilst the artillery had the construction of all the bridges of boats. There were in Vienna large accumulations of timber, carried down from the summits of the Alps by the confluents of the Danube. All the engineer soldiers, all the carpenters out of work, and all the artillery horses left idle by the cessation of fighting, were employed in preparing or carrying this timber to the river to be floated down to Ebersdorf. There were numerous pile-driving machines in Vienna, river works being frequently executed there. These also were taken to Ebersdorf, and after three weeks' work sixty wooden piles were seen rearing themselves above the highest flood-mark, and on them lay a broad platform capable of giving passage to any quantity of artillery and cavalry. Twenty fathoms below this fixed bridge was the old bridge of boats, much strengthened, and intended for the infantry, so that the passage of the several arms might be effected simultaneously, and the communications with the isle of Lobau might be so much the more prompt.

Though these two works protected each other, Napoleon desired to secure them entirely from the shock of floating bodies, and he tried all sorts of means to that end. His first expedient had been to take from the arsenal of Vienna a huge chain which the Turks had used in the siege of 1683, and which had been preserved as one of the triumphal spoils. Now that our vessels are furnished with these enormous chains, we should not be so much astonished at the dimensions of that which the Turks left at Vienna; but at that time it was regarded as one of the most wonderful works of its kind. It was resolved then to stretch it across the large arm in order to stop the bodies thrown in by the enemy for the purpose of damaging our bridges. But this scheme had to be given up for want of machines to stretch the chain sufficiently. Napoleon then

conceived the idea of constructing a vast wear, consisting of a series of large piles deeply imbedded, and planted obliquely to the stream, so as to give less prise to the force of the current. This work, not less extraordinary than the fixed bridge, was executed almost as quickly. But its efficacy did not appear to be certain, for it happened several times that the line of piles was forced by boats laden with materials which had escaped from the hands of the workmen. Napoleon then had recourse to another system, and established a constant look-out by means of the seamen of the guard, who, moving about continually in wherries above the wear, hooked the boats that floated down and drew them to the shore. By means of this combination of precautions the communications between the right bank and the isle of Lobau were rendered certain and infallible.

But it was not enough in Napoleon's eyes to have put his bridges out of the reach of all danger from the river. A surprise by the enemy, a sudden incursion into the isle of Lobau, a retreat it might be in disorder after the loss of a battle, might expose them to unforeseen and inevitable destruction. Napoleon resolved to protect them by a vast *tête de pont* erected on the isle of Lobau, so that, if that isle were taken from us, some battalions might defend them, and the army might thus retain the means of retiring in safety to the other side of the river.

This series of works indissolubly connected the isle of Lobau with the right bank and with the little town of Ebersdorf, now become our base of operations. There were works also to be executed in the island in order to make of it an entrenched camp, spacious, secure, commodious, salubrious, and provided with everything necessary for living there some days.

There were in the isle of Lobau low and marshy grounds often exposed to inundation. There were also small channels which were dry when the waters were low, and became real rivers when they were high. We had had an example of this during the great floods of May 21st, 22nd, and 23rd. Napoleon had raised causeways made in the low parts of the isle to enable the troops to move about in all weathers, and he had several wooden bridges thrown over each dry watercourse, so that there might be no difficulty in passing them in any state of the waters. Intending that the isle should become a grand depôt which should suffice for itself, happen what might, he had a powder magazine built on it, and supplied from the arsenals of Vienna. Ovens were erected by his orders, stores of Hungarian flour were laid in, and several thousand oxen from the same country were turned out to pasture. He sent wine also in abundance, and of such quality as the French army had never drunk anywhere but in Spain. The Austrian aristocracy and the convents of Vienna, which possessed the best cellars in Europe, supplied that choice beverage. Desiring that the isle should be as easy to traverse by night as by day, Napoleon had all the roads lighted by lamps, hung on posts, just as in the streets of a great town.

The last and most difficult preparatory measure was to provide for the passage of the small branch, which was to be effected by force in the face of a powerful enemy, kept on the alert by our presence in the isle of Lobau. Whatever advantages were presented by the site of the old passage, it was not likely it could be used again. Indeed, the Austrians had in a manner walled up that door, by erecting a line of entrenchments, thickly planted with artillery, from Essling to Aspern. Another objection to the old landing-place was, that it was not spacious enough for the deployment of a considerable army. The enemy was so well aware that it was by the isle of Lobau we should make our descent on the left bank, that we might expect to find him drawn up in order of battle immediately before us; whereas on the former occasion our several corps had time to defile one after the other, and to deploy without impediment. This could not be expected to happen again, so that now we had to prepare to debouche almost *en masse*, and to fight at the very moment we touched the ground.

For these reasons Napoleon looked about for a new passage, only making a feint of still preferring the old one. The small arm of the river, on reaching the extremity of the island, turned off at a right angle, and ran 4 thousand yards in a straight line along the right flank of the island to meet the main stream. If a point on that line was chosen for the crossing-place, the descent would be upon a smooth plain, very commodious for the deployment of a numerous army. On that plain, then, Napoleon resolved to debouche. It is true there was nothing in the conformation of the ground to afford the army any protection; but if it passed over *en masse*, it would be protected by that very circumstance; besides, it was not impossible to make up for the exposed character of the ground by a judicious arrangement of artillery.

On the left bank, just at the abrupt bend of the small branch, was situated the inconsiderable town of Enzersdorf, covered with defensive works and artillery like Essling and Aspern; then a little lower down was the open plain just mentioned; and lastly, thick woods covering the ground to the confluence of the two arms of the river. It was between Enzersdorf and these woods that Napoleon determined to cross the stream.

But he took all possible pains to convince the enemy that he would cross at the old place on the left of the island, where he erected numerous works, not only for that reason, but also because he deemed it expedient to have bridges in all directions, so as to increase his facilities for crossing the river and deploying rapidly. But the most important works were accumulated on the right side of the island, along the line from Enzersdorf to the junction of the two branches of the river. Some islets in the small branch, to which the army gave names of their own choosing, such as *isle Massena*, *île des Moulins*, *île Espagne*, *île Pouzet*, *île Lannes*, *île Alexandre*, were joined to Lobau by fixed bridges, and covered with batteries of large calibre. These batteries, mounting 109

pieces of ordnance, including 24-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, were intended to cast projectiles to a great distance, and cover every spot at which the enemy presented themselves. Those of the île Massena, île des Moulins, and île Espagne were to fire upon Aspern, Essling, and the works raised in that direction. Those of the îsle Pouzet were in two hours to reduce the unfortunate town of Enzersdorf to ashes. Lastly, those of the île Alexandre were to sweep the plain chosen for the deployment of the French, and were to pour upon it such a mass of grape that no hostile force should be able to remain on it. As there was no want of time, they were planted with the utmost care, and provided with earthworks, platforms, and small powder magazines. The heavy guns, which an army never takes with it, had been procured from the arsenal of Vienna, and the carriages had been constructed by the workmen there.

In order to render the passage of his troops simultaneous and crushing, Napoleon had recourse to arrangements unknown before. It was his design, that in some minutes several thousand men should have crossed the small branch, and surprised and taken the Austrian advanced posts; that in two hours 50 thousand others should have deployed on the enemy's side of the river to fight a first battle; and that in four or five, 150 thousand soldiers, 40 thousand horses, and six hundred guns should have passed over in order to decide the fate of the Austrian monarchy. Never had such operations been projected or executed on such a scale.

When a river is to be crossed, the operation is begun by suddenly conveying some determined men to the opposite side in boats. These men proceed to disarm or kill the enemy's advanced posts, and to fix the moorings to which the boats are to be attached that are to carry the bridge. The army then passes over as quickly as possible; for a bridge is a long narrow defile, which masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery cannot traverse without greatly extending their length.

The first of these operations was the most difficult in presence of an enemy so numerous and so well-prepared as were the Austrians. To facilitate it, Napoleon had large flat boats constructed, capable of carrying 300 men each, and having a moveable gunwale to protect the men from musketry, which being let down would serve instead of planks for landing. Every *corps d'armée* was provided with five of these flat boats, which made an advanced guard of fifteen hundred men carried over at once and unexpectedly at each point of passage. Now it was not likely that the enemy, who did not know exactly where the operation was to be performed, could confront us with advanced posts so considerable as these. A hawser was to be immediately attached to a tree and stretched across the stream, and the boats were to ply along it to and fro. The construction of the bridges was then to begin. All the boats being prepared, all the tackle arranged, the places selected, and the men instructed as to what they had to do, there was reason to believe that two hours would

suffice for the completion of a bridge sixty fathoms long—an operation which used formerly to occupy twelve or fifteen hours, if everything was ready, from twenty-four to forty-eight if it was not so. Napoleon decided that four bridges at least should be formed—two of boats, one of pontoons, and one of large rafts for the cavalry and artillery, so that three *corps d'armée* might debouche simultaneously —those, namely, of Massena, Oudinot, and Davout. Thus several thousand men, ferried over in boats in a few minutes, would suffice to overwhelm the enemy's advanced posts. Fifty to sixty thousand debouching in two hours under the protection of formidable batteries would make head against the forces which the enemy might bring together on becoming aware of the passage. Lastly, in four or five hours the whole army would have debouched, ready to give battle, and provided with means of retreat as secure as if it had not a great river behind it. It was probable, even, that the operation would be ended before the enemy could disturb it, for the fire of powerful batteries and the simultaneous passage of our troops would naturally throw it into extreme confusion.

Another contrivance of Napoleon's was to enable a column of infantry to debouche on the instant, and as quickly as the advanced guards carried over in the flat boats. To this end he invented a bridge of a novel description, the construction of which he entrusted to captain Dessales, a very intelligent officer. The common way of bridge-making is to moor a series of boats side by side, one after the other. Napoleon conceived the idea of having a bridge in one single piece, composed of boats fastened together beforehand. It was to be floated down the stream to the spot chosen for it; one end was then to be made fast to the shore, the other, being left free, would be carried by the force of the current to the opposite bank, to which it was to be fixed by men who were to run along it for that purpose. This being accomplished, no more would be requisite than to drop some anchors, in order to steady it in the middle. It had been calculated, and rightly, as the result showed, that some minutes would be sufficient for this prodigious operation.

Lest the place where this bridge was constructed might betray the secret of its destined site, the following precaution was taken. The isle of Lobau was covered with yards and docks for boatbuilding, as though it had been one of the great ports of France. The docks were connected by canals with the small branch of the river, and there the numerous boats, pontoons, and rafts to be used in constructing the bridges, were built without indicating the place where the passage was to be effected. There was behind the île Alexandre, on the right flank of the large island of Lobau, a long, wide, and rather deep channel, in which each piece of work was to receive the last finish. In that channel the bridge in one piece was stowed away ready to be floated into the small branch of the river at the last moment. But as this channel formed a bend at its extremity, Napoleon took the precaution of having several

joints made in the bridge, so that it might accommodate itself to all the sinuosities of the channel.

Clearly foreseeing that at the actual moment of the operation the need of rapid communications between the two banks would be strongly felt, and wishing to repair even to excess the imprudence of his first passage of the Danube, Napoleon had timber, rafts, and pontoons laid ready in those interior channels, so that four or five additional bridges might be thrown across to hasten the deployment of the army as much as possible, and render retreat as easy in case of defeat as on an ordinary field of battle.

Whilst thousands of workmen of all kinds were labouring with incredible activity in the isle of Lobau, the seamen of the guard were incessantly cruising about in boats armed with howitzers to protect those immense works, and to explore the islands and every nook of the river, so as to acquire a knowledge of the localities that would be very useful on the day of the grand operation. Napoleon had recovered a valuable remnant of general Dupont's army; this was the brave captain Baste, commander of the marines of the guard in the Andalusian campaign, alike able as an infantry and a naval officer, and the only man whom Napoleon had pardoned for the Baylen catastrophe; for he had given him promotion whilst he was implacable towards his companions in misfortune. Captain Baste, now a colonel, still commanded the marines of the guard, and was to be present everywhere at the hour of peril.

Napoleon galloped every day from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf to see to the progress of the works, and at every visit some new idea occurred to him. The Viennese, under whose eyes and with whose aid in some instances this prodigious enterprise was performed, thrilled with indignation in secret, and would have revolted but for the powerful army that kept them down. But Napoleon took extreme pains to quiet them. Discipline was rigorously observed. Not one offensive act or expression was allowed, and every breach of good conduct was punished on the spot. Provisions failing, Napoleon had considerable quantities of grain and herds of cattle brought from Hungary, so that the cost of living was not extravagantly high at Vienna. He consented to employ the *bourgeoisie* for the maintenance of order, because our troops were not so well adapted for that service, being foreigners and enemies. But he limited the numbers of the burgher force to 6 thousand, and he allowed them only 1500 muskets, a number equal to that of the men who mounted guard every day. He exercised, moreover, a strict *surveillance* over the inhabitants. Knowing that many soldiers of the old garrison were concealed in the city in plain clothes, ready to second the first popular outbreak, he dictated some acts of severity, confining himself, however, to what was indispensable. As for the lower classes that wanted work, he furnished it to them at a reasonable rate of wages, and not always for the service of the army, but often, on the contrary, for the use or embellishment of

Vienna, so that the bread he afforded them might not seem too bitter.

Such was the aspect of the isle of Lobau during the month of June. On the 1st of July, everything being ready, Napoleon gave orders that the troops should begin to assemble in the isle on the 3rd of July, that they should be all there on the 4th, and cross the small branch that night in order to give battle on the 5th, if they met the enemy immediately on landing, or on the 6th, if he did not present himself immediately. On the 1st of July he quitted Schönbrunn, and established his head-quarters in Lobau. Marshal Massena's corps being there already, Napoleon ordered into it successively general Oudinot's corps, the guard, marshal Davout's corps, the light cavalry, the heavy cavalry, and the immense mass of field artillery. The defiling of the troops was under the superintendence of general Mathieu Dumas. The position of each *corps d'armée* was marked out with stakes. Orders had been forwarded that the army of Italy should arrive at four in the morning, the army of Dalmatia and the Bavarians at five at the latest. The Saxons, who had been some days at Vienna, and Dupas' French division, passed over with the first troops. The several corps were rested, well fed, and in the best spirits. Their losses had been partly repaired by some marching battalions and squadrons which had arrived in June, and by the return of a great many men from the hospitals. The guard was superb, complete in all arms, but especially in artillery. Adding together the troops of Massena, Oudinot, Davout, Bernadotte, prince Eugene, Macdonald, Marmont, de Wrede, and the guard, there appeared to be 150 thousand men; of whom 26 thousand were cavalry, and 12 thousand artillerymen serving 550 guns—an enormous force, such as Napoleon had never yet mustered on a field of battle; and, indeed, if we rightly consult the history of the world, we shall find that such a host had never been brought into action by any leader. Besides this vast force, Napoleon had with him the invincible Massena, who was suffering from a fall from his horse, but was capable of mastering all physical sufferings on a day of battle; the stubborn Davout, the impetuous Oudinot, the intrepid Macdonald, and a multitude of others who were ready to purchase the triumph of our arms with their blood. The heroic Lannes, mortally wounded at Ebersdorf, was the only man missing. Fate had forbidden him to witness a victory to which he had powerfully contributed by his conduct in this campaign; but his death was happy, since he fell in the course of the last of our triumphs.

When arrived in the isle of Lobau, Napoleon was seized with a sudden uneasiness: some indications made him fearful that the archduke Charles had given him the slip by descending the Danube to Presburg. It is certain that the archduke might have had recourse to that manœuvre, and the proof that it would have been well conceived on his part was that his adversary was very appre-

hensive of it. It is true that by quitting the position he occupied opposite Vienna, on the heights of Wagram, he would have left the French free to cross the Danube without a battle; but with the means contrived by Napoleon there was but little chance of hindering that passage, and by advancing into the heart of Hungary, he would have obliged the French to weaken themselves by lengthening out their line of operation, and to leave a corps to guard Vienna, whilst the Austrians would have been reinforced by archduke John and the Hungarian rising. There were grounds, therefore, for suspecting such a design; and Napoleon, to end his doubts, made a bold feint, which, whilst enlightening him as to the designs of the Austrian commander, would deceive the latter as to the real point fixed on for the passage of the river.

The Legrand division of Massena's corps was stationed near the site of the former passage, and captain Baillot, a brave and able officer of pontonniers, was ordered to form a bridge of boats there. Towards night the artillery was planted right and left of the bend of the river, the voltigeurs of the Legrand division embarked in boats under the command of Masséna's aide-de-camp, Sainte Croix, crossed the small branch, and secured a landing in spite of the Austrian advanced posts. In less than two hours the bridge was complete, the Legrand division crossed it, then traversed the little wood beyond it, and debouched between Essling and Aspern. After having taken some prisoners and killed some men, it drew down upon it a brisk cannonade from the enemy's redoubts, and when day broke it perceived a display of forces which left no doubt as to the presence of the main Austrian army in those parts. Napoleon thus became assured that he had the enemy before him, and that he might soon terminate the war on the vast plain of Marchfeld.

Archduke Charles was in fact on the opposite heights of Wagram, vacillating between a multitude of projects, not knowing which to choose, and as usual not applying himself to execute any of them. He had spent the days immediately succeeding the battle of Essling in receiving congratulations on his victory, but he had done nothing to secure an incontestible triumph after that doubtful one. Certainly it was not for having abstained from invading Lobau that he desired blame, nor for not having tried above or below Vienna a passage which might have brought about the deliverance of Austria, but also its total ruin; but without imposing complicated and hazardous plans on the Austrian commander. Why, since he was so well pleased with the battle of Essling—why did he not profit by that lesson, and derive from it another battle of Essling more complete and more decisive? That event, so much vaunted by the Austrians, was the expression of the military difficulty Napoleon had to overcome, and which consisted in crossing a great river to give battle with that river at his back. The archduke should therefore have left nothing undone to increase that difficulty, and even to render it insurmountable if possible. This

was a simple, safe, and tried course, and without performing any prodigy it would have been enough to stop Napoleon once more on the banks of the Danube, in order to insure his speedy expulsion from Austria. There were two very simple measures to be taken towards that end: first, to give to the battle-ground, which was known beforehand, all the strength which a defensive position could receive from the efforts of art; secondly, to concentrate there all the armies of the monarchy. Of these two measures the archduke fortunately had adopted neither.

Napoleon had accumulated redoubts over the whole extent of the isle of Lobau in order to debouche under the protection of a powerful artillery of large calibre: was it not natural, then, to erect redoubts on the opposite bank which should render it inaccessible? A power which was fighting on its own soil, and which was one of the best provided with *matériel* in Europe, could not be in want of heavy artillery. Now the archduke had entrenched Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, because there had been fighting at those three points; but from Enzersdorf to the confluence of the two arms along the whole right side of Lobau, on the plain which Napoleon selected to debouche upon, he had contented himself with constructing only a single redoubt mounted with six cannons, near a place called Maison Blanche, and posting some troops in the little castle of Sachsengang, situated in the wood. The possibility of our debouching on our right, which Napoleon had pondered during a space of forty days, had never once occurred to archduke Charles, and it was only from Aspern to Essling, and from Essling to Enzersdorf, that he had constructed really formidable works; and even these were not of a strength sufficient to resist soldiers so impetuous as the French.

The archduke's next care, after having rendered the passage of the Danube as difficult as possible, should have been to form for himself a defensive position the most favourable possible on the plain of Marchfeld. Now supposing the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Danube, if he was beaten in a defensive battle, the archduke might have passed from the defensive to the offensive on the following day, or even on the same day, and tried, with a great probability of succeeding, to throw him into the river. The ground presented many advantages in that respect. The plain of Marchfeld rose with a gentle inclination for two leagues, up to a small chain of hills, extending from Neusiedel to Wagram, and washed by the Russbach, a large, deep, and marshy stream, behind which the archduke had encamped his chief forces. He had stationed there three of his *corps d'armée*, the first under Bellegarde, the second under Hohenzollern,* the fourth under Rosenberg, making together about 75 thousand men. It would have been easy, by taking advantage of the hills and the stream, to erect formidable works against which no impetuosity, even of Frenchmen, could have prevailed. This position was connected with the Danube by a second line of hills, of

* It was Kollowrath who commanded it in the beginning of the war.

a semicircular form, passing by Aderklaa, Gerarsdorf, and Stamersdorf, the approach to which was not obstructed by a deep stream, but which did not require that protection, since it was on that side the Austrians ought to have assumed the offensive, whilst on the other they should have stood obstinately and invincibly on the defence. The archduke had still 65 or 70 thousand men, consisting of the third corps under Kollowrath,* the fifth under the prince de Reuss,† and the sixth under Klenau.‡ This last guarded the banks of the stream. The reserve of cavalry and grenadiers cantoned between Wagram and Gerarsdorf connected the two masses of the Austrian army. That on the left, encamped between Neusiedel and Wagram, might have obstinately defended the hills, and during that time the mass on the right, which extended from Gerarsdorf to Stamersdorf, should have assumed the offensive, taken the French in flank, cut them off from the Danube or thrown them into the river. The archduke did actually think of proceeding in this manner, but without having constructed any of the works which would have rendered the position between Wagram and Neusiedel unassailable.

The last precaution which the Austrian commander ought to have taken, was to concentrate his forces so as to be superior in number to his adversary on the field of battle. The concentrating movements which brought the French corps one after the other under the walls of Vienna, were partly known to the Austrian commander, although the principal manœuvre, by which the army of Italy was to be made to take part in the great battle, was skilfully concealed from him. This manner of acting ought to have served him as a lesson, and have induced him to muster between Lobau and Wagram all the troops that were not indispensable elsewhere. But he had very imperfectly followed the instructive example of his adversary. He had, indeed, called from Lintz to Wagram Kollowrath's corps, which had reinforced him by a score thousand men; but he had left on the Upper Danube at least 12 thousand, part of whom he might have called up to him, the French having evidently no project in that direction. He thought of sending for archduke John, whereas he ought already to have had him by him, since the town of Presburg could defend itself with 3 or 4 thousand men for garrison. He might have made general Chasteler join him with 7 or 8 thousand men, ban Giulay sufficing to contend with the French posts left on the Raab; and this would have raised the reinforcement brought him by archduke John from 12 to 20 thousand. Lastly, archduke Ferdinand was making a useless campaign in Poland, and was employing from 30 to 35 thousand excellent soldiers in ridiculous expeditions from Thorn to Sandomir. Had 15 thousand men been left in that part of the theatre of war, another 20 thousand

* Previously commanded by Hohenzollern.
† Previously commanded by prince Louis.
‡ Previously commanded by general Hiller.

men might have co-operated towards saving the monarchy under the walls of Vienna.

Thus, had he manœuvred like Napoleon with the art which consists in leaving in each place only what is there indispensable, and accumulating on the decisive point all that can be spared elsewhere, archduke Charles might have brought 20 thousand men from Presburg, 9 or 10 thousand from Lintz, and 20 thousand from Cracow, which would have added 50 thousand men to his forces, and perhaps have decided the question in his favour. What, indeed, would have been the result if the French, debouching with 140 or 150 thousand men, had encountered 200 thousand, 80 thousand of these being in an impregnable position, and 120 thousand assailing them in flank whilst they were attacking that position? It is probable that in that case, in spite of all his genius, the term of Napoleon's grandeur would have arrived three or four years sooner on that plain of Marchfeld.

The archduke, who surmised but did not foresee with certainty that all would be decided between Wagram and the isle of Lobau, did none of those things we have just mentioned. He encamped his troops on the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram, made them manœuvre in order to train his recruits, fed them plentifully enough with bread and meat supplied by the Jews, but let them want straw, fodder, and water (except the corps stationed near the Russbach), although he was in his own country and backed by the patriotism of the whole population. He had scarcely done anything towards remounting the cavalry, though Austria abounded in horses, and he did not obtain from a devoted country what Napoleon drew from it, who was abhorred as a foreign conqueror. His six corps, with the two reserves of grenadiers and cuirassiers, might be estimated at about 140 thousand men, with 400 pieces of artillery; and he reckoned besides on archduke John's 12 thousand, which would give him a total of about 150 thousand, whereas he might have brought together nearly 200 thousand. His troops were very much attached to him, but though they esteemed his courage and military knowledge, and preferred him to his brother, they had not sufficient confidence in his genius, and they dreaded seeing him confronted with Napoleon almost as much as he dreaded it himself.

Archduke Charles, who had been kept on the alert by the successive accumulation of French troops towards Ebersdorf, put his troops in motion on hearing the cannonade provoked by the Legrand division, in the belief that the passage was about to be repeated at the same point as before. An advanced guard, under general Nordmann, already occupied Enzersdorf, the plain on the right of the island, the little redoubt of Maison Blanche, and the wood at the confluence of the two branches of the Danube. Whilst this, the most menaced point, was protected merely by an advanced guard, general Klenau, with the whole sixth corps, occupied the works between Aspern and Essling, before which it was supposed the French army would again

offer battle. Archduke Charles descended from the hills of Wagram to the plain of Marchfeld with Bellegarde, Hohenzollern, and Rosenberg's corps (the 1st, 2nd, and 4th), to support Nordmann and Klenau. He also made Kollowrath's corps (the 3rd) descend from the semicircle of hills, which formed his right, from Wagram to the Danube, leaving the prince de Reuss in position at Stamersdorf, opposite Vienna, to observe if the French made any attempt on that side. The reserve of infantry and cavalry remained behind in the environs of Gerarsdorf. He remained thus in position on the 1st and 2nd of July; then, seeing no signs of the French, imagining that the passage would not take place immediately, and disliking to remain in the plain with his army exposed to a suffocating heat and to all sorts of privations, he led it back to its usual camping-ground on the hills.

On the 3rd, Napoleon did nothing but continue in secret behind the screen of the woods to perfect his means of passage, whilst his troops were incessantly arriving in the island by the great bridges. Their constantly increasing agglomeration could even be discerned at a distance, and on the 4th archduke Charles ordered the artillery at Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, to fire upon Lobau, where it seemed likely that every ball would tell upon such an accumulation of men. Never before, indeed, had there been packed together in a space of one league in diameter and three leagues in circumference 150 thousand soldiers, 550 guns, and 40 thousand horses. Fortunately the island was too broad to allow of the shots doing mischief. This would have required guns of large calibre like those which Napoleon had had the foresight to mount on his batteries, whilst the archduke had only field-pieces in his works. Massena's troops, however, that were nearest to the enemy, lost some men.

On the 4th, at the close of day, Massena, Davout, and Oudinot, screened by the woods, approached the right of the island and took their stations, Massena opposite Enzersdorf, Davout a little lower down, opposite Maison Blanche, Oudinot lower still, facing the coppice wood at the confluence. Colonel Baste of the marines moored near the latter place with his armed boats ready to convoy the troops. At nine o'clock Oudinot's corps began its passage. The Conroux brigade of the Tharreau division embarked on board the flat boats before mentioned, and escorted by colonel Baste's flotilla, quitted the ports of the isle of Lobau and proceeded towards the wood at the confluence. It was a dark night, and heavy clouds portended a tempest, which could not but favour our enterprise. The small arm was crossed in a few minutes, though it widened as it approached the large one. Our men landed on the opposite bank, took the enemy's sentinels belonging to general Nordmann's advanced guard, then seized the redoubt of Maison Blanche, all within a quarter of an hour, and with the loss of only a few men. The hawser was immediately fastened to the tree previously fixed upon, and the rafts, plying to and fro, rapidly transported the rest of the Tharreau division. At the same time captain Larue, seconded by colonel

Baste, brought into position the materials of the bridge which was to be established at the confluence of the small branch with the large one, and completed his task in two hours. During this time the Tharreau division kept up an irregular fire in the dark against the Austrian advanced posts, which it repulsed without difficulty, and the Grandjean (late St. Hilaire) and Frère (late Claparède) divisions, which completed Oudinot's corps, were drawn up in close columns waiting for the bridge to be thrown over to enable them to cross the stream and join the Tharreau division.

Marshal Massena had orders not to begin his passage until general Oudinot should have already set foot on the enemy's side of the river. At eleven o'clock he put himself in motion with the Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, and Molitor divisions, Legrand's having already crossed over between Aspern and Essling. Fifteen hundred voltigeurs, led by the brave aide-de-camp Sainte Croix, and escorted by colonel Baste, crossed in five flat boats from the channel of the île Alexandre, and landed on the opposite bank under the fire of the Austrian advanced posts, whom Oudinot's fusillade had put upon the alert. As the rafts could not easily reach the shore the soldiers jumped into the water up to their middle, some to fight hand-to-hand with the enemy's sharpshooters, others to drag the rafts to land. The hawser being made fast to a tree, the rafts began to ply, and the voltigeurs engaged with the enemy were succoured. Meanwhile the bridge in one piece issued from the same channel under the direction of the commandant Dessalles, and was floated a hundred yards down the current in order to leave a clear passage for the materials of the other bridges. Some intrepid pontonniers, advancing in a wherry under the enemy's fire, dropped an anchor and brought up the bridge to its position. Whilst they were firmly securing one end of it on our side of the stream, the troops of Boudet's division ran along it to fasten it at the other end. Fifteen or twenty minutes sufficed for this fine operation. The rest of Massena's troops immediately passed over and took possession of the left bank before the Austrians had time to bring down their masses to oppose the deployment of the French army.

The pontoon bridge, and then the bridge of rafts, next issued from the channel of the île Alexandre, but in separate pieces, and were fixed above the bridge in one piece, at two hundred yards from each other. The pontoon bridge was intended for Davout's infantry, the raft bridge for Davout and Massena's artillery and cavalry. The former was to be completed in less than two hours and a half, the second in four or five. The pontonniers worked at them without intermission under a continual fire.

His project being unmasked, Napoleon ordered the artillery of the redoubts to open their fire, first in order to demolish the little town of Enzersdorf, so that it might not serve as a *point d'appui* for the enemy, and then to sweep the plain below with such a deluge of grape that it would be impossible for Nordmann's troops to remain there. He gave the same order not only to the batteries

on the right side of the isle, but also to those on the left towards the old passage, in order to bewilder the Austrians by these simultaneous attacks. At once 900 guns of the largest bore rent the air with their detonations. Colonel Baste, cruising with his armed boats both above and below the isle of Lobau, directed a cannonade against every point where firing was perceived, in a manner sufficient to distract the coolest and most determined enemy. The heavens soon mingled their thunder with that of Napoleon's artillery, and poured down torrents of rain and hail on both armies. The forked lightnings flashed, and when their glare had ceased it was succeeded by that of thousands of bombs and shells falling on the unfortunate town of Enzersdorf. Never had war in its mightiest furies presented so fearful a spectacle. Napoleon, riding up and down the bank on which the prodigious enterprise was being executed, directed everything with the calmness and security which accompany projects long meditated. His officers, all of them prepared like himself, felt that night neither confusion nor embarassment. Everything proceeded with perfect regularity, in spite of the hail, the rain, the bullets, the balls, and the rolling of the thunder and the cannonade. Vienna, awakened by these sinister sounds, learned at last that its fate was in the balance, and that Napoleon's design, so long threateningly impending, was near being accomplished.

At two o'clock in the morning the army had already three bridges; that at the confluence, that in one piece below the île Alexandre, and the pontoon bridge opposite that island. Oudinot passed over the first, Massena over the second, and immediately after him Davout. The troops defiled rapidly and in close columns. On the right, general Oudinot soon carried the wood at the confluence, repulsed some of Nordmann's posts, crossed a small branch, that of Steigbieghl, on planks, and carried his left to the Maison Blanche, his right to the little hamlet of Muhlleiten. In these various engagements he took three pieces of cannon and some hundreds of prisoners. A little to his right was the fortified castle of Sachsengang, garrisoned by an Austrian battalion. He surrounded it and riddled it with shells. During this time Massena had defiled with his whole infantry, but not yet having his cannons, he kept near the margin of the river, in order to be covered by the artillery of the redoubts, under the long range of which, the plain having become untenable, Nordmann's troops gradually retired.

When day dawned on the banks of the river about four o'clock in the morning, a most imposing spectacle presented itself to the eyes of both armies. The storm had cleared away, and the rising sun glittered on thousands of bayonets and helmets. To the right, general Oudinot was marching up the plain, while his rear guard was bombarding the castle of Sachsengang. To the left, Massena was bearing on the town of Enzersdorf, which continued burning without being able to return the fire that was poured upon it, its artillery having been silenced in a few minutes. The interval between these

two corps was filled up by that of Davout, the whole of which had passed over. Part of the artillery and cavalry had crossed the pontoon bridge; the rest was thronging to the bridge of rafts, followed by the imperial guard. Seventy thousand men were already in line of battle on the enemy's side of the river, capable by themselves of making head against the forces of archduke Charles. Bernadotte with the Saxons was making ready to defile after the imperial guard. The armies of Italy and Dalmatia, and the Bavarian division, which had all been moved into Lobau during the night, were advancing on their side. The whole mass marched with admirable and irresistible *ensemble*. The soldiers, who had been forbidden to light fires during the night, in order not to present a mark to the enemy's artillerymen, and who were dripping from the rain, warmed themselves in the first rays of a July sun. Some quitted the ranks to embrace relations and friends whom they had not seen for years; for corps which had come, some from the heart of Dalmatia, others from the confines of Poland and Spain, met together on this new battle-field after having separated at Austerlitz to repair to the opposite extremities of the continent. Bavarians, Badeners, Saxons, Poles, Portuguese, were mingled with French in this rendezvous of nations, ready to fight for a policy which concerned them not. The joyous spirit of our soldiers broke out in all directions, though before evening very many of them would have ceased to exist. The sunshine, their confidence in victory, and the hope of signal rewards, enlivened their spirits. They were, above all, delighted to see the Danube overcome, and they admired the resources of the genius that had transported them so rapidly and in such imposing masses from the one bank to the other. Seeing Napoleon ride along the front of the lines, they raised their chakos on the points of their bayonets, and saluted him with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!*

By Napoleon's orders possession was to be taken of the town of Enzersdorf on the left, and the castle of Sachsengang on the right, that no enemy might be left in his rear when he deployed on the plain. Some trifling field-works covered the gates of the little town, now half reduced to ashes. An Austrian battalion defended it, but had almost exhausted its ammunition, and was about to be relieved by another when Massena ordered the attack. His two aides-de-camp, Sainte Croix and Pelet, assailed one of the gates of Enzersdorf with the 46th, whilst Lasalle, enclosing the town with his cavalry, prevented any succour from reaching it. The infantry carried the gate-works at the point of the bayonet, entered the burning streets, and captured all that remained alive of the Austrian battalion. The men who endeavoured to escape from the town were cut down by Lasalle's cavalry.

General Oudinot, after cannonading the castle of Sachsengang, summoned it to surrender; and the commandant yielded without resistance, seeing himself drowned, as it were, in a flood of a hundred and fifty thousand men. The army had nothing now to molest it

on its wings. It could deploy in the plain opposite archduke Charles, and offer him battle at the foot of the hills of Wagram: That prince at that moment beheld all his anticipations miserably deceived. After such a mistake as he had made in the disposal of his advanced guards, they had no alternative but to retreat, for if they held out, Klenau would inevitably be taken aback in the redoubts of Essling and Aspern. After all, the archduke was not aware that matters were so serious as they really were. He supposed that the passage had been effected only in part, that the French army would employ at least four-and-twenty hours in crossing the river and deploying, and that he should have time to assail it before it was in a condition to defend itself. Standing on a hill beside his brother, the emperor, who was questioning him as to the state of affairs, he told him that the French indeed had forced the Danube, but that he was letting them pass over in order to throw them into the river. "Very good," said the emperor, shrewdly, "but do not let too many of them pass over."* Archduke Charles, who had no choice left, directed Klenau to fall back in good order on the main body.

Napoleon, having three-fourths of his army beyond the river, now thought only of gaining ground in order that he might put himself in order of battle. Marching always with extreme prudence, he ordered several precautions before he advanced further. Though he had bridges enough to convey his troops from one bank to the other, he wished to receive his *matériel* more rapidly, and, above all, to have numerous means of retreat in case of ill success. In consequence, he had three more bridges laid down, which, with the four established in the night, made seven. All the materials being ready, his commands would be obeyed in a few hours. He likewise gave orders for an equal number of *têtes de pont*,—some made of fascines, others of bags of earth prepared beforehand, so that in its retreat the army might not be deprived of its means of passage by a sudden irruption upon its rear. Lastly, he entrusted to general Regnier, an excellent officer, very skilful in defensive war, the keeping of the isle of Lobau. He left him seven battalions; two of which were to guard the large bridges, one the bridge at the confluence, one the bridges over the small branch, and three were to form a reserve in the centre of the isle of Lobau. Orders were given to let no one pass from the other side of the river except the wounded.

These precautions taken, Napoleon began to deploy on the plain, his left remaining stationary near Enzersdorf and the Danube, his right marching towards the heights of Wagram, performing, consequently, a movement of conversion. He had formed in two lines: in the first line were Massena on the left, Oudinot in the centre, Davout on the right; in the second line were Bernadotte on the left, Marmont and de Wrede in the centre, and the army of Italy

* This remarkable saying remained traditional among the military men of the time.

on the right. The guard and the cuirassiers formed a superb reserve in the rear. The artillery advanced on the front of the several corps, mingled with some detachments of cavalry. The bulk of the cavalry, hussars, chasseurs, and dragoons was spread along the wings. Napoleon was in the centre, counting on a certain and decisive victory.

He continued to gain ground, pivoting constantly on his left, the corps in the first line separating from each other to make room successively for those in the second, and the whole army thus deploying after the manner of a fan before the enemy, who fell back on the hills of Wagram. Our artillery fired as it marched. Our cavalry charged the Austrian cavalry when it could come up with it, or the rear guards of infantry when they remained within its reach. Davout's corps, finding on its way the village of Rutzendorf, against which cavalry could not be employed, attacked and carried it with the infantry. Dupas' French division, marching with Bernadotte's Saxons, in like manner took the village of Raschdorf. At that point, the Austrian cavalry having attempted to support its infantry, was sharply repulsed by the Saxon cuirassiers, who behaved gallantly under aide-de-camp (afterwards marshal) Gerard. Massena, slowly moving up the bank of the Danube, encountered first Essling, then Aspern in his movement, took them reversely, and entered without resistance. Klenau's sixth corps retired by Leopoldau on Stamersdorf and Gerarsdorf. At six o'clock on the evening of the 5th we lined the chain of the Wagram hills in its whole extent, after having lost in executing this magnificent operation only some hundreds of our soldiers, whilst we had put nearly 2 thousand Austrians *hors de combat*, and made about 3 thousand prisoners at Sachsengang, Enzersdorf, Raschdorf, and Rutzendorf.

The French army, which had deployed in marching, now formed but one long line of about three leagues, parallel to that of the Austrians, which was almost straight from Neusiedel to Wagram, but curved at the centre towards Aderklaa, and continued in a semicircle by Gerasdorf and Stamersdorf to the margin of the Danube. From Neusiedel, a village commanded by a square tower, to Wagram, ran the gently sloping hills on which was encamped the left wing of the Austrian army to the number of about 75 thousand, protected by the swampy stream of the Russbach. It was there, as we have said, that invincible entrenchments might have been made with the help of art, but, fortunately, nothing was seen there but the camp barracks. At Neusiedel, that is to say at the extreme left of the Austrians, was prince Rosenberg with Nordmann's advanced guard and a numerous cavalry; less to the left, towards Baumersdorf, was Hohenzollern's corps; and towards the centre, at Wagram, Bellegarde's corps, with archduke Charles' head-quarters. It was about this point that the line of battle began to bend back to meet the Danube, and that the useful protection of the Russbach ceased. The Austrians had in their very centre the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers, extending in a semicircle from Wagram to Gerarsdorf.

They had on their right the third corps under general Kollowrath, the sixth under general Klenau, which had just retreated from Essling and Aspern, and the fifth under prince de Reuss, between Gerarsdorf, Stamersdorf, and the Danube.

The French line followed exactly the contour of the enemy's line. Before the Austrian left wing we had our right, that is to say Davout, established in the village of Glinzendorf, facing Rosenberg's corps, and Oudinot, established in the village of Grosshofen, facing Hohenzollern's corps. In the centre was the army of Italy confronting Bellegarde. Bearing to the left, opposite Wagram, was Bernadotte with the Saxons, over against the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers; and, quite to the left, from Süssenbrunn to Kagran, were Massena's four divisions, appointed to act against Kollowrath, Klenau, and de Reuss. In the centre, behind the army of Italy and the Saxons, Napoleon had kept in reserve Marmont's corps, the imperial guard, the Bavarians, and the cuirassiers. Thus in this vast line of battle, straight, as we have said, from Neusiedel to Wagram, and curved from thence to Stamersdorf, the Austrians had their greatest strength in their wings and their least at their centre, since the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers formed the sole connexion between the two principal masses. We, on the contrary, possessed a sufficient force on our right wing from Glinzendorf to Grosshofen, where Davout and Oudinot were, a very moderate one from Süssenbrunn and Kagran, where was Massena alone, but a considerable one between Grosshofen and Aderklaa, since in that place, besides the army of Italy and the Saxons, there was the army of Dalmatia, the imperial guard, the Bavarians, and all the heavy cavalry. This arrangement was assuredly the best; the one which allowed of the most rapid measures to meet the various chances of the battle by moving right or left as occasion might require, and which also made it possible to strike the Austrian army in its weak place—namely, the centre of the line. In fact, on this occasion as at Essling, wishing to envelop the French army so as to hinder it from debouching, archduke Charles had weakened his centre, and made himself vulnerable at that point by the sword of his potent adversary.

This state of things, which could not escape so practised an eye as Napoleon's, tempted him to bring matters to an end that very night by a decisive act, which would have dispensed him from shedding torrents of blood on the following day. All reports agreed in stating that the enemy nowhere stood his ground, but retreated with singular readiness. Surprised, in fact, by the sudden apparition of the French army, archduke Charles had made no arrangements for attacking, and had only instructed his advanced guards to fall back. Trusting too easily to the report of some officers, Napoleon hoped, that by making an abrupt attack at nightfall on the plateau of Wagram, he should break the enemy's centre before the latter had sufficiently provided for his defence, and that the Austrian army, being thus severed, would retreat of its own accord, so that nothing would

remain for the end of the campaign but an active and destructive pursuit of its two moieties. In this instance was manifested the inconvenience of acting with enormous masses of men and over immense spaces. The commander-in-chief, being unable to see or direct everything in person, was obliged to rely on lieutenants, who observed with too little accuracy, and often even acted without concert.

Napoleon then, with an imprudence that did not correspond to the admirable forethought displayed on these days, gave orders to storm the plateau of Wagram. Those who could act against it were Oudinot, by attacking Baumersdorf; the army of Italy, by passing the Russbach between Baumersdorf and Wagram; and Bernadotte, by assailing Wagram itself through Aderklaa. Accordingly, Bernadotte with the Saxons and the Dupas division, Macdonald and Grenier with two divisions of the army of Italy, and Oudinot with his whole corps, advanced at nightfall against the Austrian position. Oudinot marched against Baumersdorf, cannonaded it, set fire to it with shells, and endeavoured to take it from Hohenzollern's advanced guards, who had in the Russbach a potent means of resistance. On the opposite side, Bernadotte and the Saxons fell upon Wagram, which was defended by a detachment from Bellegarde's corps, and nearly mastered it, but not enough to advance beyond it. Whilst Oudinot and Bernadotte were thus prosecuting the attack at the two extremities, in order to seize the enemy's two *points d'appui*, Dupas and Macdonald, in the middle, proceeded to cross the Russbach. The stream was not wide but it was deep, and formed an impediment not very easily overcome. Dupas, with the 5th light infantry and the 19th of the line, dashed into it, shouting, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Some soldiers, who in their haste had rushed into the part where the water was deepest, were drowned; the rest got safe over, rallied, and ascended the hill-side under a fire of grape and musketry. The Austrians, thus suddenly attacked, had formed in square behind the camp barracks, under cover of which their sharpshooters kept up a very brisk fire. Dupas' two brave French regiments dislodged the sharpshooters, of whom they captured about 300, passed the line of the barracks, and fell upon the squares. The 5th, which headed the column, broke one of these squares, took its flag, and made it prisoner. The 19th seconded this vigorous exploit, as did also the Rudlof and Melsch grenadiers, two Saxon battalions under Dupas. The Austrian line was just on the point of being broken when the assailants received a volley in their rear, which extremely surprised and disconcerted them. The two columns of the army of Italy, the one commanded by Macdonald the other by Grenier, after having crossed the Russbach, were ascending the plateau to join Dupas, when, perceiving the latter's Saxons and taking them for enemies, they fired upon them. The Saxons, thus unexpectedly attacked in the rear, returned the fire, and the troops of Macdonald and Grenier, believing themselves charged in front, whilst at the

same time they were attacked in flank from Baumersdorf, which was still occupied by Hohenzollern's corps, were thrown into a state of confusion, which the night soon converted into a panic. They rushed down from the plateau, followed by the dismayed Saxons, and took to flight in incredible disorder. Dupas, left alone with his two French regiments, and assailed on all sides by Bellegarde's corps, which archduke Charles himself had rallied, was obliged to give way and quit the plateau under reiterated charges of horse and foot. Oudinot broke off the attack on Baumersdorf, and Bernadotte, abandoning Wagram, which he had almost conquered, fell back on Aderklaa.

This panic cost the Dupas division a thousand men by the dispersion of its two Saxon battalions, which had been in too great haste to surrender to the Austrians, and the army of Italy some thousands strayed and missing. Fortunately, the cavalry being sent out in all directions soon brought back the scattered soldiers to their respective corps. Our army, though still as brave, was yet less experienced than that of Austerlitz or Friedland, and too numerous, compounded of too many various elements, to be as firm, solid, and apt at manœuvres as formerly. After all, this was a check of little moment, between the marvellous passage which had just been accomplished, and the victory which there was reason to look for on the morrow.

Napoleon directed that every corps should bivouac on the position it had occupied during the day, his centre being still in great force, and capable of affording aid to whichever of his wings might require it. There was no wood on the plain, and the soldiers could make no fires, which was a painful privation, for though it was July the night was very cold. Every man lay down in his cloak. The soldiers had biscuits and brandy. Napoleon had only a fire fed with a few trusses of straw to warm him in his bivouac. Having spent several hours in conference with his marshals, that they might be well acquainted with his intentions, he sent them all away before day except Davout, whom he kept with him until dawn. It was the third night he had passed on foot or on horseback.

During this time archduke Charles had at last arranged his plan of battle. He had always entertained the thought, suggested by very old study of that field of battle, to oppose the offensive movement of the French with his left wing, encamped on the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram, and whilst the French were busied before that sort of entrenched camp, to assume in his turn the offensive against them with his right wing bent forward, fall upon them in flank, separate them from the Danube, and once he had reduced them to stand on the defensive, to bring down his left upon them from the hills of Wagram, in order to drive them into the river with all his combined forces. He hoped, moreover, that whilst his left was defending the banks of the Russbach, and his right was attacking the French in flank, archduke John would come up from Presburg and assail them in the rear, and that they

would be unable to withstand such a combination of efforts. All this would have been possible, nay probable, if, manœuvring like Napoleon, the archduke had brought to the field 30 or 40 thousand more men; if he had notified archduke John in good time; and if, availing himself of the fact that the field of battle was known beforehand, he had accumulated between Neusiedel and Wagram works which would have rendered that entrenched camp impregnable. In that case an attack in flank upon the French, already exhausted by a fruitless effort, would have produced infallible results. But archduke Charles had done none of these things, as we have seen; he had erected on the ground he had to defend only barracks for his troops, and it was not until the evening of the preceding day, the 4th, that he had sent orders to his brother to join him. The obstacle which those barracks presented in the night affair and on the following day, sufficiently showed what might have happened if considerable works had been added to the configuration of the ground.

Be that as it may, in one of the half-burnt houses of the village of Wagram, evacuated by Bernadotte, archduke Charles dictated his orders. He directed his left not to enter into action until his right, put in motion that very night, should have begun to make the French waver by the attack in flank it was to make upon them. That wing, consisting of Klenau and Kollowrath's corps, was to march immediately—that is to say, at one or two o'clock in the morning,—fall upon our left, which consisted only of Massena's corps, and drive it from Kagran to Aspern, and from Süssenbrunn to Breitenlee. Immediately afterwards the reserves of grenadiers and cuirassiers, connecting the right wing with the centre between Gerarsdorf and Wagram, were to advance on Aderklaa, and there combine with part of Bellegarde's corps, come down for that purpose from the plateau of Wagram. This movement having been effected, the left wing, composed of the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg, was to descend on Baumersdorf and Neusiedel, cross the Russbach, take the villages of Grosshofen and Glenzendorf, occupied by marshal Davout, and thus complete this double manœuvre in flank and front, which, in the opinion of the commander-in-chief, was to bring about the sweeping of the French into the Danube.

As regards this plan, we cannot tell why the corps of the prince de Reuss, which was nearer the Danube than Klenau's corps, and which terminated the right wing of the Austrians near Stamersdorf, had not orders to take part in the operations of that wing, and thus render more irresistible the attack it was appointed to make. The need of observing the road from Vienna was not great enough to paralyse a whole corps, for it was evident, from the passage of the French across the isle of Lobau, that they did not contemplate another elsewhere. Moreover, the orders issued ought to have been calculated with reference to distance and time, so as to make each corps act at the fit moment.

The commander-in-chief's orders, despatched from Wagram in

the night arrived in less than an hour at the left wing, which was at the distance of a league, and required more than two hours to reach the right wing, which was more than two leagues off, and which had to be sought for in the midst of extreme confusion. As ill-luck would have it, in the retreat effected that evening, Klenau's corps had approached too near Gerarsdorf, and had taken up the ground intended for that of Kollowrath. More time, therefore, than had been calculated at head-quarters was requisite to combine in the dark the corps composing the right wing, and to make them take up their position in order of battle, and it was near four o'clock when they were barely beginning their movement. On the other hand, at that very moment the left wing, which had had earlier notice, and was not obliged to lose time in seeking its position, was about to come first into action, whereas it ought not to have done so until long after the right.

Whilst all was movement in the Austrian camp, and the troops, instead of going to rest, were fatiguing themselves in rectifying positions wrongly taken, deep stillness prevailed amongst the French. They lay asleep on the ground they had occupied on the preceding day, for Napoleon, having well reinforced his right on account of the possibility of archduke John's arrival, but still more his centre, where he had accumulated considerable forces, had nothing more to do but to keep quiet until the enemy should have unmasked his designs. He had, therefore, ordered his marshals to be under arms by daybreak, but to let the Austrians declare themselves before they moved, in order that they might ascertain with certainty the point where their blows would be mortal. He inclined, however, to have the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram carried by Davout and Oudinot, and, at the same time, to make an irruption through the centre with the army of Italy, the Saxons, and Marmont's corps, whilst Massena with his four divisions should only act against the Austrian right wing from Aderklaa to the Danube. Napoleon reserved to himself the Bavarians, the imperial guard, and the heavy cavalry, to meet unforeseen contingencies. These designs were subject to the control of events.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 6th of July, a day for ever memorable, the fire began first on the left of the Austrians and the right of the French. Prince Rosenberg, in consequence of erroneous instructions naming four o'clock as the hour for entering into action, descended from the heights of Neusiedel, crossed the Russbach at the village of Neusiedel, and moved in two columns on Grosshofen and Glinzendorf, which he attacked with extreme vigour. Marshal Davout had at his disposal his three ordinary divisions—Morand, Friant, and Gudin,—the small Puthod division (formerly Demont), six regiments of light cavalry under general Montbrun, three of dragoons under general Grouchy, and the four Espagne regiments of cuirassiers under general Arrighi (since duke of Padua). General Friant's left and general Gudin's right sent detachments to the defence of the village of Glinzendorf, whilst the

Puthod division undertook the defence of the village of Grosshofen, behind which it had bivouacked. Large banks of earth extended from the one to the other of these villages. Our soldiers, judiciously placed behind this natural entrenchment, kept up a well-sustained fire of musketry, which did vast mischief to the Austrians, without the latter doing us much in return. On hearing the firing, Napoleon sent general Mathieu Dumas with orders to his lieutenants not to hazard any offensive movement, but to content themselves with firmly keeping their ground, until he should have given them his final instructions; and he galloped to the right wing where marshal Davout was stationed. On his way he saw very distinctly the two Austrian columns attacking the villages of Glinzendorf and Grosshofen. He was accompanied by a brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers, with some batteries of light artillery, and he directed them to take the attacking column at Grosshofen in flank. This diversion came very *àpropos*, for it enabled general Puthod to recover possession of the village which the Austrians had taken at the point of the bayonet. The latter were forced to retreat to the Russbach. The same thing happened to the column which, having debouched from Neusiedel on Glinzendorf, found in front of them Gudin's right and Friant's left, and on their flank the light artillery of general Arrighi's cuirassiers. This column, too, was compelled to fall back on the Russbach. Prince Rosenberg was about to renew these attacks, when archduke Charles countermanded the movement, seeing that his left wing was beginning the battle prematurely.

The fire of musketry and cannon was now general on that vast front of three leagues, along which 300 thousand men and 11 hundred pieces of cannon were arrayed against each other. Napoleon, who saw everywhere a sort of simultaneous attack on the enemy's part, without any clearly defined plan, deemed it necessary, nevertheless, in any case to seize the hills of Neusiedel, in order to occupy the point at which the archdukes Charles and John might come to a junction. The aspect of the ground pointed out the way in which this was to be done. The heights forming the plateau of Wagram ran parallel with the Russbach as far as Neusiedel and the square tower, where they make a bend backwards, and presented a much gentler slope of very easy access. All that was requisite, then, was to cross the Russbach a little more to the right, away from the enemy's fire, in order to take the Austrian position in flank. Montbrun's light cavalry and Grouchy's dragoons were ordered rapidly to prepare the means of crossing the stream. Then the Morand and Friant divisions had orders to cross the Russbach and advance at right angles to the Gudin and Puthod divisions, and attack the plateau on the side whilst the latter were attacking it in front. As soon as the angle, of which the square tower formed the apex, was taken, Napoleon proposed to have Baumersdorf assailed by Oudinot, and Wagram by the army of Italy. When these several points had been carried, archduke John might appear on the field of battle, but it would be only to witness a disaster.

Napoleon had but just made these arrangements with marshal Davout, when several aides-de-camp arrived from Massena and Bernadotte, announcing a bad beginning of the day on the left and the centre, and requesting his presence and aid.

The events in question were serious, but quite reparable. Bernadotte, who had been obliged to evacuate Wagram on the preceding night and fall back on Aderklaa, remained in that position in the morning, presenting a point to the concavity of the curved line described by the Austrians. He saw on his right Bellegarde descending on Aderklaa with the most considerable part of his corps; and on his left the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers advancing on Süssenbrunn. He resolved, therefore, to fall back on a small plateau behind Aderklaa, in order to be nearer the army of Italy on the one side, and Massena on the other. No sooner had he executed this movement than Bellegarde's advanced guards fell upon him. The Saxons were unable long to resist such an assault, and he was driven back to a considerable distance.

At the same time, Massena's four weak divisions, amounting to but 18 thousand men against the 60 thousand of Klenau, Kollowrath, and Lichtenstein, had been obliged to retrograde in order to take up a less extended position on our left. Massena, though suffering from a recent fall from his horse, was present at the battle as he had promised Napoleon, and gave his orders from an open carriage, in which he lay all swathed in compresses.

It appeared to Massena, that if a vigorous stand was not made at the point which Bernadotte had just quitted, not only the left wing, but even the centre would be endangered. He therefore ordered the Carra St. Cyr division, consisting of the 24th light and 4th of the line, to march on Aderklaa. These two brave regiments dashed headlong into the village, and took it in spite of the impediments offered by the garden-walls and houses. But instead of halting there and securing their position, they too impetuously advanced beyond it, and placed themselves uncovered in the position in which Bernadotte had with reason declined to remain, and received Bellegarde's fire on their right flank and front, and that of the grenadier reserve on their left. After a heroic resistance, they were constrained to yield to numbers and fall back on Aderklaa, deprived of their two colonels. General Molitor then came to the support of Carra St. Cyr; but Legrand and Boudet, left alone with 10 thousand men against Klenau and Kollowrath with 15 thousand, were constrained to retreat to the left, and abandon a considerable extent of ground.

Such was the state of things reported to Napoleon at nine A.M. Satisfied as to his right wing, where he left Davout thoroughly instructed as to what he had to do, he galloped off, followed by his staff, to go to a distance of nearly two leagues, and repair the mischief. He found Bernadotte greatly agitated, tranquillised him, and rode on to Massena's carriage, round which the cannon-balls were raining. At that moment the Aspre grenadiers, excited by

the presence of archduke Charles, who had put himself at their head, were advancing victoriously through Aderklaa, from which they had driven out the Carra St. Cyr division.

Little moved by that spectacle, and relying on the vast resources at his command, Napoleon conversed for a while with Massena, and settled with him his plan of conduct. Already it might be inferred, from the direction of the firing, that Boudet had been forced back a long way, and that the archduke was in contact with the Danube on his right. Some officers even brought intelligence that Boudet had been driven back to Aspern after losing all his artillery. With troops as steady as those of Austerlitz, and who had not the recollection of Essling so fresh in their minds, Napoleon might have allowed his left to be forced, provided his centre stood fast, and have victoriously assumed the offensive on his right. As Davout was soon to carry the plateau of Wagram, and as Aderklaa could not fail to be retaken, it would have been altogether for our advantage to have the right wing of the Austrians between us and the Danube. We should have taken it wholly, and the house of Austria would, perhaps, have fallen that day. Napoleon thought of adopting that strategy, as he made known some days after. But with young troops, who had not forgotten Essling, it would have been running a great risk. The news that the enemy was at the bridges might alone throw them into a state of consternation. He rejected this idea, therefore, and thought only how he might put a direct stop to the progress of the Austrians towards the centre and the left, by a prompt disposal of the troops he had in reserve.

And here he reaped the fruit of his profound foresight. It was a principle of his, that it was by concentrating on one point the action of certain special arms that grand effects were to be produced, and therefore it was that he had bestowed an immense reserve of artillery on the guard, and had kept under his hand a reserve of fourteen regiments of cuirassiers. So he ordered the whole of the artillery of the guard, together with all that could be spared by the several corps, to advance at a gallop. Just then, general de Wrede arrived on the ground with twenty-five pieces of excellent artillery, and solicited the honour of taking part in that decisive movement, to which Napoleon consented. He sent also for general Macdonald, with three divisions of the army of Italy, the fusiliers and mounted grenadiers of the guard, and general Nansouty's six regiments of cuirassiers. His design was to shake the Austrian centre with a hundred guns, and then to pierce it with Macdonald's bayonets and Nansouty's sabres. He decided at the same time that Massena, with the Carra St. Cyr, Molitor, and Legrand divisions, formed in close columns, should wheel to the right, and then move forward perpendicularly to the Danube to the aid of Boudet, thus performing a flank movement under the fire of Kollowrath and Klenau. After all, the numerous *têtes de pont* he had constructed afforded him a sufficient security, and in this instance, again, his forethought was rewarded. But he did not choose that his young troops should

hear the cannon in their rear, and be rendered uneasy about the communications of the army with the Danube.

These orders were obeyed on the instant. Massena's three divisions defiled in one long column towards the Danube, receiving in flank, with heroic impassibility, the fire of Klenau and Kollowrath. Lasalle and Marulaz covered them during their march, charging and repulsing the Austrian cavalry. Meanwhile Napoleon, impatient for the arrival of Macdonald and Lauriston, sent officer after officer to hasten them, and, mounted on a Persian horse of dazzling whiteness, rode under a hail of cannon-balls about the ground quitted by Massena. The cannonade had by this time acquired the frequency of musket-firing, and everybody shuddered at the thought of seeing the man, on whose life so many destinies depended, struck by one of those blind messengers of death. But up came at last at a gallop, making the earth tremble beneath them, the sixty pieces of artillery belonging to the guard, and forty others, French and Bavarian, all directed by the illustrious Drouot. The hundred guns were ranged in a line, and instantly began the most tremendous cannonade ever known in our long wars. From Wagram to Aderklaa, and from Aderklaa to Süssenbrunn, the Austrian line presented an open angle, one side of which was formed by Bellegarde, the other by the grenadiers and the cuirassiers. The hundred cannons, firing incessantly on that double line, pierced it with balls, and soon dismounted the enemy's artillery. Napoleon observed with his glass the effect of that formidable battery, and was satisfied with the correctness of his own conceptions. But artillery was not sufficient to break the Austrian centre; bayonets, too, were requisite, and the army of Italy came up at double-quick step. The intrepid Macdonald, recently recalled from disfavour, marches at the head of his corps, astonishing those who did not know him by his costume of the fashion of the republic, and preparing to astonish them still more by his behaviour under fire. He deploys part of the Broussier division and a brigade of the Seras division in a single line, and ranges in close columns on the left wing the remains of the Broussier division, on the right Lamarque's division, and thus presents to the enemy an oblong square, which he closes with the twenty-four squadrons of Nansouty's cuirassiers. As a support to him, Napoleon places in his rear the fusiliers and tirailleurs of the imperial guard, to the number of eight battalions, under general Reille. To these he adds the cavalry of the guard, to fall at the right moment upon the enemy's infantry, and then, with his eyes fixed on that grand spectacle, he awaits the success of the manœuvres he has ordered.

Macdonald advances under a deluge of fire, leaving the ground covered at every step with his dead and wounded, still closing his ranks without wavering, and communicating his own gallant bearing to his soldiers. "What a brave man!" Napoleon exclaims several times, seeing him march thus under grape and bullets. Suddenly prince John de Lichtenstein advances to the charge with his heavy cavalry. Macdonald halts, and orders the two columns

which form the sides of his square to face the enemy, who is thus met with three lines of fire. The ground shakes under the gallop of the Austrian cuirassiers, but they are received with such volleys of musketry, that they are forced to halt and retreat upon their infantry, whom their flight throws into great disorder. It is now the moment for our cavalry to charge and make thousands of prisoners in this confusion. Macdonald gives the order to Nansouty, but the latter, being obliged to bring up his troops from the rear to the front, unavoidably loses some precious time. When he is ready, the disorder of the Austrian infantry is partly repaired. He charges, however, and breaks several squares. Macdonald, in his impatience, addresses himself to the cavalry of the guard which was near him, and was commanded by general Walther. But the latter could only receive orders of marshal Bessières, and he had just been struck by a cannon-ball. Macdonald was sorely vexed at seeing the fruit of his victory thus escape him; but, though he made few prisoners, he had at least forced the Austrian army to retrograde, and frustrated their attempt on our centre and left. The archduke's troops gradually withdrew from Aderklaa on the one side, and Süssenbrunn on the other.

The serious danger that had threatened the army was now removed. Massena's column had arrived near the river towards Aspern, had faced to the right, and, preceded by its cavalry, had resumed the offensive against Kollowrath and Klenau. Boudet was brought back into line, and, all marching forward, drove the Austrians back upon Breitenlee and Hirschstatten. Lasalle and Marulaz made brilliant charges at the head of their cavalry, but the former was struck by a musket-ball, and ended his glorious career in seeing the enemy fly.

Thus the archduke's centre, shaken by the fire of a hundred pieces of ordnance, and arrested by Macdonald, retreats, as does also his right. If marshal Davout, in accordance with his orders, carries the position of Neusiedel on the left wing of the Austrians, it is all over with them. That position being taken, the line of heights from Neusiedel to Wagram will be no longer tenable, and archduke Charles will be cut off from the route to Hungary, separated from archduke John, and forced into Bohemia. Accordingly, Napoleon's gaze is now constantly turned to the right, towards the square tower which commands the village of Neusiedel, and he waits only the progress of the fire on that side to let loose Oudinot's corps on Wagram. He has still left, in case archduke John should come up, half the army of Italy, Marmont's corps, the old guard, and the Bavarians. Happen then what may, he has resources to meet every chance of the day.

The confidence Napoleon placed in marshal Davout was fully justified on this as on all other occasions. Montbrun and Grouchy prepared the passage of the Russbach on our extreme right for themselves and the infantry. The Morand and Friant divisions crossed the stream after the cavalry, and, ranging themselves on the

flank of the position of Neusiedel, formed a right angle with Gudin and Puthod's divisions, which remained before the Russbach from Neusiedel to Baumersdorf. When the signal to attack was given, Morand, who was on the extreme right where the ascent was easiest, advanced first. Friant, placed between Morand and Neusiedel, where he formed the apex of the angle, waited until Morand should have gained ground upon the extremity of the enemy's line to attack the hill in his turn. For the present he confined himself to a violent cannonade, which he maintained with sixty pieces detached from several divisions. Morand, seconded on the left by this cannonade, and on the right by Montbrun's cavalry charges, coolly ascended the rising ground. ' In order to face this attack in flank, Rosenberg makes his line fall back. Morand continues his ascent under a plunging fire of the whole of that part of the Austrian line, and then attacks the enemy in column. Rosenberg assails his left, formed by the 17th of the line, and compels it to give way for a moment, until Friant sends to its aid Gilly's brigade, consisting of the 15th light and 33rd of the line, which charge up the hill, and drive back Rosenberg's troops at the point of the bayonet. Puthod and Gudin's divisions now come into action. 'Puthod forces his way into the village of Neusiedel, and, after a severe conflict with the Austrian troops, compels them to retire 'upon the hill in the rear. At the same moment Gudin daringly scales the plateau under a murderous fire, whilst Friant has already gained ground in Rosenberg's rear. The square tower is at this moment passed by both Friant and Gudin. All is not ended, however. Hitherto they had had to fight only Rosenberg, favoured by the position; but Hohenzollern, who had remained stationary above Baumersdorf, opposite Oudinot, who had not yet been engaged, moved half his troops towards the square tower, to assail Gudin's right and plunge it in the Russbach. Vainly did Arrighi's cuirassiers endeavour to defile between the camp barracks in order to charge the hill which terminates in the plateau. Assailed in the narrow lanes of the camp by a most vehement fire, they could not charge with advantage, and retreated in disorder. The 85th of the line of Gudin's division was nearly brought to a halt by the violence of the fire. The other regiments of the same division came to its aid, and the whole body gradually succeeded in repulsing Hohenzollern, whilst Morand and Friant gained ground on the rear of the plateau in closely pursuing Rosenberg's troops.

Whilst marshal Davout thus accomplished his task, Napoleon, seeing his fires passing beyond the square tower, no longer had any doubt of the day's success. "The battle is won!" he exclaimed; and he sent the news to marshal Massena, prince Eugene, and general Macdonald. Then he ordered Oudinot's corps to march on Baumersdorf and Wagram, and carry that portion of the heights. Oudinot's troops dashed into the village, which they had been unable to carry on the preceding evening, traversed it, ascended the plateau, and joined Gudin's division on their right. The impulse then

became general. The Austrian line was everywhere driven back; and Gudin's division ranging evenly at that moment with those of Friant and Morand, Davout's whole corps formed one long oblique line, which swept the whole extent of the plateau of Wagram.

The Tharreau division of Oudinot's corps marched on Wagram, charged several battalions, took two and the village, in which it made several prisoners. The Frère division (Oudinot's second) passed the village on the right. The Grandjean division (formerly St. Hilaire) followed that movement, repulsed the Austrian infantry, and sharply assailed them when they attempted to make a stand. The 10th light infantry fell upon a battalion which had formed in square, and took it. Napoleon, seeing the Austrian army retreating in all quarters, and our line extending and even weakening itself in some points as it advanced, sent succours where they were needed, and particularly to general Macdonald, who was separated from Massena on his left, and Bernadotte on his right. He ordered to his aid de Wrede's Bavarian infantry and the cavalry of the guard. On arriving at Süssenbrunn he found the enemy's infantry still in possession of the village, which he took, and, charging with his light cavalry, he made 4 or 5 thousand prisoners at one stroke.

It was now three o'clock. Our left had driven back Klenau on Jedlersdorf; our centre had forced Bellegarde on Helmhof; our right had made Hohenzollern and Rosenberg fall back upon Bockflüss. Archduke Charles then gave orders for a retreat, fearing that he should lose the road to Moravia, and be forced towards Bohemia, far away from the centre of the monarchy. One hundred and twenty thousand Frenchmen pursued the same number of Austrians, engaging with them here and there in a multitude of partial conflicts, and collecting at every step prisoners, cannons, and colours.

Such was that celebrated battle of Wagram, begun at four in the morning and terminated at four in the afternoon. Napoleon had still in reserve Marmont's corps, part of the army of Italy, and the old guard—in all, 30 thousand men—in case archduke John should come and take part in the battle. That prince did at last approach the plain of Marchfeld, and showed himself to the right on our rear towards Siebenbrunn. His scouts, encountering ours, produced a sort of panic. The *vivandières*, and the long files of soldiers carrying off the wounded, thought that a second army was coming to recommence the fight, and they ran away uttering cries of terror. Among these fugitives were many young soldiers, exhausted by the heat of the day, and who, as usual, quitted the ground under the pretext of picking up the wounded. Such was the tumult, that the reserved corps had to stand to their arms, and Napoleon, who had dismounted and was resting in the shade of a pyramid made of drums, was obliged to get into the saddle again. He believed that archduke John was debouching in good earnest, and he was preparing to receive him with the forces he had kept intact for that purpose, when he saw the danger passing away, and the heads

of the column which had shown themselves for a while disappearing below the horizon. The order to repair to Wagram had been despatched to archduke John on the evening of the 4th; he received it on the morning of the 5th, started that day at noon, passed the night at Marchegg, marched again rather late on the morning of the 6th, and arrived when the battle was ended. He had certainly not intended to betray his brother, but he marched as might have been expected of a man of undecided character, who knew not the value of time. Had he come sooner on the ground, he would have added to the effusion of blood without changing the fortune of the day, since, to meet the 12 thousand men he brought with him, there were Marmont's 10 thousand, the 10 thousand remaining with prince Eugene, and, if necessary, the old guard. He had badly obeyed a chief who had badly commanded.

The results of the battle of Wagram, without being as extraordinary as those of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland, were very great nevertheless. The Austrians had lost in killed or wounded about 24 thousand men, among whom were generals Nordmann, d'Aspre, Wukassovich, Vecsay, Rouvroy, Nostiz, Hesse Homburg, Vacquant, Motzen, Stutterheim, Homberg, and Merville. We had taken from them 9 thousand prisoners, who, with those of the preceding day, made a total of 12 thousand, and a score pieces of cannon. We had thus weakened the Austrian force by 36 thousand men. On our part we had lost from 15 to 18 thousand men, 7 thousand of whom were mortally wounded. It was, then, a memorable battle, the greatest in respect to numbers which Napoleon had fought, and one of the most important in its consequences. Its most wonderful characteristic was not, as on former occasions, the prodigious quantity of prisoners, flags, and cannons taken during the day; it was, that one of the broadest rivers in Europe had been crossed in face of the enemy with admirable precision, concert, and security; it was, twenty-four hours fighting along a line three leagues long and backed against that river, with all the perils of such a situation annulled; it was, that the position by which the commander-in-chief held the French in check was carried, and the army that defended the Austrian monarchy was beaten, and put out of condition to keep the field! These results were immense, since they terminated the war. In a military point of view, Napoleon had, in the passage of the Danube, outdone anything ever before achieved in that way. On the field of battle, he had with rare promptitude moved from the centre to the left the reserve he had skilfully made, and had solved the question by one of those decisive movements which belong only to great captains; and if he had deprived himself of one important result by too soon stopping the Austrians when about to place themselves between him and the river, he had done so from highly prudential motives, which deserve to be admired. If there was anything to object to in what related to these prodigious events, it was certain consequences of Napoleon's policy, such as the extreme youth of his troops, the immoderate extent of the operations, the mistakes

arising from the assemblage of men of so many different nations, and an incipient confusion imputable, not to the mind of the commander, but to the diversity and the quantity of the elements he was obliged to use. His genius was ever extraordinary, and the more extraordinary for that he strove against the nature of things; but it was already visible, that if that strife were prolonged, it was not the nature of things that would be vanquished.

As to the adversary, he had been brave, devoted to his cause, ingenious, but undecided. Without considering all the plans more or less specious which he had been blamed for not having adopted, such as assailing the isle of Lobau after the battle of Essling, or crossing the Danube above or below Vienna, it is unquestionable that there were certain simple things, of infallible effect, which he ought to have done, and which fortunately for us he did not do; such as multiplying the impediments to the passage of the river all about the isle of Lobau; entrenching the camp which was to be the field of battle, which would have enabled him, after making head against the French, to take them in flank and drive them back upon the river; giving his orders with precision enough not to have the left wing entering into action before the right; and gathering together for that decisive day all the disposable forces of the monarchy, whereof 40 thousand men at least remained idle in Hungary, Bohemia, and Gallicia. It is commonly simple things, dictated by good sense and imprudently omitted, which decide the fate of the most important operations, especially in war. There seem grounds, too, for saying that the Austrian prince gave the word to retreat a little too soon, for he was still capable of making a stand against the French, and, had he done so, archduke John's appearance on the field of battle would not have been too late. On the other hand, it must be owned that longer resistance might have rendered the defeat so complete, that nothing would have remained of an army on the preservation of which depended the weal of the monarchy. Further resistance would have increased the chances of victory, but also greatly increased the chances of perishing beyond recovery. But whatever we may think of those various judgments which have been pronounced on these memorable events by all historians during the last half century, it is not the less true that there is glory even in being mistaken when one fights heroically for one's country, and takes part in such grand things. The war, besides, was drawing to an end, for it was not with archduke's John's 12 thousand men, and the 80 thousand men remaining to archduke Charles, that it was possible to save the monarchy. Though the latter had lost in action only 30 and some odd thousands, an equal number belonging to the landwehr had quitted the ranks and were returning home. To retire into one of the provinces of the monarchy, recruit the army as far as it was possible, and by holding out threats of indefinitely prolonging the war obtain better conditions of peace, was the only hopeful course yet remaining.

It was thus Napoleon appraised the result of the battle of Wagram,

and whilst he regarded the end of hostilities as at hand, he would have that end be such that the peace should depend absolutely upon himself. If instead of sending the old army of Boulogne into Spain, to perish uselessly against natural obstacles, he had kept it between the Rhine and the Danube, he might have overwhelmed Austria with it, and expunged that power from the map of Europe for the remainder of his own reign. But, obliged to contend with hastily-collected forces against the immense armaments of Austria, he had done wonders in subjugating her in three months; and if he succeeded in imposing peace upon her and punishing her for this fourth war by fresh sacrifices of territory, population, and money, that was enough for his personal glory, and for the maintenance of his greatness. He had already, therefore, abandoned the idea of dethroning the house of Hapsburg, which he had conceived in the first impulse of his anger, and after the prodigious triumphs of Ratisbon. To punish that house by lowering it still more, and by the same blow to extinguish the resistances that had threatened to break out in Europe, was to be the sole, but great and brilliant enough prize of that last campaign—a campaign not less extraordinary than the others, especially if the means were compared with the results.

Napoleon, then, had no other intention in pursuing the Austrians than to bring them finally to submission. But it was no longer possible for him to act as he used to do in former days; that is to say, after having fought a whole day, to resume his march immediately, so as to reap all the consequences of victory. His army was too numerous, he had too many points to look to, he had too many newly-officered regiments, and too many young soldiers in the regiments with old officers, to be able to march again the same evening or the following morning, without caring about what he left behind him. There were regiments, in fact, in which a multitude of the soldiers were either marauding or occupied in the transport of the wounded. Some there were of 2500 men that had 500 men *hors de combat*, 1000 detached, and only 1000 present under arms. The heat was excessive, wine was plentiful in the villages, the soldier was somewhat disorderly in the enjoyment of victory, and it needed Napoleon's immense ascendency over him to maintain obedience, presence with the colours, and attachment to duty. Already everything was become more difficult at this period, and Napoleon knew it without owning it.

The next day, July 7, he repaired to the imperial residence of Wolkersdorf, from which the emperor Francis had watched the battle of Wagram, and established his head-quarters there. He granted that day to the several corps to convey their wounded to the ambulances in the isle of Lobau, rally the detached or missing soldiers, revictual themselves, renew their stock of ammunition, and put themselves in a condition to perform a long and rapid march. Meanwhile, he despatched the troops that had not been brought into action on the route on which it was probable they would find

the enemy. Moravia seemed the most likely place of retreat to be chosen by the Austrian commanders, because, being situated between Bohemia and Hungary, it allowed of communication with either, of drawing from them what resources they could, and of choosing the one or other as the theatre of a prolonged resistance. Napoleon first despatched Montbrun's cavalry along the Nikolsburg road, and sent after it, on the evening of the 7th, Marmont's fine corps and the Bavarian troops of general de Wrede, whose artillery alone had been engaged. Assigning to them Moravia as their common destination, he left them free to turn right or left, into Hungary or Bohemia, as Montbrun's *reconnaissances* should indicate the one or the other as the direction in which the enemy had retreated. He directed Massena to rally his forces as soon as possible, and with such of his divisions as had suffered least, particularly those of Legrand and Molitor, to march along the Danube and observe the route to Bohemia by Korneuburg, Stockerau, and Znaïm. He left him the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and Lasalle's cavalry, which after that general's death had been commanded by Marulaz, and, the latter having been wounded, by general Bruyère.

The next day, the 8th, Napoleon being as yet very imperfectly informed as to the march of the Austrians, whom the light cavalry discovered on both roads, the Moravian and the Bohemian, and still judging that of Moravia as the most naturally indicated, he sent Davout, whose *corps d'armée* was quite recovered from the fatigues of the 6th, to Nikolsburg, after Marmont. He had left him Grouchy's dragoons and Arrighi's cuirassiers. These troops, with Marmont's, made a total of at least 45 thousand men, capable of making head against the whole army of archduke Charles. At the same time, Napoleon sent the Saxons to the March, to watch archduke John, and compel him to remain beyond that line. He left prince Eugene under the walls of Vienna with part of his army, to quell the capital if it stirred, and to stop archduke John, if, quitting the left bank of the Danube, which he had just conquered, he made an attempt on the unguarded right bank, to which Chasteler and Giulay might possibly lend their aid. General Vandamme was also moved to Vienna with the Wurtembergers. Napoleon sent Macdonald after Massena, and he himself remained twenty-four hours longer at Wolkersdorf with the whole guard, Nansouty's cuirassiers, and Oudinot's young troops, in order to learn on which of the two routes, that to Moravia or that to Bohemia, he should be certain of finding the enemy.

Though he did not believe in the possibility of a prolonged resistance on the part of the Austrians, yet not wishing to leave anything to chance during his absence from Vienna, Napoleon took measures for putting it in a state of defence. He ordered the hundred and nine guns of large calibre, which had protected the passage of the army, to be carried back to the capital and planted on the walls; to close all the bastions, so that the garrison might be

safe against foes within or without; to collect provisions and ammunition for 10 thousand men for three months; to send up to the capital the boats that had been employed in the various operations of the isle of Lobau; to establish a temporary bridge of boats on the site of the Thabor bridge, until it could be reconstructed on piles, and to protect it on both banks with vast *têtes de pont*. The isle of Lobau might thenceforth suffice for itself with the bridges on piles over both branches of the river, since it was become only a place of depôt, and a receptable for prisoners and wounded men. With an assured communication at Vienna, and another at the isle of Lobau, Napoleon had means of passage sufficient for all imaginable contingencies of war. He gave orders at the same time to complete the arming of Raab, and to finish the works at Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, which were still intended to secure his line of operation. Lastly, having taken all these precautions in case of a prolonged struggle, he resolved to derive from the victory of Wagram one of its most essential consequences—an immediate increase of his financial resources—and he imposed on the provinces of the monarchy a war-contribution of two hundred millions, which being once decreed could not be brought in question in any subsequent negotiation for peace. In this way he employed the 7th, 8th, and part of the 9th of July at Wolkersdorf, whilst waiting the result of the *reconnaissances* prosecuted in all directions.

Archduke Charles, there is no telling why, had adopted Bohemia as the place of retreat. Whether fearing that he should not reach the road to Moravia in time, or wishing to preserve the important province of Bohemia to the monarchy, and to remain in communication with the centre of Germany, which was still expected to rise, he had retreated on the Znaïm road, which leads to Prague by Iglau. This was a strange resolution on his part, for, except the satisfaction of separating from his brother the archduke John, and leaving it to him to raise Hungary, whilst he himself proceeded to turn to account all the resources of Bohemia, it is hard to know what advantages he hoped to derive from it. By entering Bohemia he shut himself up in a sort of close field, which his adversary might traverse entirely in a few marches, and without moving far from the Danube, and thus everything was made to depend on a final encounter, which would take place soon, and the issue of which could not be doubtful. On the contrary, had he marched into Hungary, he would have rallied all the forces left to the house of Austria, drawn his adversary into the heart of the monarchy, where the Austrian army would have gone on continually increasing and the French army diminishing; where he would, perhaps, have found opportunity to fight another battle less unfortunate than Wagram, and raised up against Napoleon the only difficulty by which he could be beaten—the only one by which he was beaten subsequently—that of distances. The inconvenience of losing the resources of Bohemia was not very considerable, for on the one hand that province had scarcely anything left

to supply, and on the other, Napoleon had not forces to devote to its occupation. The archduke's choice, then, can only be explained by the trouble and perplexity attendant on defeat, which almost always leads to the worst measures, and makes one misfortune engender others still greater and more irreparable.

Well, then, the archduke had taken the road to Prague by Znaïm, having with him Bellegarde, Kollowrath, and Klenau's corps, and the grenadier and cavalry reserves; altogether not more than 60 thousand men. The corps of prince de Reuss, which had wasted the day of the 6th in observing the Vienna road, not having suffered in the battle, brought up the rear. On the way to Moravia, by Wilfersdorf and Nikolsburg, archduke Charles allowed Hohenzollern and Rosenberg's corps to retire, to flank the main army—a fact which suggests that there was in this circumstance something worse than a bad resolution, namely, absence of resolution, and that each corps took the route on which the lost battle had cast it. The left, in fact, composed of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg's forces, had been forced upon the route to Moravia; whilst the centre and the right had been driven on that to Bohemia. Thus it is, that frequently where history exhausts itself in search of motives, there have been none at all.

The double march, however, which removed from archduke Charles some 20 or 25 thousand of his best forces, had one momentary advantage. It left Napoleon in complete uncertainty as to the enemy's route, and exposed him to mistake the direction in which he should send his columns. Thus, along the Moravian road, by Wolkersdorf and Nikolsburg, he had sent Montbrun, Marmont, de Wrede, and Davout (that is to say, 45 thousand men against 25 thousand), and on the route by Znaïm, Massena, Macdonald, Marulaz, and St. Sulpice (28 thousand men against 60 thousand). It is true that as he himself kept in the middle with the guard, Nansouty, and Oudinot, he could in a few hours afford the aid of 30 thousand men to whichever of his lieutenants had need of it.

Massena on the one side, and Marmont on the other, pursued their respective routes. On the 8th of July, Marmont was close upon Rosenberg's rear guard, and picked up many of its wounded and fatigued soldiers, most of them belonging to the landwehr. Arrived at Wilfersdorf on the 9th, he learned, through Montbrun's skilful and daring *reconnaissances*, that Rosenberg had turned off to the left. The fact was, the two lieutenants of archduke Charles had quitted the road to Moravia, and were making again for Bohemia, to join the main body of the army; therein obeying a will, the strange vacillations of which will be presently seen. General Marmont having been left free by Napoleon to act according to circumstances, turned off likewise, and marched, by Mistelbach and Laa, in the direction of Znaïm. But, not knowing whether the body he was pursuing was the main army or a detachment, he only informed marshal Davout of his *détour* to the left,

without doing anything to hinder the latter from continuing his march to Nikolsburg and Moravia.

On the 9th, when half-way to Laa, he came up with 1200 horse and two infantry battalions of Rosenberg's, routed them, and took some hundreds of prisoners. He arrived in the evening at Laa, on the Taya—a stream which, after passing through the heart of Moravia, falls into the Morava. The heat was stifling, that province being sheltered on the north by the mountains of Bohemia, Upper Silesia, and Hungary. The wine-cellars of the country were well stocked, and Marmont's troops, tired, heated, and too confident from recent victory, took to straggling, so that when he arrived at Laa he had not a fourth of his effective in the ranks. He assembled the officers, pointed out to them the danger of endangering the result of a grand campaign by culpable negligence, shot two of the soldiers by way of example, and was able to rally his men, and march by daybreak against Znaïm. Again another *détour* of the enemy went near to perplex him. Rosenberg's corps, which had turned off to the left to reach the road to Znaïm, now turned to the right, to get back to that to Brünn. Hohenzollern's corps still continued its march to Bohemia, but archduke Charles sent Rosenberg's back towards Moravia; there is no telling why, for that corps was not strong enough to defend the province if the French cared to occupy it. This was a further proof that these two corps had been left, without reflection, on the route to Moravia, and that they had been, again without reflection, ordered now towards Znaïm, now towards Brünn. Puzzling as were these divagations of the Austrian forces, Marmont, with remarkable military sagacity, persisted in his march on Znaïm, leaving Rosenberg to make a fresh *détour* to the right, whilst he himself continued in the direction which led, as he rightly surmised, to the enemy.

Towards the middle of the same day Marmont, having reached a position in which he had the Taya on his left, and in front a deep ravine falling into the Taya, saw beyond the ravine the basin in which the town of Znaïm was situated, in the form of an amphitheatre. The Austrians were crowding on the bridge over the Taya, and hastily traversing the town to reach the Bohemian road in time. Far from being in a condition to place himself across that road and bar it, he was himself in great danger, having but 10 thousand men against 60 thousand. The Austrians occupied the banks of the ravine, which he took from them by a vigorous attack of the 8th and 23rd of the line. He also seized the village of Teswitz, situated below, from which point he could cannonade the bridge, besides two farms on his right, to serve him as *points d'appui;* and a wood further still to the right, which he filled with his tirailleurs. Having his front thus covered by the ravine of which he was master, his left by the Taya, and his right by farms and a wood, both strongly occupied, he could harass the Austrians with his cannon during their passage over the bridge, without too much exposing himself to their reprisals. Meanwhile, he despatched

aides-de-camp to inform Napoleon of the singular position in which he was placed.

To relieve themselves from Marmont's severe and perilous cannonade, the Austrians made a determined attack on the village of Teswitz. Seeing their preparations for this attack, Marmont sent Bavarian troops to baffle it. As the assailants redoubled their efforts, it was necessary to employ against them the whole of de Wrede's division, and at last the 81st of the line. That French regiment put an end to the conflict, and kept the Austrians at a great distance. The day ended without any other event. Towards the close of it a distant cannonade on the left announced Massena's march on the Bohemian road. Napoleon, too, could not fail to arrive soon on the right. Marmont, therefore, passed the night quietly, in full confidence in his position. Another circumstance tended to increase his sense of security. M. de Fresnel, a Frenchman in the service of Austria, presented himself, on the part of general the count de Bellegarde, to request an armistice. General Marmont not having power to conclude such an act, and hoping, too, that it would be possible to surround the Austrian army on the following day, despatched the envoy to the Emperor's head-quarters, without taking upon himself to suspend hostilities.

The French were now coming up by both roads with the Austrians. Massena had been constantly on the heels of prince de Reuss' rear guard, and had taken from it many prisoners. On the 9th he came up with it at the foot of the Mallebern hills, and on the 10th at Hollabrünn, where he fought, whilst Marmont was establishing his position before Znaïm. Archduke Charles, on hearing of the presence of a French corps at Laa, had sent the grenadiers and the cavalry reserve to take possession of the bridge over the Taya, and had followed them himself with Bellegarde, Kollowrath, and Klenau's corps, leaving Reuss to hold out at Hollabrünn as long as he could. He it was, then, with the corps we have mentioned, whom Marmont saw crossing the Schallersdorf bridge, as that over the Taya before Znaïm was called. Whilst these things were taking place on the right, Napoleon marched to Laa on the 10th, hoping to have the guard at Znaïm on the 11th. About the middle of that day he arrived before his troops at Marmont's head-quarters.

On the morning of the 11th the Austrians continued to defile in sight of Marmont, who cannonaded them from the village of Teswitz as they passed the river; and Massena, pursuing prince de Reuss, drove them in the middle of the day on the Taya, after a sharp engagement. On coming up to the Schallersdorf bridge, which was barricaded, Massena made the gallant Legrand division attack it. Its commander, leading his soldiers under fire with his usual bravery, assailed the bridge in front, whilst Massena's artillery played on it obliquely. Scaling the barricades, he made himself master of the bridge, and, after that act of daring, he marched his division into the little plain which formed the basin of the Taya, in presence

of the troops of prince de Reuss and the Austrian grenadiers backed against the town of Znaïm. From the summit of the hills to the right, on the other side of the Taya, general Marmont watched this spectacle, impatient to second Massena effectually.

The latter, not content with one act of hardihood, resolved to attack the Austrians, drive them into Znaïm, follow them through it, and chace them beyond it, in hopes that Marmont's troops would bar the way against them to Bohemia. But he had with him only Legrand's division, the Carra St. Cyr division, the same which had been so imprudently heroic at Aderklaa, not having yet come up. Yet with his one division he assailed de Reuss' troops and the grenadiers, his artillery seconding him from the hither side of the Taya. Having crossed the bridge, he entered the long village of Schallersdorf, took it, seized a large convent on the left called Kloster Bruck, and launched his cuirassiers into the plain on the right, where they made several vigorous charges against the Austrians. Massena, with 7 or 8 thousand men, was then engaged with more than 30 thousand, without reckoning the 30 thousand others drawn up beyond Znaïm, in the plains through which lay the road to Bohemia. A frightful storm having come on, the battle was almost suspended by the impossibility of firing. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the Austrian grenadiers advanced in silence through the village of Schallersdorf, surprised our soldiers, who could not use their muskets, and for a while made themselves masters of the bridge. Massena thought to set the cuirassiers at them, but the ground had become too slippery to support them. Matters were assuming an alarming aspect, when fortunately the Carra St. Cyr division came up, recaptured the bridge, cut its way through the whole length of the column of grenadiers, took 800 of them prisoners, and debouched victoriously on the plain of Znaïm. At that moment Marmont had debouched from Teswitz, and joined Massena in driving the Austrians on Znaïm, whence they would soon be constrained to retreat in disorder, but the guard not having yet come up there was no hope of surrounding them. Three thousand horse of that corps had indeed already appeared, and these, with Montbrun's cavalry and St. Sulpice's cuirassiers, might make the retreat of the Austrians singularly calamitous.

But Napoleon, who had meanwhile arrived, had met Bellegarde's envoy and received prince John de Lichtenstein himself, who came to ask for a suspension of arms, and promise, in the name of military honour, the opening of a negotiation for the immediate conclusion of peace. Napoleon conferred a while with major-general Berthier, M. Maret, duke of Bassano, and the grand-marshal Duroc, as to the course to be taken. He might, if he kept the Austrians engaged for some hours longer by an obstinate combat, have gained time enough perhaps to turn them, or, at the very least, to let loose after them 10 thousand horse, who would have thrown them into horrible disorder. But without having recourse to that measure, there was a certainty of obtaining the most advantageous

conditions of peace, and his pride being gratified at seeing the most brilliant and most noble officer in the Austrian army come and humbly implore him to put an end to the war, he was inclined to stop in his victorious march. Opinions differed on this subject. Some were for extinguishing the house of Austria and all coalitions with it, so that they might not be revived when we turned to Spain to finish the war there. Others alleged the danger of prolonging a struggle begun with extemporised means and ended in three months by a miracle of genius, but which, if continued, might provoke a rising in Germany, rouse even the Russians, who were not disposed to see the house of Austria destroyed, and thus set the whole continent in flames. Napoleon, feeling confusedly that he had already greatly abused fortune, and hoping that this fresh lesson would for the future hinder Austria from molesting him in his struggle with Spain and England, exclaimed, "Enough blood has been shed! Let us make peace!"

He exacted from prince John of Lichtenstein a promise that plenipotentiaries should be sent forth with power to negotiate, and left Berthier on the part of France, and M. de Wimpffen on that of Austria, to stipulate the conditions of an armistice.

Whilst they were thus engaged, colonel Marbot and general d'Aspre were despatched to the advanced posts to put an end to hostilities. They arrived between Schallersdorf and Znaïmwhilst Massena's troops were engaged with the Austrian grenadiers. Such was the eagerness of the combatants, that the cry of "*Peace! peace! Stop firing!*" repeated a thousand times, was not enough to separate them. Colonel Marbot and general d'Aspre were even slightly wounded in their endeavours to put an end to the fight. They succeeded at last, and a profound silence, broken only by the joyous acclamations of the victors, succeeded to a frightful cannonade. The day cost us about 2 thousand killed and wounded, and the Austrians more than 3 thousand, with 5 or 6 thousand prisoners. It was a final victory, that worthily closed this grand campaign.

Taking the field at the end of April, with troops hardly formed and still scattered, against archduke Charles, who marched with an army long organised and already brought together, Napoleon succeeded in some days in completing his own, concentrating it in presence of the enemy, cutting in two that of archduke Charles, and casting one moiety into Bohemia, the other into Lower Austria. Such had been the first act of the campaign which ended at Ratisbon. Next, pursuing the Austrians dispersed over both sides of the Danube, Napoleon marched so rapidly and so surely, that he never allowed them to rally before Vienna, and entered that capital a month after the opening of the campaign, thus repairing the defeat of the army of Italy, and stopping at their source all schemes for stirring up the continent against France. Wishing to cross the Danube to end the war by a decisive battle, and having been interrupted in that operation by a

sudden flood, he sustained, by prodigies of energy in the two days of Essling, the very dangerous enterprise of fighting with a river at his back, thanks to the admirable choice of the isle of Lobau as a ground of passage. Having returned to the right bank, he devised magnificent works to annul almost entirely the obstacle that separated him from the Austrians, brought up the armies of Italy and Dalmatia, thus concentrated all his forces for a decisive battle, and then, performing in a few hours the miracle of crossing a broad river in presence of the enemy, with 150 men and 500 pieces of artillery, he terminated, in one of the greatest battles in the history of the world, that fourth Austrian war—a war not less memorable than all those he had directed, and one in which his genius, surmounting its own faults, had made up by marvels of industry and perseverance for all the deficiencies which an insensate policy had accumulated around him; a war in which the warnings of fortune were once more renewed, as if to put the great captain on his guard against the errors of the imprudent and wildly ambitious politician.

In stipulating the terms of the armistice, Napoleon was most careful to ensure his military position in case of a renewal of hostilities, should it be found impossible to agree on the conditions of peace. He insisted, in the first place, that he should be allowed to occupy, in a permanent manner, all the provinces he had only traversed with his troops: these were Upper and Lower Austria, half Moravia, consisting of the districts of Znaïm and Brünn, the part of Hungary extending from the Raab to Vienna, Styria, Carinthia, and a portion of Carniola necessary for communicating with Italy and Dalmatia. In this way the line of separation between the belligerent armies was to pass through Lintz, Krems, Znaïm, Brünn, Göding, Presburg, Raab, Grätz, Laybach, and Trieste. Moreover, as supports to this line, the citadel of Brünn, the town of Presburg, and the fortresses of Raab, Grätz, and Laybach, were to be left to him, or delivered to him immediately. He thus occupied more than a third of the Austrian empire. Established in its centre, supported by the capital and the principal fortresses, he might, in case of prolonged hostilities, take Vienna for his basis of operations, and push his conquests into the most remote provinces. He allowed a month for the duration of the armistice, and stipulated for a fortnight's previous notice in case of rupture. A month would suffice for the negotiations, if there was a real desire to come to terms, and for the arrival of reinforcements from France if there was not. Hard as were the conditions of this armistice, the archduke's troops were in a situation that made anything preferable to the continuance of hostilities. It was agreed unanimously at head-quarters that the armistice should be accepted, and it was signed by M. de Wimpfen in the name of the generalissimo, and by major-general Berthier in the name of Napoleon. The Austrian grand army had fought bravely, and, in spite of its misfortunes, it might say that it rather raised up the Austrian power than suffered it to fall, though painful

sacrifices must be made if peace was to be obtained from a victor justly elated with his advantages.

The armistice was signed at Znaïm on the 11th, at midnight, and was dated the 12th. After exchanging complimentary messages with archduke Charles, Napoleon set off for Schönbrunn, to use every means either to have peace or to end the war by a last brief and decisive effort. In the course of the month of August negotiations might have been concluded, or all the means might have been collected for recommencing, in September, a last campaign, which should put an end to the existence of the house of Austria. Napoleon therefore ordered fresh preparations, as though he had done nothing yet, and as though he had not victories to be turned to profit diplomatically, but defeats to repair.

In the first place, he distributed his troops between Vienna and the circle traced by the armistice, so that they had ample room, and yet could be rapidly concentrated on any one point of the circle. He stationed general Marmont at Krems, whence he could pass by St. Polten into Carinthia when he had to return to Dalmatia; marshal Massena at Znaïm, the scene of his late victory; marshal Davout at Brünn, the point towards which his march tended; the Saxons on the line on which they were already, between Marchegg and Presburg; prince Eugene on the Raab, where he had been victorious. General Grenier was also to occupy the Raab; general Macdonald, Grätz and Laybach. General Oudinot was to station himself with his own corps and the young guard on the plain of Vienna. The old guard bivouacked in the fine imperial residence of Schönbrunn. As one of the advantages of the armistice was to allow of employing July and August in bringing the Tyrol to submission, the whole Bavarian contingent was sent into German Tyrol, and prince Eugene's Italian troops were marched into Italian Tyrol. Fresh forces were sent into the Vorarlberg and Franconia.

Having a large proportion of young soldiers who might suffer in their health from a town life, and in their military spirit from the inactivity of an armistice, he ordered them to be encamped. The weather was fine, the country beautiful; wine, meat, and bread were in plenty. The contributions levied on the Austrian provinces, and payable either in paper or in kind, furnished means of payment for whatever was taken without ruining anybody, and burdening only the finances of the state. Workshops were established at Vienna, Lintz, Znaïm, Brünn, Presburg, and Grätz, to make clothes, shoes, linen, and clothing appurtenances, materials and workmanship being always paid for. In a month the army, well fed, clothed, rested, and trained, would be again in excellent condition. Its numbers, too, were to be augmented. A reinforcement of 30 thousand men was on its way from Strasburg. This was more than the losses of the campaign, particularly after the slightly wounded (those curable within three or four weeks) should have returned to the ranks. Napoleon gave orders for 50 thousand men in addition to these, so as to raise to the number of 250 thousand Frenchmen

and 50 thousand allies the army acting at the heart of the Austrian monarchy—a force double what Austria could raise on the most favourable hypothesis. To arrive at this result, Napoleon adopted a means singularly well adapted for recruiting the corps. Many regiments in the army wanted men, whereas in the depôts there was an abundance of conscripts, and even more than could be officered. Napoleon sent to their respective regiments under Davout, Marmont, and Massena, the soldiers of the third and fourth battalions that formed Puthod and Barbou's divisions and Oudinot's corps, and sent the officers to Strasburg to reconstruct their battalions with ready-drilled soldiers, and then return with them to the army. At the same time, they were to perform another service, by conducting to Strasburg 20 thousand prisoners, whom it was not thought advisable to leave in the isle of Lobau, lest hostilities should be renewed.

Napoleon, as we have often said, had created provisional demi-brigades with the fifth and fourth battalions of certain regiments which were in a more advanced state of organisation than the rest. He dissolved eleven of these demi-brigades, comprising at least 20 thousand men, who had orders to proceed to Strasburg, where they were to be used in reconstructing the fourth battalions. He made a fresh review of the depôts that had not draughted off all their men into the demi-brigades, and he required them all to furnish marching battalions, distinguished by the numbers of the regiments to which they belonged. On arriving at Ratisbon they would be conveyed thence to Vienna by the Danube. Napoleon moreover made a demand on Italy for 10 thousand men. He had not much need of additional cavalry soldiers, for, as usual, he had lost few men of that arm, but many horses, to replace which he established new horse-markets at Passau, Lintz, Vienna, and Raab. Lastly, satisfied with the services of the artillery, he resolved further to reinforce it, and to raise it from 550 to 700 guns, by augmenting, not the regimental artillery (a return to old practices which experience had not justified), but that of the several corps, and particularly that of the imperial guard. The latter had done excellent service at Wagram, where it counted for sixty pieces. He resolved to raise it to 120. Eighteen companies of artillery taken from the depôts—those of Italy especially—supplied the *personnel* of this augmentation. All the calibres were raised. The naval artillery was to relieve the land artillery in the guard of the coasts, and the companies of the latter were to take the places of those sent from the depôts to the army. The defensive works at Raab, Vienna, Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, were pushed forward with increased activity. The wounded were divided into three categories: those who had undergone amputation were sent to Strasburg; the severely wounded were distributed between Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, so that they might rejoin their regiments in two or three months; the slightly wounded were sent to each camp. By this arrangement the movements of the army were secured from any embarrassment in case hostilities were resumed.

Rewards were duly distributed, beginning as usual with the leaders of the army. General Oudinot, who had well replaced marshal Lannes at the head of the second corps; general Marmont, who had made a bold and judicious march from Dalmatia to the middle of Moravia; and general Macdonald, who had displayed throughout the Italian campaign profound experience in war, and the rarest intrepidity at Wagram, were named marshals. Presents were bestowed on the several corps, and especially on the wounded. One act of severity was mingled with these manifestations of gratitude and munificence. Marshal Bernadotte, who, through his own fault or that of his corps, had been unable to keep the post assigned to him between Wagram and Aderklaa, nevertheless published an order of the day addressed to the Saxons, in which he thanked them for their conduct on the 5th and 6th of July, and attributed to them, as it were, the winning of the battle. This manner of distributing to himself and his soldiers praises which he ought to have waited to receive from Napoleon, greatly offended the latter, because it offended the army and its leaders. To punish it, Napoleon wrote a most severe order of the day, which was communicated to the marshals only, but which was a sufficient reprimand for such an extravagance of vanity, for being addressed to rivals it was not probable it should remain secret.

Lastly, Napoleon went in person to visit his camps in Upper Austria, Moravia, and Hungary, knowing that, by such significant vigilance, he better insured the conclusion of a peace than by all the efforts of his negotiators. The town of Altenburg was appointed for their meeting place. Thus was the time employed during the armistice of Znaïm by that indefatigable genius, who comprehended everything except this simple truth, that the world was not so indefatigable as himself.

END OF VOL. X.

WHITING BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.



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on 10 February, 2016